mirror of
https://github.com/freemkv/freemkv-unlock.git
synced 2026-10-07 18:13:11 +00:00
release: 1.7.0
Fixed - ld/profile: find_by_drive_id no longer mis-binds a drive whose reported product_id is real but uncatalogued to a sibling model's profile (and its wrong LibreDrive microcode); the product-id-blind loose match is gated on an empty id. Docs / CI - Third-party NOTICE for the LibreDrive microcode bundled in profiles.json; cargo-deny gate (#15) and audience-based comment-guard (#17).
This commit is contained in:
Matthew Jackson
+66
-10
@@ -17,10 +17,31 @@ on:
|
||||
# seven others down with it, which is why it gets the full OS matrix rather
|
||||
# than a token Linux run.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Cargo.lock is gitignored (library convention), so `--locked` is deliberately
|
||||
# NOT used: with no committed lockfile it fails rather than resolves.
|
||||
# Cargo.lock is now committed (issue #15), so the resolved dependency graph is
|
||||
# recorded and the `deny` job audits it. `--locked` is still deliberately NOT
|
||||
# used, matching the binary crates' ci.yml: CI's sibling path-patch layout
|
||||
# resolves the freemkv crates as path packages, which `--locked` can't satisfy.
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
# ── Single source of truth for the MSRV ─────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
#
|
||||
# `rust-version` in Cargo.toml is the ONE place the MSRV is declared. This job
|
||||
# reads it; every job that must build/test AT the MSRV consumes
|
||||
# `needs.resolve-msrv.outputs.v` instead of a hardcoded pin, so the floor
|
||||
# cannot drift out of sync across workflow files. The `test` job building
|
||||
# green at this value IS the verification that the declared MSRV is real.
|
||||
# clippy deliberately does NOT use it — it runs on `stable` (lint debt is
|
||||
# caught against current Rust).
|
||||
resolve-msrv:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
outputs:
|
||||
v: ${{ steps.msrv.outputs.v }}
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
- id: msrv
|
||||
shell: bash
|
||||
run: echo "v=$(grep -m1 '^rust-version' Cargo.toml | sed -E 's/.*\"([^\"]+)\".*/\1/')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
|
||||
# CI owns the changelog: main may never carry a released version without a
|
||||
# CHANGELOG.md entry for it. The release orchestrator dates an existing
|
||||
# `## [X.Y.Z]` heading — it does NOT invent one — so a version bump that
|
||||
@@ -48,24 +69,36 @@ jobs:
|
||||
echo "::warning::${msg} (allowed on ${GITHUB_REF_NAME:-unknown}; required before it can reach main)."
|
||||
|
||||
lint:
|
||||
needs: resolve-msrv
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@1.88.0
|
||||
# fmt runs on the pinned MSRV toolchain; clippy runs on stable. Linting on
|
||||
# stable makes new-lint debt a BLOCKING gate the pinned version would
|
||||
# otherwise hide. The MSRV pin is installed second so it stays the default
|
||||
# toolchain (fmt uses it implicitly); clippy is invoked with `+stable`.
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
|
||||
with:
|
||||
components: clippy, rustfmt
|
||||
components: clippy
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@master
|
||||
with:
|
||||
toolchain: ${{ needs.resolve-msrv.outputs.v }}
|
||||
components: rustfmt
|
||||
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
shared-key: freemkv-unlock-ci
|
||||
- run: cargo fmt --check
|
||||
# --all-targets so the test code is linted too, not just the library.
|
||||
- run: cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
|
||||
- run: cargo +stable clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
|
||||
|
||||
test:
|
||||
needs: resolve-msrv
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@1.88.0
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@master
|
||||
with:
|
||||
toolchain: ${{ needs.resolve-msrv.outputs.v }}
|
||||
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
shared-key: freemkv-unlock-ci
|
||||
@@ -79,13 +112,15 @@ jobs:
|
||||
# release gate). It mirrors the `test` job's environment — same pinned
|
||||
# toolchain, ubuntu-latest, no `if:` so it runs on every branch and PR just
|
||||
# as `test` does. `--locked` is intentionally omitted to match this crate's
|
||||
# policy (Cargo.lock is gitignored; --locked would fail without it).
|
||||
# policy (Cargo.lock is committed but --locked can't satisfy the path-patch layout).
|
||||
coverage:
|
||||
needs: resolve-msrv
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@1.88.0
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@master
|
||||
with:
|
||||
toolchain: ${{ needs.resolve-msrv.outputs.v }}
|
||||
components: llvm-tools-preview
|
||||
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
@@ -99,6 +134,21 @@ jobs:
|
||||
slug: freemkv/freemkv-unlock
|
||||
fail_ci_if_error: false
|
||||
|
||||
# cargo-deny gates the RESOLVED dependency graph: RUSTSEC advisories, a
|
||||
# permissive licence allow-list, and source/ban hygiene. It mirrors the
|
||||
# `test` job's checkout (single root checkout, no siblings) and runs on
|
||||
# `stable` — advisory/licence debt is caught against current Rust, not the
|
||||
# MSRV pin — so no `needs: resolve-msrv`.
|
||||
deny:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
|
||||
- uses: EmbarkStudios/cargo-deny-action@v2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
command: check advisories bans licenses sources
|
||||
manifest-path: Cargo.toml
|
||||
|
||||
# The crate ships on macOS and Windows through its consumers, so it has to
|
||||
# compile there. Build the tests (not just `cargo check`) — that forces
|
||||
# codegen and catches errors in test-only code, which `check` skips.
|
||||
@@ -115,11 +165,14 @@ jobs:
|
||||
# than a slow one: release.sh's CI gate refuses while any run for the
|
||||
# commit is still in progress, so a never-scheduled job blocks releases
|
||||
# silently -- see the note on real-media in qa.yml.
|
||||
needs: resolve-msrv
|
||||
if: github.ref_name == 'qa' || github.ref_name == 'main'
|
||||
runs-on: macos-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@1.88.0
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@master
|
||||
with:
|
||||
toolchain: ${{ needs.resolve-msrv.outputs.v }}
|
||||
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
shared-key: freemkv-unlock-ci
|
||||
@@ -138,11 +191,14 @@ jobs:
|
||||
# than a slow one: release.sh's CI gate refuses while any run for the
|
||||
# commit is still in progress, so a never-scheduled job blocks releases
|
||||
# silently -- see the note on real-media in qa.yml.
|
||||
needs: resolve-msrv
|
||||
if: github.ref_name == 'qa' || github.ref_name == 'main'
|
||||
runs-on: windows-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@1.88.0
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@master
|
||||
with:
|
||||
toolchain: ${{ needs.resolve-msrv.outputs.v }}
|
||||
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
shared-key: freemkv-unlock-ci
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
||||
name: comment-guard
|
||||
|
||||
# Caps explanatory prose by COMMENT INTENT (not visibility):
|
||||
# //! / /*! module docs — unbounded (module-scoped, can't hide per-item text)
|
||||
# /// / /** */ item docs — 8 prose lines (fenced ``` examples excluded)
|
||||
# // / /* */ asides — 3 lines (single-blank-separated runs count as one)
|
||||
# Overflow belongs in the module //! or docs/<topic>.md with a one-line // pointer.
|
||||
|
||||
on: [push, pull_request]
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
comment-guard:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
- name: Run comment-guard
|
||||
run: python3 ci/comment-guard.py
|
||||
@@ -24,6 +24,19 @@ on:
|
||||
workflow_dispatch:
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
# Single source of truth for the MSRV — see ci.yml. Jobs that build/test AT
|
||||
# the MSRV read `needs.resolve-msrv.outputs.v` from Cargo.toml's rust-version;
|
||||
# clippy (cross-lint) runs on stable instead.
|
||||
resolve-msrv:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
outputs:
|
||||
v: ${{ steps.msrv.outputs.v }}
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
- id: msrv
|
||||
shell: bash
|
||||
run: echo "v=$(grep -m1 '^rust-version' Cargo.toml | sed -E 's/.*\"([^\"]+)\".*/\1/')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Name the candidate ────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Every push to `qa` is a release candidate, so every push gets a tag:
|
||||
@@ -65,6 +78,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
# changes what the optimiser can prove. A test that only passes in debug is
|
||||
# a test that never guarded the binary anyone actually ships.
|
||||
release-tests:
|
||||
needs: resolve-msrv
|
||||
strategy:
|
||||
fail-fast: false
|
||||
matrix:
|
||||
@@ -74,7 +88,9 @@ jobs:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
path: freemkv-unlock
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@1.88.0
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@master
|
||||
with:
|
||||
toolchain: ${{ needs.resolve-msrv.outputs.v }}
|
||||
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
workspaces: freemkv-unlock
|
||||
@@ -90,7 +106,9 @@ jobs:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
path: freemkv-unlock
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@1.88.0
|
||||
# clippy runs on stable (matches ci.yml's lint job); build/test stay on
|
||||
# the MSRV pin. See ci.yml for why the lint toolchain need not be the MSRV.
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
|
||||
with:
|
||||
components: clippy
|
||||
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
|
||||
@@ -105,12 +123,15 @@ jobs:
|
||||
# of the SCSI transport and platform layers compile on no other runner, so
|
||||
# without this they are first built at release time.
|
||||
windows-build:
|
||||
needs: resolve-msrv
|
||||
runs-on: windows-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
path: freemkv-unlock
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@1.88.0
|
||||
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@master
|
||||
with:
|
||||
toolchain: ${{ needs.resolve-msrv.outputs.v }}
|
||||
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
workspaces: freemkv-unlock
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
|
||||
/target
|
||||
Cargo.lock
|
||||
.cargo/config.toml
|
||||
NEXT_SESSION.md
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,19 @@
|
||||
# Changelog
|
||||
|
||||
## [1.7.0] — 2026-09-02
|
||||
|
||||
### Fixed
|
||||
|
||||
- `ld/profile`: `find_by_drive_id` no longer mis-binds a drive whose reported `product_id` is real but not catalogued to a sibling model's profile. The product-id-blind loose match is now gated on an empty product id, so a wrong profile — and its wrong LibreDrive microcode — can't be selected for a drive that does report a product id.
|
||||
|
||||
### Changed
|
||||
|
||||
- Version aligned to 1.7.0 for the unified release.
|
||||
|
||||
### Docs
|
||||
|
||||
- Added a third-party NOTICE clarifying that the LibreDrive microcode bundled in `src/ld/profiles.json` is proprietary MakeMKV material, not covered by this repository's MIT license.
|
||||
|
||||
## [1.6.14] — 2026-08-31
|
||||
|
||||
### Changed
|
||||
|
||||
Generated
+454
@@ -0,0 +1,454 @@
|
||||
# This file is automatically @generated by Cargo.
|
||||
# It is not intended for manual editing.
|
||||
version = 4
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "aes"
|
||||
version = "0.9.2"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "f8eb277bec05f56a0e0591f155a484cbd0f4f07ff2905051a48c72f004f7ed58"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"cipher",
|
||||
"cpubits",
|
||||
"cpufeatures 0.3.1",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "autocfg"
|
||||
version = "1.5.1"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "f2032f911046de80f0a198e0901378627c33f59ea0ac00e363d481118bd70a53"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "base64"
|
||||
version = "0.23.1"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "ac07cdecf99051d9a5238b80f35af32cdeba5b336e55d957b318b50137e18da5"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "block-buffer"
|
||||
version = "0.10.4"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "3078c7629b62d3f0439517fa394996acacc5cbc91c5a20d8c658e77abd503a71"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"generic-array",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "block-buffer"
|
||||
version = "0.12.1"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "d2f6c7dbe95a6ed67ad9f18e57daf93a2f034c524b99fd2b76d18fdfeb6660aa"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"hybrid-array",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "cfg-if"
|
||||
version = "1.0.4"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "9330f8b2ff13f34540b44e946ef35111825727b38d33286ef986142615121801"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "chacha20"
|
||||
version = "0.10.2"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "65c35e4b699c7e15ccbe7ee35c005e4fc0a278d22238a2857e6ce2dadeda1b06"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"cfg-if",
|
||||
"cpufeatures 0.3.1",
|
||||
"rand_core",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "cipher"
|
||||
version = "0.5.2"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "e8cf2a2c93cd704877c0858356ed03480ff301ee950b43f1cbe4573b088bfa6c"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"crypto-common 0.2.2",
|
||||
"inout",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "const-oid"
|
||||
version = "0.10.2"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "a6ef517f0926dd24a1582492c791b6a4818a4d94e789a334894aa15b0d12f55c"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "cpubits"
|
||||
version = "0.1.1"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "15b85f9c39137c3a891689859392b1bd49812121d0d61c9caf00d46ed5ce06ae"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "cpufeatures"
|
||||
version = "0.2.17"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "59ed5838eebb26a2bb2e58f6d5b5316989ae9d08bab10e0e6d103e656d1b0280"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"libc",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "cpufeatures"
|
||||
version = "0.3.1"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "5ca28b0ae3115b884660db4118d803791fd6756b6e88f39c0f3f7859060d7566"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"libc",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "crypto-common"
|
||||
version = "0.1.7"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "78c8292055d1c1df0cce5d180393dc8cce0abec0a7102adb6c7b1eef6016d60a"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"generic-array",
|
||||
"typenum",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "crypto-common"
|
||||
version = "0.2.2"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "ce6e4c961d6cd6c9a86db418387425e8bdeaf05b3c8bc1411e6dca4c252f1453"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"hybrid-array",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "digest"
|
||||
version = "0.10.7"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "9ed9a281f7bc9b7576e61468ba615a66a5c8cfdff42420a70aa82701a3b1e292"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"block-buffer 0.10.4",
|
||||
"crypto-common 0.1.7",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "digest"
|
||||
version = "0.11.3"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "f1dd6dbb5841937940781866fa1281a1ff7bd3bf827091440879f9994983d5c2"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"block-buffer 0.12.1",
|
||||
"const-oid",
|
||||
"crypto-common 0.2.2",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "freemkv-unlock"
|
||||
version = "1.6.14"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"aes",
|
||||
"base64",
|
||||
"num-bigint",
|
||||
"num-traits",
|
||||
"rand",
|
||||
"serde",
|
||||
"serde_json",
|
||||
"sha1",
|
||||
"sha2",
|
||||
"tracing",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "generic-array"
|
||||
version = "0.14.7"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "85649ca51fd72272d7821adaf274ad91c288277713d9c18820d8499a7ff69e9a"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"typenum",
|
||||
"version_check",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "getrandom"
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
checksum = "300e883d756b2e4ec94e02791f39b04b522276138852cfc41d9fb7e904106099"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"cfg-if",
|
||||
"libc",
|
||||
"r-efi",
|
||||
"rand_core",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "hybrid-array"
|
||||
version = "0.4.14"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "707114b52a152fa7bdb290cd7cd5912d9467273b6d74e21b8d81aca1f8533f6b"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"typenum",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "inout"
|
||||
version = "0.2.2"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "4250ce6452e92010fdf7268ccc5d14faa80bb12fc741938534c58f16804e03c7"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"hybrid-array",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "itoa"
|
||||
version = "1.0.18"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "8f42a60cbdf9a97f5d2305f08a87dc4e09308d1276d28c869c684d7777685682"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "libc"
|
||||
version = "0.2.189"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
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|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "memchr"
|
||||
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|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "cf8baf1c55e62ffcace7a9f06f4bd9cd3f0c4beb022d3b367256b91b87513d98"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "num-bigint"
|
||||
version = "0.5.1"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "93e7820bc0a80a0238e650327316f929ba18d5be054b647490a3a6a339f3e7c0"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"num-integer",
|
||||
"num-traits",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "num-integer"
|
||||
version = "0.1.47"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "7ce2d95d4b3734dc35aa2f45e1aa22cd416814592a4f9d9205e11affd5b8e10b"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"num-traits",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "num-traits"
|
||||
version = "0.2.19"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "071dfc062690e90b734c0b2273ce72ad0ffa95f0c74596bc250dcfd960262841"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"autocfg",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "once_cell"
|
||||
version = "1.21.4"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "9f7c3e4beb33f85d45ae3e3a1792185706c8e16d043238c593331cc7cd313b50"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "pin-project-lite"
|
||||
version = "0.2.17"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "a89322df9ebe1c1578d689c92318e070967d1042b512afbe49518723f4e6d5cd"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "proc-macro2"
|
||||
version = "1.0.107"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "985e7ec9bb745e6ce6535b544d84d6cd6f7ad8bd711c398938ae983b91a766d9"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"unicode-ident",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "quote"
|
||||
version = "1.0.47"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "1fbf4db142a473a8d80c26bbf18454ed458bf8d26c8219c331daecfdbd079001"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"proc-macro2",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "r-efi"
|
||||
version = "6.0.0"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "f8dcc9c7d52a811697d2151c701e0d08956f92b0e24136cf4cf27b57a6a0d9bf"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "rand"
|
||||
version = "0.10.2"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "c7f5fa3a058cd35567ef9bfa5e75732bee0f9e4c55fa90477bef2dfcdbc4be80"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"chacha20",
|
||||
"getrandom",
|
||||
"rand_core",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "rand_core"
|
||||
version = "0.10.1"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "63b8176103e19a2643978565ca18b50549f6101881c443590420e4dc998a3c69"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "serde"
|
||||
version = "1.0.229"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "4148590afebada386688f18773da617792bf2ef03ffc1e4cbd2b1d45b023e0ba"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"serde_core",
|
||||
"serde_derive",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "serde_core"
|
||||
version = "1.0.229"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "67dca2c9c51e58a4791a4b1ed58308b39c64224d349a935ab5039aa360942a48"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"serde_derive",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "serde_derive"
|
||||
version = "1.0.229"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "e7a5d71263a5a7d47b41f6b3f06ba276f10cc18b0931f1799f710578e2309348"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"proc-macro2",
|
||||
"quote",
|
||||
"syn 3.0.4",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "serde_json"
|
||||
version = "1.0.151"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "c841b55ecdae098c80dcae9cf767f6f8a0c2cdb3416bbef72181df4d0fe73f14"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"itoa",
|
||||
"memchr",
|
||||
"serde",
|
||||
"serde_core",
|
||||
"zmij",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "sha1"
|
||||
version = "0.10.7"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "a978451301f4db1d02937a4ab3ccce137717b81826e79b7d49ffe3244a13c3b8"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"cfg-if",
|
||||
"cpufeatures 0.2.17",
|
||||
"digest 0.10.7",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "sha2"
|
||||
version = "0.11.0"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "446ba717509524cb3f22f17ecc096f10f4822d76ab5c0b9822c5f9c284e825f4"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"cfg-if",
|
||||
"cpufeatures 0.3.1",
|
||||
"digest 0.11.3",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "syn"
|
||||
version = "2.0.119"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "872831b642d1a07999a962a351ed35b955ea2cfc8f3862091e2a240a84f17297"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"proc-macro2",
|
||||
"quote",
|
||||
"unicode-ident",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "syn"
|
||||
version = "3.0.4"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "e6275cddf4610d1775e6d1fe9469b2e77d0f39fd98fb7450901b821e0c53649f"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"proc-macro2",
|
||||
"quote",
|
||||
"unicode-ident",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "tracing"
|
||||
version = "0.1.44"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "63e71662fa4b2a2c3a26f570f037eb95bb1f85397f3cd8076caed2f026a6d100"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"pin-project-lite",
|
||||
"tracing-attributes",
|
||||
"tracing-core",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "tracing-attributes"
|
||||
version = "0.1.31"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "7490cfa5ec963746568740651ac6781f701c9c5ea257c58e057f3ba8cf69e8da"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"proc-macro2",
|
||||
"quote",
|
||||
"syn 2.0.119",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "tracing-core"
|
||||
version = "0.1.36"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "db97caf9d906fbde555dd62fa95ddba9eecfd14cb388e4f491a66d74cd5fb79a"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"once_cell",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "typenum"
|
||||
version = "1.20.1"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "b6f5e870be6c3b371b77fe0ee0bafb859fa4964b4404c27de1d380043c4dda20"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "unicode-ident"
|
||||
version = "1.0.24"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "e6e4313cd5fcd3dad5cafa179702e2b244f760991f45397d14d4ebf38247da75"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "version_check"
|
||||
version = "0.9.5"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "0b928f33d975fc6ad9f86c8f283853ad26bdd5b10b7f1542aa2fa15e2289105a"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "zmij"
|
||||
version = "1.0.23"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "29666d0abbfad1e3dc4dcf6144730dd3a3ab225bbbdac83319345b1b44ccfc1b"
|
||||
|
||||
[[patch.unused]]
|
||||
name = "freemkv-engine"
|
||||
version = "1.6.14"
|
||||
|
||||
[[patch.unused]]
|
||||
name = "freemkv-i18n"
|
||||
version = "1.6.14"
|
||||
|
||||
[[patch.unused]]
|
||||
name = "freemkv-keysources"
|
||||
version = "1.6.14"
|
||||
|
||||
[[patch.unused]]
|
||||
name = "libfreemkv"
|
||||
version = "1.6.14"
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
[package]
|
||||
name = "freemkv-unlock"
|
||||
version = "1.6.14"
|
||||
version = "1.7.0"
|
||||
edition = "2024"
|
||||
rust-version = "1.88"
|
||||
license = "MIT"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
NOTICE — Third-Party Drive Microcode
|
||||
====================================
|
||||
|
||||
freemkv-unlock's own source code is licensed under the MIT License (see LICENSE).
|
||||
The MIT License does NOT cover the drive-microcode payloads bundled in
|
||||
`src/ld/profiles.json`.
|
||||
|
||||
Those payloads are volatile, RAM-only optical-drive microcode ("LibreDrive")
|
||||
authored and owned by the MakeMKV team (GuinpinSoft inc.). Each payload embeds
|
||||
its own copyright notice, e.g.:
|
||||
|
||||
"This is volatile RAM-only microcode for LibreDrive by MakeMKV -
|
||||
http://www.makemkv.com/libredrive/
|
||||
Copyright (c) MakeMKV team, all rights reserved."
|
||||
|
||||
They are included solely to recognize supported drives and perform the
|
||||
non-persistent, RAM-only unlock in interoperation with MakeMKV's LibreDrive, on
|
||||
drives their owners already possess. They are third-party proprietary material —
|
||||
**Copyright (c) MakeMKV team, all rights reserved** — and are **NOT** licensed
|
||||
under MIT. No ownership is claimed or transferred.
|
||||
|
||||
freemkv is an independent project, not affiliated with, endorsed by, or
|
||||
sponsored by MakeMKV / GuinpinSoft inc. With thanks to the MakeMKV team for
|
||||
LibreDrive. See https://www.makemkv.com/ and http://www.makemkv.com/libredrive/.
|
||||
@@ -36,4 +36,13 @@ for u in freemkv_unlock::all_unlockers() {
|
||||
To remove an unlocker, delete its module directory and its one line in
|
||||
`all_unlockers()` — nothing else changes.
|
||||
|
||||
License: MIT.
|
||||
## License
|
||||
|
||||
freemkv-unlock's own source is MIT — see [LICENSE](LICENSE).
|
||||
|
||||
`src/ld/profiles.json` bundles volatile, RAM-only **LibreDrive** microcode
|
||||
authored and owned by the **MakeMKV team** (GuinpinSoft inc.) — *Copyright (c)
|
||||
MakeMKV team, all rights reserved.* That microcode is third-party proprietary
|
||||
material, **not** covered by the MIT license; no ownership is claimed. See
|
||||
[`NOTICE`](NOTICE). With thanks to the MakeMKV team for
|
||||
[LibreDrive](http://www.makemkv.com/libredrive/).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""comment-guard: cap explanatory prose by COMMENT INTENT, not visibility.
|
||||
|
||||
Three tiers, keyed on the syntax the author reached for:
|
||||
|
||||
* `//!` / `/*!` — a module (or crate) design doc. UNBOUNDED. There is one per
|
||||
file, at the top, documenting the module as a whole, so it can't be used to
|
||||
smuggle per-item rationale the way item docs can. Long correctness / design
|
||||
essays (e.g. a memory-ordering proof) legitimately live here.
|
||||
* `///` / `/** */` — item documentation. Up to DOC_CAP *prose* lines. Fenced
|
||||
``` code blocks do NOT count, so real examples aren't punished. This holds
|
||||
whether or not the item is `pub`: a `pub(crate)` fn deserves a real doc
|
||||
paragraph just like a `pub` one. Capping `///` here (rather than exempting
|
||||
it, as the old guard did — issue #17) is what stops rationale being hidden
|
||||
behind a doc sigil, while still leaving room for a genuine paragraph.
|
||||
* `//` / `/* */` — a quick internal aside. Up to INLINE_CAP lines. This is the
|
||||
shape that sprawls into walls, so it's kept tight: stanzas separated by a
|
||||
single blank line count CUMULATIVELY, so one essay can't be split into runs.
|
||||
|
||||
Overflow belongs in the module `//!`, or in docs/<topic>.md with a one-line `//`
|
||||
pointer — both show up in review.
|
||||
|
||||
Scans src/ and tests/ under the given root (default cwd). `--selftest` runs
|
||||
built-in cases. Exit non-zero if any block exceeds its cap.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
|
||||
INLINE_CAP = 3
|
||||
DOC_CAP = 8
|
||||
|
||||
_RAW_OPEN = re.compile(r'r(#*)"') # raw string opener: r"…", r#"…"#, br##"…"## …
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _strip_line_comment(s):
|
||||
"""Return (kind, body) for a whole-line comment, else (None, None).
|
||||
|
||||
kind is 'doc' for `///`/`//!`, 'plain' for other `//`. A trailing comment on
|
||||
a code line is not a whole-line comment and is ignored (single-line, cheap).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if s.startswith("//!"):
|
||||
return "doc", s[3:]
|
||||
if s.startswith("///") and not s.startswith("////"):
|
||||
return "doc", s[3:]
|
||||
if s.startswith("//"):
|
||||
return "plain", s[2:]
|
||||
return None, None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _fence_toggle(body):
|
||||
"""True if this doc body line opens/closes a ``` fenced code block."""
|
||||
return body.strip().startswith("```")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _classify(lines):
|
||||
"""Yield per-line dicts: comment kind ('doc'/'plain'/None), doc-ness of
|
||||
block comments, and code info. Block comments are tracked across lines.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
info = []
|
||||
in_block = False
|
||||
block_is_doc = False
|
||||
raw_hashes = None # None = not in a raw string; int N = open, needs '"' + N*'#'
|
||||
for raw in lines:
|
||||
s = raw.lstrip()
|
||||
rec = {"raw": raw, "s": s, "comment": None, "is_doc": False, "code": False}
|
||||
# Inside a raw string literal (e.g. an embedded HTML/CSS/JS asset): the
|
||||
# bytes are string data, not Rust comments, so the guard is blind to them
|
||||
# until the string closes. Prevents `/* */` or `//` lines in an embedded
|
||||
# page from being counted as comment blocks.
|
||||
if raw_hashes is not None:
|
||||
if ('"' + "#" * raw_hashes) in raw:
|
||||
raw_hashes = None
|
||||
info.append(rec)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if in_block:
|
||||
rec["comment"] = "doc" if block_is_doc else "plain"
|
||||
rec["is_doc"] = block_is_doc
|
||||
if "*/" in raw:
|
||||
in_block = False
|
||||
info.append(rec)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
# A block comment only starts a comment-line if it's the first token.
|
||||
if s.startswith("/*"):
|
||||
rec["is_doc"] = s.startswith("/**") or s.startswith("/*!")
|
||||
rec["comment"] = "doc" if rec["is_doc"] else "plain"
|
||||
if "*/" not in s[2:]:
|
||||
in_block = True
|
||||
block_is_doc = rec["is_doc"]
|
||||
info.append(rec)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
kind, _ = _strip_line_comment(s)
|
||||
if kind is not None:
|
||||
rec["comment"] = kind
|
||||
rec["is_doc"] = kind == "doc"
|
||||
info.append(rec)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
# Code (or blank). Blank = empty after strip.
|
||||
rec["code"] = s != ""
|
||||
# A code line may OPEN a raw string that spans following lines. Detected
|
||||
# only on code (comments were handled above), so `// see r"x"` is safe.
|
||||
m = _RAW_OPEN.search(raw)
|
||||
if m and ('"' + "#" * len(m.group(1))) not in raw[m.end():]:
|
||||
raw_hashes = len(m.group(1))
|
||||
info.append(rec)
|
||||
return info
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def violations(path):
|
||||
lines = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").splitlines()
|
||||
info = _classify(lines)
|
||||
n = len(info)
|
||||
out = []
|
||||
|
||||
i = 0
|
||||
while i < n:
|
||||
rec = info[i]
|
||||
if rec["comment"] is None:
|
||||
i += 1
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
start = i
|
||||
if rec["is_doc"]:
|
||||
# Doc run: contiguous doc lines. `//!` / `/*!` module docs are
|
||||
# UNBOUNDED; any other doc run caps PROSE (fenced ``` excluded) at
|
||||
# DOC_CAP, regardless of the documented item's visibility.
|
||||
j = i
|
||||
prose = 0
|
||||
in_fence = False
|
||||
module_doc = False
|
||||
while j < n and info[j]["comment"] == "doc":
|
||||
s = info[j]["s"]
|
||||
if s.startswith("//!") or s.startswith("/*!"):
|
||||
module_doc = True
|
||||
body = (
|
||||
s[3:] if (s.startswith("///") or s.startswith("//!")) else s
|
||||
)
|
||||
if _fence_toggle(body):
|
||||
in_fence = not in_fence
|
||||
elif not in_fence and body.strip() != "":
|
||||
prose += 1
|
||||
j += 1
|
||||
if not module_doc and prose > DOC_CAP:
|
||||
out.append((start + 1, prose, DOC_CAP, "doc prose"))
|
||||
i = j
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
# Internal (plain) run, with single-blank bridging (cumulative).
|
||||
j = i
|
||||
count = 0
|
||||
while j < n:
|
||||
r = info[j]
|
||||
if r["comment"] == "plain":
|
||||
count += 1
|
||||
j += 1
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if r["comment"] == "doc":
|
||||
break
|
||||
if r["comment"] is None and not r["code"]:
|
||||
# blank: bridge only a SINGLE blank, else stop
|
||||
if j + 1 < n and info[j + 1]["comment"] == "plain":
|
||||
j += 1
|
||||
continue
|
||||
break
|
||||
break # code
|
||||
if count > INLINE_CAP:
|
||||
out.append((start + 1, count, INLINE_CAP, "inline comment"))
|
||||
i = j
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main(argv):
|
||||
if "--selftest" in argv:
|
||||
return _selftest()
|
||||
root = Path(argv[1]) if len(argv) > 1 else Path.cwd()
|
||||
files = sorted(p for d in ("src", "tests") for p in (root / d).rglob("*.rs"))
|
||||
total = 0
|
||||
for f in files:
|
||||
for start, length, cap, kind in violations(f):
|
||||
rel = f.relative_to(root)
|
||||
print(f"{rel}:{start}: {kind} block is {length} lines (max {cap})")
|
||||
total += 1
|
||||
if total:
|
||||
print(f"\ncomment-guard: {total} comment block(s) exceed their cap.")
|
||||
print(
|
||||
f"Inline // asides cap at {INLINE_CAP}; /// item-doc prose caps at "
|
||||
f"{DOC_CAP} (fenced examples excluded); //! module docs are unbounded. "
|
||||
"Trim, move the rationale into the module //!, or docs/<topic>.md "
|
||||
"with a // pointer."
|
||||
)
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _selftest():
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
|
||||
cases = [
|
||||
# (rust source, expected number of violations)
|
||||
# short /// doc -> ok
|
||||
("/// short doc\npub fn a() {}\n", 0),
|
||||
# /// on a PRIVATE item now gets the doc cap (8), so 4 lines is fine
|
||||
("/// l1\n/// l2\n/// l3\n/// l4\nfn priv_a() {}\n", 0),
|
||||
# ...but /// is NOT unlimited: 9 prose lines on a private item fails
|
||||
("".join(f"/// l{k}\n" for k in range(9)) + "fn priv_b() {}\n", 1),
|
||||
# 8 prose /// on a pub item -> ok (boundary)
|
||||
("".join(f"/// l{k}\n" for k in range(8)) + "pub fn c() {}\n", 0),
|
||||
# 9 prose /// on a pub item -> violation
|
||||
("".join(f"/// l{k}\n" for k in range(9)) + "pub fn d() {}\n", 1),
|
||||
# /// with a long fenced example -> example excluded, ok
|
||||
(
|
||||
"/// summary\n/// # Examples\n/// ```\n"
|
||||
+ "".join("/// code\n" for _ in range(12))
|
||||
+ "/// ```\npub fn e() {}\n",
|
||||
0,
|
||||
),
|
||||
# pub(crate) gets the SAME doc cap as pub (no pub/private split anymore)
|
||||
("".join(f"/// l{k}\n" for k in range(6)) + "pub(crate) fn f() {}\n", 0),
|
||||
# bare inline 4 lines -> violation
|
||||
("// a\n// b\n// c\n// d\nlet x = 1;\n", 1),
|
||||
# blank-split dodge: 3 + blank + 3 inline -> cumulative -> violation
|
||||
("// a\n// b\n// c\n\n// d\n// e\n// f\nfn z() {}\n", 1),
|
||||
# plain /* */ block, 5 lines -> inline cap -> violation
|
||||
("/* one\n two\n three\n four\n five */\nfn q() {}\n", 1),
|
||||
# comment-like lines INSIDE a raw string are string data, not comments
|
||||
(
|
||||
'const H: &str = r##"<style>\n'
|
||||
+ "".join("/* css note */\n" for _ in range(8))
|
||||
+ '</style>"##;\nfn h() {}\n',
|
||||
0,
|
||||
),
|
||||
# //! module doc may run long -> EXEMPT (no cap)
|
||||
("".join(f"//! l{k}\n" for k in range(40)) + "\npub fn m() {}\n", 0),
|
||||
# /*! block module doc may run long -> EXEMPT
|
||||
("/*! l0\n" + "".join(f" l{k}\n" for k in range(30)) + "*/\nfn n() {}\n", 0),
|
||||
]
|
||||
ok = True
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
|
||||
for idx, (src, want) in enumerate(cases):
|
||||
p = Path(d) / f"case{idx}.rs"
|
||||
p.write_text(src)
|
||||
got = len(violations(p))
|
||||
flag = "ok" if got == want else "FAIL"
|
||||
if got != want:
|
||||
ok = False
|
||||
print(f" selftest {idx}: want {want} got {got} [{flag}]")
|
||||
print("selftest PASSED" if ok else "selftest FAILED")
|
||||
return 0 if ok else 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
sys.exit(main(sys.argv))
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# cargo-deny — gates the RESOLVED dependency graph (issue #15).
|
||||
# Runs in CI against the committed Cargo.lock: RUSTSEC advisories, a permissive
|
||||
# licence allow-list, and source/ban hygiene. Update the lock (cargo update)
|
||||
# to clear an advisory rather than adding an `ignore` entry without cause.
|
||||
|
||||
[advisories]
|
||||
yanked = "deny"
|
||||
# ignore = ["RUSTSEC-0000-0000"] # only with a written justification
|
||||
|
||||
[licenses]
|
||||
# The whole tree is permissive. r-efi's LGPL arm is satisfied by Apache-2.0
|
||||
# (its expression is "Apache-2.0 OR LGPL-2.1-or-later"), so no copyleft is
|
||||
# allowed here. Add a licence only when a real dependency introduces it.
|
||||
allow = [
|
||||
"MIT",
|
||||
"Apache-2.0",
|
||||
"Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception",
|
||||
"0BSD",
|
||||
"Unicode-3.0",
|
||||
"Unlicense",
|
||||
"Zlib",
|
||||
"BSD-2-Clause",
|
||||
"BSD-3-Clause",
|
||||
"ISC",
|
||||
"CDLA-Permissive-2.0",
|
||||
]
|
||||
confidence-threshold = 0.9
|
||||
|
||||
[bans]
|
||||
multiple-versions = "warn" # transitive dupes (digest 0.10/0.11 etc.) are noise, not a gate
|
||||
wildcards = "deny"
|
||||
# The freemkv siblings resolve as path deps under CI's path-patch layout, which
|
||||
# reads as a wildcard version req. That is internal, not a supply-chain wildcard.
|
||||
allow-wildcard-paths = true
|
||||
|
||||
[sources]
|
||||
unknown-registry = "deny"
|
||||
unknown-git = "deny"
|
||||
# The freemkv siblings are first-party git-tag deps; allow git sources from
|
||||
# our own org only (CI resolves them as git, not the local path override).
|
||||
[sources.allow-org]
|
||||
github = ["freemkv"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
|
||||
# AACS bus authentication handshake
|
||||
|
||||
## Flow
|
||||
|
||||
1. Invalidate AGIDs → allocate fresh AGID
|
||||
2. Send host certificate + nonce
|
||||
3. Receive drive certificate + nonce
|
||||
4. Receive drive key point + signature, verify
|
||||
5. Sign host key point, send
|
||||
6. ECDH: host_priv × drive_key_point → bus key (low 128 bits of x)
|
||||
7. Read VID or Read Data Keys (encrypted with bus key)
|
||||
|
||||
## Why `scsi_read`/`scsi_write` check status at the seam
|
||||
|
||||
The contract this crate is built on (`ScsiTransport::execute`) returns `Ok`
|
||||
on a SCSI sense and `Err` ONLY on a transport-layer fault. These two helpers
|
||||
used to propagate the `?` and nothing else — so a CHECK CONDITION (`Ok`,
|
||||
non-zero `status`) handed the caller back its own ZERO-FILLED buffer and
|
||||
every REPORT/SEND KEY step consumed zeros as valid drive data: a drive
|
||||
certificate of zeros, a key point of zeros, a Volume ID of zeros, all
|
||||
reported as success. It has not fired in production only because the sole
|
||||
transport implementor violates the contract in the opposite direction (it
|
||||
returns `Err` for any non-zero status). Plugging in a CONFORMING transport
|
||||
would have turned the whole handshake into a zero-buffer success, so the
|
||||
status and the transferred length are checked here, at the seam.
|
||||
|
||||
## Why `scsi_write` shares this reasoning
|
||||
|
||||
Same contract reasoning as `scsi_read`: a drive that REFUSES the host
|
||||
certificate answers with `Ok` + CHECK CONDITION, and treating that as a
|
||||
successful send carried the handshake on against a drive that never
|
||||
accepted it.
|
||||
|
||||
## `ec_mul` design notes
|
||||
|
||||
**Constant-time tradeoff:** this branches on `scalar.bit(0)` and clones
|
||||
BigUints per iteration, so its timing is data-dependent on the secret scalar
|
||||
(the long-term host private key in `ecdsa_sign`, the ephemeral key in ECDH).
|
||||
This is deliberate: the handshake runs once per disc against a local optical
|
||||
drive, so throughput and the narrow local-timing surface do not justify
|
||||
pulling in a vetted constant-time backend. Revisit if this ever signs in a
|
||||
remote/shared context.
|
||||
|
||||
**Cofactor:** both AACS curves used here have cofactor 1, so a point that
|
||||
lies on the curve is automatically in the prime-order subgroup — no
|
||||
small-subgroup defense / `n·P == O` check is required for the inputs this is
|
||||
called with.
|
||||
|
||||
## `verify_cert_p256` — provisional AACS 2.0 cert layout
|
||||
|
||||
Verifies an AACS 2.0 drive certificate (type 0x11) against an AACS 2.0 LA
|
||||
key. PROVISIONAL LAYOUT — the byte offsets below are NOT yet confirmed
|
||||
against a genuine AACS 2.0 cert, and no such cert exists on this machine to
|
||||
pin them (an exhaustive hunt found only 2.0 *content* certs, a different
|
||||
format; a real host/drive AKE cert needs a live USB/SCSI capture). What IS
|
||||
confirmed: first, the P-256/SHA-256 ECDSA primitive and curve constants are
|
||||
correct (`ecdsa_verify_p256_verifies_a_genuine_aacs2_content_cert` verifies a
|
||||
real 2.0 content cert under the published CC key); second, the 132-byte
|
||||
4-byte-header framing MATCHES the step-6 drive-key message (x[4..36] /
|
||||
y[36..68] / r[68..100] / s[100..132]), the natural 20→32-byte scaling of the
|
||||
established AACS 1.0 84-byte key-message framing.
|
||||
|
||||
What is NOT confirmed: that a *certificate* shares that framing. No known
|
||||
implementation verifies 2.0 certs against a confirmed layout (the published
|
||||
spec draft leaves that format ambiguous), and the AACS 2.0 draft architecture
|
||||
lists the 2.0 host cert (type 0x12) with a 6-byte Host ID + a NEW 4-byte
|
||||
paired-Device-Key-Set field before the 64-byte public key — implying a
|
||||
~140–144-byte cert with the pubkey near offset 12–16 and a signed range of
|
||||
~76–80 bytes, NOT 68. The drive cert (type 0x11) has no paired-DKS field
|
||||
(~140 bytes, pubkey ~[12..76], signed ~first 76). So the offsets HERE
|
||||
(pubkey [4..68], signed [..68]) are a best-effort self-consistent
|
||||
placeholder, chosen to match the confirmed key message; they will almost
|
||||
certainly move when a real cert lands (see the `#[ignore]` real-cert slot).
|
||||
This matters for USEFULNESS, not SAFETY: a wrong signed range makes
|
||||
verification FAIL, and since the caller treats a verify failure as FATAL,
|
||||
the path fails CLOSED (rejects) rather than trusting anything — never the
|
||||
reverse.
|
||||
|
||||
The `>= 132` guard keeps the `cert[100..132]` slice safe while letting a
|
||||
full-length cert reach verification (the old `>= 138` guard rejected every
|
||||
132-byte input unconditionally).
|
||||
|
||||
The LA anchor is a PARAMETER, not the compiled-in constant, so a unit test
|
||||
can drive the whole chain under a test LA keypair (sign a synthetic drive
|
||||
cert, prove it is accepted / a bad-sig cert is rejected) without the real
|
||||
anchor's private half, which no one has. Production always threads
|
||||
`AACS2_LA_PUB_X/Y` from `aacs2_authenticate_p256`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Why an unknown drive-cert type must be rejected
|
||||
|
||||
This used to be an `if` / `else if` with NO `else`, so an unknown type
|
||||
(e.g. 0x02) fell straight through: `is_aacs20` stayed false, so the step-6
|
||||
key-signature check still ran — against `cert_pub_key(drive_cert)`, the
|
||||
drive's OWN key lifted out of a cert that was never checked against the LA.
|
||||
A rogue USB bridge could set byte 0 to 0x02, present its own keypair, sign
|
||||
`host_nonce || drive_key_point`, and the handshake would return Ok with an
|
||||
attacker-chosen bus key. The chain of trust must not appear to have run
|
||||
when it did not.
|
||||
|
||||
## AACS 2.0 chain-of-trust gate (`aacs2_authenticate_p256_with_agid`)
|
||||
|
||||
The SAME shape the AACS 1.0 sibling (`aacs_authenticate_with_agid`)
|
||||
enforces, now MANDATORY because this path is live. Two distinct rejections,
|
||||
both BEFORE any drive key is trusted:
|
||||
|
||||
**(a) Cert TYPE gate.** An AACS 2.0 drive cert is type 0x11. Anything else
|
||||
is unexpected on the native P-256 AKE and is REJECTED here, never allowed to
|
||||
fall through. The earlier `if type==0x11 && !verify` form left NO branch for
|
||||
a non-0x11 type: a rogue bridge could send a type-0x10 (or any) cert, skip
|
||||
verification entirely, and still reach the step-6 key check against
|
||||
`cert_pub_key_p256(drive_cert)` — its OWN key, lifted from a cert the LA
|
||||
never signed — winning an attacker-chosen bus key. The chain of trust must
|
||||
not merely LOOK like it ran.
|
||||
|
||||
**(b) Cert VERIFY is FATAL.** A type-0x11 cert whose P-256/SHA-256 signature
|
||||
does not verify under the real 2.0 LA anchor (`AACS2_LA_PUB`, on-curve — see
|
||||
`la_anchor_keys_are_on_curve`) is REJECTED, not logged-and-continued.
|
||||
`ecdsa_verify_p256` range/curve-checks every point (`point_on_curve`), so a
|
||||
forged or off-curve cert key cannot slip past. The previous "non-fatal for
|
||||
backward compat" behaviour was the exact hole the SECURITY note demanded be
|
||||
closed before wiring.
|
||||
|
||||
## `run_cert_handshake` — cert-agnostic AKE selection
|
||||
|
||||
The AACS 1.0 host cert is always present and is tried FIRST: an AACS 2.0
|
||||
drive accepts a 1.0 host cert for backward compatibility, which is enough to
|
||||
learn the Volume ID. If the drive REFUSES the 1.0 cert (a plain cert-level
|
||||
rejection — NOT a dead or wedged bus) and THIS host cert also carries AACS
|
||||
2.0 (P-256) credentials, fall back to the native P-256 AKE.
|
||||
|
||||
This does NOT branch on "do we possess 2.0 certs?" as a feature switch: it
|
||||
consumes whatever the supplied `HostCert` carries, exactly as the 1.0 path
|
||||
consumes `hc.certificate`. A host cert without v2 credentials simply has
|
||||
nothing more to present and keeps its 1.0 error; a host cert WITH them
|
||||
drives the P-256 AKE the moment the drive asks for it. When a real 2.0 host
|
||||
cert is supplied at runtime, the P-256 handshake runs — no code change, no
|
||||
possession gate.
|
||||
|
||||
A transport fault on the 1.0 attempt short-circuits the fallback:
|
||||
re-running the P-256 AKE against a bus that is gone re-issues AGID
|
||||
invalidation + SEND/REPORT KEY for nothing and buries the real (replug)
|
||||
cause. The `Err` arm below still classifies it as `Transport`.
|
||||
|
||||
## AACS 2.0 (P-256) host-certificate handshake — live-path test plumbing
|
||||
|
||||
No genuine 2.0 host cert exists for us to sign with (a side agent is hunting
|
||||
one; see the `#[ignore]` slot at the end). So the tests below prove the
|
||||
PLUMBING under a self-generated test LA keypair: a 132-byte drive cert
|
||||
signed by the test LA is threaded through the SAME code the production
|
||||
anchor uses, only the anchor differs (a parameter, not a recompile). The
|
||||
layout mirrored is the code's self-consistent 4-byte-header framing —
|
||||
header(4)+pub_x(32)+pub_y(32)+sig_r(32)+sig_s(32)=132, LA signs SHA-256 over
|
||||
cert[..68] — identical to the step-6 drive-key message framing and the
|
||||
156-byte SEND KEY host-cert payload (4+20 nonce+132 cert).
|
||||
|
||||
## `ecdsa_verify_p256_verifies_a_genuine_aacs2_content_cert` — why it matters
|
||||
|
||||
SANITY: `ecdsa_verify_p256` + the P-256 curve constants + SHA-256 are correct
|
||||
against GENUINE AACS 2.0 material. No real 2.0 host/drive AKE cert exists
|
||||
anywhere on this machine (an exhaustive hunt found none — it needs a live
|
||||
USB/SCSI AKE capture), but a real AACS 2.0 CONTENT certificate does
|
||||
(`research/aacs/iso-aacs/CivilWar/Content000.cer`, type 0x10, 232 bytes). It
|
||||
is signed by the AACS 2.0 *Content Cert* key (P-256/SHA-256, 64-byte
|
||||
signature over the first `signed_len` bytes) — a DIFFERENT key for a
|
||||
DIFFERENT purpose than the AKE LA anchor, but it exercises the EXACT same
|
||||
`ecdsa_verify_p256` primitive `verify_cert_p256` relies on; only the pubkey
|
||||
and the offsets differ. Proving it verifies here pins that the P-256
|
||||
ECDSA/SHA-256 math and the `point_on_curve` gate are right, so when a
|
||||
genuine 2.0 host/drive cert (and its correct signed range) lands, only the
|
||||
offsets — not the crypto — remain to be fixed.
|
||||
|
||||
The CC pubkey is the published AACS 2.0 Content Certificate public key
|
||||
(P-256). Corrupting any `P256_*` constant, or removing SHA-256, makes this
|
||||
real-vector verification go red.
|
||||
|
||||
## Cert support
|
||||
|
||||
- AACS 1.0: custom 160-bit curve, SHA-1, 20-byte keys
|
||||
- AACS 2.0: an AACS 2.0 drive accepts an AACS 1.0 host cert for backward
|
||||
compatibility (that yields the Volume ID), and the native P-256/SHA-256
|
||||
AACS 2.0 AKE is the fallback when the drive refuses the 1.0 cert AND the
|
||||
supplied host cert carries AACS 2.0 (P-256) credentials. Both paths are
|
||||
LIVE and share the same chain-of-trust hardening; see
|
||||
`run_cert_handshake` for the cert-agnostic dispatch.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
|
||||
# `DriveProfile` field visibility and `allow(dead_code)`
|
||||
|
||||
Only `identity` and `signature` are public — they are what the catalog is
|
||||
public FOR ("is this drive supported?", and the emulator's impersonation).
|
||||
Everything below them is unlock MECHANISM: the MediaTek firmware image and
|
||||
the per-drive vendor CDB templates. `Cargo.toml` says this crate is never
|
||||
published because it carries drive firmware; re-exporting `DriveProfile`
|
||||
with a `pub firmware: Vec<u8>` handed that firmware, and every vendor CDB,
|
||||
to any downstream crate that called `ld::profile()`. They are `pub(crate)`
|
||||
so the mechanism stays inside the unlocker.
|
||||
|
||||
`allow(dead_code)`: this is the on-disk catalog schema, and several
|
||||
captured CDB templates have no in-crate consumer yet. They were `pub`
|
||||
before, so the compiler saw the (external) use; making them `pub(crate)`
|
||||
is what exposes them as unread. Deleting them would silently drop fields
|
||||
from the format the profile-extraction pipeline emits.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
|
||||
# Module visibility rationale (`src/lib.rs`)
|
||||
|
||||
Why each unlocker module is `pub mod` or `mod`, and what's actually public
|
||||
about it. The consumer never reaches an unlocker impl directly — only through
|
||||
[`all_unlockers`] — so "public" here means "exposes something other than the
|
||||
unlocker impl itself."
|
||||
|
||||
## `ld`
|
||||
|
||||
Public ONLY for its drive-profile catalog (`ld::profiles` / the `Profiles`
|
||||
object) and, under the `emulation` feature, the unlock-handshake wire format
|
||||
the bdemu test-emulator needs. The unlocker impl itself (`Mt1959Unlocker`) is
|
||||
`pub(crate)` — clients still reach unlockers only through `all_unlockers`.
|
||||
`aacs` and `css` carry no such public catalog, so they stay fully private.
|
||||
|
||||
## `renesas`
|
||||
|
||||
Public for its `is_renesas` drive-probe, which reports a dead bus as
|
||||
`Err(UnlockError::Transport)` rather than "not a Renesas drive" — a
|
||||
distinction the consumer needs before it can trust a negative probe result.
|
||||
The unlocker impl (`Renesas`) is `pub(crate)` — reached only through
|
||||
`all_unlockers`.
|
||||
|
||||
## `freemkv`
|
||||
|
||||
Carries no public catalog (the firmware self-identifies rather than matching
|
||||
a bundled profile) and no emulation wire format yet, so it stays fully
|
||||
private — the unlocker impl (`FreemkvUnlocker`) is reached only through
|
||||
`all_unlockers`.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
# `scsi::mock` — crate-wide mock transport
|
||||
|
||||
The crate-wide mock transport. Before this existed, EVERY mock in the crate
|
||||
returned `Ok` with status 0 and a full `bytes_transferred` — so no test could
|
||||
ever exercise the three outcomes the contract actually distinguishes, and a
|
||||
whole class of transport-fault misclassification bugs sat uncaught (a dead bus
|
||||
read as "this unlocker doesn't apply", a zero-filled buffer read as valid
|
||||
drive data). This fixture can express all of them, and is the red-before-green
|
||||
vehicle for the transport-contract fixes across ld / aacs / css / renesas.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
||||
# Why `Unlocked`'s `Debug` impl is hand-written
|
||||
|
||||
`Unlocked` is the public carrier that leaves this crate, and both `bus_key`
|
||||
(the AACS bus key) and `vid` (the Volume ID that feeds VUK derivation) are key
|
||||
material that must never reach a log or a test-failure message in plaintext.
|
||||
The `AacsAuth` / `CertHandshake` siblings already redact; a derived `Debug`
|
||||
here would print the very bytes they hide.
|
||||
|
||||
Presence is still observable (`Some`/`None`) so a log can say WHETHER a key
|
||||
was obtained without revealing WHAT it is.
|
||||
+197
-544
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+3
-5
@@ -149,11 +149,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
let _ = AacsCert::new();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// THE full success path through `Unlocker::unlock_bus` itself: a
|
||||
/// self-consistent AACS 1.0 drive emulator carries auth + VID + data-key
|
||||
/// reads all the way to `Ok(Unlocked { .. })`, so the crate's public entry
|
||||
/// point — not just `run_cert_handshake` underneath it — is proven to wire
|
||||
/// `volume_id` and `read_data_key` into `Unlocked` correctly.
|
||||
// Full success path through `Unlocker::unlock_bus`: a self-consistent
|
||||
// AACS 1.0 emulator proves the public entry point (not just
|
||||
// `run_cert_handshake`) wires `volume_id`/`read_data_key` into `Unlocked`.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn unlock_bus_succeeds_end_to_end() {
|
||||
let mut t = handshake::tests::DriveEmu::new();
|
||||
|
||||
+3
-4
@@ -104,10 +104,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// `is_transport_failure` is false for `CssAuthFailed`, false for a
|
||||
/// `Scsi` error carrying a sense (a drive rejection, not a dead bus) even
|
||||
/// at the transport-failure status, and true only for the genuine
|
||||
/// transport fault (status + no sense).
|
||||
// False for `CssAuthFailed` and for a `Scsi` error with a sense (a
|
||||
// drive rejection, not a dead bus) even at transport-failure status;
|
||||
// true only for the genuine transport fault (status + no sense).
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn is_transport_failure_false_paths() {
|
||||
assert!(!Error::CssAuthFailed.is_transport_failure());
|
||||
|
||||
+97
-224
@@ -12,18 +12,9 @@ mod error;
|
||||
use crate::css::error::{Error, Result, step_err};
|
||||
use crate::scsi::{DataDirection, ScsiTransport};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Issue ONE CSS bus-auth CDB, honouring the transport contract.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The single seam every bus-auth step now goes through. It closes two holes
|
||||
/// that each step open-coded before:
|
||||
/// * `Err` was collapsed to `CssAuthFailed`, so a dead bus looked like "this
|
||||
/// unlocker doesn't apply" and the consumer kept probing it ([`step_err`]);
|
||||
/// * `Ok` was never inspected, but per the contract a CHECK CONDITION arrives
|
||||
/// as `Ok` with a non-zero `status` — so a refused command handed the step
|
||||
/// back its own zero-filled buffer to parse as drive data.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// `min_bytes` is the number of bytes the step must actually receive (0 for a
|
||||
/// write / no-data command, whose transferred count no transport promises).
|
||||
// Issue ONE CSS bus-auth CDB, honouring the transport contract: treats a
|
||||
// non-zero status as CssAuthFailed and checks bytes_transferred >= min_bytes
|
||||
// rather than trusting an unfilled buffer. See docs/css-mod.md#css_scsi.
|
||||
fn css_scsi(
|
||||
scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport,
|
||||
cdb: &[u8],
|
||||
@@ -209,13 +200,9 @@ impl Default for DvdUnlocker {
|
||||
|
||||
impl crate::Unlocker for DvdUnlocker {
|
||||
fn name(&self) -> &'static str {
|
||||
// User-facing unlocker label. This unlocker's job is the DVD
|
||||
// read-enablement bus-auth (it clears the drive's scrambled-read
|
||||
// barrier and learns no key) — a property of the DVD medium, NOT of
|
||||
// whether the content happens to be CSS-scrambled. Reporting it as
|
||||
// "DVD" is honest: on any DVD the bus-auth ran; the CSS descramble
|
||||
// itself is keyless and handled downstream, so it is not a separate
|
||||
// "did an unlocker run" signal.
|
||||
// "DVD" names the medium this bus-auth unlocks, not the CSS scheme:
|
||||
// the bus-auth runs on any DVD regardless of whether the content is
|
||||
// actually scrambled. See docs/css-mod.md#dvdunlocker-name.
|
||||
"DVD"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -227,10 +214,9 @@ impl crate::Unlocker for DvdUnlocker {
|
||||
scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport,
|
||||
_ctx: &crate::UnlockCtx,
|
||||
) -> std::result::Result<crate::Unlocked, crate::UnlockError> {
|
||||
// Self-guard against the hardware — do NOT trust the caller-declared
|
||||
// DiscKind alone. If the drive does not report a DVD profile, refuse
|
||||
// (NotApplicable) WITHOUT issuing any CSS CDB, so a mis-routed
|
||||
// Blu-ray/UHD is never sent CSS bus-auth.
|
||||
// Self-guard against the hardware, not just the caller-declared
|
||||
// DiscKind: refuse (NotApplicable) without issuing any CSS CDB when
|
||||
// the drive doesn't report a DVD profile.
|
||||
if !mounted_disc_is_dvd(scsi)? {
|
||||
tracing::debug!(
|
||||
target: "freemkv::css",
|
||||
@@ -247,14 +233,9 @@ impl crate::Unlocker for DvdUnlocker {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Transport-level "is the mounted disc a DVD?" probe (GET CONFIGURATION
|
||||
/// current-profile, DVD family `0x0010..=0x001F`). Lets the DvdUnlocker
|
||||
/// self-verify against the drive instead of trusting the caller's DiscKind.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// `Err(Transport)` on a dead bus. This is the FIRST command the DVD unlocker
|
||||
/// issues, and its match had no `Err` arm at all: a transport fault fell into
|
||||
/// `_ => false`, which the caller turned into `NotApplicable` — a dead bus read
|
||||
/// as "not a DVD", with nothing logged anywhere on the path.
|
||||
// Probes GET CONFIGURATION current-profile (DVD family 0x0010..=0x001F) so
|
||||
// DvdUnlocker can self-verify against the drive rather than trust the
|
||||
// caller's DiscKind. See docs/css-mod.md#mounted_disc_is_dvd.
|
||||
fn mounted_disc_is_dvd(
|
||||
scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport,
|
||||
) -> std::result::Result<bool, crate::UnlockError> {
|
||||
@@ -305,19 +286,16 @@ fn mounted_disc_is_dvd(
|
||||
|
||||
fn unlock_css_reads_inner(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport, _lba: u32) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::css", "css unlock: begin");
|
||||
// The bus-auth challenge-response sets the drive's Authentication Success
|
||||
// Flag (ASF=1), which is what opens scrambled-sector reads. This is the
|
||||
// ONLY step required to unlock reads; a failure here is fatal — we
|
||||
// genuinely cannot read scrambled sectors.
|
||||
// The bus-auth challenge-response sets ASF=1, which is what opens
|
||||
// scrambled-sector reads. It's the only required step, so a failure
|
||||
// here is fatal.
|
||||
let agid = establish_authenticated_session(scsi).inspect_err(|e| {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::css", error_code = e.code(), "css unlock: bus authentication failed");
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::css", agid, "css unlock: bus authentication ok");
|
||||
// Disc-key REPORT KEY: issued BEST-EFFORT for any firmware that ties part
|
||||
// of its read-unlock to it. The bytes are unused (the descramble key is
|
||||
// recovered keylessly) and a failure is NON-FATAL — the gate is already
|
||||
// open from bus-auth. This replaces the title-key REPORT KEY, whose hard
|
||||
// failure used to abort the whole unlock (the 7014 bug on USB bridges).
|
||||
// Disc-key REPORT KEY: best-effort only, for firmware that ties part of
|
||||
// its read-unlock to it; bytes are unused and failure is non-fatal.
|
||||
// See docs/css-mod.md#disc-key-report-key (7014 bug history).
|
||||
if let Err(e) = read_disc_key(scsi, agid) {
|
||||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::css", error_code = e.code(), "css unlock: disc-key REPORT KEY skipped (non-fatal)");
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -327,14 +305,8 @@ fn unlock_css_reads_inner(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport, _lba: u32) -> Result<()>
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Step 1: Bus Authentication ────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Run the CSS bus-authentication challenge-response (invalidate AGIDs →
|
||||
/// allocate AGID → host challenge → brute-force the variant → drive challenge →
|
||||
/// send host key). Completing the handshake sets the drive's Authentication
|
||||
/// Success Flag (ASF=1) — which is the ENTIRE purpose: it unlocks
|
||||
/// scrambled-sector reads. Returns the negotiated AGID (the caller needs it for
|
||||
/// the best-effort disc-key REPORT KEY). The CSS bus key is intentionally NOT
|
||||
/// derived: descrambling is keyless — the key is recovered directly from the
|
||||
/// data — so the bus key has no consumer.
|
||||
// Runs the CSS bus-auth handshake to set ASF=1 (invalidate AGIDs, allocate,
|
||||
// challenge/response). Returns the AGID; no bus key is derived. See docs/css-mod.md.
|
||||
fn establish_authenticated_session(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> Result<u8> {
|
||||
// Invalidate all AGIDs via REPORT KEY format 0x3F. This is also what makes
|
||||
// an abandoned AGID self-heal — which is not a reason to abandon one.
|
||||
@@ -453,22 +425,15 @@ fn authenticate_with_agid(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport, agid: u8) -> Result<()>
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// The authenticated session (ASF=1) is now established — scrambled-sector
|
||||
// reads are unlocked, which is the only thing we needed. The CSS bus key
|
||||
// would be CryptKey(2, variant, key1 || key2), but it has no consumer
|
||||
// (descrambling is keyless — the key is recovered directly from the
|
||||
// data), so it is not derived.
|
||||
// reads are unlocked. The CSS bus key would be CryptKey(2, variant,
|
||||
// key1 || key2), but has no consumer (descrambling is keyless).
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Step 2: Disc Key ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Issue READ DVD STRUCTURE format 0x02 (the Disc Key block — opcode 0xAD, NOT
|
||||
/// the REPORT KEY 0xA4 disc-key block; format 0x01 is Copyright Information)
|
||||
/// purely for the bus-auth unlock side
|
||||
/// effect. The returned block contents are not used — the descramble title key
|
||||
/// is recovered keylessly elsewhere, so the genuine disc-key REPORT KEY is
|
||||
/// intentionally skipped. (If a drive is ever found where bus-auth alone does
|
||||
/// not open scrambled reads, a real REPORT KEY format 0x02 belongs here.)
|
||||
// Issues READ DVD STRUCTURE format 0x02 (opcode 0xAD) purely for its
|
||||
// bus-auth side effect; returned bytes are unused. See docs/css-mod.md#read_disc_key.
|
||||
fn read_disc_key(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport, agid: u8) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
// READ DVD STRUCTURE, format 0x02 (disc key), 2048+4 bytes
|
||||
let alloc_len: u16 = 2048 + 4;
|
||||
@@ -493,10 +458,8 @@ fn read_disc_key(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport, agid: u8) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
|
||||
fn crypt_key(key_type: usize, variant: u8, challenge: &[u8; 10]) -> [u8; 5] {
|
||||
// key_type indexes PERM_CHALLENGE ([_;3]); variant indexes
|
||||
// VARIANTS/PERM_VARIANT ([_;32]). All internal callers pass key_type in
|
||||
// 0..3 and variant in 0..32; the asserts document the contract for the
|
||||
// pub(crate) test entry point test_crypt_key and turn a would-be
|
||||
// out-of-bounds panic into an explicit precondition violation.
|
||||
// VARIANTS/PERM_VARIANT ([_;32]). Asserts turn an out-of-bounds index
|
||||
// into an explicit precondition violation. See docs/css-mod.md.
|
||||
debug_assert!(key_type < 3, "crypt_key: key_type out of range");
|
||||
debug_assert!((variant as usize) < 32, "crypt_key: variant out of range");
|
||||
let perm = &PERM_CHALLENGE[key_type];
|
||||
@@ -650,14 +613,9 @@ fn send_key_cdb(agid: u8, format: u8, param_len: u16) -> [u8; 12] {
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
/// SECURITY REGRESSION GUARD: no instrumentation in libfreemkv may emit
|
||||
/// raw key material. Scan every source file for a `tracing` field that
|
||||
/// binds a forbidden key name to a value-producing expression (`= expr`
|
||||
/// or `%expr` / `?expr`). The only allowed forms are a string literal
|
||||
/// (e.g. `disc_key = "<redacted>"`) or a `_fp` fingerprint field.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This is a source-scan test (not a runtime capture) so it stays cheap
|
||||
/// and catches re-introductions at compile/CI time.
|
||||
// SECURITY REGRESSION GUARD: scans source files for a `tracing` field
|
||||
// binding a forbidden key name to a value expression (only a string
|
||||
// literal or `_fp` field is allowed). See docs/css-mod.md#key-guard.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn no_key_bytes_in_instrumentation() {
|
||||
use std::path::Path;
|
||||
@@ -709,10 +667,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
for &name in forbidden {
|
||||
// A fingerprint field (`<name>_fp = ...`) is allowed.
|
||||
// Match `<name>` followed by optional fingerprint
|
||||
// suffix then `=` and a value that is NOT a string
|
||||
// literal redaction marker.
|
||||
// A fingerprint field (`<name>_fp = ...`) is allowed;
|
||||
// match `<name>` then `=` with a value that is not a
|
||||
// string-literal redaction marker.
|
||||
if let Some(idx) = line.find(name) {
|
||||
let after = &line[idx + name.len()..];
|
||||
let after = after.trim_start();
|
||||
@@ -743,10 +700,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Scan this crate's `src` plus the sibling workspace crates so the
|
||||
// key-material logging guard covers every crate that can reach the
|
||||
// CSS/AACS internals, not just libfreemkv. Missing sibling dirs (e.g.
|
||||
// when building the crate standalone) are simply skipped.
|
||||
// Scan this crate's `src` plus sibling workspace crates so the
|
||||
// guard covers everything that can reach CSS/AACS internals.
|
||||
// Missing sibling dirs (standalone builds) are simply skipped.
|
||||
let manifest = Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"));
|
||||
let workspace = manifest.parent().unwrap_or(manifest);
|
||||
let mut violations = Vec::new();
|
||||
@@ -796,15 +752,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
|
||||
// ── CSS constant-table integrity ───────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Each PERM_CHALLENGE row is a permutation of indices 0..10 (it reorders
|
||||
/// the 10 challenge bytes). A non-permutation would drop/duplicate
|
||||
/// challenge bytes, weakening or corrupting the bus key derivation.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Grounding: crypt_key does `scratch[i] = challenge[perm[i]]` for i in
|
||||
/// 0..10 — perm must be a bijection on 0..10 to use every challenge byte
|
||||
/// exactly once.
|
||||
/// Mutation: change PERM_CHALLENGE[0] entry `9` to `8` (duplicate) -> the
|
||||
/// "covers 0..10" assert fires.
|
||||
// Each PERM_CHALLENGE row must be a permutation of indices 0..10; a
|
||||
// non-permutation would drop/duplicate bytes. See docs/css-mod.md#perm-challenge-rows.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn perm_challenge_rows_are_permutations() {
|
||||
for (row, perm) in PERM_CHALLENGE.iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
@@ -821,15 +770,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Each PERM_VARIANT row maps the 32 variants to 32 distinct 5-bit values
|
||||
/// (it is a permutation of 0..32). key_type 1 uses PERM_VARIANT[0],
|
||||
/// key_type 2 uses PERM_VARIANT[1] to pick the css_variant; a collision
|
||||
/// would make two variants indistinguishable.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Grounding: `css_variant = PERM_VARIANT[k][variant]` then indexes
|
||||
/// VARIANTS[css_variant] (0..32).
|
||||
/// Mutation: set PERM_VARIANT[0][1] = PERM_VARIANT[0][0] -> duplicate
|
||||
/// assert fires; also any value >= 32 would later index VARIANTS OOB.
|
||||
// Each PERM_VARIANT row must map the 32 variants to 32 distinct 5-bit
|
||||
// values; a collision would make two variants indistinguishable.
|
||||
// See docs/css-mod.md#perm-variant-rows.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn perm_variant_rows_are_permutations_of_0_31() {
|
||||
for (row, perm) in PERM_VARIANT.iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
@@ -849,16 +792,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
|
||||
// ── crypt_key behaviour ────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// crypt_key result depends on every challenge byte. The challenge is
|
||||
/// permuted into `scratch` and folded through the LFSR seeding and the 6
|
||||
/// XOR rounds. Flipping any single challenge byte must change the output.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Grounding: scratch[i]=challenge[perm[i]] for all 10 i, and scratch
|
||||
/// seeds both LFSRs (bytes 5..10 via tmp1) and the round terms (bytes
|
||||
/// 0..5).
|
||||
/// Mutation: in `scratch[i] = challenge[perm[i]]` replace with
|
||||
/// `challenge[i]` for a perm that drops a byte — or hardcode one scratch
|
||||
/// entry — and some challenge byte stops mattering; this fails.
|
||||
// crypt_key's result must depend on every challenge byte: flipping any
|
||||
// single byte must change the output. See docs/css-mod.md#crypt-key-byte-dependence.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn crypt_key_depends_on_every_challenge_byte() {
|
||||
let base: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
|
||||
@@ -874,17 +809,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// crypt_key(0, v, ..) must produce a DISTINCT result for each of the 32
|
||||
/// variants on a fixed challenge. bus_auth brute-forces the variant by
|
||||
/// matching crypt_key(0, v, host_challenge) == key1; if two variants
|
||||
/// collided, the wrong variant could be selected and the whole auth
|
||||
/// derail.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Grounding: variant selects css_variant -> VARIANTS[css_variant] -> cse,
|
||||
/// which feeds every round; distinct variants give distinct cse-driven
|
||||
/// keys in practice.
|
||||
/// Mutation: make `cse` ignore the variant (e.g. `let cse = 0`) -> all 32
|
||||
/// outputs collapse to one value; the distinctness assert fires.
|
||||
// crypt_key(0, v, ..) must be distinct for each of the 32 variants:
|
||||
// bus-auth brute-forces the variant by matching against key1, so a
|
||||
// collision could select the wrong one. See docs/css-mod.md.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn crypt_key_type0_distinct_per_variant() {
|
||||
let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
|
||||
@@ -899,16 +826,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// crypt_key enforces its documented precondition `key_type < 3` via
|
||||
/// debug_assert (active in test builds). A key_type of 3 would index
|
||||
/// PERM_CHALLENGE (len 3) out of bounds; the assert turns that into an
|
||||
/// explicit precondition panic.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Grounding: `debug_assert!(key_type < 3, ...)`; PERM_CHALLENGE has 3
|
||||
/// rows (indices 0,1,2).
|
||||
/// Mutation: delete the debug_assert AND the match-arm guard — but the
|
||||
/// match `_ =>` arm would then index PERM_CHALLENGE[3] OOB and panic
|
||||
/// differently; with the assert in place this test pins the contract.
|
||||
// crypt_key's `key_type < 3` debug_assert must fire for key_type 3
|
||||
// (which would otherwise index PERM_CHALLENGE out of bounds).
|
||||
// See docs/css-mod.md#crypt-key-preconditions.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
#[should_panic]
|
||||
fn crypt_key_rejects_out_of_range_key_type() {
|
||||
@@ -916,12 +836,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
let _ = crypt_key(3, 0, &challenge);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// crypt_key enforces `variant < 32` via debug_assert. A variant of 32
|
||||
/// would index VARIANTS / PERM_VARIANT (len 32) out of bounds.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Grounding: `debug_assert!((variant as usize) < 32, ...)`.
|
||||
/// Mutation: removing the assert makes this index VARIANTS[32] (still a
|
||||
/// panic, but unguarded); the assert documents/enforces the contract.
|
||||
// crypt_key's `variant < 32` debug_assert must fire for variant 32
|
||||
// (which would otherwise index VARIANTS/PERM_VARIANT out of bounds).
|
||||
// See docs/css-mod.md#crypt-key-preconditions.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
#[should_panic]
|
||||
fn crypt_key_rejects_out_of_range_variant() {
|
||||
@@ -931,17 +848,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
|
||||
// ── SCSI CDB builders (MMC REPORT KEY / SEND KEY layout) ───────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// report_key_cdb encodes a 12-byte MMC REPORT KEY (opcode 0xA4) CDB:
|
||||
/// byte 0 = operation code 0xA4
|
||||
/// bytes 8-9 = allocation length, big-endian
|
||||
/// byte 10 = (AGID << 6) | (key_format & 0x3F)
|
||||
/// All other bytes are zero.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Grounding: MMC REPORT KEY CDB; the AGID is the top 2 bits of byte 10,
|
||||
/// key format the low 6 bits.
|
||||
/// Mutation: change `(alloc_len >> 8)` to `alloc_len` for byte 8 (lose the
|
||||
/// big-endian split) -> byte 8/9 assert fails. Change `agid << 6` to
|
||||
/// `agid << 5` -> the AGID-position assert fails.
|
||||
// report_key_cdb encodes a 12-byte MMC REPORT KEY (opcode 0xA4) CDB:
|
||||
// byte 0=0xA4, bytes 8-9=big-endian len, byte 10=(AGID<<6)|(format&0x3F).
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn report_key_cdb_matches_mmc_layout() {
|
||||
let cdb = report_key_cdb(0b10, 0x04, 0x010C); // AGID=2, format=0x04, len=268
|
||||
@@ -962,26 +870,18 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(cdb.len(), 12, "REPORT KEY is a 12-byte CDB");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The key format field is masked to 6 bits: a format with high bits set
|
||||
/// must not corrupt the AGID. report_key_cdb(0, 0xFF, _) -> byte 10 low 6
|
||||
/// bits = 0x3F, AGID = 0.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Grounding: `(agid << 6) | (format & 0x3F)`.
|
||||
/// Mutation: drop the `& 0x3F` mask -> 0xFF would overwrite the AGID bits;
|
||||
/// byte 10 would be 0xFF not 0x3F, this fails.
|
||||
// The key-format field is masked to 6 bits so a format with high bits
|
||||
// set (e.g. 0xFF) cannot corrupt the AGID bits of byte 10.
|
||||
// See docs/css-mod.md#cdb-builders.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn report_key_cdb_masks_format_to_6_bits() {
|
||||
let cdb = report_key_cdb(0, 0xFF, 8);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cdb[10], 0x3F, "format masked to 6 bits, AGID stays 0");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// send_key_cdb encodes a 12-byte MMC SEND KEY (opcode 0xA3) CDB with the
|
||||
/// parameter-list length at bytes 8-9 (big-endian) and AGID/format at byte
|
||||
/// 10.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Grounding: MMC SEND KEY CDB layout.
|
||||
/// Mutation: change opcode to SCSI_REPORT_KEY -> opcode assert fails;
|
||||
/// swap bytes 8/9 -> length assert fails.
|
||||
// send_key_cdb encodes a 12-byte MMC SEND KEY (opcode 0xA3) CDB with the
|
||||
// parameter-list length at bytes 8-9 (big-endian) and AGID/format at
|
||||
// byte 10. See docs/css-mod.md#cdb-builders.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn send_key_cdb_matches_mmc_layout() {
|
||||
let cdb = send_key_cdb(0b11, 0x03, 0x000C); // AGID=3, format=3, param_len=12
|
||||
@@ -996,16 +896,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(cdb.len(), 12);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Allocation length larger than 255 must split across bytes 8 (high) and
|
||||
/// 9 (low) — a 16-bit big-endian field. report_key_cdb with alloc_len
|
||||
/// 0x0804 (2052, the disc-key block size used in read_disc_key) -> byte 8
|
||||
/// = 0x08, byte 9 = 0x04.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Grounding: read_disc_key uses `alloc_len = 2048 + 4 = 2052 = 0x0804`
|
||||
/// and writes `cdb[8] = (alloc_len >> 8); cdb[9] = alloc_len`.
|
||||
/// Mutation: write only byte 9 (`cdb[9] = alloc_len as u8`) without byte 8
|
||||
/// -> the drive sees a 4-byte transfer, truncating the disc-key block;
|
||||
/// this asserts the high byte is present.
|
||||
// Allocation length > 255 must split across bytes 8 (high) and 9 (low)
|
||||
// as a 16-bit big-endian field, e.g. 0x0804 (the disc-key block size).
|
||||
// See docs/css-mod.md#cdb-builders.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn report_key_cdb_alloc_len_is_16bit_big_endian() {
|
||||
let cdb = report_key_cdb(0, 0x00, 0x0804);
|
||||
@@ -1013,10 +906,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(cdb[9], 0x04, "low byte of 2052-byte transfer");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The unlocker's user-facing name is "DVD" (the medium it read-unlocks),
|
||||
/// not "CSS" (the scheme). Apps render the unlocker report from this name,
|
||||
/// so it is a stable contract — the bus-auth ran on any DVD, encrypted or
|
||||
/// not, and the report must say so rather than conflate it with a CSS crack.
|
||||
// The unlocker's user-facing name is "DVD" (the medium), not "CSS" (the
|
||||
// scheme); apps render the unlocker report from this name, so it is a
|
||||
// stable contract.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn dvd_unlocker_is_named_dvd() {
|
||||
use crate::Unlocker;
|
||||
@@ -1056,10 +948,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(r.unwrap_err(), UnlockError::NotApplicable);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Defense in depth: even when the caller declares `DiscKind::Css`, the
|
||||
/// DvdUnlocker self-verifies against the drive's GET CONFIGURATION profile.
|
||||
/// A drive reporting a Blu-ray profile → `NotApplicable`, and NOT a single
|
||||
/// CSS CDB is issued (no bus-auth fired at a BD).
|
||||
// Defense in depth: even when the caller declares `DiscKind::Css`,
|
||||
// DvdUnlocker self-verifies against GET CONFIGURATION; a BD profile
|
||||
// must yield NotApplicable with no CSS CDB issued.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn dvd_unlocker_self_guards_against_non_dvd() {
|
||||
use crate::scsi::{DataDirection, ScsiResult};
|
||||
@@ -1120,11 +1011,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
use crate::scsi::mock::{MockTransport, Reply};
|
||||
use crate::{DiscKind, DriveId, UnlockCtx, UnlockError, Unlocker};
|
||||
|
||||
/// THE defect-7 test. `mounted_disc_is_dvd` is the FIRST command the DVD
|
||||
/// unlocker issues and its match had no `Err` arm: a transport fault fell
|
||||
/// into `_ => false`, so a dead bus was reported as "not a DVD"
|
||||
/// (`NotApplicable`) and the consumer kept probing it — with nothing logged
|
||||
/// anywhere on the path. Catches restoring that catch-all arm.
|
||||
// Defect-7 regression: a transport fault on the first probe command
|
||||
// must abort as Transport, not fall through to NotApplicable (which
|
||||
// let the consumer keep probing a dead bus). See docs/css-mod.md.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn transport_fault_probing_for_a_dvd_aborts() {
|
||||
let id = DriveId::default();
|
||||
@@ -1149,11 +1038,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(r.unwrap_err(), UnlockError::NotApplicable);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A DVD is mounted, then the bus dies during bus-auth. THE defect-2 test:
|
||||
/// every CSS step used to do `.map_err(|_| CssAuthFailed)`, discarding the
|
||||
/// `ScsiError` and making the `Transport` arm of the error conversion
|
||||
/// unreachable from any real call site — so a dead bus arrived as
|
||||
/// `NotApplicable` and the consumer went on probing it.
|
||||
// Defect-2 regression: a DVD is mounted, then the bus dies mid
|
||||
// bus-auth — must abort as Transport, not collapse to CssAuthFailed /
|
||||
// NotApplicable. See docs/css-mod.md.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn transport_fault_during_bus_auth_aborts() {
|
||||
let id = DriveId::default();
|
||||
@@ -1178,10 +1065,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(r.unwrap_err(), UnlockError::NotApplicable);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A conforming transport answering the AGID allocation with a CHECK
|
||||
/// CONDITION must NOT let the handshake carry on off the caller's own
|
||||
/// zero-filled buffer (agid 0, a challenge answered by zeros). Catches
|
||||
/// dropping the `status` check in `css_scsi`.
|
||||
// A CHECK CONDITION on AGID allocation must not let the handshake carry
|
||||
// on off the caller's own zero-filled buffer; catches a dropped
|
||||
// `status` check in `css_scsi`.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn agid_allocation_check_condition_fails_the_auth() {
|
||||
// 4 AGID invalidations are best-effort; the 5th command is the alloc.
|
||||
@@ -1198,10 +1084,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert!(matches!(e, Error::CssAuthFailed));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Defect 18: an AGID allocated and then lost to a failed challenge must be
|
||||
/// RELEASED (REPORT KEY format 0x3F), not abandoned. A drive has four; the
|
||||
/// leak self-heals because the next session invalidates all of them, but
|
||||
/// leaving a drive short between attempts is a state we should not create.
|
||||
// Defect 18: an AGID lost to a failed challenge must be RELEASED
|
||||
// (REPORT KEY format 0x3F), not abandoned, even though a drive's four
|
||||
// AGIDs self-heal on the next session's invalidation pass.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn a_failed_handshake_releases_the_agid_it_allocated() {
|
||||
let mut t = MockTransport::scripted(
|
||||
@@ -1281,10 +1166,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Host challenge + Key1 both succeed, but the drive challenge REPORT KEY
|
||||
/// (step 3) is refused. Distinct from `key1_report_failure_fails_the_auth`
|
||||
/// (step 2) and `key2_send_failure_fails_the_auth` (step 4) below — each
|
||||
/// pins a different `css_scsi` call site's `?`.
|
||||
// Host challenge + Key1 succeed but the drive-challenge REPORT KEY
|
||||
// (step 3) is refused; distinct from the step-2 and step-4 failure
|
||||
// tests, each pinning a different `css_scsi` call site's `?`.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn drive_challenge_report_failure_fails_the_auth() {
|
||||
struct FailAtDriveChallenge(FakeDvdDrive);
|
||||
@@ -1368,13 +1252,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Full happy-path bus-auth ────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// A fake drive that plays its half of the CSS bus-auth handshake for
|
||||
/// real: it captures the host's genuinely-random per-session challenge
|
||||
/// and answers Key1 with the actual `crypt_key(0, variant, ..)` for a
|
||||
/// fixed `variant`, so the host's brute-force loop matches it honestly
|
||||
/// (not via a canned constant the loop happens to hit). Also answers
|
||||
/// GET CONFIGURATION as a DVD and READ DVD STRUCTURE (disc key) as a
|
||||
/// success, so the full `unlock_bus` path can be driven end to end.
|
||||
// A fake drive that plays its half of the CSS handshake for real:
|
||||
// answers Key1 honestly, and DVD/disc-key probes as success.
|
||||
struct FakeDvdDrive {
|
||||
variant: u8,
|
||||
host_challenge: [u8; 10],
|
||||
@@ -1445,12 +1324,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// End-to-end happy path for the bus-auth handshake: AGID allocation,
|
||||
/// host challenge, a Key1 that genuinely matches the brute-forced
|
||||
/// variant, the drive-challenge/Key2 exchange, and the disc-key REPORT
|
||||
/// KEY all succeed. Exercises `establish_authenticated_session`'s `Ok`
|
||||
/// return and `read_disc_key`'s success path, neither of which the
|
||||
/// failure-path tests above reach.
|
||||
// End-to-end happy path for the bus-auth handshake (AGID, challenge,
|
||||
// Key1/Key2, disc-key REPORT KEY), exercising the `Ok` returns that
|
||||
// the failure-path tests above never reach.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn full_bus_auth_and_disc_key_succeed() {
|
||||
let mut t = FakeDvdDrive {
|
||||
@@ -1463,10 +1339,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
read_disc_key(&mut t, agid).expect("disc-key REPORT KEY succeeds");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The same happy path driven through the public `unlock_bus` entry
|
||||
/// point (DVD self-guard, full bus-auth, best-effort disc key), proving
|
||||
/// `DvdUnlocker::unlock_bus` returns `Ok(Unlocked::default())` on success
|
||||
/// — the path every failure-injection test above deliberately avoids.
|
||||
// The same happy path through the public `unlock_bus` entry point,
|
||||
// proving it returns `Ok(Unlocked::default())` on success — the path
|
||||
// every failure-injection test above deliberately avoids.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn dvd_unlocker_succeeds_end_to_end() {
|
||||
let id = DriveId::default();
|
||||
@@ -1497,10 +1372,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
unlock_css_reads(&mut t, 0).expect("css bus-auth + best-effort disc key succeed");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A drive whose bus-auth succeeds but refuses the best-effort disc-key
|
||||
/// REPORT KEY (CHECK CONDITION). `unlock_css_reads_inner` must swallow
|
||||
/// that failure — the read barrier is already open from bus-auth, so the
|
||||
/// whole unlock must still report `Ok`, not propagate the disc-key error.
|
||||
// A drive whose bus-auth succeeds but refuses the best-effort disc-key
|
||||
// REPORT KEY; `unlock_css_reads_inner` must swallow that failure since
|
||||
// the read barrier is already open from bus-auth.
|
||||
struct DiscKeyRefusingDrive(FakeDvdDrive);
|
||||
|
||||
impl ScsiTransport for DiscKeyRefusingDrive {
|
||||
@@ -1532,10 +1406,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
.expect("bus-auth succeeded; a refused best-effort disc-key read must not fail it");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// `crypt_key`'s `key_type == 2` arm (`PERM_VARIANT[1]`) has no
|
||||
/// production caller (only key_type 0, the variant brute-force, and 1,
|
||||
/// the drive-challenge Key2, are ever invoked from `authenticate_with_agid`)
|
||||
/// but is a pure, directly-testable function of its documented contract.
|
||||
// `crypt_key`'s key_type==2 arm (`PERM_VARIANT[1]`) has no production
|
||||
// caller (only 0 and 1 are invoked from `authenticate_with_agid`) but
|
||||
// is a pure, directly-testable function.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn crypt_key_type2_is_deterministic_and_distinct_from_type1() {
|
||||
let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
|
||||
|
||||
+311
-643
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
||||
THIRD-PARTY NOTICE for profiles.json
|
||||
====================================
|
||||
|
||||
`profiles.json` in this directory contains volatile, RAM-only optical-drive
|
||||
microcode ("LibreDrive") authored and owned by the MakeMKV team (GuinpinSoft
|
||||
inc.). Each payload embeds its own notice:
|
||||
|
||||
"This is volatile RAM-only microcode for LibreDrive by MakeMKV -
|
||||
http://www.makemkv.com/libredrive/
|
||||
Copyright (c) MakeMKV team, all rights reserved."
|
||||
|
||||
This microcode is third-party proprietary material — Copyright (c) MakeMKV team,
|
||||
all rights reserved — and is NOT covered by this repository's MIT LICENSE. No
|
||||
ownership is claimed. See the repository-root NOTICE. Thanks to the MakeMKV team
|
||||
for LibreDrive: https://www.makemkv.com/ , http://www.makemkv.com/libredrive/ .
|
||||
@@ -19,3 +19,13 @@ This module performs only the **non-persistent** unlock — the access state it
|
||||
sets up lives in drive RAM and is gone on power cycle. The one-time, permanent
|
||||
drive preparation is the drive owner's own manual step and is **never**
|
||||
automated here.
|
||||
|
||||
## Third-party microcode (`profiles.json`)
|
||||
|
||||
`profiles.json` bundles volatile, RAM-only optical-drive microcode
|
||||
("LibreDrive") authored and owned by the **MakeMKV team** (GuinpinSoft inc.).
|
||||
Each payload carries its own notice — *"Copyright (c) MakeMKV team, all rights
|
||||
reserved."* This microcode is **third-party proprietary material and is NOT
|
||||
covered by this repository's MIT license**; no ownership is claimed. See the
|
||||
[`NOTICE`](./NOTICE) in this directory and the repository-root `NOTICE`. With
|
||||
thanks to the MakeMKV team for [LibreDrive](http://www.makemkv.com/libredrive/).
|
||||
|
||||
+35
-84
@@ -6,13 +6,9 @@
|
||||
//! encryption AT THE DRIVE (the unlocked drive serves clear content) and
|
||||
//! reporting the OEM Volume ID.
|
||||
|
||||
// `cdb` carries ONLY the unlock-handshake wire format that the bdemu emulator
|
||||
// needs (the real unlocker drives its CDBs from per-drive profile templates, not
|
||||
// these constants). Compile it only when the `emulation` feature exposes it, so
|
||||
// it never dead-codes in a normal build.
|
||||
// Compiled under `cfg(test)` as well as the feature: its tests pin the unlock
|
||||
// wire format, and gating the whole module on a non-default feature meant CI
|
||||
// (which builds with default features) never ran them.
|
||||
// `cdb` is only the bdemu emulator's wire format (real unlocking uses profile
|
||||
// templates), gated behind `emulation`; also compiled under `cfg(test)` so its
|
||||
// wire-format tests run in default-feature CI. See docs/ld-mod.md — cdb gating.
|
||||
#[cfg(any(feature = "emulation", test))]
|
||||
mod cdb;
|
||||
mod error;
|
||||
@@ -24,12 +20,8 @@ use crate::scsi::{DataDirection, ScsiTransport};
|
||||
use crate::{DriveId, UnlockCtx, UnlockError, Unlocked, Unlocker};
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Public profile catalog ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The catalog of drives the MT1959 unlocker recognizes is the one piece of
|
||||
// ld worth exposing publicly: it answers "is this drive supported?" without
|
||||
// unlocking, and the bdemu test-emulator reads it to impersonate a supported
|
||||
// drive. The unlock *mechanism* (firmware blobs, upload sequence, CDB wire
|
||||
// format) stays private — only the catalog and its match result are public.
|
||||
// Only the catalog is public (supported-drive lookup, used by bdemu); the
|
||||
// unlock mechanism stays private. See docs/ld-mod.md — public catalog design.
|
||||
|
||||
pub use profile::{DriveProfile as Profile, Identity, Platform, ProfileMatch, Profiles};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -54,12 +46,9 @@ pub fn profile(drive_id: &DriveId) -> Option<ProfileMatch> {
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "emulation")]
|
||||
pub use cdb::{UNLOCK_MARKER, is_unlock_read_buffer};
|
||||
|
||||
/// The MT1959 unlocker. `pub(crate)` — clients reach it only through
|
||||
/// [`crate::all_unlockers`], never by name (the locked-design contract).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Matches a drive against the bundled profile database and, on a hit,
|
||||
/// runs the MediaTek MT1959 firmware-unlock (and disc-speed calibration)
|
||||
/// handshake over the raw SCSI transport.
|
||||
// The MT1959 unlocker, reached only through `crate::all_unlockers` (never by
|
||||
// name). Matches a drive against the bundled profile database and runs the
|
||||
// firmware-unlock + disc-speed-calibration handshake over raw SCSI.
|
||||
pub(crate) struct Mt1959Unlocker;
|
||||
|
||||
impl Mt1959Unlocker {
|
||||
@@ -76,17 +65,9 @@ pub(crate) fn firmware_name(id: &DriveId) -> Option<&'static str> {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Mt1959Unlocker {
|
||||
/// Read the OEM Volume ID via the matched profile's vendor CDB.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Takes the profile the caller ALREADY matched rather than re-running
|
||||
/// `find_bundled`: the catalog is 206 entries and drive-prep used to scan it
|
||||
/// twice per drive (once here, once in `firmware_unlock`) for the same
|
||||
/// answer.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// `Ok(Some(vid))` on a well-formed 36-byte response (signature `00 22 00`,
|
||||
/// VID at `[4..20]`); `Ok(None)` when there is no OEM-VID CDB or the response
|
||||
/// is short / bad-signature / drive-rejected (the drive is still unlocked,
|
||||
/// just no VID); `Err` only on a transport fault.
|
||||
// Read the OEM Volume ID via the matched profile's vendor CDB (profile passed
|
||||
// in to avoid a redundant 206-entry catalog scan). Ok(Some) on a well-formed
|
||||
// response; Ok(None) if unreadable; Err only on a transport fault.
|
||||
fn read_oem_vid(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport,
|
||||
@@ -101,10 +82,9 @@ impl Mt1959Unlocker {
|
||||
|
||||
let mut buf = vec![0u8; RESPONSE_LEN];
|
||||
let result = scsi.execute(&cdb, DataDirection::FromDevice, &mut buf, 5_000)?;
|
||||
// Per the transport contract a drive sense arrives as `Ok` with a
|
||||
// non-zero `status`, NOT as `Err`. Without this check a CHECK CONDITION
|
||||
// would be read as a successful 36-byte response and the caller's own
|
||||
// zero fill parsed as a Volume ID.
|
||||
// Per the transport contract a drive sense arrives as `Ok` with non-zero
|
||||
// `status`, not `Err` — without this check a CHECK CONDITION reads as a
|
||||
// successful response and the zero-filled buffer parses as a bogus VID.
|
||||
if result.status != 0 {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(
|
||||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||||
@@ -139,15 +119,9 @@ impl Mt1959Unlocker {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Mt1959Unlocker {
|
||||
/// The MediaTek firmware unlock. Because the MT1959 unlocker removes AACS bus
|
||||
/// encryption AT THE DRIVE (the unlocked drive serves CLEAR content), this ONE
|
||||
/// operation satisfies BOTH the drive-features and the bus-removal capability
|
||||
/// — so `unlock_features` and `unlock_bus` both delegate here. The result
|
||||
/// carries `drive_unlocked: true` (no bus key needed) and the OEM Volume ID.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// A no-firmware-route drive (Renesas / no profile) returns `NotApplicable`; a
|
||||
/// transport fault propagates as `Transport`; any other firmware failure also
|
||||
/// falls through as `NotApplicable`.
|
||||
// The MediaTek firmware unlock. Since it removes AACS at the drive (clear
|
||||
// content), this one op satisfies both features and bus-removal, so both
|
||||
// trait methods delegate here. See docs/ld-mod.md — firmware_unlock contract.
|
||||
fn firmware_unlock(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport,
|
||||
@@ -167,14 +141,9 @@ impl Mt1959Unlocker {
|
||||
// A transport fault → UnlockError::Transport; any other firmware failure
|
||||
// → NotApplicable (via From<error::Error>).
|
||||
mt.init(scsi)?;
|
||||
// `init` only proves the handshake COMPLETED — `do_unlock` returns Ok on
|
||||
// a response that carried the per-drive signature but not both firmware
|
||||
// markers. Only `is_unlocked()` means the drive actually reached the
|
||||
// extended-access state and serves clear content. Reporting
|
||||
// `drive_unlocked: true` off `init` alone told the consumer the bus was
|
||||
// clear on a half-unlocked drive, which suppressed the cert-auth
|
||||
// fallback and shipped ciphertext at rc=0. A partial unlock must fall
|
||||
// through to the next unlocker.
|
||||
// `init` only proves the handshake completed, not that the drive reached
|
||||
// extended-access state. Reporting unlocked off `init` alone shipped
|
||||
// ciphertext at rc=0. See docs/ld-mod.md — half-unlock fallback.
|
||||
if !mt.is_unlocked() {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(
|
||||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||||
@@ -183,19 +152,13 @@ impl Mt1959Unlocker {
|
||||
);
|
||||
return Err(UnlockError::NotApplicable);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Prime the per-region speed table. Best-effort — it must not fail the
|
||||
// unlock — but NOT silent: speed calibration can fail completely, and an
|
||||
// unlogged `let _ =` made a fully-failed calibration indistinguishable
|
||||
// from a successful one in the rip log.
|
||||
// Prime the per-region speed table. Best-effort (must not fail the unlock)
|
||||
// but not silent — an unlogged `let _ =` made a failed calibration
|
||||
// indistinguishable from success in the rip log.
|
||||
if let Err(e) = mt.probe_disc(scsi) {
|
||||
// A transport fault here is a DEAD BUS, not a speed-calibration miss.
|
||||
// The rest of this path (`read_oem_vid`) is a no-op for the 140/206
|
||||
// profiles that carry no `read_vid_cdb`, so it never touches the bus
|
||||
// again — meaning this swallowed fault was the ONLY dead-bus signal,
|
||||
// and warn-and-continue turned it into `Ok(Unlocked{drive_unlocked:
|
||||
// true})`: a dead bus rendered as a fully-unlocked drive (the flagship
|
||||
// failure-that-looks-like-success). A genuine calibration miss (drive
|
||||
// sense / short reply) still continues on the default speed table.
|
||||
// A transport fault here is a dead bus, not a calibration miss — most
|
||||
// profiles never touch the bus again, so this was the only dead-bus
|
||||
// signal. See docs/ld-mod.md — probe_disc dead-bus classification.
|
||||
if e.is_transport_failure() {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(
|
||||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||||
@@ -423,12 +386,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(err, UnlockError::NotApplicable);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// THE defect-1 test. The drive answers every unlock READ_BUFFER with a
|
||||
/// response carrying the per-drive signature and the primary firmware marker
|
||||
/// but NOT the secondary one — `do_unlock` returns `Ok` and `init()`
|
||||
/// succeeds, yet the drive is NOT in the extended-access state. Reporting
|
||||
/// `drive_unlocked: true` here suppresses the cert-auth fallback. Catches
|
||||
/// removing the `is_unlocked()` gate in `firmware_unlock`.
|
||||
// THE defect-1 test: response carries the signature + primary marker but not
|
||||
// the secondary one, so init() succeeds but the drive isn't in extended-access
|
||||
// state. Catches removing the `is_unlocked()` gate in `firmware_unlock`.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn half_unlocked_drive_falls_through_instead_of_claiming_unlocked() {
|
||||
use crate::scsi::mock::{MockTransport, Reply};
|
||||
@@ -475,16 +435,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert!(u.drive_unlocked);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// THE probe-disc dead-bus test. The drive unlocks fully (both firmware
|
||||
/// markers), then the bus DIES during disc-speed calibration. `probe_disc`
|
||||
/// used to be warn-and-continued regardless of the fault, and — because the
|
||||
/// 140/206 profiles without a `read_vid_cdb` never touch the bus again — a
|
||||
/// dead bus was reported as `Ok(Unlocked{drive_unlocked:true})`: a dead bus
|
||||
/// rendered as a successful unlock (the flagship failure-that-looks-like-
|
||||
/// success). `firmware_unlock` must now abort with `Transport`.
|
||||
/// MUTATION: reverting the `if e.is_transport_failure()` return in
|
||||
/// `firmware_unlock` (warn-and-continue), OR flattening the probe loops'
|
||||
/// transport classification, makes this go red.
|
||||
// THE probe-disc dead-bus test: bus dies during speed calibration after a
|
||||
// full unlock; must abort with Transport, not report a successful unlock.
|
||||
// See docs/ld-mod.md — probe_disc dead-bus test / mutation notes.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn transport_fault_during_probe_disc_is_transport_not_a_successful_unlock() {
|
||||
let id = known_vid_drive_id();
|
||||
@@ -534,11 +487,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(err, UnlockError::Transport);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A drive-sense (not a dead bus) rejecting the speed probe is a genuine
|
||||
/// calibration miss, not a transport fault — `firmware_unlock` must
|
||||
/// warn-and-continue on the drive's default speed table, still reporting a
|
||||
/// full unlock. The non-transport sibling of
|
||||
/// `transport_fault_during_probe_disc_is_transport_not_a_successful_unlock`.
|
||||
// A drive-sense (not a dead bus) rejecting the speed probe is a genuine
|
||||
// calibration miss: warn-and-continue on the default speed table, still
|
||||
// reporting a full unlock. Non-transport sibling of the probe-fault test.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn drive_sense_during_probe_disc_still_reports_a_successful_unlock() {
|
||||
let id = known_vid_drive_id();
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,10 +31,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::scsi::mock::{MockTransport, Reply};
|
||||
|
||||
/// A minimal driver that takes every `PlatformDriver` default (`is_unlocked`)
|
||||
/// so the shim's dispatch and the default's `false` are both exercised —
|
||||
/// every real driver (`Mt1959`) overrides `is_unlocked`, so without this the
|
||||
/// default body is dead in coverage even though it is reachable code.
|
||||
// Minimal driver taking the `PlatformDriver` default `is_unlocked`, so
|
||||
// the default's `false` path is exercised (real drivers override it).
|
||||
struct StubDriver;
|
||||
|
||||
impl PlatformDriver for StubDriver {
|
||||
|
||||
+77
-149
@@ -117,21 +117,17 @@ impl Mt1959 {
|
||||
expected: usize,
|
||||
) -> Result<usize> {
|
||||
// The READ_BUFFER CDB transfer-length is a single byte; an
|
||||
// `expected` above 255 cannot be expressed and would silently
|
||||
// truncate. All in-crate callers pass small fixed sizes (4); guard
|
||||
// the invariant rather than emit a malformed CDB.
|
||||
// `expected` above 255 would silently truncate. Guard the
|
||||
// invariant rather than emit a malformed CDB.
|
||||
debug_assert!(
|
||||
expected <= u8::MAX as usize,
|
||||
"read_buffer_probe expected exceeds 1-byte CDB length field"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let cdb = self.read_buffer_sub(sub_cmd, address, expected as u8);
|
||||
let result = scsi.execute(&cdb, DataDirection::FromDevice, buf, 5_000)?;
|
||||
// A drive sense arrives as `Ok` with a non-zero status (the transport
|
||||
// contract), and a merely SHORT response is the drive answering badly —
|
||||
// neither is a dead bus. Fabricating a transport-failure status here
|
||||
// turned a short probe reply into a hard abort of a rip that would
|
||||
// otherwise have succeeded; a real transport fault still propagates
|
||||
// through the `?` above with its own status.
|
||||
// A drive sense arrives as `Ok` with a non-zero status; a merely
|
||||
// SHORT response is the drive answering badly — neither is a dead
|
||||
// bus. See docs/mt1959.md — short-probe-not-transport-failure.
|
||||
if result.status != 0 || result.bytes_transferred != expected {
|
||||
return Err(Error::Scsi {
|
||||
opcode: SCSI_READ_BUFFER,
|
||||
@@ -183,13 +179,9 @@ impl Mt1959 {
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// `response` is a fixed 64-byte buffer, so `response.len()` is
|
||||
// always >= every offset below — the meaningful bound is how many
|
||||
// bytes the drive actually delivered. Every marker check MUST be
|
||||
// reachable: when the checks were each guarded by their own `n >= ..`
|
||||
// the drive delivering ZERO bytes skipped all three and `do_unlock`
|
||||
// returned `Ok` on a buffer the drive never wrote. Require enough bytes
|
||||
// to actually validate, up front.
|
||||
// `response` is a fixed 64-byte buffer; the meaningful bound is how
|
||||
// many bytes the drive actually delivered. Require enough bytes to
|
||||
// validate before checking markers, up front. See docs/mt1959.md — min-unlock-response-length.
|
||||
let n = result.bytes_transferred.min(response.len());
|
||||
if n < MIN_UNLOCK_RESPONSE {
|
||||
tracing::debug!(
|
||||
@@ -212,15 +204,9 @@ impl Mt1959 {
|
||||
return Err(Error::UnlockFailed);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Extended-access state is active when BOTH the per-drive
|
||||
// signature matched AND the response carries the secondary
|
||||
// marker at offset 16 (repeated through bytes 16..64) AND the
|
||||
// primary mode marker at [12..16] is present. The active-mode
|
||||
// marker at [12..16] is the primary gate; the [16..20] marker
|
||||
// is the redundant confirmation the firmware writes through
|
||||
// the rest of the response. Requiring both before we tell the
|
||||
// upper layer "OEM path is live" keeps any partial / corrupted
|
||||
// response from steering us off the cert-auth fallback.
|
||||
// Extended-access state requires the signature match AND both the
|
||||
// primary marker at [12..16] AND the secondary marker at [16..20].
|
||||
// See docs/mt1959.md — unlock-marker-gating.
|
||||
self.unlocked =
|
||||
response[FIRMWARE_MODE_OFFSET..FIRMWARE_MODE_OFFSET + 4] == FIRMWARE_MODE_SIG;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -295,11 +281,8 @@ impl Mt1959 {
|
||||
);
|
||||
return Err(Error::UnlockFailed);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// A transport fault means the bus is gone. Re-uploading firmware
|
||||
// into a dead bus three times accomplishes nothing and the
|
||||
// generic UnlockFailed it used to end on is classified as
|
||||
// "unlocker not applicable", so the consumer kept probing a dead
|
||||
// drive instead of aborting. Surface the fault unchanged.
|
||||
// A dead bus must abort here, not be retried three times as
|
||||
// firmware reloads. See docs/mt1959.md — run-init-transport-fault.
|
||||
Err(e) if e.is_transport_failure() => {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(
|
||||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||||
@@ -365,10 +348,8 @@ impl Mt1959 {
|
||||
self.do_unlock(scsi)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Detect disc type from capacity to select probe mode.
|
||||
// BD: 3C 01 44 12 01 00 00 00 04 00 (init_addr = 0x0100)
|
||||
// UHD: 3C 01 44 12 02 00 00 00 04 00 (init_addr = 0x0200)
|
||||
// Empirically verified via SCSI capture: BD and UHD use different init addresses.
|
||||
// Detect disc type from capacity to select probe mode (BD vs UHD
|
||||
// init address). See docs/mt1959.md — probe-init-address-detection.
|
||||
let cap_cdb = [
|
||||
SCSI_READ_CAPACITY,
|
||||
0x00,
|
||||
@@ -382,16 +363,12 @@ impl Mt1959 {
|
||||
0x00,
|
||||
];
|
||||
let mut cap_buf = [0u8; READ_CAPACITY_RESPONSE_SIZE];
|
||||
// A transport fault here is a dead bus: propagate it (the caller
|
||||
// classifies it as `Transport` and aborts) instead of silently
|
||||
// defaulting the disc type. A drive sense (`Ok`, non-zero status) or a
|
||||
// short reply just means "capacity unknown" -> assume BD.
|
||||
// A transport fault here is a dead bus: propagate it. A drive
|
||||
// sense or short reply just means "capacity unknown" -> assume BD.
|
||||
let cap = scsi.execute(&cap_cdb, DataDirection::FromDevice, &mut cap_buf, 5_000)?;
|
||||
let disc_sectors = if cap.status == 0 && cap.bytes_transferred >= 4 {
|
||||
// last_lba + 1 = sector count. A 0xFFFFFFFF last-LBA is the
|
||||
// READ CAPACITY(10) "capacity exceeds 32 bits" sentinel; saturate
|
||||
// rather than wrap to 0 (which would misclassify a huge disc as
|
||||
// BD). A saturated count stays above the UHD threshold -> UHD.
|
||||
// last_lba + 1 = sector count; saturate on the 32-bit-overflow
|
||||
// sentinel rather than wrap to 0. See docs/mt1959.md — capacity-saturation.
|
||||
u32::from_be_bytes([cap_buf[0], cap_buf[1], cap_buf[2], cap_buf[3]]).saturating_add(1)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
0
|
||||
@@ -434,14 +411,9 @@ impl Mt1959 {
|
||||
);
|
||||
})
|
||||
{
|
||||
// A dead bus MUST keep its transport classification: this loop is
|
||||
// reached from `probe_disc`, whose caller aborts the rip only when
|
||||
// it sees `Transport`. Flattening every failure to `UnlockFailed`
|
||||
// (which classifies as "not applicable") let a bus that died mid
|
||||
// speed-probe fall through to `Ok(Unlocked{drive_unlocked:true})`.
|
||||
// A short / rejected probe reply is still the drive's OWN failure —
|
||||
// keep it as `UnlockFailed` so it doesn't hard-abort a rip that
|
||||
// could continue on the default speed table.
|
||||
// A dead bus MUST keep its transport classification; a
|
||||
// short/rejected reply is the drive's own failure and stays
|
||||
// `UnlockFailed`. See docs/mt1959.md — probe-failure-classification.
|
||||
if e.is_transport_failure() {
|
||||
return Err(e);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -450,10 +422,8 @@ impl Mt1959 {
|
||||
addr = addr.wrapping_add(PROBE_STEP);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Pass 2: continue past the coarse range. It used to restart at 0 with
|
||||
// the SAME PROBE_STEP, re-issuing all 88 pass-1 addresses verbatim — 88
|
||||
// redundant SCSI round-trips per disc, which dominates drive prep at
|
||||
// real bus latency and teaches the drive's speed table nothing new.
|
||||
// Pass 2: continue past the coarse range (do not restart at 0).
|
||||
// See docs/mt1959.md — probe-pass-overlap-fix.
|
||||
let mut addr: u32 = PROBE_COARSE_END as u32;
|
||||
while addr < PROBE_FINE_END {
|
||||
let mut resp = [0u8; PROBE_RESPONSE_SIZE as usize];
|
||||
@@ -464,12 +434,9 @@ impl Mt1959 {
|
||||
&mut resp,
|
||||
PROBE_RESPONSE_SIZE as usize,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
// Fine probing is best-effort — a short / rejected reply just ends
|
||||
// the sweep early. But a bus that DIED here must not be swallowed:
|
||||
// a bare `break` returned `Ok(())` from `run_probe`, so a dead bus
|
||||
// mid-pass-2 vanished into `Ok(Unlocked{drive_unlocked:true})` with
|
||||
// no log at all (the flagship failure-that-looks-like-success). A
|
||||
// transport fault keeps its classification and aborts.
|
||||
// Fine probing is best-effort — a short/rejected reply just ends
|
||||
// the sweep early, but a transport fault must keep its
|
||||
// classification and abort. See docs/mt1959.md — probe-pass2-transport-fault.
|
||||
if e.is_transport_failure() {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(
|
||||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||||
@@ -619,10 +586,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(len, 2208, "MODE SELECT length = firmware.len(), not 2496");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// variant_a had no direct test at all (variant_b did). Pins its upload
|
||||
/// sequence: WRITE_BUFFER carrying the firmware at its real per-drive
|
||||
/// length in the CDB's 24-bit length field, then the 0x45 verify READ_BUFFER
|
||||
/// whose result used to be discarded outright.
|
||||
// Pins variant_a's upload sequence: WRITE_BUFFER at the real per-drive
|
||||
// length in the CDB's 24-bit length field, then the 0x45 verify
|
||||
// READ_BUFFER whose result used to be discarded outright.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn variant_a_uploads_at_the_real_length_and_issues_the_verify_read() {
|
||||
let mut profile = fixture_profile([0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44]);
|
||||
@@ -660,12 +626,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert!(t.cdbs.is_empty(), "no CDB may reach the drive");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// THE defect-15 test. A drive that returns ZERO bytes used to skip the
|
||||
/// signature check, the firmware-active check AND the mode check — every
|
||||
/// gate was individually guarded by its own `n >= ..` — so `do_unlock`
|
||||
/// returned `Ok(vec![0u8; 64])` and (with the old `drive_unlocked: true`)
|
||||
/// reported a fully unlocked drive. Catches restoring those per-check
|
||||
/// guards.
|
||||
// THE defect-15 test: a zero-byte response used to skip every marker
|
||||
// check (each individually `n >= ..` guarded) and report a fully
|
||||
// unlocked drive. See docs/mt1959.md — defect-15.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn do_unlock_rejects_a_zero_length_response() {
|
||||
let sig = [0x99, 0x9E, 0xC3, 0x75];
|
||||
@@ -706,10 +669,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert!(!e.is_transport_failure(), "a sense is not a dead bus");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// THE defect-16 test (the inverse misclassification). A merely SHORT probe
|
||||
/// response used to be fabricated into a transport-failure status, which
|
||||
/// hard-aborts a rip that would otherwise have succeeded. Catches
|
||||
/// reintroducing the fabricated 0xFF.
|
||||
// THE defect-16 test: a merely short probe response used to be
|
||||
// fabricated into a transport-failure status, hard-aborting a rip
|
||||
// that would otherwise have succeeded.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn short_probe_response_is_not_a_transport_failure() {
|
||||
let mut t = crate::scsi::mock::MockTransport::always(crate::scsi::mock::Reply::short(
|
||||
@@ -744,11 +706,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert!(e.is_transport_failure());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// THE defect-4 test. A dead bus must abort `run_init` at once. It used to
|
||||
/// match `Err(_)` and re-upload firmware into the dead bus on all three
|
||||
/// attempts, then return the generic `UnlockFailed`, which classifies as
|
||||
/// `NotApplicable` — so the consumer kept probing. Catches removing the
|
||||
/// `is_transport_failure` arm.
|
||||
// THE defect-4 test: a dead bus must abort `run_init` at once, not
|
||||
// re-upload firmware on all three attempts and return the generic
|
||||
// `UnlockFailed`. See docs/mt1959.md — defect-4.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn run_init_aborts_on_a_transport_fault_without_reloading_firmware() {
|
||||
let mut t =
|
||||
@@ -823,11 +783,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A drive SENSE (not a dead bus) during the coarse speed probe is the
|
||||
/// drive's OWN failure, not a transport fault — `run_probe` must report
|
||||
/// `UnlockFailed`, not `Transport`. The sibling of
|
||||
/// `transport_fault_during_pass1_probe_stays_a_transport_failure`, which
|
||||
/// only exercises the `is_transport_failure()` arm.
|
||||
// A drive SENSE (not a dead bus) during the coarse probe is the
|
||||
// drive's own failure — `run_probe` must report `UnlockFailed`, not
|
||||
// `Transport`. Sibling of the pass-1 transport-fault test below.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn drive_sense_during_pass1_probe_is_unlock_failed_not_transport() {
|
||||
struct SenseAtFirstProbe;
|
||||
@@ -866,12 +824,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert!(matches!(e, Error::UnlockFailed));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// THE probe pass-1 dead-bus test. A bus that dies during the coarse speed
|
||||
/// probe must keep its transport classification out of `run_probe` so the
|
||||
/// caller (`firmware_unlock`) aborts with `Transport` rather than reporting a
|
||||
/// fully-unlocked drive.
|
||||
/// MUTATION: flattening the pass-1 error to `Error::UnlockFailed` makes the
|
||||
/// `is_transport_failure` assert go red (UnlockFailed maps to NotApplicable).
|
||||
// THE probe pass-1 dead-bus test: a bus that dies during the coarse
|
||||
// probe must keep its transport classification so the caller aborts
|
||||
// with `Transport`. See docs/mt1959.md — pass1-dead-bus-mutation.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn transport_fault_during_pass1_probe_stays_a_transport_failure() {
|
||||
let mut t = ProbeFaultsTransport { fault_at: 0 };
|
||||
@@ -884,12 +839,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(crate::UnlockError::from(e), crate::UnlockError::Transport);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// THE probe pass-2 dead-bus test. Pass 1 completes; the bus dies in the fine
|
||||
/// probe. The loop used to `break` on ANY error and return `Ok(())`, so a
|
||||
/// dead bus mid-pass-2 vanished into `Ok`. It must now propagate a transport
|
||||
/// fault (a short/rejected fine probe still ends the sweep benignly).
|
||||
/// MUTATION: restoring the bare `break` makes `expect_err` panic (run_probe
|
||||
/// returns Ok).
|
||||
// THE probe pass-2 dead-bus test: the loop used to `break` on ANY
|
||||
// error and return `Ok(())`, swallowing a dead bus mid-pass-2. It
|
||||
// must now propagate. See docs/mt1959.md — pass2-dead-bus-mutation.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn transport_fault_during_pass2_probe_stays_a_transport_failure() {
|
||||
let mut t = ProbeFaultsTransport {
|
||||
@@ -904,10 +856,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(crate::UnlockError::from(e), crate::UnlockError::Transport);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// `validate`'s transport-abort branch had no test. A dead bus must propagate
|
||||
/// as a transport fault on the FIRST attempt, not be retried five times.
|
||||
/// MUTATION: turning the `Err(e) => return Err(Error::from(e))` arm into a
|
||||
/// `continue` makes this exhaust to `UnlockFailed` and the assert go red.
|
||||
// `validate`'s transport-abort branch: a dead bus must propagate on
|
||||
// the first attempt, not be retried five times.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn validate_propagates_a_transport_fault_without_retrying() {
|
||||
let mut t =
|
||||
@@ -932,13 +882,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(t.calls(), 5, "retries the full five attempts");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// variant_a's firmware-verify-read transport-abort branch (~variant_a.rs:97)
|
||||
/// had no test. WRITE_BUFFER succeeds, the 0x45 verify read faults: a dead bus
|
||||
/// must abort THERE, not be swallowed into the unlock retries.
|
||||
/// MUTATION: dropping the `if err.is_transport_failure() { return Err }` lets
|
||||
/// execution fall through to `do_unlock` (scripted to answer, so it fails on
|
||||
/// the signature as `UnlockFailed`), and the `is_transport_failure` assert
|
||||
/// goes red — a genuine red-before-green, not green-both-ways.
|
||||
// variant_a's firmware-verify-read transport-abort branch: WRITE_BUFFER
|
||||
// succeeds, the 0x45 verify read faults — a dead bus must abort there,
|
||||
// not be swallowed into the unlock retries. See docs/mt1959.md — variant-a-verify-read-transport-abort.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn variant_a_verify_read_transport_fault_aborts() {
|
||||
let mut profile = fixture_profile([0; 4]);
|
||||
@@ -974,14 +920,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert!(t.cdbs.is_empty(), "no CDB may reach the drive");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// THE full success path: WRITE_BUFFER upload, a fully-good verify read
|
||||
/// (exercising the `Ok(r) if status==0 && bytes_transferred==len` arm no
|
||||
/// other variant_a test reaches), then BOTH `do_unlock` calls succeed —
|
||||
/// the first fatally-gated, the second best-effort. Every other
|
||||
/// variant_a test above deliberately stops short (empty firmware, a
|
||||
/// dead bus, or `do_unlock` failing against `RecordingTransport`'s empty
|
||||
/// response) — this is the only one that reaches `load_firmware`'s final
|
||||
/// `Ok(())`.
|
||||
// THE full success path: WRITE_BUFFER upload, a fully-good verify
|
||||
// read, then both `do_unlock` calls succeed. The only variant_a test
|
||||
// that reaches `load_firmware`'s final `Ok(())`.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn variant_a_load_firmware_succeeds_end_to_end() {
|
||||
let sig = [0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44];
|
||||
@@ -1002,12 +943,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert!(mt.init_complete, "do_unlock #1 must have set init_complete");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// variant_b had no transport-abort test. A firmware-upload STEP that hits a
|
||||
/// dead bus (here the metadata read) must abort via `trace_step`, not be
|
||||
/// swallowed and carried into the unlock retries.
|
||||
/// MUTATION: dropping `trace_step`'s `if err.is_transport_failure()` return
|
||||
/// lets execution reach `do_unlock` (scripted good → signature fails as
|
||||
/// `UnlockFailed`), so the `is_transport_failure` assert goes red.
|
||||
// variant_b's firmware-upload step (here the metadata read) hitting a
|
||||
// dead bus must abort via `trace_step`, not be swallowed into the
|
||||
// unlock retries. See docs/mt1959.md — variant-b-upload-step-transport-abort.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn variant_b_upload_step_transport_fault_aborts() {
|
||||
let mut profile = fixture_profile([0; 4]);
|
||||
@@ -1056,12 +994,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Build a synthetic 64-byte unlock response.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// `mode_marker`: bytes [12..16]. Pass `FIRMWARE_ACTIVE_SIG` for the
|
||||
/// active-mode primary marker.
|
||||
/// `id_marker`: bytes [16..20] (and repeated through [20..64] in
|
||||
/// real responses; only [16..20] is checked).
|
||||
// Build a synthetic 64-byte unlock response. `mode_marker` fills
|
||||
// bytes [12..16]; `id_marker` fills bytes [16..20] (repeated through
|
||||
// [20..64] in real responses; only [16..20] is checked).
|
||||
fn build_response(signature: [u8; 4], mode_marker: [u8; 4], id_marker: [u8; 4]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let mut r = vec![0u8; 64];
|
||||
r[0..4].copy_from_slice(&signature);
|
||||
@@ -1144,11 +1079,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(t.calls(), 1, "must not retry a signature mismatch");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// `run_init`'s retry loop: `do_unlock` fails generically (too short to
|
||||
/// validate — not a signature mismatch, not a transport fault), the
|
||||
/// firmware reload it falls back to also fails generically (an empty
|
||||
/// firmware blob) rather than fatally, so the loop must `continue` and
|
||||
/// try again — three times — before exhausting to the last error.
|
||||
// `run_init`'s retry loop: a generic `do_unlock` failure plus a
|
||||
// generic firmware-reload failure must `continue` and retry three
|
||||
// times before exhausting to the last error.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn run_init_exhausts_after_three_generic_failures() {
|
||||
let mut t = crate::scsi::mock::MockTransport::always(crate::scsi::mock::Reply::short(
|
||||
@@ -1168,11 +1101,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Same shape as `run_init_exhausts_after_three_generic_failures`, but for
|
||||
/// a MODE_B (`is_variant_b = true`) drive — pins that `run_init`'s mode
|
||||
/// dispatch (`self.mode == MODE_A`) actually reaches `variant_b::load_firmware`
|
||||
/// and not just its `variant_a` sibling, which every other `run_init` test
|
||||
/// above exercises exclusively.
|
||||
// Same shape as the mode-A generic-failure test, but for a MODE_B
|
||||
// drive — pins that `run_init`'s dispatch actually reaches
|
||||
// `variant_b::load_firmware`, not just its variant_a sibling.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn run_init_exhausts_after_three_generic_failures_mode_b() {
|
||||
let mut t = crate::scsi::mock::MockTransport::always(crate::scsi::mock::Reply::short(
|
||||
@@ -1190,10 +1121,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Same generic `do_unlock` failure, but this time the firmware-reload
|
||||
/// fallback itself hits a dead bus. That must abort `run_init`
|
||||
/// immediately (transport classification preserved), not be folded into
|
||||
/// `last_err` and retried.
|
||||
// Same generic `do_unlock` failure, but the firmware-reload fallback
|
||||
// itself hits a dead bus — must abort `run_init` immediately, not be
|
||||
// folded into `last_err` and retried.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn run_init_firmware_reload_transport_fault_aborts() {
|
||||
let mut profile = fixture_profile([0; 4]);
|
||||
@@ -1232,10 +1162,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert!(mt.init_complete, "run_probe must do_unlock itself first");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A READ CAPACITY drive sense (status != 0) means "capacity unknown" ->
|
||||
/// `disc_sectors` falls back to 0, which is still below the UHD
|
||||
/// threshold, so probing continues with the BD init address rather than
|
||||
/// aborting.
|
||||
// A READ CAPACITY drive sense means "capacity unknown" -> falls back
|
||||
// to 0 sectors, which is below the UHD threshold, so probing
|
||||
// continues with the BD init address rather than aborting.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn run_probe_capacity_check_condition_falls_back_to_zero_sectors() {
|
||||
struct CapacitySenseTransport;
|
||||
@@ -1327,10 +1256,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The fine (pass-2) probe sweep ends early on a merely-rejected probe
|
||||
/// reply (not a transport fault) — it must `break` out of the sweep and
|
||||
/// let `run_probe` still return `Ok`, rather than propagating the drive's
|
||||
/// refusal as a hard failure.
|
||||
// The fine (pass-2) probe sweep ends early on a merely-rejected
|
||||
// probe reply (not a transport fault) — it must `break` and let
|
||||
// `run_probe` still return `Ok`.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn run_probe_pass2_ends_early_on_a_rejected_probe_without_failing() {
|
||||
struct Pass2RejectsTransport {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -21,9 +21,8 @@ pub(super) fn load_firmware(mt: &mut Mt1959, scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> Re
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Upload firmware via WRITE_BUFFER. The CDB's length is a 24-bit field;
|
||||
// if the blob exceeds that, the encoded length would silently disagree
|
||||
// with the bytes actually sent (`data`). Reject rather than upload a
|
||||
// length-mismatched command.
|
||||
// reject blobs that would exceed it rather than send a length-mismatched
|
||||
// command.
|
||||
let len = firmware.len();
|
||||
if len > WRITE_BUFFER_MAX_LEN {
|
||||
return Err(crate::ld::error::Error::UnlockFailed);
|
||||
@@ -43,12 +42,9 @@ pub(super) fn load_firmware(mt: &mut Mt1959, scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> Re
|
||||
let mut data = firmware.clone();
|
||||
scsi.execute(&cdb, DataDirection::ToDevice, &mut data, 30_000)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify the firmware loaded (non-fatal — different buffer_id 0x45). There
|
||||
// is no documented expected payload to compare against, so the outcome is
|
||||
// TRACED rather than asserted: discarding it with `let _ =` meant a corrupt
|
||||
// upload proceeded straight into the do_unlock retries with no diagnostic
|
||||
// whatsoever, which is exactly the silent-failure shape this crate exists to
|
||||
// avoid.
|
||||
// Verify the firmware loaded (non-fatal — different buffer_id 0x45). No
|
||||
// documented expected payload exists, so the outcome is traced rather
|
||||
// than asserted, instead of silently discarded before the unlock retries.
|
||||
let verify_cdb = [
|
||||
super::SCSI_READ_BUFFER,
|
||||
super::MODE_A,
|
||||
@@ -100,10 +96,9 @@ pub(super) fn load_firmware(mt: &mut Mt1959, scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> Re
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Double unlock after firmware upload. The first establishes the
|
||||
// unlock and is fatal on failure; the second is a confirmation pass and
|
||||
// is best-effort (matching variant B), so a benign hiccup on the
|
||||
// redundant call doesn't fail an already-successful unlock.
|
||||
// Double unlock after firmware upload: first is fatal on failure, second
|
||||
// is a best-effort confirmation pass (matching variant B) so a benign
|
||||
// hiccup there doesn't fail an already-successful unlock.
|
||||
mt.do_unlock(scsi)?;
|
||||
let _ = mt.do_unlock(scsi);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,11 +13,9 @@ const FIRMWARE_EXTRA: [u8; 16] = [0; 16];
|
||||
/// that drive — real profiles must supply their own (see `DriveProfile`).
|
||||
const VENDOR_VERIFY: [u8; 10] = [0xF1, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x30, 0x01, 0xF3, 0xAD, 0x23];
|
||||
|
||||
/// Trace the outcome of a best-effort firmware-upload step and swallow
|
||||
/// everything EXCEPT a transport fault. These steps are advisory (the unlock
|
||||
/// retries below are the real gate) but their results were previously thrown
|
||||
/// away entirely, so a firmware upload could fail end to end and leave nothing
|
||||
/// in the log to say so — and a dead bus kept the sequence running.
|
||||
// See docs/variant-b-firmware-upload.md — trace_step rationale.
|
||||
// Swallows everything except a transport fault; these steps are advisory,
|
||||
// the unlock retries below are the real gate.
|
||||
fn trace_step(phase: &'static str, r: crate::scsi::Result<crate::scsi::ScsiResult>) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
match r {
|
||||
Ok(res) if res.status == 0 => {
|
||||
@@ -60,12 +58,9 @@ pub(super) fn load_firmware(mt: &mut Mt1959, scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> Re
|
||||
return Err(crate::ld::error::Error::UnlockFailed);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 1: Upload the firmware via MODE SELECT. The profile's `firmware` is
|
||||
// the exact per-drive image — extracted at the drive's own load-CDB length
|
||||
// (2192..2528 bytes; the old fixed 0x9C0 truncated some drives and over-read
|
||||
// others into blob strings). Upload all of it. MODE SELECT(10)'s
|
||||
// parameter-list length is 16-bit, so reject only a blob that can't be
|
||||
// expressed in the CDB.
|
||||
// Step 1: Upload the firmware via MODE SELECT (see docs/variant-b-firmware-upload.md).
|
||||
// MODE SELECT(10)'s parameter-list length is 16-bit, so reject only a
|
||||
// blob that can't be expressed in the CDB.
|
||||
let write_len = firmware.len();
|
||||
if write_len > u16::MAX as usize {
|
||||
return Err(crate::ld::error::Error::UnlockFailed);
|
||||
@@ -128,13 +123,9 @@ pub(super) fn load_firmware(mt: &mut Mt1959, scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> Re
|
||||
scsi.execute(&write_extra_cdb, DataDirection::ToDevice, &mut data2, 5_000),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 4: Vendor verify (0xF1 — B-only, not standard SCSI). PER-DRIVE: take
|
||||
// it from the profile (39 distinct values across the 140 B drives). The
|
||||
// const is only a legacy fallback — it carries one drive's token.
|
||||
// The result used to be discarded with `let _ =` despite the comment calling
|
||||
// this a verify step: a corrupt upload proceeded straight to the do_unlock
|
||||
// retries with no diagnostic. There is no documented expected payload, so
|
||||
// the outcome is TRACED; only a dead bus aborts.
|
||||
// Step 4: Vendor verify (0xF1 — B-only, not standard SCSI), per-drive.
|
||||
// See docs/variant-b-firmware-upload.md for why the outcome is traced
|
||||
// rather than discarded.
|
||||
let verify_cdb = mt.profile.fw_verify_cdb.unwrap_or(VENDOR_VERIFY);
|
||||
let mut dummy = [0u8; 0];
|
||||
trace_step(
|
||||
@@ -142,11 +133,9 @@ pub(super) fn load_firmware(mt: &mut Mt1959, scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> Re
|
||||
scsi.execute(&verify_cdb, DataDirection::None, &mut dummy, 5_000),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 5: Unlock retries (up to 5, then a final fatal attempt). On a
|
||||
// successful unlock we issue one confirmation pass; its result is
|
||||
// intentionally best-effort — the first call already established the
|
||||
// unlock state, so a hiccup on the redundant confirmation must not fail
|
||||
// an otherwise-good unlock.
|
||||
// Step 5: Unlock retries (up to 5, then a final fatal attempt). The
|
||||
// confirmation pass after success is intentionally best-effort — see
|
||||
// docs/variant-b-firmware-upload.md.
|
||||
for _attempt in 0..5 {
|
||||
match mt.do_unlock(scsi) {
|
||||
Ok(_) => {
|
||||
|
||||
+53
-83
@@ -42,20 +42,10 @@ pub struct Identity {
|
||||
|
||||
/// Per-drive profile.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// VISIBILITY: only `identity` and `signature` are public — they are what the
|
||||
/// catalog is public FOR ("is this drive supported?", and the emulator's
|
||||
/// impersonation). Everything below them is unlock MECHANISM: the MediaTek
|
||||
/// firmware image and the per-drive vendor CDB templates. `Cargo.toml` says this
|
||||
/// crate is never published because it carries drive firmware; re-exporting
|
||||
/// `DriveProfile` with a `pub firmware: Vec<u8>` handed that firmware, and every
|
||||
/// vendor CDB, to any downstream crate that called `ld::profile()`. They are
|
||||
/// `pub(crate)` so the mechanism stays inside the unlocker.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// `allow(dead_code)`: this is the on-disk catalog schema, and several captured
|
||||
/// CDB templates have no in-crate consumer yet. They were `pub` before, so the
|
||||
/// compiler saw the (external) use; making them `pub(crate)` is what exposes
|
||||
/// them as unread. Deleting them would silently drop fields from the format the
|
||||
/// profile-extraction pipeline emits.
|
||||
/// Only `identity` and `signature` are public; everything else (firmware
|
||||
/// image, per-drive vendor CDB templates) is `pub(crate)` unlock mechanism
|
||||
/// that must stay inside this unpublished crate.
|
||||
/// See docs/drive-profile-visibility.md — field-visibility and allow(dead_code) rationale.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Deserialize)]
|
||||
pub struct DriveProfile {
|
||||
@@ -72,11 +62,8 @@ pub struct DriveProfile {
|
||||
pub(crate) firmware: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
|
||||
// ── OEM-extended-access CDB templates ──────────────────────────────
|
||||
//
|
||||
// All optional — older profile blobs that pre-date the CDB capture
|
||||
// pipeline simply omit these fields and decode as `None`. Encoded
|
||||
// in the JSON as lowercase hex strings without separators
|
||||
// (e.g. `"3c014410e29100002400"` for a 10-byte CDB).
|
||||
// All optional (`None` if pre-capture-pipeline). Hex strings, no
|
||||
// separators, e.g. `"3c014410e29100002400"`.
|
||||
#[serde(default)]
|
||||
pub(crate) unlock_init_value: u8,
|
||||
#[serde(default)]
|
||||
@@ -113,14 +100,9 @@ pub struct DriveProfile {
|
||||
pub(crate) speed_calc_table: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Hand-written, REDACTING Debug. `DriveProfile` is `pub` and reachable through
|
||||
// the public `Profiles` catalog (`ld::bundled` / `ld::profiles`), whose own
|
||||
// derived `Debug` would recurse into this one. `Cargo.toml` says this crate is
|
||||
// NEVER published because it carries drive firmware; a derived `Debug` would
|
||||
// render that firmware image AND every captured per-drive vendor CDB (the unlock
|
||||
// MECHANISM) straight into any log. Show only the PUBLIC identity + signature
|
||||
// (what the catalog is public FOR); collapse the firmware to a byte length and
|
||||
// omit the vendor CDB templates entirely so no mechanism bytes reach a log.
|
||||
// Hand-written, REDACTING Debug: a derived one would recurse through the
|
||||
// public `Profiles` catalog and print raw firmware + vendor CDB bytes into
|
||||
// logs. Show only identity + signature; collapse firmware to a length.
|
||||
impl std::fmt::Debug for DriveProfile {
|
||||
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
|
||||
f.debug_struct("DriveProfile")
|
||||
@@ -167,23 +149,16 @@ pub struct ProfileMatch {
|
||||
pub platform: Platform,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Parsing ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Decode an even-length ASCII hex string into bytes.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Operates on raw bytes rather than `&str` char-boundary slices: a
|
||||
/// non-ASCII input (e.g. a hand-edited profile with a multi-byte char)
|
||||
/// could otherwise have `&s[i..i+2]` land inside a UTF-8 char boundary and
|
||||
/// panic. Hex is ASCII, so any non-ASCII or non-hex byte simply fails to
|
||||
/// decode. The error is a stable, language-neutral token (`"hex"`), not a
|
||||
/// translatable English message.
|
||||
// ── Parsing: decode hex on raw bytes (not `&str` slices) so non-ASCII
|
||||
// can't land `&s[i..i+2]` inside a UTF-8 char boundary and panic — it
|
||||
// just fails to decode with `"hex"`.
|
||||
fn decode_hex(s: &str) -> std::result::Result<Vec<u8>, &'static str> {
|
||||
let bytes = s.as_bytes();
|
||||
if !bytes.len().is_multiple_of(2) {
|
||||
return Err("hex");
|
||||
}
|
||||
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(bytes.len() / 2);
|
||||
for pair in bytes.chunks_exact(2) {
|
||||
for pair in bytes.as_chunks::<2>().0.iter() {
|
||||
let hi = (pair[0] as char).to_digit(16).ok_or("hex")?;
|
||||
let lo = (pair[1] as char).to_digit(16).ok_or("hex")?;
|
||||
out.push((hi * 16 + lo) as u8);
|
||||
@@ -223,9 +198,7 @@ where
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Fixed-length hex deserializers for CDB templates ────────────────────
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Profile JSON encodes CDBs as lowercase hex strings without separators.
|
||||
// An empty string / null / missing field decodes as `None`.
|
||||
// Lowercase hex strings, no separators; empty/null/missing decodes as `None`.
|
||||
|
||||
fn parse_hex_bytes(s: &str) -> std::result::Result<Vec<u8>, &'static str> {
|
||||
decode_hex(s)
|
||||
@@ -306,12 +279,8 @@ pub fn bundled() -> Option<&'static Profiles> {
|
||||
CACHE
|
||||
.get_or_init(|| match load_from_str(BUNDLED_PROFILES) {
|
||||
Ok(p) => Some(p),
|
||||
// The `None` is cached PERMANENTLY (correctly — the blob is fixed at
|
||||
// compile time), which means a bad shipped profiles.json makes
|
||||
// Mt1959Unlocker report "drive not supported" for every drive for the
|
||||
// life of the process. Unlogged, that is indistinguishable from a
|
||||
// genuinely uncataloged drive; log it once, loudly, at the one place
|
||||
// the parse happens.
|
||||
// `None` caches permanently; unlogged that's indistinguishable
|
||||
// from a genuinely uncataloged drive, so log once, loudly, here.
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
tracing::error!(
|
||||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||||
@@ -340,13 +309,13 @@ fn load_from_str(data: &str) -> Result<Profiles> {
|
||||
|
||||
/// Find a profile matching a drive's INQUIRY fields.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Per platform section (MT1959-A, then MT1959-B, then Renesas), tried in
|
||||
/// order of decreasing specificity: full match including `product_id` and
|
||||
/// `firmware_date` (skipped when the drive reports no product), then the same
|
||||
/// without `product_id`. Both require `firmware_date`; every profile carries a
|
||||
/// unique identity under these fields, so a match is exact — no looser
|
||||
/// vendor/revision fallback that could pick the wrong same-model variant. All
|
||||
/// comparisons are whitespace-trimmed. Returns the first section that matches.
|
||||
/// Per platform section (MT1959-A, then MT1959-B, then Renesas). A drive that
|
||||
/// reports a `product_id` matches ONLY on the full identity including it — if
|
||||
/// no cataloged profile matches exactly, the drive is treated as uncataloged
|
||||
/// (no match), never bound to a same-vendor/revision sibling. The looser
|
||||
/// four-field pass (vendor/revision/vendor_specific/firmware_date) runs only
|
||||
/// when the drive reports no `product_id` at all. All comparisons are
|
||||
/// whitespace-trimmed. Returns the first section that matches.
|
||||
pub fn find_by_drive_id(profiles: &Profiles, drive_id: &crate::DriveId) -> Option<ProfileMatch> {
|
||||
let v = drive_id.vendor_id.trim();
|
||||
let prod = drive_id.product_id.trim();
|
||||
@@ -374,12 +343,17 @@ pub fn find_by_drive_id(profiles: &Profiles, drive_id: &crate::DriveId) -> Optio
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(p) = list.iter().find(|p| {
|
||||
// The product_id-blind pass runs ONLY when the drive reports none: a
|
||||
// drive that reports a product_id but misses the exact match is an
|
||||
// uncataloged variant, else it'd bind to a sibling's wrong firmware.
|
||||
if prod.is_empty()
|
||||
&& let Some(p) = list.iter().find(|p| {
|
||||
p.identity.vendor_id.trim() == v
|
||||
&& p.identity.product_revision.trim() == r
|
||||
&& p.identity.vendor_specific.trim() == vs
|
||||
&& p.identity.firmware_date.trim() == date
|
||||
}) {
|
||||
})
|
||||
{
|
||||
return Some(ProfileMatch {
|
||||
profile: p.clone(),
|
||||
platform,
|
||||
@@ -441,6 +415,16 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
let id0 = make_drive_id("TIE", "1.00", "XX00000", "200001010000");
|
||||
let m0 = find_by_drive_id(&profiles, &id0).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(m0.profile.signature, [0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa]);
|
||||
|
||||
// A REPORTED product_id that matches no cataloged entry must NOT fall
|
||||
// through to the four-field pass and bind to a sibling (MODEL-A/B);
|
||||
// an uncataloged variant is no match, not a wrong match.
|
||||
let mut idc = make_drive_id("TIE", "1.00", "XX00000", "200001010000");
|
||||
idc.product_id = "MODEL-C".to_string();
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
find_by_drive_id(&profiles, &idc).is_none(),
|
||||
"an uncataloged product_id must not mis-bind to a same-vendor sibling",
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
@@ -543,10 +527,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(parse_hex4("aabbccdd").unwrap(), [0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Platform::name() returns stable, non-empty, language-neutral identifiers.
|
||||
/// These strings are logged and keyed on in caller code; changing them is a
|
||||
/// breaking change.
|
||||
/// Mutation: swapping Mt1959A and Mt1959B names silently misroutes firmware upload.
|
||||
// Platform::name() strings are logged/keyed by callers; changing them is
|
||||
// a breaking change. Mutation: swapping A/B names misroutes firmware upload.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn platform_name_is_stable() {
|
||||
// The exact strings are part of the public stable API (logged/keyed).
|
||||
@@ -555,11 +537,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(Platform::Renesas.name(), "Renesas");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// find_by_drive_id: exact match (including firmware_date) wins over loose match.
|
||||
/// Spec: two-pass — first an exact match including firmware_date, then looser.
|
||||
/// Build two synthetic Profiles entries that differ only by firmware_date,
|
||||
/// and verify the correct one is selected.
|
||||
/// Mutation: doing only the loose pass would return the first entry regardless of date.
|
||||
// find_by_drive_id: two-pass — exact match (incl. firmware_date) wins
|
||||
// over loose. Mutation: skipping the exact pass returns the first entry
|
||||
// regardless of date.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn find_by_drive_id_exact_date_wins_over_loose() {
|
||||
use serde_json::json;
|
||||
@@ -651,10 +631,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::ProfileParse)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Bundled profiles is non-empty (mt1959_a has at least one entry).
|
||||
/// This pins the embedded JSON: if profiles.json is accidentally emptied
|
||||
/// or truncated, this test goes red.
|
||||
/// Mutation: clearing profiles.json would make this fail.
|
||||
// Pins the embedded JSON: if profiles.json is emptied/truncated, this
|
||||
// goes red.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn bundled_profiles_has_entries() {
|
||||
let profiles = load_bundled().unwrap();
|
||||
@@ -664,10 +642,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// deserialization of a profile with missing optional CDB fields
|
||||
/// produces None for those fields (not a parse error).
|
||||
/// Spec: all CDB template fields are `#[serde(default)]` — they are optional.
|
||||
/// Mutation: making a CDB field required breaks backward-compat with old blobs.
|
||||
// All CDB fields are `#[serde(default)]`. Mutation: making one required
|
||||
// breaks backward-compat with old blobs.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn profile_optional_cdb_fields_default_to_none() {
|
||||
use serde_json::json;
|
||||
@@ -715,12 +691,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// `DriveProfile`'s `Debug` must NOT render the firmware image or the
|
||||
/// per-drive vendor CDB templates — this crate is unpublished precisely
|
||||
/// because it carries drive firmware, and the profile is reachable through
|
||||
/// the public `Profiles` catalog.
|
||||
/// MUTATION: restoring `#[derive(Debug)]` prints the raw firmware bytes
|
||||
/// (e.g. the 0xEE marker below) and the CDB bytes, so this goes red.
|
||||
// `Debug` must not render firmware/CDB bytes. Mutation: restoring
|
||||
// `#[derive(Debug)]` prints them (e.g. the 0xEE marker below), goes red.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn drive_profile_debug_redacts_firmware_and_cdbs() {
|
||||
use serde_json::json;
|
||||
@@ -749,10 +721,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert!(s.contains("VIS"), "identity must remain visible: {s}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// deserialize_hex4 of an empty string must produce [0;4] without error.
|
||||
/// This matches `deserialize_hex4`'s explicit early-return for empty strings.
|
||||
/// Mutation: treating empty string as an error prevents profiles where signature
|
||||
/// was not captured from loading.
|
||||
// deserialize_hex4("") must produce [0;4]. Mutation: treating empty as
|
||||
// an error blocks profiles with no captured signature from loading.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn profile_empty_signature_deserialises_as_zeroes() {
|
||||
use serde_json::json;
|
||||
|
||||
+23
-36
@@ -1,34 +1,28 @@
|
||||
//! freemkv-unlock — the unlock layer for the freemkv toolchain.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! An **unlocker removes a drive-level bus-encryption barrier** so the drive
|
||||
//! serves readable (de-bus'd / de-scrambled) sectors. Content-key decryption is
|
||||
//! a separate layer — the consumer's (libfreemkv's) job.
|
||||
//! serves readable (de-bus'd / de-scrambled) sectors. Content-key decryption
|
||||
//! is a separate layer — the consumer's (libfreemkv's) job.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This crate defines the [`Unlocker`] contract + the SCSI transport contract,
|
||||
//! and holds the self-contained unlocker modules (firmware / AACS cert / CSS).
|
||||
//! libfreemkv depends on this crate and dispatches via [`all_unlockers`]; it
|
||||
//! never names an individual unlocker. To remove an unlocker, delete its module
|
||||
//! dir and its one line in [`all_unlockers`] — nothing else changes.
|
||||
//! This crate defines the [`Unlocker`] contract + the SCSI transport
|
||||
//! contract, and holds the self-contained unlocker modules (firmware / AACS
|
||||
//! cert / CSS). libfreemkv depends on this crate and dispatches via
|
||||
//! [`all_unlockers`]; it never names an individual unlocker directly.
|
||||
|
||||
pub mod scsi;
|
||||
|
||||
mod aacs;
|
||||
mod css;
|
||||
// `ld` is public ONLY for its drive-profile catalog (`ld::profiles` / the
|
||||
// `Profiles` object) and, under the `emulation` feature, the unlock-handshake
|
||||
// wire format the bdemu test-emulator needs. The unlocker impl itself
|
||||
// (`Mt1959Unlocker`) is `pub(crate)` — clients still reach unlockers only through
|
||||
// [`all_unlockers`]. `aacs` and `css` carry no such public catalog, so they
|
||||
// stay fully private.
|
||||
// `ld` is public only for its drive-profile catalog + (under `emulation`) the
|
||||
// handshake wire format bdemu needs; the unlocker impl stays `pub(crate)`.
|
||||
// See docs/module-visibility.md — module visibility rationale.
|
||||
pub mod ld;
|
||||
// `renesas` is public for its `is_renesas` drive-probe (which reports a dead
|
||||
// bus as `Err(UnlockError::Transport)` rather than "not a Renesas drive"); the unlocker impl
|
||||
// (`Renesas`) is `pub(crate)` — reached only through [`all_unlockers`].
|
||||
// `renesas` is public for its `is_renesas` drive-probe (dead bus vs. "not a
|
||||
// Renesas drive"); the unlocker impl stays `pub(crate)`.
|
||||
// See docs/module-visibility.md — module visibility rationale.
|
||||
pub mod renesas;
|
||||
// `freemkv` carries no public catalog (the firmware self-identifies rather
|
||||
// than matching a bundled profile) and no emulation wire format yet, so it
|
||||
// stays fully private — the unlocker impl (`FreemkvUnlocker`) is reached only
|
||||
// through [`all_unlockers`].
|
||||
// `freemkv` self-identifies rather than matching a bundled profile, so it
|
||||
// stays fully private. See docs/module-visibility.md — module visibility rationale.
|
||||
mod freemkv;
|
||||
|
||||
use scsi::ScsiTransport;
|
||||
@@ -95,13 +89,9 @@ pub struct Unlocked {
|
||||
pub drive_unlocked: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Hand-written, REDACTING Debug — `Unlocked` is the public carrier that leaves
|
||||
// this crate, and both `bus_key` (the AACS bus key) and `vid` (the Volume ID
|
||||
// that feeds VUK derivation) are key material that must never reach a log or a
|
||||
// test-failure message in plaintext. The `AacsAuth` / `CertHandshake` siblings
|
||||
// already redact; a derived `Debug` here would print the very bytes they hide.
|
||||
// Presence is still observable (Some/None) so a log can say WHETHER a key was
|
||||
// obtained without revealing WHAT it is.
|
||||
// Hand-written, REDACTING Debug: `bus_key`/`vid` are key material that must
|
||||
// never reach a log in plaintext; presence (Some/None) stays observable.
|
||||
// See docs/unlocked-debug-redaction.md — full rationale.
|
||||
impl std::fmt::Debug for Unlocked {
|
||||
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
|
||||
f.debug_struct("Unlocked")
|
||||
@@ -206,11 +196,9 @@ pub fn all_unlockers() -> Vec<Box<dyn Unlocker>> {
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
/// The dispatch order is a documented contract (`firmware → cert → css`) and
|
||||
/// had NO test: `all_unlockers` is the one place an unlocker is named, and
|
||||
/// the consumer stops at the first that doesn't decline, so reordering this
|
||||
/// list silently changes which unlocker claims a drive. Catches a reorder,
|
||||
/// a rename, and an accidental addition/removal.
|
||||
// Dispatch order is a documented contract (`firmware → cert → css`); the
|
||||
// consumer stops at the first unlocker that doesn't decline, so reordering
|
||||
// this list silently changes which unlocker claims a drive.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn all_unlockers_dispatch_order_is_firmware_then_cert_then_css() {
|
||||
let names: Vec<&'static str> = all_unlockers().iter().map(|u| u.name()).collect();
|
||||
@@ -265,10 +253,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(unlocker_name(&DriveId::default()), None);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// `Unlocked` is the public carrier that leaves the crate, and its `bus_key`
|
||||
/// and `vid` are key material. Its `Debug` must NOT print those bytes.
|
||||
/// MUTATION: restoring `#[derive(Debug)]` prints the raw byte arrays, so the
|
||||
/// distinctive marker bytes appear in the output and this goes red.
|
||||
// `bus_key`/`vid` are key material; `Debug` must NOT print those bytes.
|
||||
// MUTATION: restoring `#[derive(Debug)]` prints the raw byte arrays, so
|
||||
// the marker bytes appear in the output and this test goes red.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn unlocked_debug_redacts_key_material() {
|
||||
let u = Unlocked {
|
||||
|
||||
+18
-58
@@ -19,17 +19,13 @@ const RENESAS_MARKER_OFFSET: usize = 16;
|
||||
/// `Ok(true)` if `scsi` is a Renesas-platform drive (Pioneer or HL-DT-ST
|
||||
/// Renesas).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Issues the vendor READ_BUFFER 0x02/0xF1 probe: a Renesas controller serves a
|
||||
/// 48-byte identity block whose bytes `[16..19]` are the ASCII `SAT` interface
|
||||
/// tag. A MediaTek drive rejects it — as a CHECK CONDITION (`Ok` with a
|
||||
/// non-zero status) or, through a non-conforming transport, as an `Err`
|
||||
/// carrying a sense — which is `Ok(false)`: not a Renesas drive. This is the
|
||||
/// definitive Renesas-vs-MediaTek split.
|
||||
/// Issues the vendor READ_BUFFER 0x02/0xF1 probe: a Renesas controller serves
|
||||
/// a 48-byte identity block whose bytes `[16..19]` are the ASCII `SAT`
|
||||
/// interface tag. A rejection (CHECK CONDITION or `Err` with a sense) is
|
||||
/// `Ok(false)`: not a Renesas drive.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// A TRANSPORT fault is `Err(Transport)`. It used to be folded into the same
|
||||
/// `false` as a drive rejection, and because this probe is the first SCSI
|
||||
/// command the unlocker issues, a dead bus read as "not a Renesas drive" — the
|
||||
/// consumer then walked the remaining unlockers against a bus that was gone.
|
||||
/// `Err(Transport)` on a dead bus. See docs/renesas-mod.md for why a
|
||||
/// transport fault must not be folded into `Ok(false)`.
|
||||
pub fn is_renesas(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> std::result::Result<bool, UnlockError> {
|
||||
let mut buf = [0u8; RB_F1_LEN];
|
||||
match scsi.execute(&RB_F1_CDB, DataDirection::FromDevice, &mut buf, 5_000) {
|
||||
@@ -70,28 +66,9 @@ impl Renesas {
|
||||
Renesas
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The Pioneer/Renesas vendor "open" — MakeMKV's live sequence, replicated in
|
||||
/// full: a primary read, and on its failure a payload-less "knock" + a second
|
||||
/// read at a different window.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// A. `READ_BUFFER 0x02/0xB0 @0x000004` (164 B) — the primary open.
|
||||
/// B. (only if A refuses) `WRITE_BUFFER 0x02/0x41 @0xA5AAAA` (0-byte knock)
|
||||
/// then `READ_BUFFER 0x02/0xB0 @0x500000` (164 B).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Success is by SCSI *status* alone (the 164-byte payload CONTENT is not
|
||||
/// validated — verified empirically: a real drive's table and an all-zero
|
||||
/// buffer are accepted identically as long as status is GOOD). We run the
|
||||
/// whole A→knock→B path rather than bailing after A, because the knock is a
|
||||
/// per-firmware fallback: some firmware revisions only answer the `0x500000`
|
||||
/// window *after* the knock (MakeMKV issues the knock exactly when A returns
|
||||
/// CHECK CONDITION). If NEITHER A nor B returns GOOD, the drive did not open →
|
||||
/// defer to the next unlocker.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// (There may be more than one knock offset across firmware families; only
|
||||
/// the observed `0xA5AAAA` is issued here — add variants as they are proven.)
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// `Ok(true)` = opened (A or B GOOD). `Ok(false)` = neither opened (CHECK
|
||||
/// CONDITION). `Err(Transport)` = dead bus.
|
||||
// MakeMKV's vendor "open" sequence: primary read (A), and on refusal a
|
||||
// knock + second read (B). See docs/renesas-mod.md for the full sequence
|
||||
// and why we run A→knock→B rather than bailing after A.
|
||||
fn vendor_open(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> std::result::Result<bool, UnlockError> {
|
||||
const RB_B0_04_CDB: [u8; 10] = [0x3C, 0x02, 0xB0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x00];
|
||||
const KNOCK_A5AAAA_CDB: [u8; 10] =
|
||||
@@ -142,17 +119,9 @@ impl Unlocker for Renesas {
|
||||
"Renesas"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Recognize and open a Renesas/Pioneer drive the way MakeMKV does:
|
||||
/// 1. `READ_BUFFER 0xF1` identity gate (the `SAT` marker) — else this is
|
||||
/// not our drive → `NotApplicable`.
|
||||
/// 2. the single vendor open read `READ_BUFFER 0xB0 @0x04` — GOOD status
|
||||
/// confirms the drive is rip-ready. A CHECK CONDITION here is exactly
|
||||
/// where MakeMKV gives up on the drive, so we defer to the next unlocker
|
||||
/// (`NotApplicable`) rather than claim a drive we could not open.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// On success returns `drive_unlocked: false`: the vendor open makes the
|
||||
/// drive readable, but AACS bus decryption is still the host cert's job (the
|
||||
/// cert unlocker runs next), so we do not assert the bus is handled here.
|
||||
// Gate on the `0xF1` SAT identity, then the vendor open read `0xB0@0x04`;
|
||||
// `drive_unlocked: false` since AACS bus decryption is the cert's job.
|
||||
// See docs/renesas-mod.md for the full MakeMKV-parity rationale.
|
||||
fn unlock_features(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport,
|
||||
@@ -210,11 +179,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Rejects the command the way a MediaTek drive does: ILLEGAL REQUEST. The
|
||||
/// sense is what distinguishes this from a dead bus — the old fixture sent
|
||||
/// `sense: None`, which is the wire shape of a TRANSPORT fault, and the test
|
||||
/// built on it asserted `NotApplicable`, pinning exactly the
|
||||
/// misclassification this file had.
|
||||
// Rejects like a MediaTek drive: ILLEGAL REQUEST with a sense, which is
|
||||
// what distinguishes this from a dead bus. See docs/renesas-mod.md.
|
||||
struct RejectingTransport;
|
||||
impl ScsiTransport for RejectingTransport {
|
||||
fn execute(
|
||||
@@ -303,10 +269,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(err, UnlockError::NotApplicable);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The same rejection delivered the way a CONFORMING transport delivers it —
|
||||
/// `Ok` with a CHECK CONDITION status — must reach the same answer. Catches
|
||||
/// dropping the `r.status == 0` check, which would read the probe buffer's
|
||||
/// zero fill as an identity block.
|
||||
// Same rejection via a CONFORMING transport (`Ok` + CHECK CONDITION);
|
||||
// must reach the same answer. See docs/renesas-mod.md.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn check_condition_is_not_a_renesas_drive() {
|
||||
use crate::scsi::mock::{MockTransport, Reply};
|
||||
@@ -332,12 +296,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A genuine Renesas drive (passes the `0xF1` SAT gate) that REFUSES the
|
||||
/// vendor open read `RB 0xB0@0x04` with CHECK CONDITION — the exact point
|
||||
/// where MakeMKV abandons the drive. `unlock_features` must defer to the
|
||||
/// next unlocker (`NotApplicable`), not claim a drive it could not open.
|
||||
/// MUTATION: dropping the `vendor_open` gate makes this return `Ok` and
|
||||
/// wrongly claim the drive.
|
||||
// A recognized Renesas drive that REFUSES the vendor open read must
|
||||
// defer to the next unlocker, not claim the drive. See docs/renesas-mod.md.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn open_rejection_defers_to_next_unlocker() {
|
||||
struct GateOkOpenRefused;
|
||||
|
||||
+5
-12
@@ -100,14 +100,8 @@ pub(crate) fn build_set_cd_speed(read_speed: u16) -> [u8; 12] {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Test fixture ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The crate-wide mock transport. Before this existed, EVERY mock in the crate
|
||||
// returned `Ok` with status 0 and a full `bytes_transferred` — so no test could
|
||||
// ever exercise the three outcomes the contract actually distinguishes, and a
|
||||
// whole class of transport-fault misclassification bugs sat uncaught (a dead bus
|
||||
// read as "this unlocker doesn't apply", a zero-filled buffer read as valid
|
||||
// drive data). This fixture can express all of them, and is the red-before-green
|
||||
// vehicle for the transport-contract fixes across ld / aacs / css / renesas.
|
||||
// Crate-wide mock transport, able to express all three transport outcomes.
|
||||
// See docs/scsi-mock-fixture.md — why this fixture exists
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)] // a fixture: each helper is used by a subset of the modules
|
||||
pub(crate) mod mock {
|
||||
@@ -322,10 +316,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(build_set_cd_speed(0xFFFF)[2..4], [0xFF, 0xFF]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The fixture itself must honour the contract it exists to test: a drive
|
||||
/// sense is `Ok` with a non-zero status, a bus fault is `Err`. If this ever
|
||||
/// drifts, every transport-contract test built on it silently stops testing
|
||||
/// anything.
|
||||
// The fixture must honour the contract it tests: a drive sense is `Ok`
|
||||
// with non-zero status, a bus fault is `Err`. If this drifts, every
|
||||
// transport-contract test built on it silently stops testing anything.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn mock_transport_expresses_the_three_contract_outcomes() {
|
||||
let mut t = MockTransport::scripted(
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user