mirror of
https://github.com/freemkv/freemkv-keysources.git
synced 2026-10-07 18:13:11 +00:00
Matthew Jackson
6e4f05dec4
Several tests asserted only key[0] (the first byte), which a byte-transposition bug could pass — assert the full 16-byte key everywhere, including a KAT that recomputes the expected VUK-derived keys directly. test_parse_disc_entry used identical all-zero placeholders for M/I/V/U, which couldn't catch a field mix-up; give each field a distinct byte pattern and assert every field. Docs: keydb-format.md claimed DiscEntry::title was genuinely unused dead code, but it's read by to_keydb_cfg and the redacting Debug impl — correct the comment to only list empty/find_vuk as truly unused. Also cross-reference the two independent MAX_KEYDB_BYTES constants (keydb.rs's decompression cap and keydb_format.rs's on-disk load cap) so they're kept in sync, and bump Cargo.lock's version metadata.
2162 lines
88 KiB
Rust
2162 lines
88 KiB
Rust
//! AACS Key Database parsing — KEYDB.cfg format.
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//!
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//! Byte-faithful copy of libfreemkv's `aacs::keydb` parser, relocated so the
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//! keydb.cfg format lives with the key sources that consume it. The parsing
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//! logic is identical; the only deviation is [`KeyDb::load`], which returns a
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//! standalone [`std::io::Result`] here instead of `libfreemkv::error::Result`
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//! (so the format crate carries no dependency on libfreemkv's error type).
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//
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// See docs/keydb-format.md — why the full parser API (incl. dead_code items) is retained.
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#![allow(dead_code)]
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use libfreemkv::aacs::types::{DeviceKey, HostCert};
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/// A keydb per-disc unit key: the CPS-unit number paired with its 16-byte key.
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pub type NumberedUnitKey = (u32, [u8; 16]);
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// Upper bound on the on-disk keydb.cfg size accepted by `KeyDb::load` (the
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// public UHD keydb is ~62 MiB; 128 MiB bounds a hostile/corrupt file).
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// Mirror of keydb.rs's MAX_KEYDB_BYTES decompression cap; keep them equal.
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const MAX_KEYDB_BYTES: u64 = 128 * 1024 * 1024;
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/// Upper bound on parsed disc entries. The real public keydb carries
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/// ~170k+ entries, so the cap sits well above that while still bounding
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/// memory against a pathological input. Surplus lines are ignored.
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const MAX_DISC_ENTRIES: usize = 500_000;
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/// Parsed AACS key database.
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///
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/// NO `#[derive(Debug)]`: see the hand-written redacting impl below. The
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/// derive dumped every processing key and all ~181k discs' key material into
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/// any `{:?}`.
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pub struct KeyDb {
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/// Device keys for MKB processing
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pub device_keys: Vec<DeviceKey>,
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/// Processing keys (pre-computed media keys for specific MKB versions)
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pub processing_keys: Vec<[u8; 16]>,
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/// Host certificate + private key for SCSI authentication, paired with the
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/// keydb's revocation metadata (libfreemkv's `HostCert` stays pure; the
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/// `Revoked in MKBv<N>` annotation is tracked in this crate).
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pub host_certs: Vec<KeydbHostCert>,
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/// Per-disc VUK entries indexed by disc hash (hex lowercase).
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///
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/// The key is `Arc<str>` and is the SAME allocation as the entry's own
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/// [`DiscEntry::disc_hash`] — the map used to own a second `String` clone
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/// of every hash, ~13 MB of pure duplication across the real keydb's 181k
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/// entries (and now that [`crate::KeydbSource`] caches the parsed db for
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/// the process lifetime, that duplication is resident, not transient).
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/// `Arc<str>: Borrow<str>`, so lookups still take a plain `&str`.
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pub disc_entries: HashMap<Arc<str>, DiscEntry>,
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}
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// Key material must never leak via `{:?}`; both types below carry raw AACS
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// key bytes. See docs/keydb-format.md for why these hand-write a redacting
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// `Debug` instead of deriving it. Pinned by `keydb_debug_is_redacted` / `disc_entry_debug_is_redacted`.
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impl std::fmt::Debug for KeyDb {
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fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
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f.debug_struct("KeyDb")
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.field("device_keys_len", &self.device_keys.len())
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.field("processing_keys_len", &self.processing_keys.len())
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.field("host_certs_len", &self.host_certs.len())
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.field("disc_entries_len", &self.disc_entries.len())
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.finish()
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}
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}
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impl std::fmt::Debug for DiscEntry {
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fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
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f.debug_struct("DiscEntry")
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.field("disc_hash", &self.disc_hash)
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.field("title", &self.title)
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.field("media_key", &self.media_key.map(|_| "<redacted>"))
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.field("vid", &self.vid.map(|_| "<redacted>"))
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.field("vuk", &self.vuk.map(|_| "<redacted>"))
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.field("unit_keys_len", &self.unit_keys.len())
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.field("mkb_version", &self.mkb_version)
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.field("volume_size", &self.volume_size)
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.field("is_uhd", &self.is_uhd)
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.finish()
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}
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}
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/// A keydb host certificate together with its revocation generation.
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///
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/// libfreemkv's [`HostCert`] is intentionally crypto-pure and carries no
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/// revocation state; the keydb's `; Revoked in MKBv<N>` comment is parsed
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/// here and stored alongside the cert so callers can filter by MKB generation
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/// without modifying the library type.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
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pub struct KeydbHostCert {
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/// The pure libfreemkv host certificate + private key(s).
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pub cert: HostCert,
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/// The MKB generation at which this host cert was revoked, parsed from a
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/// `; Revoked in MKBv<N>` comment. `None` when the cert carries no such
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/// annotation (treated as never-revoked).
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pub revoked_at_mkb: Option<u32>,
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}
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/// A per-disc entry from the key database.
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///
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/// NO `#[derive(Debug)]`: see the hand-written redacting impl above.
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct DiscEntry {
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/// Disc hash (20 bytes, hex). `Arc<str>` so the entry and the
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/// [`KeyDb::disc_entries`] key that points at it share ONE allocation
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/// instead of two.
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pub disc_hash: Arc<str>,
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/// Disc title
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pub title: String,
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/// Media Key (16 bytes) — from MKB processing
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pub media_key: Option<[u8; 16]>,
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/// Volume ID — the AACS VID (the keydb `I` token), 16 bytes. NOT the disc's
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/// identity (that's `disc_hash`); this is the per-disc Volume ID used to
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/// derive the VUK.
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pub vid: Option<[u8; 16]>,
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/// Volume Unique Key (16 bytes) — decrypts title keys
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pub vuk: Option<[u8; 16]>,
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/// Unit keys (title keys) indexed by CPS unit number
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pub unit_keys: Vec<NumberedUnitKey>,
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/// MKB version parsed from the trailing `; MKBv<N>` comment, if present.
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pub mkb_version: Option<u32>,
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/// Volume size in bytes parsed from `VolumeSize: <N>` in the comment.
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pub volume_size: Option<u64>,
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/// True if the comment contains the literal `(UHD)` flag.
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pub is_uhd: bool,
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}
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// Parse a hex string like "0xABCD..." into bytes. Operates on bytes, not
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// `&str` char boundaries: the keydb is third-party content, so a non-ASCII
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// scalar must not panic on a mid-codepoint slice. Non-hex byte -> `None`.
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pub(crate) fn parse_hex(s: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
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// The one workspace hex parser (strips an optional 0x/0X, byte-based).
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libfreemkv::hex::parse_hex_bytes(s)
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}
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// Read digits right after the first `marker` in `text`. Byte-based so
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// untrusted comment text never panics on a char boundary; skips whitespace
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// before the digits, serving both `MKBv<N>` and `VolumeSize: <N>`.
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fn parse_digits_after<T: std::str::FromStr>(text: &str, marker: &str) -> Option<T> {
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let bytes = text.as_bytes();
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let start = text.find(marker)? + marker.len();
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let mut i = start;
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// Skip any whitespace between the marker and the digits.
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while i < bytes.len() && bytes[i].is_ascii_whitespace() {
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i += 1;
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}
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let digit_start = i;
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while i < bytes.len() && bytes[i].is_ascii_digit() {
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i += 1;
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}
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if i == digit_start {
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return None;
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}
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// The digit run is pure ASCII, so this slice is a valid str.
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std::str::from_utf8(&bytes[digit_start..i])
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.ok()?
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.parse()
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.ok()
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}
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/// Parse the host-cert revocation generation from a `Revoked in MKBv<N>`
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/// comment on a `| HC |`/`| HC2 |` line. `None` when absent.
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fn parse_revoked_at_mkb(line: &str) -> Option<u32> {
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parse_digits_after(line, "Revoked in MKBv")
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}
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/// Parse hex into a fixed-size array.
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pub(crate) fn parse_hex16(s: &str) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
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libfreemkv::hex::parse_hex_fixed::<16>(s)
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}
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pub(crate) fn parse_hex20(s: &str) -> Option<[u8; 20]> {
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libfreemkv::hex::parse_hex_fixed::<20>(s)
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}
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// What `KeyDb::parse` threw away, by reason. See docs/keydb-format.md — why
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// this counter exists (silent corruption on a third-party keydb) and why
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// it's logged once per parse rather than per-line.
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#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub(crate) struct ParseStats {
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/// `| DK` rows that parsed as neither a positioned nor an orphan device key.
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pub dk_rejected: usize,
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/// `| PK` rows whose key field did not yield 16 bytes.
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pub pk_rejected: usize,
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/// `| HC` rows rejected (bad hex, short cert, missing field).
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pub hc_rejected: usize,
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/// `| HC2` rows rejected (bad hex, wrong priv length, short cert).
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pub hc2_rejected: usize,
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/// `0x… = …` disc rows the field parser refused outright.
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pub disc_rejected: usize,
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/// Disc rows dropped because [`MAX_DISC_ENTRIES`] was already reached.
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pub disc_over_cap: usize,
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/// Disc rows that REPLACED an earlier row with the same hash (last wins).
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/// Not necessarily corruption, but never something to discover silently:
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/// a duplicated hash means one of the two rows' keys is now unreachable.
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pub disc_duplicate: usize,
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}
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impl ParseStats {
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/// Total rows the parser refused. Excludes duplicates, which were parsed
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/// successfully and merely overwrote a sibling.
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fn rejected(&self) -> usize {
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self.dk_rejected
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+ self.pk_rejected
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+ self.hc_rejected
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+ self.hc2_rejected
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+ self.disc_rejected
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+ self.disc_over_cap
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}
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// Emit the one summary line, if there is anything to say; returns whether
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// it fired (tests use this). `pub(crate)` so `KeydbSource` can re-emit it
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// on a cache hit too, keeping the warning from going silent forever.
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pub(crate) fn log(&self) -> bool {
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if self.rejected() == 0 && self.disc_duplicate == 0 {
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return false;
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}
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tracing::warn!(
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target: "freemkv::keysource",
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dk_rejected = self.dk_rejected,
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pk_rejected = self.pk_rejected,
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hc_rejected = self.hc_rejected,
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hc2_rejected = self.hc2_rejected,
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disc_rejected = self.disc_rejected,
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disc_over_cap = self.disc_over_cap,
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disc_duplicate = self.disc_duplicate,
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"keydb.cfg lines were rejected while parsing; the file may be truncated or corrupt (keys past the damage will not resolve)"
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);
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true
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}
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}
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// True when `line` opens a per-disc row. Matches `0x`/`0X` case-insensitively
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// (like `parse_hex`) so an uppercase row isn't silently dropped. Shared with
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// `KeydbSource::save`, whose entry count must match what this parser accepts.
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pub(crate) fn is_disc_entry_line(line: &str) -> bool {
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(line.starts_with("0x") || line.starts_with("0X")) && line.contains(" = ")
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}
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impl KeyDb {
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/// Construct an empty KeyDb. Used by unit tests; production code
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/// reaches a populated KeyDb via [`KeyDb::load`] or [`KeyDb::parse`].
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pub fn empty() -> Self {
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KeyDb {
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device_keys: Vec::new(),
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processing_keys: Vec::new(),
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host_certs: Vec::new(),
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disc_entries: HashMap::new(),
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}
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}
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/// Parse a KEYDB.cfg file from a string.
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///
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/// Lines the parser cannot use are counted and summarised in ONE
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/// `tracing::warn!` (see [`ParseStats`]) — they are never dropped silently.
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pub fn parse(data: &str) -> Self {
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let (db, stats) = Self::parse_counted(data);
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stats.log();
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db
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}
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/// [`Self::parse`] without the log — the seam the rejection-counting tests
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/// assert on (a `tracing` subscriber would be the only other way to observe
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/// a count, and the count is the thing under test, not its formatting).
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pub(crate) fn parse_counted(data: &str) -> (Self, ParseStats) {
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let mut stats = ParseStats::default();
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let mut db = KeyDb {
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device_keys: Vec::new(),
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processing_keys: Vec::new(),
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host_certs: Vec::new(),
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disc_entries: HashMap::new(),
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};
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for line in data.lines() {
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let line = line.trim();
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// Skip comments and empty lines
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if line.is_empty() || line.starts_with(';') || line.starts_with('#') {
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continue;
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}
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// Device Key: positioned rows -> `device_keys` (tree walk); orphan
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// rows (no position fields) -> `processing_keys` (brute walker).
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// Per AACS a "PK" IS a DK at terminal position, so both are DKs here.
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if line.starts_with("| DK") {
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if let Some(dk) = Self::parse_device_key(line) {
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db.device_keys.push(dk);
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} else if let Some(key) = Self::parse_orphan_dk(line) {
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db.processing_keys.push(key);
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} else {
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stats.dk_rejected += 1;
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}
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continue;
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}
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// Processing Key
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if line.starts_with("| PK") {
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if let Some(pk) = Self::parse_processing_key(line) {
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db.processing_keys.push(pk);
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} else {
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stats.pk_rejected += 1;
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}
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continue;
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}
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// Host Certificate (AACS 2.0). Normally augments the preceding HC
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// (AACS 1.0) row, but an HC2 row may appear first (third-party line
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// ordering); then it's carried on a fresh HostCert with an empty v1 cert.
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if line.starts_with("| HC2") {
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if let Some((pk, cert, revoked_at_mkb)) = Self::parse_host_cert_v2(line) {
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if let Some(hc) = db.host_certs.last_mut() {
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hc.cert.private_key_v2 = Some(pk);
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hc.cert.certificate_v2 = Some(cert);
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// The revocation annotation can live on the HC2 line
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// instead of the HC line; carry it onto the combined
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// cert if the HC line had none, so it isn't lost.
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if hc.revoked_at_mkb.is_none() {
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hc.revoked_at_mkb = revoked_at_mkb;
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}
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} else {
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db.host_certs.push(KeydbHostCert {
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cert: HostCert {
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private_key: [0u8; 20],
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certificate: Vec::new(),
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private_key_v2: Some(pk),
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certificate_v2: Some(cert),
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},
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revoked_at_mkb,
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});
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}
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} else {
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stats.hc2_rejected += 1;
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}
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continue;
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}
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// Host Certificate (AACS 1.0)
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if line.starts_with("| HC") {
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if let Some(hc) = Self::parse_host_cert(line) {
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db.host_certs.push(hc);
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} else {
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stats.hc_rejected += 1;
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}
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continue;
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}
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// Disc entry: starts with 0x / 0X (see `is_disc_entry_line`).
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if is_disc_entry_line(line) {
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// The cap is a memory bound against a pathological file, but
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// hitting it means real discs are being dropped — count it, the
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// way `load`'s size/UTF-8 caps produce a diagnostic.
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if db.disc_entries.len() >= MAX_DISC_ENTRIES {
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stats.disc_over_cap += 1;
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continue;
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}
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match Self::parse_disc_entry(line) {
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// The map key IS the entry's own `disc_hash` allocation
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// (`Arc` clone, no second copy of the string).
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Some(entry) => {
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if db
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.disc_entries
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.insert(entry.disc_hash.clone(), entry)
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.is_some()
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{
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stats.disc_duplicate += 1;
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}
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}
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None => stats.disc_rejected += 1,
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}
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}
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}
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(db, stats)
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}
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/// Load a KEYDB.cfg from disk.
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///
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/// A read failure (missing/unreadable file, non-UTF-8 content) surfaces
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/// as an [`std::io::Error`] (the cap-exceeded case as
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/// [`std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData`]). Note that [`Self::parse`] itself
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/// is lenient: a syntactically valid but key-less file parses to an empty
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/// [`KeyDb`] rather than an error — callers needing a non-empty db must
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/// check the parsed contents.
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pub fn load(path: &std::path::Path) -> std::io::Result<Self> {
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let (db, stats) = Self::load_counted(std::fs::File::open(path)?, path)?;
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stats.log();
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Ok(db)
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}
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// `Self::load` from an ALREADY-OPEN file, without the log. See
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// docs/keydb-format.md — why the same descriptor must supply both the
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// identity stamp and the bytes, and why rejection counts are retained here.
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pub(crate) fn load_counted(
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f: std::fs::File,
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path: &std::path::Path,
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) -> std::io::Result<(Self, ParseStats)> {
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// Read through a hard `take` cap rather than trusting a stat: a
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// `metadata` pre-check reports len 0 for a FIFO/char device (e.g. would
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// read `/dev/zero` forever). One byte past cap matches `read_capped_to_string`.
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use std::io::Read;
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let mut buf = Vec::new();
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f.take(MAX_KEYDB_BYTES + 1).read_to_end(&mut buf)?;
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if buf.len() as u64 > MAX_KEYDB_BYTES {
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return Err(std::io::Error::new(
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std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
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format!(
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"keydb.cfg exceeds {MAX_KEYDB_BYTES} byte cap: {}",
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path.display()
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),
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));
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}
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let data = String::from_utf8(buf).map_err(|_| {
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std::io::Error::new(
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std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
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format!("keydb.cfg is not valid UTF-8: {}", path.display()),
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)
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})?;
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Ok(Self::parse_counted(&data))
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}
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|
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/// Look up a disc by its hash. Returns the VUK if found.
|
|
pub fn find_vuk(&self, disc_hash: &str) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
|
|
let hash = disc_hash
|
|
.trim()
|
|
.to_lowercase()
|
|
.trim_start_matches("0x")
|
|
.to_string();
|
|
// Try with 0x prefix and without; every stored key currently carries
|
|
// the prefix, so the no-prefix fallback is a defensive match kept for
|
|
// the prefix-agnostic lookup contract.
|
|
self.disc_entries
|
|
.get(format!("0x{hash}").as_str())
|
|
.or_else(|| self.disc_entries.get(hash.as_str()))
|
|
.and_then(|e| e.vuk)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Look up a disc by its hash. Returns the full entry.
|
|
pub fn find_disc(&self, disc_hash: &str) -> Option<&DiscEntry> {
|
|
let hash = disc_hash
|
|
.trim()
|
|
.to_lowercase()
|
|
.trim_start_matches("0x")
|
|
.to_string();
|
|
// No-prefix fallback below (every stored key carries "0x", see
|
|
// find_vuk); kept as a defensive match for the lookup contract.
|
|
self.disc_entries
|
|
.get(format!("0x{hash}").as_str())
|
|
.or_else(|| self.disc_entries.get(hash.as_str()))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Iterate every disc entry. Used by Path 3 (scan for matching VID).
|
|
pub fn iter_disc_entries(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &DiscEntry> {
|
|
self.disc_entries.values()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// The host certs usable at MKB generation `mkb`.
|
|
///
|
|
/// A cert annotated `Revoked in MKBv<R>` is unusable once the disc's MKB
|
|
/// generation reaches `R` (an AACS MKB revokes a cert from its own
|
|
/// generation onward), so it is included only while `gen < R`. When `mkb`
|
|
/// is `None` the disc's generation is unknown and cannot be filtered, so
|
|
/// every cert is returned; certs with no revocation annotation are always
|
|
/// returned.
|
|
pub fn host_certs(&self, mkb: Option<u32>) -> Vec<HostCert> {
|
|
self.host_certs
|
|
.iter()
|
|
.filter(|hc| match (hc.revoked_at_mkb, mkb) {
|
|
(None, _) => true,
|
|
(Some(_), None) => true,
|
|
(Some(revoked), Some(disc_gen)) => disc_gen < revoked,
|
|
})
|
|
.map(|hc| hc.cert.clone())
|
|
.collect()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Standalone keydb accessor: the disc's Volume ID (the keydb `I` token),
|
|
/// looked up by the same disc-hash form [`Self::find_disc`] accepts. Pure
|
|
/// file lookup; no crypto/derivation.
|
|
pub fn get_vid(&self, disc_hash: &str) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
|
|
self.find_disc(disc_hash).and_then(|e| e.vid)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Standalone keydb accessor: the disc's stored unit (title) keys, cloned.
|
|
/// Empty when the disc is absent or carries no unit keys. Pure file lookup.
|
|
pub fn get_uk(&self, disc_hash: &str) -> Vec<NumberedUnitKey> {
|
|
self.find_disc(disc_hash)
|
|
.map(|e| e.unit_keys.clone())
|
|
.unwrap_or_default()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Standalone keydb accessor: `(disc_hash, unit_keys)` for every disc entry
|
|
/// that carries at least one unit key. Pure file lookup.
|
|
pub fn get_uks(&self) -> Vec<(String, Vec<NumberedUnitKey>)> {
|
|
self.disc_entries
|
|
.values()
|
|
.filter(|e| !e.unit_keys.is_empty())
|
|
.map(|e| (e.disc_hash.to_string(), e.unit_keys.clone()))
|
|
.collect()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Serialize back to keydb.cfg text — the INVERSE of [`Self::parse`], so the
|
|
/// keydb wire format lives in ONE place (parse + emit together). Emits, in a
|
|
/// deterministic order: host certs, device keys, processing keys, then one
|
|
/// line per disc entry (sorted by hash). `parse(to_keydb_cfg(kd))` reproduces
|
|
/// every field (see `round_trips_through_parse`). Used by the key-import tool
|
|
/// to export a complete keydb.cfg (keys + host certs + VIDs).
|
|
///
|
|
/// See docs/keydb-format.md for why the trailing `; <comment>` is only
|
|
/// emitted after a `U` (unit-keys) field.
|
|
pub fn to_keydb_cfg(&self) -> String {
|
|
fn hx(b: &[u8]) -> String {
|
|
use std::fmt::Write;
|
|
let mut s = String::with_capacity(b.len() * 2);
|
|
for x in b {
|
|
let _ = write!(s, "{x:02x}");
|
|
}
|
|
s
|
|
}
|
|
let mut out = String::new();
|
|
|
|
// Host certs (AACS 1.0): | HC | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x.. | HOST_CERT 0x.. ; Revoked in MKBv<N>
|
|
// AACS 2.0 credentials ride a sibling `| HC2 |` line; emit it too so a
|
|
// round-trip through `to_keydb_cfg` never silently drops v2 host certs.
|
|
for hc in &self.host_certs {
|
|
out.push_str("| HC | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x");
|
|
out.push_str(&hx(&hc.cert.private_key));
|
|
out.push_str(" | HOST_CERT 0x");
|
|
out.push_str(&hx(&hc.cert.certificate));
|
|
if let Some(n) = hc.revoked_at_mkb {
|
|
out.push_str(" ; Revoked in MKBv");
|
|
out.push_str(&n.to_string());
|
|
}
|
|
out.push('\n');
|
|
// AACS 2.0 (HC2): inverse of `parse_host_cert_v2`.
|
|
if let (Some(pk2), Some(cert2)) = (
|
|
hc.cert.private_key_v2.as_ref(),
|
|
hc.cert.certificate_v2.as_ref(),
|
|
) {
|
|
out.push_str("| HC2 | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x");
|
|
out.push_str(&hx(pk2));
|
|
out.push_str(" | HOST_CERT 0x");
|
|
out.push_str(&hx(cert2));
|
|
out.push('\n');
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Device keys: | DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x.. | DEVICE_NODE 0x.. | KEY_UV 0x.. | KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT 0x..
|
|
for dk in &self.device_keys {
|
|
out.push_str("| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x");
|
|
out.push_str(&hx(&dk.key));
|
|
out.push_str(&format!(
|
|
" | DEVICE_NODE 0x{:04x} | KEY_UV 0x{:08x} | KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT 0x{:02x}\n",
|
|
dk.node, dk.uv, dk.u_mask_shift
|
|
));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Processing keys: | PK | 0x..
|
|
for pk in &self.processing_keys {
|
|
out.push_str("| PK | 0x");
|
|
out.push_str(&hx(pk));
|
|
out.push('\n');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Per-disc entries, sorted by hash for a deterministic, diff-friendly file.
|
|
let mut hashes: Vec<&Arc<str>> = self.disc_entries.keys().collect();
|
|
hashes.sort();
|
|
for h in hashes {
|
|
let d = &self.disc_entries[&**h];
|
|
// `parse` keeps the `hash_part` verbatim, so the stored `disc_hash`
|
|
// already carries its `0x` prefix — emit it as-is (prefixing another
|
|
// `0x` would double it on re-parse).
|
|
out.push_str(h);
|
|
out.push_str(" = ");
|
|
// Parse stores the title VERBATIM (parens and all), so emitting it
|
|
// bare round-trips through parse. Empty → "Unknown".
|
|
if d.title.is_empty() {
|
|
out.push_str("Unknown");
|
|
} else {
|
|
out.push_str(&d.title);
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(mk) = d.media_key {
|
|
out.push_str(" | M | 0x");
|
|
out.push_str(&hx(&mk));
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(id) = d.vid {
|
|
out.push_str(" | I | 0x");
|
|
out.push_str(&hx(&id));
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(vuk) = d.vuk {
|
|
out.push_str(" | V | 0x");
|
|
out.push_str(&hx(&vuk));
|
|
}
|
|
if !d.unit_keys.is_empty() {
|
|
out.push_str(" | U |");
|
|
for (n, k) in &d.unit_keys {
|
|
out.push_str(&format!(" {}-0x{}", n, hx(k)));
|
|
}
|
|
// Comment only after U (the one ;-split field) so it can't corrupt
|
|
// a preceding hex value on re-parse.
|
|
if d.mkb_version.is_some() || d.volume_size.is_some() || d.is_uhd {
|
|
out.push_str(" ;");
|
|
if let Some(v) = d.mkb_version {
|
|
out.push_str(&format!(" MKBv{v}"));
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(sz) = d.volume_size {
|
|
out.push_str(&format!(" VolumeSize: {sz}"));
|
|
}
|
|
if d.is_uhd {
|
|
out.push_str(" (UHD)");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
out.push('\n');
|
|
}
|
|
out
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Private parsers (re-open the inherent impl) ─────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
impl KeyDb {
|
|
fn parse_device_key(line: &str) -> Option<DeviceKey> {
|
|
// | DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x... | DEVICE_NODE 0x... | KEY_UV 0x... | KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT 0x...
|
|
let key_str = line.split("DEVICE_KEY").nth(1)?.split('|').next()?.trim();
|
|
let node_str = line.split("DEVICE_NODE").nth(1)?.split('|').next()?.trim();
|
|
let uv_str = line.split("KEY_UV").nth(1)?.split('|').next()?.trim();
|
|
let shift_str = line
|
|
.split("KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT")
|
|
.nth(1)?
|
|
.split(';')
|
|
.next()?
|
|
.split('|')
|
|
.next()?
|
|
.trim();
|
|
|
|
Some(DeviceKey {
|
|
key: parse_hex16(key_str)?,
|
|
// Canonical hex parsers (one prefix/case rule for the whole workspace)
|
|
// — NOT an ad-hoc `from_str_radix(trim_start_matches("0x"))`, whose
|
|
// case-sensitive strip silently dropped an uppercase-`0X` value.
|
|
node: libfreemkv::hex::parse_hex_u16(node_str)?,
|
|
uv: libfreemkv::hex::parse_hex_u32(uv_str)?,
|
|
u_mask_shift: libfreemkv::hex::parse_hex_u8(shift_str)?,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn parse_processing_key(line: &str) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
|
|
// | PK | 0x...
|
|
let parts: Vec<&str> = line.split('|').collect();
|
|
if parts.len() >= 3 {
|
|
let key_str = parts[2].split(';').next()?.trim();
|
|
return parse_hex16(key_str);
|
|
}
|
|
None
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Parse an orphan DK row: `| DK |` with only `DEVICE_KEY` (no position
|
|
// metadata), treated as terminal/unpositioned by the brute walker. `None`
|
|
// if a position field is present — those are positioned DKs (`parse_device_key`).
|
|
fn parse_orphan_dk(line: &str) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
|
|
if line.contains("DEVICE_NODE")
|
|
|| line.contains("KEY_UV")
|
|
|| line.contains("KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT")
|
|
{
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
let key_str = line
|
|
.split("DEVICE_KEY")
|
|
.nth(1)?
|
|
.split('|')
|
|
.next()?
|
|
.split(';')
|
|
.next()?
|
|
.trim();
|
|
parse_hex16(key_str)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn parse_host_cert(line: &str) -> Option<KeydbHostCert> {
|
|
// | HC | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x... | HOST_CERT 0x... ; Revoked in MKBv<N>
|
|
let priv_str = line
|
|
.split("HOST_PRIV_KEY")
|
|
.nth(1)?
|
|
.split('|')
|
|
.next()?
|
|
.trim();
|
|
let cert_str = line
|
|
.split("HOST_CERT")
|
|
.nth(1)?
|
|
.split(';')
|
|
.next()?
|
|
.split('|')
|
|
.next()?
|
|
.trim();
|
|
|
|
let certificate = parse_hex(cert_str)?;
|
|
// AACS 1.0 host certs are 92 bytes; drop malformed/short rows at
|
|
// parse time so the handshake never attempts junk (mirrors the v2
|
|
// path, which enforces >= 132).
|
|
if certificate.len() < 92 {
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Some(KeydbHostCert {
|
|
cert: HostCert {
|
|
private_key: parse_hex20(priv_str)?,
|
|
certificate,
|
|
private_key_v2: None,
|
|
certificate_v2: None,
|
|
},
|
|
revoked_at_mkb: parse_revoked_at_mkb(line),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Parse AACS 2.0 host cert: `| HC2 | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x... | HOST_CERT 0x...`
|
|
/// Returns the private key, the cert bytes, and the `Revoked in MKBv<N>`
|
|
/// generation (if the line carries that comment).
|
|
fn parse_host_cert_v2(line: &str) -> Option<([u8; 32], Vec<u8>, Option<u32>)> {
|
|
let priv_str = line
|
|
.split("HOST_PRIV_KEY")
|
|
.nth(1)?
|
|
.split('|')
|
|
.next()?
|
|
.trim();
|
|
let cert_str = line
|
|
.split("HOST_CERT")
|
|
.nth(1)?
|
|
.split(';')
|
|
.next()?
|
|
.split('|')
|
|
.next()?
|
|
.trim();
|
|
|
|
let priv_bytes = parse_hex(priv_str)?;
|
|
if priv_bytes.len() != 32 {
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
let mut pk = [0u8; 32];
|
|
pk.copy_from_slice(&priv_bytes);
|
|
|
|
let cert = parse_hex(cert_str)?;
|
|
if cert.len() < 132 {
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Some((pk, cert, parse_revoked_at_mkb(line)))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn parse_disc_entry(line: &str) -> Option<DiscEntry> {
|
|
// 0x<hash> = <title> | D | <date> | M | 0x<mk> | I | 0x<id> | V | 0x<vuk> | U | <unit_keys> ; <comment>
|
|
let (hash_part, rest) = line.split_once(" = ")?;
|
|
let disc_hash: Arc<str> = Arc::from(hash_part.trim().to_lowercase());
|
|
|
|
// The trailing `;` comment (e.g. "; MKBv76/BEE/FindVUK 1.74 -
|
|
// VolumeSize: 81309007872 (UHD)") carries metadata the key fields
|
|
// don't; capture everything after the FIRST ';' on the line.
|
|
let comment = line.split_once(';').map(|(_, c)| c).unwrap_or("");
|
|
let mkb_version: Option<u32> = parse_digits_after(comment, "MKBv");
|
|
let volume_size: Option<u64> = parse_digits_after(comment, "VolumeSize:");
|
|
let is_uhd = comment.contains("(UHD)");
|
|
|
|
// Title kept VERBATIM (trimmed), a faithful copy for exact round-trip.
|
|
// See docs/keydb-format.md — why display prettification does NOT belong here.
|
|
let before_fields = rest.split(" | ").next().unwrap_or("");
|
|
// A title-only entry (no key fields) carries its `;` comment on the same
|
|
// chunk — strip it so the comment doesn't leak into the title.
|
|
let title = before_fields
|
|
.split(';')
|
|
.next()
|
|
.unwrap_or("")
|
|
.trim()
|
|
.to_string();
|
|
|
|
// Parse fields by tag
|
|
let mut media_key = None;
|
|
let mut vid = None;
|
|
let mut vuk = None;
|
|
let mut unit_keys = Vec::new();
|
|
|
|
let parts: Vec<&str> = rest.split(" | ").collect();
|
|
// Field scan starts at index 1: `parts[0]` is ALWAYS the title chunk;
|
|
// excluding it stops a title matching a field-tag letter ("M"/"I"/"V"/
|
|
// "U"/"D") from being eaten as a tag and shadowing the real field.
|
|
let mut i = 1;
|
|
while i < parts.len() {
|
|
match parts[i].trim() {
|
|
// M/I/V strip a trailing `; comment` before hex-parsing (like the
|
|
// U arm below): when one of these is the row's LAST field, the
|
|
// comment gets glued on and parse_hex16 would otherwise fail.
|
|
"M" => {
|
|
if i + 1 < parts.len() {
|
|
media_key =
|
|
parse_hex16(parts[i + 1].split(';').next().unwrap_or("").trim());
|
|
i += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
"I" => {
|
|
if i + 1 < parts.len() {
|
|
vid = parse_hex16(parts[i + 1].split(';').next().unwrap_or("").trim());
|
|
i += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
"V" => {
|
|
if i + 1 < parts.len() {
|
|
vuk = parse_hex16(parts[i + 1].split(';').next().unwrap_or("").trim());
|
|
i += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
"U" if i + 1 < parts.len() => {
|
|
// Unit keys: "1-0xKEY" or "1-0xKEY ; comment"
|
|
let uk_str = parts[i + 1].split(';').next().unwrap_or("").trim();
|
|
for uk in uk_str.split(' ') {
|
|
let uk = uk.trim();
|
|
if let Some((num, key)) = uk.split_once('-')
|
|
&& let Ok(n) = num.parse::<u32>()
|
|
&& let Some(k) = parse_hex16(key)
|
|
{
|
|
unit_keys.push((n, k));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
i += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
_ => {}
|
|
}
|
|
i += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Some(DiscEntry {
|
|
disc_hash,
|
|
title,
|
|
media_key,
|
|
vid,
|
|
vuk,
|
|
unit_keys,
|
|
mkb_version,
|
|
volume_size,
|
|
is_uhd,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tests {
|
|
use super::*;
|
|
|
|
// `load` must enforce `MAX_KEYDB_BYTES` through a bounded read, not a stat
|
|
// (a prior metadata-based cap was skippable via a FIFO/char device
|
|
// reporting len 0). Asserts both edges of the boundary.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn load_enforces_the_size_cap_at_both_edges() {
|
|
let dir = std::env::temp_dir()
|
|
.join("fmkv-keydb-cap")
|
|
.join(format!("{}", std::process::id()));
|
|
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// Exactly at the cap is accepted. Use a comment line so `parse` is happy
|
|
// and the content is valid UTF-8 of a known length.
|
|
let at = dir.join("at_cap.cfg");
|
|
let body = vec![b'#'; MAX_KEYDB_BYTES as usize];
|
|
std::fs::write(&at, &body).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(
|
|
KeyDb::load(&at).is_ok(),
|
|
"a file exactly at MAX_KEYDB_BYTES must load"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// One byte over is rejected as InvalidData, not truncated and not OOM.
|
|
let over = dir.join("over_cap.cfg");
|
|
let mut body = vec![b'#'; MAX_KEYDB_BYTES as usize];
|
|
body.push(b'#');
|
|
std::fs::write(&over, &body).unwrap();
|
|
let err = KeyDb::load(&over).expect_err("over-cap file must be rejected");
|
|
assert_eq!(err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData);
|
|
|
|
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// `to_keydb_cfg` is the exact inverse of `parse`: parse a known line set,
|
|
// serialize, re-parse, and every field survives (keys, host cert, and the
|
|
// MKBv/UHD comment metadata).
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn to_keydb_cfg_round_trips_through_parse() {
|
|
let h = |b: u8, n: usize| format!("{b:02x}").repeat(n);
|
|
let cert = h(0x99, 92); // AACS 1.0 host cert is 92 bytes
|
|
let src = format!(
|
|
"| HC | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x{priv20} | HOST_CERT 0x{cert} ; Revoked in MKBv72\n\
|
|
| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x{k16} | DEVICE_NODE 0x0a00 | KEY_UV 0x00000e23 | KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT 0x0b\n\
|
|
| PK | 0x{pk16}\n\
|
|
0x{hash20} = TestDisc | M | 0x{mk16} | I | 0x{id16} | V | 0x{vuk16} | U | 1-0x{u1} 2-0x{u2} ; MKBv76 VolumeSize: 81309007872 (UHD)\n",
|
|
hash20 = h(0xab, 20),
|
|
priv20 = h(0x88, 20),
|
|
cert = cert,
|
|
k16 = h(0x66, 16),
|
|
pk16 = h(0x77, 16),
|
|
mk16 = h(0x11, 16),
|
|
id16 = h(0x22, 16),
|
|
vuk16 = h(0x33, 16),
|
|
u1 = h(0x44, 16),
|
|
u2 = h(0x55, 16),
|
|
);
|
|
let a = KeyDb::parse(&src);
|
|
let b = KeyDb::parse(&a.to_keydb_cfg());
|
|
|
|
// Per-disc entry: every field round-trips.
|
|
assert_eq!(a.disc_entries.len(), 1);
|
|
assert_eq!(b.disc_entries.len(), 1);
|
|
let ea = a.disc_entries.values().next().unwrap();
|
|
let eb = b.disc_entries.values().next().unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(ea.disc_hash, eb.disc_hash);
|
|
assert_eq!(ea.title, eb.title, "title");
|
|
assert_eq!(ea.media_key, eb.media_key, "M");
|
|
assert_eq!(ea.vid, eb.vid, "I/vid");
|
|
assert_eq!(ea.vuk, eb.vuk, "V");
|
|
assert_eq!(ea.unit_keys, eb.unit_keys, "U");
|
|
assert_eq!(ea.mkb_version, eb.mkb_version, "MKBv");
|
|
assert_eq!(ea.is_uhd, eb.is_uhd, "UHD");
|
|
// Concrete values (not just self-consistency).
|
|
assert_eq!(ea.vid, Some([0x22u8; 16]));
|
|
assert_eq!(ea.vuk, Some([0x33u8; 16]));
|
|
assert_eq!(ea.unit_keys, vec![(1, [0x44u8; 16]), (2, [0x55u8; 16])]);
|
|
assert_eq!(ea.mkb_version, Some(76));
|
|
assert!(ea.is_uhd);
|
|
|
|
// Device key, processing key, host cert all survive byte-for-byte.
|
|
assert_eq!(a.device_keys.len(), b.device_keys.len());
|
|
assert_eq!(a.device_keys[0].key, b.device_keys[0].key);
|
|
assert_eq!(a.device_keys[0].node, b.device_keys[0].node);
|
|
assert_eq!(a.device_keys[0].uv, b.device_keys[0].uv);
|
|
assert_eq!(a.device_keys[0].u_mask_shift, b.device_keys[0].u_mask_shift);
|
|
assert_eq!(a.processing_keys, b.processing_keys);
|
|
assert_eq!(a.host_certs.len(), 1);
|
|
assert_eq!(b.host_certs.len(), 1);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
a.host_certs[0].cert.private_key,
|
|
b.host_certs[0].cert.private_key
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
a.host_certs[0].cert.certificate,
|
|
b.host_certs[0].cert.certificate
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
a.host_certs[0].revoked_at_mkb,
|
|
b.host_certs[0].revoked_at_mkb
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(b.host_certs[0].revoked_at_mkb, Some(72));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// REAL-DATA IDEMPOTENCE: parse → serialize (S1) → parse → serialize (S2);
|
|
// S1 must equal S2 byte-for-byte. REQUIRES a real keydb (KEYDB_PATH env);
|
|
// `#[ignore]` by default. See docs/keydb-format.md.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
#[ignore = "needs a real keydb.cfg: KEYDB_PATH=<path> cargo test -- --ignored"]
|
|
fn to_keydb_cfg_is_idempotent_on_real_keydb() {
|
|
let path = real_keydb_path();
|
|
let db1 = KeyDb::load(&path).unwrap();
|
|
let s1 = db1.to_keydb_cfg();
|
|
let db2 = KeyDb::parse(&s1);
|
|
let s2 = db2.to_keydb_cfg();
|
|
assert_eq!(s1.len(), s2.len(), "serialized byte length drifted");
|
|
assert!(s1 == s2, "to_keydb_cfg is NOT idempotent (S1 != S2)");
|
|
// No rows lost crossing the round trip.
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
db1.disc_entries.len(),
|
|
db2.disc_entries.len(),
|
|
"disc-entry count drift"
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(db1.device_keys.len(), db2.device_keys.len(), "DK drift");
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
db1.processing_keys.len(),
|
|
db2.processing_keys.len(),
|
|
"PK drift"
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(db1.host_certs.len(), db2.host_certs.len(), "HC drift");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// REAL-SCALE parser health: a genuine published keydb must parse with ZERO
|
|
// rejected rows — the assertion the rejection counter exists to make
|
|
// possible. `#[ignore]` by default; run with KEYDB_PATH set.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
#[ignore = "needs a real keydb.cfg: KEYDB_PATH=<path> cargo test -- --ignored"]
|
|
fn a_real_keydb_parses_with_no_rejected_rows() {
|
|
let path = real_keydb_path();
|
|
let text = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).expect("keydb must be readable");
|
|
let (db, stats) = KeyDb::parse_counted(&text);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
db.disc_entries.len() > 170_000,
|
|
"expected a full-size keydb, got {} entries",
|
|
db.disc_entries.len()
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
stats.rejected(),
|
|
0,
|
|
"a healthy keydb must not lose rows to the parser: {stats:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
stats.disc_duplicate, 0,
|
|
"duplicate disc hashes make one row's keys unreachable: {stats:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Get KEYDB path from KEYDB_PATH environment variable. Returns None if not set or not found.
|
|
fn keydb_path() -> Option<std::path::PathBuf> {
|
|
let path = std::path::PathBuf::from(std::env::var("KEYDB_PATH").ok()?);
|
|
if path.exists() { Some(path) } else { None }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The real keydb for the `#[ignore]`d real-scale tests, or a LOUD failure.
|
|
// See docs/keydb-format.md — why silent `return` on a missing fixture is
|
|
// wrong here.
|
|
fn real_keydb_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {
|
|
keydb_path().expect(
|
|
"KEYDB_PATH must point at a real keydb.cfg; run: \
|
|
KEYDB_PATH=/path/to/keydb.cfg cargo test --release -- --ignored",
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_parse_disc_entry() {
|
|
// Synthetic placeholders, DISTINCT per field so a field mix-up (M read
|
|
// as V, I as U, …) is caught — no real key material in code.
|
|
let z40 = "00".repeat(20);
|
|
let mk = "11".repeat(16);
|
|
let id = "22".repeat(16);
|
|
let vuk = "33".repeat(16);
|
|
let uk = "44".repeat(16);
|
|
let line = format!(
|
|
"0x{z40} = SAMPLE_FILM (Sample Film) | D | 2024-01-01 | M | 0x{mk} | I | 0x{id} | V | 0x{vuk} | U | 1-0x{uk} ; MKBv77"
|
|
);
|
|
let entry = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(entry.title, "SAMPLE_FILM (Sample Film)"); // faithful, verbatim
|
|
assert_eq!(entry.media_key, Some([0x11u8; 16]), "M field");
|
|
assert_eq!(entry.vid, Some([0x22u8; 16]), "I field");
|
|
assert_eq!(entry.vuk, Some([0x33u8; 16]), "V field");
|
|
assert_eq!(entry.unit_keys, vec![(1u32, [0x44u8; 16])], "U field");
|
|
assert_eq!(entry.mkb_version, Some(77));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_entry_strips_a_comment_glued_to_a_trailing_v_field() {
|
|
// A row whose LAST field is V (no U after it) with the `; MKBv…`
|
|
// comment glued onto the hex value; before M/I/V stripped it too,
|
|
// parse_hex16 silently dropped the VUK.
|
|
let z40 = "00".repeat(20);
|
|
let z32 = "00".repeat(16);
|
|
let line =
|
|
format!("0x{z40} = SAMPLE (Sample) | M | 0x{z32} | I | 0x{z32} | V | 0x{z32} ; MKBv64");
|
|
let entry = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(entry.media_key.is_some(), "M key must survive");
|
|
assert!(
|
|
entry.vuk.is_some(),
|
|
"a VUK with a trailing ; comment must not be dropped"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NOTE: key fields below use obvious repeated-byte / zero placeholders.
|
|
// NEVER put real — or real-looking — key material in code; these tests
|
|
// exercise the parser's field-splitting only.
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_parse_device_key() {
|
|
let line = "| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x00000000000000000000000000000000 | DEVICE_NODE 0x0800 | KEY_UV 0x00000400 | KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT 0x17 ; MKBv01-MKBv48";
|
|
let dk = KeyDb::parse_device_key(line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(dk.node, 0x0800);
|
|
assert_eq!(dk.u_mask_shift, 0x17);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_orphan_dk_row_loads_into_processing_keys() {
|
|
// `| DK |` row without position fields = an orphan DK; it lands in
|
|
// `processing_keys` and the brute walker handles it.
|
|
let cfg = r#"
|
|
| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x01010101010101010101010101010101 ; orphan, no position fields
|
|
| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x02020202020202020202020202020202 | DEVICE_NODE 0x0800 | KEY_UV 0x00000400 | KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT 0x17 ; positioned MKBv01-MKBv48
|
|
| PK | 0x03030303030303030303030303030303 ; legacy PK row still works
|
|
"#;
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(cfg);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
db.device_keys.len(),
|
|
1,
|
|
"positioned DK row should land in device_keys"
|
|
);
|
|
// Orphan DK + legacy PK row both end up in processing_keys.
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
db.processing_keys.len(),
|
|
2,
|
|
"orphan DK row + legacy PK row both belong in processing_keys"
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(db.processing_keys[0][..4], [0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01]);
|
|
assert_eq!(db.processing_keys[1][..4], [0x03, 0x03, 0x03, 0x03]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_parse_orphan_dk_rejects_lines_with_position_fields() {
|
|
// The parser must NOT pick up a positioned DK row as an orphan
|
|
// (that would double-count). parse_orphan_dk explicitly checks.
|
|
let positioned = "| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x02020202020202020202020202020202 | DEVICE_NODE 0x0800 | KEY_UV 0x00000400 | KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT 0x17";
|
|
assert!(
|
|
KeyDb::parse_orphan_dk(positioned).is_none(),
|
|
"positioned DK must not match orphan parser"
|
|
);
|
|
let orphan = "| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x01010101010101010101010101010101";
|
|
let key = KeyDb::parse_orphan_dk(orphan).expect("orphan should parse");
|
|
assert_eq!(key[..4], [0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_parse_host_cert() {
|
|
// 20-byte priv + 92-byte cert, all zeros — placeholders, not a key.
|
|
let line = format!(
|
|
"| HC | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x{} | HOST_CERT 0x{} ; Revoked",
|
|
"00".repeat(20),
|
|
"00".repeat(92)
|
|
);
|
|
let hc = KeyDb::parse_host_cert(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(hc.cert.private_key, [0u8; 20]);
|
|
assert_eq!(hc.cert.certificate.len(), 92);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_parse_hex_rejects_non_ascii_without_panic() {
|
|
// A 4-byte UTF-8 scalar has byte-len 4 (passes the even check); the
|
|
// old &str-slice path panicked on the mid-codepoint boundary. The
|
|
// byte-wise parser must instead return None.
|
|
assert!(parse_hex("😀").is_none());
|
|
// Mixed: leading hex then a 2-byte UTF-8 scalar (byte-len even).
|
|
assert!(parse_hex("ABé").is_none());
|
|
// Sanity: well-formed hex still parses.
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_hex("0x00FF"), Some(vec![0x00, 0xFF]));
|
|
// Odd byte length still rejected.
|
|
assert!(parse_hex("ABC").is_none());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_hc2_before_hc_is_not_dropped() {
|
|
// An HC2 row appearing before any HC row must still land its AACS 2.0
|
|
// credentials on a HostCert rather than being silently discarded.
|
|
let cfg = format!(
|
|
"| HC2 | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x{} | HOST_CERT 0x{}\n",
|
|
"00".repeat(32),
|
|
"00".repeat(132)
|
|
);
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(&cfg);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
db.host_certs.len(),
|
|
1,
|
|
"HC2-only row must create a HostCert"
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(db.host_certs[0].cert.private_key_v2.is_some());
|
|
assert!(db.host_certs[0].cert.certificate_v2.is_some());
|
|
assert!(
|
|
db.host_certs[0].cert.certificate.is_empty(),
|
|
"v1 cert stays empty for an HC2-only carrier"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_hc2_after_hc_augments_existing() {
|
|
let cfg = format!(
|
|
"| HC | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x{} | HOST_CERT 0x{}\n| HC2 | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x{} | HOST_CERT 0x{}\n",
|
|
"00".repeat(20),
|
|
"00".repeat(92),
|
|
"00".repeat(32),
|
|
"00".repeat(132)
|
|
);
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(&cfg);
|
|
assert_eq!(db.host_certs.len(), 1, "HC2 augments the preceding HC");
|
|
assert_eq!(db.host_certs[0].cert.certificate.len(), 92);
|
|
assert!(db.host_certs[0].cert.certificate_v2.is_some());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_parse_host_cert_rejects_short_v1_cert() {
|
|
// A too-short AACS 1.0 cert must be dropped at parse time.
|
|
let line = format!(
|
|
"| HC | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x{} | HOST_CERT 0x{}",
|
|
"00".repeat(20),
|
|
"00".repeat(10)
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(KeyDb::parse_host_cert(&line).is_none());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// REQUIRES a real keydb; `#[ignore]` by default. Run with:
|
|
/// `KEYDB_PATH=/path/to/keydb.cfg cargo test --release -- --ignored`.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
#[ignore = "needs a real keydb.cfg: KEYDB_PATH=<path> cargo test -- --ignored"]
|
|
fn test_parse_full_keydb() {
|
|
let path = real_keydb_path();
|
|
|
|
let db = KeyDb::load(&path).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(db.device_keys.len(), 4);
|
|
assert_eq!(db.processing_keys.len(), 3);
|
|
assert!(!db.host_certs.is_empty());
|
|
assert!(db.disc_entries.len() > 170000);
|
|
|
|
// Look up any disc entry carrying a full key set.
|
|
let entry = db
|
|
.disc_entries
|
|
.values()
|
|
.find(|e| e.vuk.is_some() && e.media_key.is_some() && !e.unit_keys.is_empty())
|
|
.expect("no disc entry with a full key set");
|
|
assert!(entry.media_key.is_some());
|
|
assert!(entry.vuk.is_some());
|
|
assert!(!entry.unit_keys.is_empty());
|
|
|
|
eprintln!(
|
|
"Parsed {} disc entries, {} DK, {} PK",
|
|
db.disc_entries.len(),
|
|
db.device_keys.len(),
|
|
db.processing_keys.len()
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// `load_counted` must read the HANDLE it was given, never re-resolve the
|
|
// path (identity stamp + bytes must match). See docs/keydb-format.md.
|
|
// With the path already replaced, the handle's contents must still win.
|
|
#[cfg(unix)]
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn load_counted_reads_the_handle_not_the_path() {
|
|
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
|
|
"fmk-keysources-load-seam-{}-{:?}",
|
|
std::process::id(),
|
|
std::thread::current().id()
|
|
));
|
|
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
|
|
let path = dir.join("keydb.cfg");
|
|
let other = dir.join("replacement.cfg");
|
|
let row = |k: &str| format!("0xaabb = T | U | 1-0x{k}\n");
|
|
std::fs::write(&path, row(&"01".repeat(16))).unwrap();
|
|
std::fs::write(&other, row(&"02".repeat(16))).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let handle = std::fs::File::open(&path).unwrap();
|
|
// The path now names a DIFFERENT inode; the handle still names the old
|
|
// one, exactly as it would mid-race.
|
|
std::fs::rename(&other, &path).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let (db, _) = KeyDb::load_counted(handle, &path).expect("the open handle is still valid");
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
db.disc_entries
|
|
.values()
|
|
.next()
|
|
.expect("one entry")
|
|
.unit_keys[0]
|
|
.1,
|
|
[0x01u8; 16],
|
|
"the parse must come from the handle that was stamped, not from a re-opened path"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Debug redaction: key material must never reach a log or a panic ────
|
|
|
|
/// The only key bytes in these fixtures are the byte 0x5A repeated; the
|
|
/// assertion is that NO run of them survives into the formatted string, in
|
|
/// either the hex or the Rust-array rendering a derived `Debug` produces.
|
|
fn assert_no_key_bytes(what: &str, rendered: &str) {
|
|
assert!(
|
|
!rendered.contains("90"),
|
|
"{what} Debug leaked a decimal key byte: {rendered}"
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
!rendered.contains("5a") && !rendered.contains("5A"),
|
|
"{what} Debug leaked a hex key byte: {rendered}"
|
|
);
|
|
// A derived `Debug` over a byte array renders `[90, 90, ...]`; matched
|
|
// as "`[` immediately followed by a digit" rather than "any `[`",
|
|
// since callers legitimately render a `Vec` of redacting structs.
|
|
let bytes = rendered.as_bytes();
|
|
assert!(
|
|
!rendered
|
|
.match_indices('[')
|
|
.any(|(i, _)| bytes.get(i + 1).is_some_and(u8::is_ascii_digit)),
|
|
"{what} Debug rendered a raw byte array: {rendered}"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// `{:?}` on a `DiscEntry` must not print the Media Key, VID, VUK or any
|
|
// Unit Key. Catches the mutation that restores `#[derive(Debug)]`.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_entry_debug_is_redacted() {
|
|
let e = DiscEntry {
|
|
disc_hash: Arc::from("0xaabb"),
|
|
title: "T".into(),
|
|
media_key: Some([0x5A; 16]),
|
|
vid: Some([0x5A; 16]),
|
|
vuk: Some([0x5A; 16]),
|
|
unit_keys: vec![(1, [0x5A; 16])],
|
|
mkb_version: Some(76),
|
|
volume_size: Some(1),
|
|
is_uhd: true,
|
|
};
|
|
let rendered = format!("{e:?}");
|
|
assert_no_key_bytes("DiscEntry", &rendered);
|
|
// The non-secret identifying fields are still useful and still printed.
|
|
assert!(rendered.contains("0xaabb"), "{rendered}");
|
|
assert!(rendered.contains("unit_keys_len"), "{rendered}");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// `{:?}` on a whole `KeyDb` must print COUNTS only. The derive dumped every
|
|
/// processing key plus all ~181k disc entries' key material — the single
|
|
/// worst leak in the crate, since a `KeyDb` is what a key source holds.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn keydb_debug_is_redacted() {
|
|
let mut db = KeyDb::empty();
|
|
db.processing_keys.push([0x5A; 16]);
|
|
db.device_keys.push(DeviceKey {
|
|
key: [0x5A; 16],
|
|
node: 1,
|
|
uv: 2,
|
|
u_mask_shift: 3,
|
|
});
|
|
db.host_certs.push(KeydbHostCert {
|
|
cert: HostCert {
|
|
private_key: [0x5A; 20],
|
|
certificate: vec![0x5A; 92],
|
|
private_key_v2: None,
|
|
certificate_v2: None,
|
|
},
|
|
revoked_at_mkb: None,
|
|
});
|
|
let e = DiscEntry {
|
|
disc_hash: Arc::from("0xaabb"),
|
|
title: "T".into(),
|
|
media_key: Some([0x5A; 16]),
|
|
vid: None,
|
|
vuk: Some([0x5A; 16]),
|
|
unit_keys: vec![(1, [0x5A; 16])],
|
|
mkb_version: None,
|
|
volume_size: None,
|
|
is_uhd: false,
|
|
};
|
|
db.disc_entries.insert(e.disc_hash.clone(), e);
|
|
|
|
let rendered = format!("{db:?}");
|
|
assert_no_key_bytes("KeyDb", &rendered);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
rendered.contains("disc_entries_len"),
|
|
"counts, not contents: {rendered}"
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
rendered.contains("processing_keys_len"),
|
|
"counts, not contents: {rendered}"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The SIBLING type: `KeyDb`'s hand-written `Debug` protects the whole-db
|
|
// rendering only; `{:?}` on one `KeydbHostCert` element walks a different
|
|
// path carrying the AACS host PRIVATE key. See docs/keydb-format.md.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn host_cert_debug_is_redacted_including_the_sibling_wrapper() {
|
|
let hc = KeydbHostCert {
|
|
cert: HostCert {
|
|
private_key: [0x5A; 20],
|
|
certificate: vec![0x5A; 92],
|
|
private_key_v2: Some([0x5A; 32]),
|
|
certificate_v2: Some(vec![0x5A; 132]),
|
|
},
|
|
revoked_at_mkb: Some(76),
|
|
};
|
|
assert_no_key_bytes("KeydbHostCert", &format!("{hc:?}"));
|
|
assert_no_key_bytes("Vec<KeydbHostCert>", &format!("{:?}", vec![hc.clone()]));
|
|
assert_no_key_bytes("HostCert", &format!("{:?}", hc.cert));
|
|
// Positive half: the private keys must be present-but-masked, not
|
|
// omitted. A `Debug` that simply dropped the fields would satisfy the
|
|
// negative assertions above while hiding that a key is held at all.
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
format!("{hc:?}").matches("<redacted>").count(),
|
|
2,
|
|
"both host private keys (1.0 and 2.0) must render as <redacted>: {hc:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
// The non-secret revocation field is what the wrapper exists for and is
|
|
// still printed — redaction must not become "print nothing useful".
|
|
assert!(
|
|
format!("{hc:?}").contains("76"),
|
|
"the revocation generation is not secret and must survive: {hc:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// The `Vec<DeviceKey>` on the other public `KeyDb` field, for the same
|
|
/// reason: `device_keys` is reachable element-wise and each entry holds a
|
|
/// 16-byte device key. Also inherited from libfreemkv's redacting impl.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn device_key_debug_is_redacted() {
|
|
let dk = DeviceKey {
|
|
key: [0x5A; 16],
|
|
node: 1,
|
|
uv: 2,
|
|
u_mask_shift: 3,
|
|
};
|
|
assert_no_key_bytes("DeviceKey", &format!("{dk:?}"));
|
|
assert_no_key_bytes("Vec<DeviceKey>", &format!("{:?}", vec![dk]));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Parser rejection accounting ── every malformed row must be COUNTED,
|
|
// per reason. Catches restoring a bare `if let Some(x) = .. { }` with no
|
|
// `else`, which let a byte-shifted download resolve nothing with zero log.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_counts_every_rejected_row_by_reason() {
|
|
let good_pk = format!("| PK | 0x{}", "ab".repeat(16));
|
|
let cfg = format!(
|
|
"{good_pk}\n\
|
|
| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0xZZ | DEVICE_NODE 0x0800 | KEY_UV 0x00000400 | KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT 0x17\n\
|
|
| PK | 0xnothex\n\
|
|
| HC | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x00 | HOST_CERT 0x00\n\
|
|
| HC2 | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x00 | HOST_CERT 0x00\n\
|
|
0xdeadbeef and no equals sign here\n"
|
|
);
|
|
let (db, stats) = KeyDb::parse_counted(&cfg);
|
|
assert_eq!(stats.dk_rejected, 1, "the bad DK row must be counted");
|
|
assert_eq!(stats.pk_rejected, 1, "the bad PK row must be counted");
|
|
assert_eq!(stats.hc_rejected, 1, "the short HC row must be counted");
|
|
assert_eq!(stats.hc2_rejected, 1, "the short HC2 row must be counted");
|
|
assert_eq!(stats.rejected(), 4, "four rows rejected in total");
|
|
// The one GOOD row still loaded — counting must not change parsing.
|
|
assert_eq!(db.processing_keys, vec![[0xABu8; 16]]);
|
|
// A `0x` line with no " = " is not a disc row at all, so it is not a
|
|
// rejection (it is a comment-shaped line the format allows).
|
|
assert_eq!(stats.disc_rejected, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// A duplicated disc hash silently last-wins through `HashMap::insert`:
|
|
/// one of the two rows' keys becomes unreachable. Not necessarily
|
|
/// corruption, but never something to discover silently.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_counts_duplicate_disc_hashes() {
|
|
let k1 = "01".repeat(16);
|
|
let k2 = "02".repeat(16);
|
|
let cfg = format!("0xAAAA = T | U | 1-0x{k1}\n0xaaaa = T | U | 1-0x{k2}\n");
|
|
let (db, stats) = KeyDb::parse_counted(&cfg);
|
|
assert_eq!(db.disc_entries.len(), 1, "same hash ⇒ one entry survives");
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
stats.disc_duplicate, 1,
|
|
"the overwritten row must be counted, not vanish"
|
|
);
|
|
// Last wins — pinned so the counter documents the ACTUAL behaviour.
|
|
assert_eq!(db.get_uk("0xaaaa"), vec![(1, [0x02u8; 16])]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Hitting `MAX_DISC_ENTRIES` drops real discs, so it must produce a
|
|
/// diagnostic like `load`'s size / UTF-8 caps do — not a bare `continue`.
|
|
/// Driven through the cap constant itself so it cannot rot if the cap moves.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_counts_disc_rows_dropped_over_the_entry_cap() {
|
|
let k = "01".repeat(16);
|
|
let mut cfg = String::with_capacity((MAX_DISC_ENTRIES + 2) * 16);
|
|
for i in 0..MAX_DISC_ENTRIES + 2 {
|
|
cfg.push_str(&format!("0x{i:x} = T | U | 1-0x{k}\n"));
|
|
}
|
|
let (db, stats) = KeyDb::parse_counted(&cfg);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
db.disc_entries.len(),
|
|
MAX_DISC_ENTRIES,
|
|
"cap still enforced"
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
stats.disc_over_cap, 2,
|
|
"the two rows dropped by the cap must be counted"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// A disc row rejected by the FIELD parser is counted separately from one
|
|
/// dropped by the cap.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_counts_unparseable_disc_row() {
|
|
// Nothing in today's grammar can be a disc row AND fail
|
|
// `parse_disc_entry`, so assert the healthy case is zero, so a future
|
|
// parser change that starts rejecting rows cannot do it silently.
|
|
let k = "01".repeat(16);
|
|
let (_, stats) = KeyDb::parse_counted(&format!("0xAAAA = T | U | 1-0x{k}\n"));
|
|
assert_eq!(stats.rejected(), 0, "a healthy keydb rejects nothing");
|
|
assert_eq!(stats.disc_duplicate, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── `0X` disc rows / the save() lockstep ── an uppercase row was once
|
|
// dropped with no diagnostic. Catches the mutation that removes the `0X`
|
|
// arm of `is_disc_entry_line`.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_row_with_uppercase_0x_prefix_is_parsed() {
|
|
let v = "33".repeat(16);
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(&format!("0XABCDEF = T | V | 0x{v}\n"));
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
db.disc_entries.len(),
|
|
1,
|
|
"an uppercase 0X disc row must parse, like every other hex field"
|
|
);
|
|
// The hash is lowercased on the way in, so lookup is unaffected.
|
|
assert_eq!(db.find_vuk("0xabcdef"), Some([0x33u8; 16]));
|
|
assert!(is_disc_entry_line("0XAA = T"));
|
|
assert!(is_disc_entry_line("0xaa = T"));
|
|
// Still not a disc row without the " = " separator.
|
|
assert!(!is_disc_entry_line("0XAABBCC"));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── One allocation per disc hash, not two ── map key and entry's own
|
|
// `disc_hash` must be the SAME allocation (used to be a clone, ~13 MB of
|
|
// duplicate text across the real keydb's 181k entries).
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_hash_is_stored_once_not_twice() {
|
|
let v = "33".repeat(16);
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(&format!("0xABCDEF = T | V | 0x{v}\n"));
|
|
let (key, entry) = db.disc_entries.iter().next().expect("one entry");
|
|
assert!(
|
|
Arc::ptr_eq(key, &entry.disc_hash),
|
|
"the map key must BE the entry's disc_hash allocation, not a clone"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ══ Hardening additions ══ parse_hex / parse_hex16 / parse_hex20 ══
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_hex_strips_lower_and_upper_prefixes() {
|
|
// Both lower- and upper-case prefixes are stripped (trim_start_matches
|
|
// "0x" then "0X"). Without one of those strips a value would be off by
|
|
// a nibble or fail length checks.
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_hex("0xABCD"), Some(vec![0xAB, 0xCD]));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_hex("0XABCD"), Some(vec![0xAB, 0xCD]));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_hex("ABCD"), Some(vec![0xAB, 0xCD]));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_hex_mixed_case_nibbles() {
|
|
// to_digit(16) accepts both cases.
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_hex("aB"), Some(vec![0xAB]));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_hex("Ff00"), Some(vec![0xFF, 0x00]));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_hex_rejects_non_hex_digit() {
|
|
// 'G' is not a hex digit → None (not silently 0).
|
|
assert!(parse_hex("0xGG").is_none());
|
|
assert!(parse_hex("12ZZ").is_none());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_hex_empty_is_empty_vec() {
|
|
// Empty (or bare "0x") → Some(empty): even byte-length 0 passes, and
|
|
// there are no nibbles to reject. parse_hex16/20 then reject on length.
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_hex(""), Some(vec![]));
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_hex("0x"), Some(vec![]));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_hex16_enforces_exactly_16_bytes() {
|
|
assert!(parse_hex16(&format!("0x{}", "00".repeat(15))).is_none());
|
|
assert!(parse_hex16(&format!("0x{}", "00".repeat(17))).is_none());
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
parse_hex16(&format!("0x{}", "00".repeat(16))),
|
|
Some([0u8; 16])
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_hex20_enforces_exactly_20_bytes() {
|
|
assert!(parse_hex20(&format!("0x{}", "00".repeat(19))).is_none());
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
parse_hex20(&format!("0x{}", "11".repeat(20))),
|
|
Some([0x11u8; 20])
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Disc entry field parsing ───────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_entry_hash_is_lowercased() {
|
|
// The disc_hash key is lowercased so HashMap lookups are
|
|
// case-insensitive (find_disc lowercases its query too).
|
|
let z32 = "00".repeat(16);
|
|
let line = format!("0xABCDEF = T | M | 0x{z32}");
|
|
let e = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(&*e.disc_hash, "0xabcdef");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_entry_title_kept_verbatim_even_with_parens() {
|
|
// Faithful copy: the title is kept VERBATIM, parens and all — NOT reduced
|
|
// to the parenthesised substring (which truncated real multi-paren titles
|
|
// and broke serialize→parse idempotence).
|
|
let line = "0x00 = RAW_NAME (Display Name) | M | 0x".to_string() + &"00".repeat(16);
|
|
let e = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(e.title, "RAW_NAME (Display Name)");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_entry_title_without_parens_uses_whole() {
|
|
let line = "0x00 = PlainTitle | M | 0x".to_string() + &"00".repeat(16);
|
|
let e = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(e.title, "PlainTitle");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_entry_malformed_parens_falls_back_to_whole_title() {
|
|
// The title is kept verbatim regardless of paren placement — a malformed
|
|
// ')' before '(' is not special-cased; the whole string is the title.
|
|
let line = "0x00 = FILM) (X | M | 0x".to_string() + &"00".repeat(16);
|
|
let e = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(e.title, "FILM) (X");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_entry_parses_all_tagged_fields() {
|
|
// M, I, V, U each populate their field. U accepts "n-0xKEY".
|
|
let m = "11".repeat(16);
|
|
let i = "22".repeat(16);
|
|
let v = "33".repeat(16);
|
|
let u = "44".repeat(16);
|
|
let line = format!("0xAA = T | M | 0x{m} | I | 0x{i} | V | 0x{v} | U | 2-0x{u}");
|
|
let e = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(e.media_key, Some([0x11u8; 16]));
|
|
assert_eq!(e.vid, Some([0x22u8; 16]));
|
|
assert_eq!(e.vuk, Some([0x33u8; 16]));
|
|
assert_eq!(e.unit_keys, vec![(2, [0x44u8; 16])]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_entry_multiple_unit_keys_space_separated() {
|
|
// The U field carries space-separated "n-0xKEY" pairs.
|
|
let k1 = "01".repeat(16);
|
|
let k2 = "02".repeat(16);
|
|
let line = format!("0xAA = T | U | 1-0x{k1} 2-0x{k2}");
|
|
let e = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(e.unit_keys, vec![(1, [0x01u8; 16]), (2, [0x02u8; 16])]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_entry_unit_key_strips_trailing_comment() {
|
|
// "U | 1-0xKEY ; comment" — the ';' comment must be stripped before
|
|
// splitting unit keys.
|
|
let k = "05".repeat(16);
|
|
let line = format!("0xAA = T | U | 1-0x{k} ; MKBv77 note");
|
|
let e = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(e.unit_keys, vec![(1, [0x05u8; 16])]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_entry_skips_unparseable_unit_key_pair() {
|
|
// A bad nibble in one unit key drops just that pair (parse_hex16 →
|
|
// None), keeping the valid ones — no panic, no half-garbage key.
|
|
let good = "07".repeat(16);
|
|
let line = format!("0xAA = T | U | 1-0xZZ 2-0x{good}");
|
|
let e = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(e.unit_keys, vec![(2, [0x07u8; 16])]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_entry_field_with_short_hex_is_none_not_panic() {
|
|
// A 30-hex-char (15-byte) M value fails parse_hex16 → media_key None.
|
|
let short = "00".repeat(15);
|
|
let line = format!("0xAA = T | M | 0x{short}");
|
|
let e = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(e.media_key.is_none());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── find_disc / find_vuk: prefix-agnostic lookup ───────────────────────
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn find_disc_matches_with_and_without_0x_and_case() {
|
|
let v = "33".repeat(16);
|
|
let line = format!("0xABCDEF = T | V | 0x{v}");
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(&line);
|
|
// Stored key is "0xabcdef". Query in several shapes.
|
|
assert!(db.find_disc("0xABCDEF").is_some());
|
|
assert!(db.find_disc("ABCDEF").is_some()); // no prefix
|
|
assert!(db.find_disc("0xabcdef").is_some());
|
|
assert!(db.find_disc(" 0xAbCdEf ").is_some()); // padded + mixed case
|
|
assert_eq!(db.find_vuk("ABCDEF"), Some([0x33u8; 16]));
|
|
assert!(db.find_disc("0xDEADBE").is_none());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Comments / blank lines / unknown lines ─────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_ignores_comments_and_blank_lines() {
|
|
let cfg = "\n; a comment\n# another\n \n";
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(cfg);
|
|
assert!(db.device_keys.is_empty());
|
|
assert!(db.processing_keys.is_empty());
|
|
assert!(db.disc_entries.is_empty());
|
|
assert!(db.host_certs.is_empty());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_empty_or_keyless_file_is_lenient_not_error() {
|
|
// parse() never errors; a keyless file is an empty KeyDb (documented
|
|
// contract — load() errors only on read failure, not empty content).
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse("; nothing here\n");
|
|
assert_eq!(db.disc_entries.len(), 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_device_key_requires_all_four_fields() {
|
|
// Missing KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT → parse_device_key returns None; it has
|
|
// DEVICE_NODE + KEY_UV so parse_orphan_dk also rejects it (has
|
|
// position fields), so nothing is loaded.
|
|
let line = "| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x00000000000000000000000000000000 | DEVICE_NODE 0x0800 | KEY_UV 0x00000400";
|
|
assert!(KeyDb::parse_device_key(line).is_none());
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(line);
|
|
assert!(db.device_keys.is_empty());
|
|
assert!(db.processing_keys.is_empty());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_device_key_accepts_uppercase_0x_prefix() {
|
|
// Regression: a case-sensitive `trim_start_matches("0x")` left an
|
|
// uppercase `0X` prefix unstripped, so `from_str_radix` failed and
|
|
// the WHOLE device key was silently dropped.
|
|
let line = "| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F \
|
|
| DEVICE_NODE 0X0001 | KEY_UV 0X00000002 | KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT 0X03";
|
|
let dk = KeyDb::parse_device_key(line).expect("uppercase 0X prefix must parse");
|
|
assert_eq!(dk.node, 1);
|
|
assert_eq!(dk.uv, 2);
|
|
assert_eq!(dk.u_mask_shift, 3);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_host_cert_v2_rejects_wrong_priv_len_and_short_cert() {
|
|
// v2 priv must be exactly 32 bytes; cert must be >= 132.
|
|
let bad_priv = format!(
|
|
"| HC2 | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x{} | HOST_CERT 0x{}",
|
|
"00".repeat(31),
|
|
"00".repeat(132)
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(KeyDb::parse_host_cert_v2(&bad_priv).is_none());
|
|
let short_cert = format!(
|
|
"| HC2 | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x{} | HOST_CERT 0x{}",
|
|
"00".repeat(32),
|
|
"00".repeat(131)
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(KeyDb::parse_host_cert_v2(&short_cert).is_none());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_processing_key_pk_row() {
|
|
// "| PK | 0x..." → 16-byte processing key. A trailing comment is
|
|
// stripped at ';'.
|
|
let line = format!("| PK | 0x{} ; MKBv64", "AB".repeat(16));
|
|
let pk = KeyDb::parse_processing_key(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(pk, [0xABu8; 16]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// A `| PK |` row with fewer than 3 `|`-delimited parts (no key field at
|
|
/// all) has nothing to parse and must return `None`, not panic on an
|
|
/// out-of-range index.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_processing_key_rejects_row_with_too_few_parts() {
|
|
assert!(KeyDb::parse_processing_key("| PK |").is_none());
|
|
assert!(KeyDb::parse_processing_key("just text, no pipes at all").is_none());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Disc-entry comment metadata: MKBv / VolumeSize / UHD ────────────────
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_entry_comment_uhd_mkb_and_volume_size() {
|
|
// Canonical UHD comment grammar.
|
|
let z = "00".repeat(16);
|
|
let line = format!(
|
|
"0xAA = T | M | 0x{z} | U | 1-0x{z} ; MKBv76/BEE/FindVUK 1.74 - VolumeSize: 81309007872 (UHD)"
|
|
);
|
|
let e = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(e.mkb_version, Some(76));
|
|
assert_eq!(e.volume_size, Some(81_309_007_872));
|
|
assert!(e.is_uhd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_entry_comment_bd_is_not_uhd() {
|
|
// "(BD)" comment ⇒ is_uhd false, VolumeSize still parsed.
|
|
let z = "00".repeat(16);
|
|
let line =
|
|
format!("0xAA = T | M | 0x{z} ; MKBv68/FindVUK 1.24 - VolumeSize: 37672976384 (BD)");
|
|
let e = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(!e.is_uhd);
|
|
assert_eq!(e.volume_size, Some(37_672_976_384));
|
|
assert_eq!(e.mkb_version, Some(68));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disc_entry_no_comment_all_metadata_none_and_fields_still_parse() {
|
|
// Regression: with NO trailing comment the three new fields default to
|
|
// None/false AND the U/M/I/V fields still parse correctly.
|
|
let m = "11".repeat(16);
|
|
let i = "22".repeat(16);
|
|
let v = "33".repeat(16);
|
|
let u = "44".repeat(16);
|
|
let line = format!("0xAA = T | M | 0x{m} | I | 0x{i} | V | 0x{v} | U | 2-0x{u}");
|
|
let e = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(e.mkb_version, None);
|
|
assert_eq!(e.volume_size, None);
|
|
assert!(!e.is_uhd);
|
|
// Unchanged field parsing.
|
|
assert_eq!(e.media_key, Some([0x11u8; 16]));
|
|
assert_eq!(e.vid, Some([0x22u8; 16]));
|
|
assert_eq!(e.vuk, Some([0x33u8; 16]));
|
|
assert_eq!(e.unit_keys, vec![(2, [0x44u8; 16])]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Host-cert revocation: parse + host_certs(mkb) filter ────────────────
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn host_cert_revoked_parses_and_filters_by_mkb() {
|
|
let revoked_line = format!(
|
|
"| HC | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x{} | HOST_CERT 0x{} ; Revoked in MKBv72",
|
|
"00".repeat(20),
|
|
"11".repeat(92),
|
|
);
|
|
let hc = KeyDb::parse_host_cert(&revoked_line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(hc.revoked_at_mkb, Some(72));
|
|
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(&revoked_line);
|
|
assert_eq!(db.host_certs.len(), 1);
|
|
// Revoked in MKBv72 ⇒ unusable at gen >= 72, usable below it.
|
|
assert!(
|
|
db.host_certs(Some(72)).is_empty(),
|
|
"a cert revoked in MKBv72 must be excluded at gen 72"
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
db.host_certs(Some(71)).len(),
|
|
1,
|
|
"still usable at gen 71 (below the revocation generation)"
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
db.host_certs(None).len(),
|
|
1,
|
|
"unknown disc MKB ⇒ cannot filter ⇒ cert returned"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn host_cert_without_revocation_included_for_all_mkb() {
|
|
let line = format!(
|
|
"| HC | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x{} | HOST_CERT 0x{}",
|
|
"00".repeat(20),
|
|
"22".repeat(92),
|
|
);
|
|
let hc = KeyDb::parse_host_cert(&line).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(hc.revoked_at_mkb, None);
|
|
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(&line);
|
|
assert_eq!(db.host_certs(Some(99)).len(), 1);
|
|
assert_eq!(db.host_certs(Some(1)).len(), 1);
|
|
assert_eq!(db.host_certs(None).len(), 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn hc2_revocation_propagates_when_hc_has_none() {
|
|
// The HC line carries no annotation; the revocation lives on the HC2
|
|
// line. The combined cert must still be filtered by that generation
|
|
// rather than being treated as never-revoked.
|
|
let cfg = format!(
|
|
"| HC | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x{} | HOST_CERT 0x{}\n| HC2 | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x{} | HOST_CERT 0x{} ; Revoked in MKBv72\n",
|
|
"00".repeat(20),
|
|
"00".repeat(92),
|
|
"00".repeat(32),
|
|
"00".repeat(132),
|
|
);
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(&cfg);
|
|
assert_eq!(db.host_certs.len(), 1, "HC2 augments the preceding HC");
|
|
assert_eq!(db.host_certs[0].revoked_at_mkb, Some(72));
|
|
assert!(
|
|
db.host_certs(Some(72)).is_empty(),
|
|
"combined cert revoked in MKBv72 must be excluded at gen 72"
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
db.host_certs(Some(71)).len(),
|
|
1,
|
|
"still usable below gen 72"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Standalone accessors: get_vid / get_uk / get_uks ────────────────────
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn get_vid_hit_and_miss() {
|
|
let i = "22".repeat(16);
|
|
let line = format!("0xABCDEF = T | I | 0x{i}");
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(&line);
|
|
// Hit — prefix-agnostic, same form find_disc accepts.
|
|
assert_eq!(db.get_vid("ABCDEF"), Some([0x22u8; 16]));
|
|
assert_eq!(db.get_vid("0xabcdef"), Some([0x22u8; 16]));
|
|
// Miss.
|
|
assert_eq!(db.get_vid("0xDEADBE"), None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn get_uk_hit_and_miss() {
|
|
let k1 = "01".repeat(16);
|
|
let k2 = "02".repeat(16);
|
|
let line = format!("0xABCDEF = T | U | 1-0x{k1} 2-0x{k2}");
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(&line);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
db.get_uk("ABCDEF"),
|
|
vec![(1, [0x01u8; 16]), (2, [0x02u8; 16])]
|
|
);
|
|
// Miss ⇒ empty.
|
|
assert!(db.get_uk("0xDEADBE").is_empty());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn get_uks_lists_only_entries_with_unit_keys() {
|
|
let k = "03".repeat(16);
|
|
let v = "33".repeat(16);
|
|
let with_uk = format!("0xAAAA = T | U | 1-0x{k}");
|
|
// An entry with only a VUK (no unit keys) must be excluded.
|
|
let no_uk = format!("0xBBBB = T | V | 0x{v}");
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(&format!("{with_uk}\n{no_uk}\n"));
|
|
let uks = db.get_uks();
|
|
assert_eq!(uks.len(), 1, "only the entry with unit keys is listed");
|
|
assert_eq!(uks[0].0, "0xaaaa");
|
|
assert_eq!(uks[0].1, vec![(1, [0x03u8; 16])]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// `parse_digits_after` must return `None`, not panic or misparse, when
|
|
/// the marker is present but no digit immediately follows it (Path 3 of
|
|
/// the MKBv/VolumeSize comment grammar: marker-with-no-value).
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn parse_digits_after_marker_with_no_trailing_digits_is_none() {
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_digits_after::<u32>("MKBv", "MKBv"), None);
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_digits_after::<u32>("MKBv/BEE", "MKBv"), None);
|
|
assert_eq!(parse_digits_after::<u32>("no marker here", "MKBv"), None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// `iter_disc_entries` yields every parsed disc, independent of hash
|
|
/// lookup — Path 3's full-scan use.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn iter_disc_entries_yields_every_disc() {
|
|
let k = "01".repeat(16);
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(&format!(
|
|
"0xAAAA = A | U | 1-0x{k}\n0xBBBB = B | U | 1-0x{k}\n"
|
|
));
|
|
let mut hashes: Vec<&str> = db.iter_disc_entries().map(|e| &*e.disc_hash).collect();
|
|
hashes.sort();
|
|
assert_eq!(hashes, vec!["0xaaaa", "0xbbbb"]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// `to_keydb_cfg` emits the sibling `| HC2 |` line for AACS 2.0
|
|
// credentials, recovered by re-`parse`; also an empty title serializes
|
|
// as the literal `Unknown`.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn to_keydb_cfg_emits_hc2_and_unknown_for_empty_title() {
|
|
let h = |b: u8, n: usize| format!("{b:02x}").repeat(n);
|
|
let k = h(0x09, 16);
|
|
let src = format!(
|
|
"| HC | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x{priv1} | HOST_CERT 0x{cert1}\n\
|
|
| HC2 | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x{priv2} | HOST_CERT 0x{cert2}\n\
|
|
0xAAAA = | U | 1-0x{k}\n",
|
|
priv1 = h(0x01, 20),
|
|
cert1 = h(0x02, 92),
|
|
priv2 = h(0x03, 32),
|
|
cert2 = h(0x04, 132),
|
|
);
|
|
let db = KeyDb::parse(&src);
|
|
assert_eq!(db.host_certs.len(), 1);
|
|
assert!(db.host_certs[0].cert.certificate_v2.is_some());
|
|
// Empty title round-trips through "Unknown".
|
|
let entry = db.disc_entries.values().next().unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(entry.title, "");
|
|
|
|
let out = db.to_keydb_cfg();
|
|
assert!(
|
|
out.contains("| HC2 | HOST_PRIV_KEY"),
|
|
"HC2 must be emitted: {out}"
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
out.contains("Unknown"),
|
|
"empty title must serialize as Unknown: {out}"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// And it round-trips: re-parsing sees the HC2 material again.
|
|
let db2 = KeyDb::parse(&out);
|
|
assert_eq!(db2.host_certs.len(), 1);
|
|
assert!(db2.host_certs[0].cert.certificate_v2.is_some());
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
db2.host_certs[0].cert.private_key_v2,
|
|
db.host_certs[0].cert.private_key_v2
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// `to_keydb_cfg`'s comment clause is written piecewise (MKBv, VolumeSize,
|
|
// UHD); exercise each optional sub-field independently, not just
|
|
// all-three-true.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn to_keydb_cfg_comment_fields_are_independent() {
|
|
let k = "0a".repeat(16);
|
|
|
|
// Only VolumeSize, no MKBv, not UHD.
|
|
let a = KeyDb::parse(&format!("0xAAAA = A | U | 1-0x{k} ; VolumeSize: 12345\n"));
|
|
let out_a = a.to_keydb_cfg();
|
|
assert!(out_a.contains("VolumeSize: 12345"), "{out_a}");
|
|
assert!(!out_a.contains("MKBv"), "{out_a}");
|
|
assert!(!out_a.contains("(UHD)"), "{out_a}");
|
|
let a2 = KeyDb::parse(&out_a);
|
|
let ea2 = a2.disc_entries.values().next().unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(ea2.volume_size, Some(12345));
|
|
assert_eq!(ea2.mkb_version, None);
|
|
assert!(!ea2.is_uhd);
|
|
|
|
// Only the UHD flag, no MKBv, no VolumeSize.
|
|
let b = KeyDb::parse(&format!("0xBBBB = B | U | 1-0x{k} ; (UHD)\n"));
|
|
let out_b = b.to_keydb_cfg();
|
|
assert!(out_b.contains("(UHD)"), "{out_b}");
|
|
assert!(!out_b.contains("MKBv"), "{out_b}");
|
|
assert!(!out_b.contains("VolumeSize"), "{out_b}");
|
|
let b2 = KeyDb::parse(&out_b);
|
|
let eb2 = b2.disc_entries.values().next().unwrap();
|
|
assert!(eb2.is_uhd);
|
|
assert_eq!(eb2.mkb_version, None);
|
|
assert_eq!(eb2.volume_size, None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// KEYDB-parser integration tests relocated from libfreemkv; exercise the
|
|
// parser end-to-end against a real keydb.cfg. See docs/keydb-format.md.
|
|
|
|
/// REQUIRES a real keydb; `#[ignore]` by default. Run with:
|
|
/// `KEYDB_PATH=/path/to/keydb.cfg cargo test --release -- --ignored`.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
#[ignore = "needs a real keydb.cfg: KEYDB_PATH=<path> cargo test -- --ignored"]
|
|
fn test_vuk_derivation() {
|
|
// Pick any UHD entry with a known MK, VID, and VUK from KEYDB.
|
|
// VUK = AES-DEC(MK, VID) XOR VID
|
|
let path = real_keydb_path();
|
|
|
|
let db = KeyDb::load(&path).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// Find a disc with both MK, vid, and VUK so we can verify derivation
|
|
let entry = db
|
|
.disc_entries
|
|
.values()
|
|
.find(|e| e.media_key.is_some() && e.vid.is_some() && e.vuk.is_some())
|
|
.expect("No disc with MK + VID + VUK");
|
|
|
|
let mk = entry.media_key.unwrap();
|
|
let vid = entry.vid.unwrap();
|
|
let expected_vuk = entry.vuk.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let derived = libfreemkv::aacs::derive::derive_vuk(&mk, &vid);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
derived, expected_vuk,
|
|
"VUK derivation failed for disc: {} (hash {})",
|
|
entry.title, entry.disc_hash
|
|
);
|
|
eprintln!("VUK derivation verified for: {}", entry.title);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// REQUIRES a real keydb AND an encrypted unit dump; `#[ignore]` by default.
|
|
/// Run with: `KEYDB_PATH=<keydb.cfg> ENCRYPTED_UNIT_PATH=<unit.bin> \
|
|
/// cargo test --release -- --ignored`.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
#[ignore = "needs KEYDB_PATH + ENCRYPTED_UNIT_PATH: cargo test -- --ignored"]
|
|
fn test_decrypt_real_unit() {
|
|
// Try decrypting a real encrypted aligned unit from a UHD sample.
|
|
// This disc is AACS 2.0 (BEE) so unit key alone won't work — bus
|
|
// decryption is needed first — but this verifies the pipeline.
|
|
let unit_path = std::path::PathBuf::from(
|
|
std::env::var("ENCRYPTED_UNIT_PATH")
|
|
.expect("ENCRYPTED_UNIT_PATH must point at an encrypted aligned unit"),
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
unit_path.exists(),
|
|
"ENCRYPTED_UNIT_PATH does not exist: {}",
|
|
unit_path.display()
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let original = std::fs::read(&unit_path).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(original.len(), libfreemkv::aacs::content::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
!libfreemkv::aacs::content::is_clean(&original, libfreemkv::disc::ContentFormat::BdTs),
|
|
"Unit should be encrypted"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let kp = real_keydb_path();
|
|
let db = KeyDb::load(&kp).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// Candidate entries: any UHD entry that carries unit keys.
|
|
let candidate_entries: Vec<&DiscEntry> = db
|
|
.disc_entries
|
|
.values()
|
|
.filter(|e| !e.unit_keys.is_empty())
|
|
.collect();
|
|
|
|
eprintln!("Found {} entries with unit keys", candidate_entries.len());
|
|
// Without candidates nothing below runs and the test would "pass" having
|
|
// exercised nothing — a parser regression that dropped every unit key
|
|
// would look exactly like the expected AACS 2.0 outcome.
|
|
assert!(
|
|
!candidate_entries.is_empty(),
|
|
"the fixture keydb must carry at least one entry with unit keys"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Try each entry's unit keys: apply the key, then ask whether it opened
|
|
// the unit (the segregated primitives — decrypt, then structural check).
|
|
let mut attempts = 0usize;
|
|
let mut any_key_changed_the_unit = false;
|
|
for entry in &candidate_entries {
|
|
for (_, key) in &entry.unit_keys {
|
|
let mut unit = original.clone();
|
|
libfreemkv::aacs::content::decrypt_unit(&mut unit, key);
|
|
attempts += 1;
|
|
any_key_changed_the_unit |= unit != original;
|
|
if libfreemkv::aacs::content::is_clean(&unit, libfreemkv::disc::ContentFormat::BdTs)
|
|
{
|
|
eprintln!("SUCCESS: Decrypted with entry {}", entry.disc_hash);
|
|
// Count TS sync bytes
|
|
let ts = (0..32).filter(|&i| unit[4 + i * 192] == 0x47).count();
|
|
eprintln!(" TS sync bytes: {}/32", ts);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Reaching here is the EXPECTED outcome for this AACS 2.0 (BEE) sample.
|
|
// See docs/keydb-format.md for why "no key worked" alone would be an
|
|
// unusable assertion, and what is asserted instead.
|
|
assert!(attempts > 0, "no unit key was tried at all");
|
|
assert!(
|
|
any_key_changed_the_unit,
|
|
"decrypt_unit left the aligned unit byte-identical for all {attempts} keys — \
|
|
the decrypt primitive is a no-op, not a failed key"
|
|
);
|
|
eprintln!(
|
|
"No unit key worked over {attempts} attempts \
|
|
(expected for AACS 2.0 BEE disc — needs read_data_key)"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// REQUIRES a real keydb; `#[ignore]` by default. Run with:
|
|
/// `KEYDB_PATH=/path/to/keydb.cfg cargo test --release -- --ignored`.
|
|
#[test]
|
|
#[ignore = "needs a real keydb.cfg: KEYDB_PATH=<path> cargo test -- --ignored"]
|
|
fn test_resolve_keys_vuk_path() {
|
|
// Test the full resolve chain using VUK path
|
|
let path = real_keydb_path();
|
|
let db = KeyDb::load(&path).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// Find any BD entry with a VUK and unit keys. `expect`, not an early
|
|
// `return`: a `return` here would ship green even if a parser
|
|
// regression stopped populating `vid`/`vuk` entirely.
|
|
let entry = db
|
|
.disc_entries
|
|
.values()
|
|
.find(|e| e.vuk.is_some() && !e.unit_keys.is_empty() && e.vid.is_some())
|
|
.expect("the fixture keydb must carry an entry with VUK + unit keys + VID");
|
|
let vuk = entry.vuk.unwrap();
|
|
let vid = entry.vid.unwrap();
|
|
let hash_hex = format!("0x{}", libfreemkv::hex::strip_hex_prefix(&entry.disc_hash));
|
|
|
|
// We need the actual Unit_Key_RO.inf from the disc to compute disc hash.
|
|
// Since we don't have it, we can at least test that the KEYDB lookup
|
|
// works with a known hash.
|
|
let found = db.find_disc(&hash_hex);
|
|
assert!(found.is_some());
|
|
assert_eq!(found.unwrap().vuk, Some(vuk));
|
|
|
|
// Verify VUK derivation if we have MK + VID
|
|
if let Some(mk) = entry.media_key {
|
|
let derived = libfreemkv::aacs::derive::derive_vuk(&mk, &vid);
|
|
assert_eq!(derived, vuk, "VUK derivation mismatch");
|
|
eprintln!("VUK derivation verified");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|