docs: move drive/firmware internals notes to the private repo; drop their pointers [skip-media]

src/css/mod.rs

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ use crate::scsi::{DataDirection, ScsiTransport};
 
 // Issue ONE CSS bus-auth CDB, honouring the transport contract: treats a
 // non-zero status as CssAuthFailed and checks bytes_transferred >= min_bytes
-// rather than trusting an unfilled buffer. See docs/css-mod.md#css_scsi.
+// rather than trusting an unfilled buffer.
 fn css_scsi(
     scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport,
     cdb: &[u8],
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ impl crate::Unlocker for DvdUnlocker {
     fn name(&self) -> &'static str {
         // "DVD" names the medium this bus-auth unlocks, not the CSS scheme:
         // the bus-auth runs on any DVD regardless of whether the content is
-        // actually scrambled. See docs/css-mod.md#dvdunlocker-name.
+        // actually scrambled.
         "DVD"
     }
 
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ impl crate::Unlocker for DvdUnlocker {
 
 // Probes GET CONFIGURATION current-profile (DVD family 0x0010..=0x001F) so
 // DvdUnlocker can self-verify against the drive rather than trust the
-// caller's DiscKind. See docs/css-mod.md#mounted_disc_is_dvd.
+// caller's DiscKind.
 fn mounted_disc_is_dvd(
     scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport,
 ) -> std::result::Result<bool, crate::UnlockError> {
@@ -300,7 +300,6 @@ fn unlock_css_reads_inner(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport, _lba: u32) -> Result<()>
     tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::css", agid, "css unlock: bus authentication ok");
     // Disc-key REPORT KEY: best-effort only, for firmware that ties part of
     // its read-unlock to it; bytes are unused and failure is non-fatal.
-    // See docs/css-mod.md#disc-key-report-key (7014 bug history).
     if let Err(e) = read_disc_key(scsi, agid) {
         tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::css", error_code = e.code(), "css unlock: disc-key REPORT KEY skipped (non-fatal)");
     }
@@ -311,7 +310,7 @@ fn unlock_css_reads_inner(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport, _lba: u32) -> Result<()>
 // ── Step 1: Bus Authentication ────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 // Runs the CSS bus-auth handshake to set ASF=1 (invalidate AGIDs, allocate,
-// challenge/response). Returns the AGID; no bus key is derived. See docs/css-mod.md.
+// challenge/response). Returns the AGID; no bus key is derived.
 fn establish_authenticated_session(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> Result<u8> {
     // Invalidate all AGIDs via REPORT KEY format 0x3F. This is also what makes
     // an abandoned AGID self-heal — which is not a reason to abandon one.
@@ -438,7 +437,7 @@ fn authenticate_with_agid(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport, agid: u8) -> Result<()>
 // ── Step 2: Disc Key ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 // Issues READ DVD STRUCTURE format 0x02 (opcode 0xAD) purely for its
-// bus-auth side effect; returned bytes are unused. See docs/css-mod.md#read_disc_key.
+// bus-auth side effect; returned bytes are unused.
 fn read_disc_key(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport, agid: u8) -> Result<()> {
     // READ DVD STRUCTURE, format 0x02 (disc key), 2048+4 bytes
     let alloc_len: u16 = 2048 + 4;
@@ -464,7 +463,7 @@ fn read_disc_key(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport, agid: u8) -> Result<()> {
 fn crypt_key(key_type: usize, variant: u8, challenge: &[u8; 10]) -> [u8; 5] {
     // key_type indexes PERM_CHALLENGE ([_;3]); variant indexes VARIANTS/
     // PERM_VARIANT ([_;32]). Real (not debug-only) asserts catch an OOB index even
-    // in release; cost is nil on this once-per-disc path. See docs/css-mod.md.
+    // in release; cost is nil on this once-per-disc path.
     assert!(key_type < 3, "crypt_key: key_type out of range");
     assert!((variant as usize) < 32, "crypt_key: variant out of range");
     let perm = &PERM_CHALLENGE[key_type];
@@ -620,7 +619,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     // SECURITY REGRESSION GUARD: scans source files for a `tracing` field
     // binding a forbidden key name to a value expression (only a string
-    // literal or `_fp` field is allowed). See docs/css-mod.md#key-guard.
+    // literal or `_fp` field is allowed).
     #[test]
     fn no_key_bytes_in_instrumentation() {
         use std::path::Path;
@@ -776,7 +775,7 @@ mod tests {
     // ── CSS constant-table integrity ───────────────────────────────────────
 
     // Each PERM_CHALLENGE row must be a permutation of indices 0..10; a
-    // non-permutation would drop/duplicate bytes. See docs/css-mod.md#perm-challenge-rows.
+    // non-permutation would drop/duplicate bytes.
     #[test]
     fn perm_challenge_rows_are_permutations() {
         for (row, perm) in PERM_CHALLENGE.iter().enumerate() {
@@ -795,7 +794,6 @@ mod tests {
 
     // Each PERM_VARIANT row must map the 32 variants to 32 distinct 5-bit
     // values; a collision would make two variants indistinguishable.
-    // See docs/css-mod.md#perm-variant-rows.
     #[test]
     fn perm_variant_rows_are_permutations_of_0_31() {
         for (row, perm) in PERM_VARIANT.iter().enumerate() {
@@ -816,7 +814,7 @@ mod tests {
     // ── crypt_key behaviour ────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
     // crypt_key's result must depend on every challenge byte: flipping any
-    // single byte must change the output. See docs/css-mod.md#crypt-key-byte-dependence.
+    // single byte must change the output.
     #[test]
     fn crypt_key_depends_on_every_challenge_byte() {
         let base: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
@@ -834,7 +832,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     // crypt_key(0, v, ..) must be distinct for each of the 32 variants:
     // bus-auth brute-forces the variant by matching against key1, so a
-    // collision could select the wrong one. See docs/css-mod.md.
+    // collision could select the wrong one.
     #[test]
     fn crypt_key_type0_distinct_per_variant() {
         let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
@@ -851,7 +849,6 @@ mod tests {
 
     // crypt_key's `key_type < 3` debug_assert must fire for key_type 3
     // (which would otherwise index PERM_CHALLENGE out of bounds).
-    // See docs/css-mod.md#crypt-key-preconditions.
     #[test]
     #[should_panic]
     fn crypt_key_rejects_out_of_range_key_type() {
@@ -861,7 +858,6 @@ mod tests {
 
     // crypt_key's `variant < 32` debug_assert must fire for variant 32
     // (which would otherwise index VARIANTS/PERM_VARIANT out of bounds).
-    // See docs/css-mod.md#crypt-key-preconditions.
     #[test]
     #[should_panic]
     fn crypt_key_rejects_out_of_range_variant() {
@@ -895,7 +891,6 @@ mod tests {
 
     // The key-format field is masked to 6 bits so a format with high bits
     // set (e.g. 0xFF) cannot corrupt the AGID bits of byte 10.
-    // See docs/css-mod.md#cdb-builders.
     #[test]
     fn report_key_cdb_masks_format_to_6_bits() {
         let cdb = report_key_cdb(0, 0xFF, 8);
@@ -904,7 +899,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     // send_key_cdb encodes a 12-byte MMC SEND KEY (opcode 0xA3) CDB with the
     // parameter-list length at bytes 8-9 (big-endian) and AGID/format at
-    // byte 10. See docs/css-mod.md#cdb-builders.
+    // byte 10.
     #[test]
     fn send_key_cdb_matches_mmc_layout() {
         let cdb = send_key_cdb(0b11, 0x03, 0x000C); // AGID=3, format=3, param_len=12
@@ -921,7 +916,6 @@ mod tests {
 
     // Allocation length > 255 must split across bytes 8 (high) and 9 (low)
     // as a 16-bit big-endian field, e.g. 0x0804 (the disc-key block size).
-    // See docs/css-mod.md#cdb-builders.
     #[test]
     fn report_key_cdb_alloc_len_is_16bit_big_endian() {
         let cdb = report_key_cdb(0, 0x00, 0x0804);
@@ -1012,7 +1006,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     // Defect-7 regression: a transport fault on the first probe command
     // must abort as Transport, not fall through to NotApplicable (which
-    // let the consumer keep probing a dead bus). See docs/css-mod.md.
+    // let the consumer keep probing a dead bus).
     #[test]
     fn transport_fault_probing_for_a_dvd_aborts() {
         let id = DriveId::default();
@@ -1039,7 +1033,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     // Defect-2 regression: a DVD is mounted, then the bus dies mid
     // bus-auth — must abort as Transport, not collapse to CssAuthFailed /
-    // NotApplicable. See docs/css-mod.md.
+    // NotApplicable.
     #[test]
     fn transport_fault_during_bus_auth_aborts() {
         let id = DriveId::default();

src/ld/mod.rs

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 
 // `cdb` is only the bdemu emulator's wire format (real unlocking uses profile
 // templates), gated behind `emulation`; also compiled under `cfg(test)` so its
-// wire-format tests run in default-feature CI. See docs/ld-mod.md — cdb gating.
+// wire-format tests run in default-feature CI.
 #[cfg(any(feature = "emulation", test))]
 mod cdb;
 mod error;
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ use crate::{DriveId, UnlockCtx, UnlockError, Unlocked, Unlocker};
 
 // ── Public profile catalog ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
 // Only the catalog is public (supported-drive lookup, used by bdemu); the
-// unlock mechanism stays private. See docs/ld-mod.md — public catalog design.
+// unlock mechanism stays private.
 
 pub use profile::{DriveProfile as Profile, Identity, Platform, ProfileMatch, Profiles};
 
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ impl LdUnlocker {
 impl LdUnlocker {
     // The MediaTek firmware unlock. Since it removes AACS at the drive (clear
     // content), this one op satisfies both features and bus-removal, so both
-    // trait methods delegate here. See docs/ld-mod.md — firmware_unlock contract.
+    // trait methods delegate here.
     fn firmware_unlock(
         &self,
         scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport,
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ impl LdUnlocker {
         mt.init(scsi)?;
         // `init` only proves the handshake completed, not that the drive reached
         // extended-access state. Reporting unlocked off `init` alone shipped
-        // ciphertext at rc=0. See docs/ld-mod.md — half-unlock fallback.
+        // ciphertext at rc=0.
         if !mt.is_unlocked() {
             tracing::warn!(
                 target: "freemkv::disc",
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ impl LdUnlocker {
         if let Err(e) = mt.probe_disc(scsi) {
             // A transport fault here is a dead bus, not a calibration miss — most
             // profiles never touch the bus again, so this was the only dead-bus
-            // signal. See docs/ld-mod.md — probe_disc dead-bus classification.
+            // signal.
             if e.is_transport_failure() {
                 tracing::warn!(
                     target: "freemkv::disc",
@@ -432,7 +432,6 @@ mod tests {
 
     // THE probe-disc dead-bus test: bus dies during speed calibration after a
     // full unlock; must abort with Transport, not report a successful unlock.
-    // See docs/ld-mod.md — probe_disc dead-bus test / mutation notes.
     #[test]
     fn transport_fault_during_probe_disc_is_transport_not_a_successful_unlock() {
         let id = known_vid_drive_id();

src/ld/platform/mt1959/mod.rs

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ impl Mt1959 {
         let result = scsi.execute(&cdb, DataDirection::FromDevice, buf, 5_000)?;
         // A drive sense arrives as `Ok` with a non-zero status; a merely
         // SHORT response is the drive answering badly — neither is a dead
-        // bus. See docs/mt1959.md — short-probe-not-transport-failure.
+        // bus.
         if result.status != 0 || result.bytes_transferred != expected {
             return Err(Error::Scsi {
                 opcode: SCSI_READ_BUFFER,
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ impl Mt1959 {
 
         // `response` is a fixed 64-byte buffer; the meaningful bound is how
         // many bytes the drive actually delivered. Require enough bytes to
-        // validate before checking markers, up front. See docs/mt1959.md — min-unlock-response-length.
+        // validate before checking markers, up front.
         let n = result.bytes_transferred.min(response.len());
         if n < MIN_UNLOCK_RESPONSE {
             tracing::debug!(
@@ -206,7 +206,6 @@ impl Mt1959 {
 
         // Extended-access state requires the signature match AND both the
         // primary marker at [12..16] AND the secondary marker at [16..20].
-        // See docs/mt1959.md — unlock-marker-gating.
         self.unlocked =
             response[FIRMWARE_MODE_OFFSET..FIRMWARE_MODE_OFFSET + 4] == FIRMWARE_MODE_SIG;
 
@@ -282,7 +281,7 @@ impl Mt1959 {
                     return Err(Error::UnlockFailed);
                 }
                 // A dead bus must abort here, not be retried three times as
-                // firmware reloads. See docs/mt1959.md — run-init-transport-fault.
+                // firmware reloads.
                 Err(e) if e.is_transport_failure() => {
                     tracing::warn!(
                         target: "freemkv::disc",
@@ -349,7 +348,7 @@ impl Mt1959 {
         }
 
         // Detect disc type from capacity to select probe mode (BD vs UHD
-        // init address). See docs/mt1959.md — probe-init-address-detection.
+        // init address).
         let cap_cdb = [
             SCSI_READ_CAPACITY,
             0x00,
@@ -368,7 +367,7 @@ impl Mt1959 {
         let cap = scsi.execute(&cap_cdb, DataDirection::FromDevice, &mut cap_buf, 5_000)?;
         let disc_sectors = if cap.status == 0 && cap.bytes_transferred >= 4 {
             // last_lba + 1 = sector count; saturate on the 32-bit-overflow
-            // sentinel rather than wrap to 0. See docs/mt1959.md — capacity-saturation.
+            // sentinel rather than wrap to 0.
             u32::from_be_bytes([cap_buf[0], cap_buf[1], cap_buf[2], cap_buf[3]]).saturating_add(1)
         } else {
             0
@@ -413,7 +412,7 @@ impl Mt1959 {
             {
                 // A dead bus MUST keep its transport classification; a
                 // short/rejected reply is the drive's own failure and stays
-                // `UnlockFailed`. See docs/mt1959.md — probe-failure-classification.
+                // `UnlockFailed`.
                 if e.is_transport_failure() {
                     return Err(e);
                 }
@@ -423,7 +422,6 @@ impl Mt1959 {
         }
 
         // Pass 2: continue past the coarse range (do not restart at 0).
-        // See docs/mt1959.md — probe-pass-overlap-fix.
         let mut addr: u32 = PROBE_COARSE_END as u32;
         while addr < PROBE_FINE_END {
             let mut resp = [0u8; PROBE_RESPONSE_SIZE as usize];
@@ -436,7 +434,7 @@ impl Mt1959 {
             ) {
                 // Fine probing is best-effort — a short/rejected reply just ends
                 // the sweep early, but a transport fault must keep its
-                // classification and abort. See docs/mt1959.md — probe-pass2-transport-fault.
+                // classification and abort.
                 if e.is_transport_failure() {
                     tracing::warn!(
                         target: "freemkv::disc",
@@ -696,7 +694,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     // THE defect-15 test: a zero-byte response used to skip every marker
     // check (each individually `n >= ..` guarded) and report a fully
-    // unlocked drive. See docs/mt1959.md — defect-15.
+    // unlocked drive.
     #[test]
     fn do_unlock_rejects_a_zero_length_response() {
         let sig = [0x99, 0x9E, 0xC3, 0x75];
@@ -776,7 +774,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     // THE defect-4 test: a dead bus must abort `run_init` at once, not
     // re-upload firmware on all three attempts and return the generic
-    // `UnlockFailed`. See docs/mt1959.md — defect-4.
+    // `UnlockFailed`.
     #[test]
     fn run_init_aborts_on_a_transport_fault_without_reloading_firmware() {
         let mut t =
@@ -894,7 +892,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     // THE probe pass-1 dead-bus test: a bus that dies during the coarse
     // probe must keep its transport classification so the caller aborts
-    // with `Transport`. See docs/mt1959.md — pass1-dead-bus-mutation.
+    // with `Transport`.
     #[test]
     fn transport_fault_during_pass1_probe_stays_a_transport_failure() {
         let mut t = ProbeFaultsTransport { fault_at: 0 };
@@ -909,7 +907,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     // THE probe pass-2 dead-bus test: the loop used to `break` on ANY
     // error and return `Ok(())`, swallowing a dead bus mid-pass-2. It
-    // must now propagate. See docs/mt1959.md — pass2-dead-bus-mutation.
+    // must now propagate.
     #[test]
     fn transport_fault_during_pass2_probe_stays_a_transport_failure() {
         let mut t = ProbeFaultsTransport {
@@ -952,7 +950,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     // variant_a's firmware-verify-read transport-abort branch: WRITE_BUFFER
     // succeeds, the 0x45 verify read faults — a dead bus must abort there,
-    // not be swallowed into the unlock retries. See docs/mt1959.md — variant-a-verify-read-transport-abort.
+    // not be swallowed into the unlock retries.
     #[test]
     fn variant_a_verify_read_transport_fault_aborts() {
         let mut profile = fixture_profile([0; 4]);
@@ -1013,7 +1011,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     // variant_b's firmware-upload step (here the metadata read) hitting a
     // dead bus must abort via `trace_step`, not be swallowed into the
-    // unlock retries. See docs/mt1959.md — variant-b-upload-step-transport-abort.
+    // unlock retries.
     #[test]
     fn variant_b_upload_step_transport_fault_aborts() {
         let mut profile = fixture_profile([0; 4]);

src/ld/platform/mt1959/variant_b.rs

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ const FIRMWARE_EXTRA: [u8; 16] = [0; 16];
 /// that drive — real profiles must supply their own (see `DriveProfile`).
 const VENDOR_VERIFY: [u8; 10] = [0xF1, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x30, 0x01, 0xF3, 0xAD, 0x23];
 
-// See docs/variant-b-firmware-upload.md — trace_step rationale.
 // Swallows everything except a transport fault; these steps are advisory,
 // the unlock retries below are the real gate.
 fn trace_step(phase: &'static str, r: crate::scsi::Result<crate::scsi::ScsiResult>) -> Result<()> {
@@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ pub(super) fn load_firmware(mt: &mut Mt1959, scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> Re
         return Err(crate::ld::error::Error::UnlockFailed);
     }
 
-    // Step 1: Upload the firmware via MODE SELECT (see docs/variant-b-firmware-upload.md).
+    // Step 1: Upload the firmware via MODE SELECT.
     // MODE SELECT(10)'s parameter-list length is 16-bit, so reject only a
     // blob that can't be expressed in the CDB.
     let write_len = firmware.len();
@@ -124,8 +123,6 @@ pub(super) fn load_firmware(mt: &mut Mt1959, scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> Re
     )?;
 
     // Step 4: Vendor verify (0xF1 — B-only, not standard SCSI), per-drive.
-    // See docs/variant-b-firmware-upload.md for why the outcome is traced
-    // rather than discarded.
     let verify_cdb = mt.profile.fw_verify_cdb.unwrap_or(VENDOR_VERIFY);
     let mut dummy = [0u8; 0];
     trace_step(
@@ -134,8 +131,7 @@ pub(super) fn load_firmware(mt: &mut Mt1959, scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> Re
     )?;
 
     // Step 5: Unlock retries (up to 5, then a final fatal attempt). The
-    // confirmation pass after success is intentionally best-effort — see
-    // docs/variant-b-firmware-upload.md.
+    // confirmation pass after success is intentionally best-effort.
     for _attempt in 0..5 {
         match mt.do_unlock(scsi) {
             Ok(_) => {

src/renesas/mod.rs

@@ -24,8 +24,7 @@ const RENESAS_MARKER_OFFSET: usize = 16;
 /// interface tag. A rejection (CHECK CONDITION or `Err` with a sense) is
 /// `Ok(false)`: not a Renesas drive.
 ///
-/// `Err(Transport)` on a dead bus. See docs/renesas-mod.md for why a
-/// transport fault must not be folded into `Ok(false)`.
+/// `Err(Transport)` on a dead bus.
 pub fn is_renesas(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> std::result::Result<bool, UnlockError> {
     let mut buf = [0u8; RB_F1_LEN];
     match scsi.execute(&RB_F1_CDB, DataDirection::FromDevice, &mut buf, 5_000) {
@@ -71,8 +70,7 @@ impl Renesas {
     }
 
     // MakeMKV's vendor "open" sequence: primary read (A), and on refusal a
-    // knock + second read (B). See docs/renesas-mod.md for the full sequence
-    // and why we run A→knock→B rather than bailing after A.
+    // knock + second read (B).
     fn vendor_open(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> std::result::Result<bool, UnlockError> {
         const RB_B0_04_CDB: [u8; 10] = [0x3C, 0x02, 0xB0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x00];
         const KNOCK_A5AAAA_CDB: [u8; 10] =
@@ -128,7 +126,7 @@ impl Unlocker for Renesas {
     /// best-effort `0xAD` reader. `Some` once the open succeeds — the drive
     /// serves clear content whether or not the bonus VID read did; `None` if it
     /// isn't a Renesas drive or the open is refused; `Err(Transport)` on a dead
-    /// bus. See docs/renesas-mod.md for the MakeMKV-parity rationale.
+    /// bus.
     fn unlock(
         &self,
         scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport,
@@ -188,7 +186,7 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     // Rejects like a MediaTek drive: ILLEGAL REQUEST with a sense, which is
-    // what distinguishes this from a dead bus. See docs/renesas-mod.md.
+    // what distinguishes this from a dead bus.
     struct RejectingTransport;
     impl ScsiTransport for RejectingTransport {
         fn execute(
@@ -280,7 +278,7 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     // Same rejection via a CONFORMING transport (`Ok` + CHECK CONDITION);
-    // must reach the same answer. See docs/renesas-mod.md.
+    // must reach the same answer.
     #[test]
     fn check_condition_is_not_a_renesas_drive() {
         use crate::scsi::mock::{MockTransport, Reply};
@@ -308,7 +306,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     // A recognized Renesas drive whose A read (RB 0xB0@0x04) is REFUSED but
     // whose B read (RB 0xB0@0x50) SUCCEEDS after the knock must unlock — and the
-    // knock CDB has to be issued BETWEEN A and B. See docs/renesas-mod.md.
+    // knock CDB has to be issued BETWEEN A and B.
     #[test]
     fn knock_runs_between_a_and_b_and_b_opens() {
         // The exact knock CDB the code issues (pinned wire format).
@@ -395,7 +393,7 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     // A recognized Renesas drive that REFUSES the vendor open read must
-    // defer to the next unlocker, not claim the drive. See docs/renesas-mod.md.
+    // defer to the next unlocker, not claim the drive.
     #[test]
     fn open_rejection_defers_to_next_unlocker() {
         struct GateOkOpenRefused;

src/vid.rs

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 //! BEST-EFFORT: only a dead bus is an `Err(Transport)`. A CHECK CONDITION, a
 //! short response, or an all-zero VID all yield `Ok(None)` — a VID miss must
 //! never discard an unlock that already removed the bus (a key source can still
-//! supply the key). See docs/freemkv-abi.md for the fixed-length reply rules.
+//! supply the key).
 
 use crate::UnlockError;
 use crate::scsi::{DataDirection, ScsiTransport};