Files
freemkv-unlock/src/ld/platform/mt1959/variant_a.rs
T
Matthew Jackson 2ee8c0b0a6 stop: Stop-aware unlock operations
ScsiTransport gains Stop methods; AGIDs are handed off by AgidGuard,
CSS is defused on Stop and MT1959 critical spans are guarded, and the
post-upload readiness poll waits via pause so a Stop ends it.
A test guards the op paths against bare sleeps.
2026-09-28 08:42:29 -07:00

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//! MT1959 variant A firmware upload.
//!
//! WRITE_BUFFER (0x3B) → verify READ_BUFFER (0x45) → unlock × 2
use super::Mt1959;
use crate::ld::error::Result;
use crate::scsi::{CriticalGuard, DataDirection, ScsiTransport};
use super::SCSI_WRITE_BUFFER;
const VERIFY_BUFFER_ID: u8 = 0x45;
/// WRITE_BUFFER carries a 24-bit transfer length, so a firmware blob
/// larger than this cannot be uploaded in one command.
const WRITE_BUFFER_MAX_LEN: usize = 0x00FF_FFFF;
pub(super) fn load_firmware(mt: &mut Mt1959, scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> Result<()> {
let firmware = &mt.profile.firmware;
if firmware.is_empty() {
return Err(crate::ld::error::Error::UnlockFailed);
}
// Upload firmware via WRITE_BUFFER. The CDB's length is a 24-bit field;
// reject blobs that would exceed it rather than send a length-mismatched
// command.
let len = firmware.len();
if len > WRITE_BUFFER_MAX_LEN {
return Err(crate::ld::error::Error::UnlockFailed);
}
let cdb = [
SCSI_WRITE_BUFFER,
0x06,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
(len >> 16) as u8,
(len >> 8) as u8,
len as u8,
0x00,
];
let mut data = firmware.clone();
// D8 (stop-design-v5 §2.3): "the WRITE BUFFER at 30 s … and its verify run inside
// a `CriticalGuard`. C_max = 35 s" — a Stop mid-upload waits for both CDBs.
let mut span = CriticalGuard::enter(&mut *scsi)?;
span.execute(&cdb, DataDirection::ToDevice, &mut data, 30_000)?;
// Verify the firmware loaded (non-fatal — different buffer_id 0x45). No
// documented expected payload exists, so the outcome is traced rather
// than asserted, instead of silently discarded before the unlock retries.
let verify_cdb = [
super::SCSI_READ_BUFFER,
super::MODE_A,
VERIFY_BUFFER_ID,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
super::VALIDATE_RESPONSE_SIZE,
0x00,
];
let mut verify_resp = [0u8; super::VALIDATE_RESPONSE_SIZE as usize];
match span.execute(
&verify_cdb,
DataDirection::FromDevice,
&mut verify_resp,
5_000,
) {
Ok(r) if r.status == 0 && r.bytes_transferred == verify_resp.len() => {
tracing::debug!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "mt1959a_fw_verify_ok",
"variant-A firmware verify read returned a full response"
);
}
Ok(r) => {
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "mt1959a_fw_verify_bad",
status = r.status,
bytes_transferred = r.bytes_transferred,
"variant-A firmware verify read did not return a full good response"
);
}
// A dead bus mid-upload must abort, not be swallowed into the unlock
// retries below.
Err(e) => {
let err = crate::ld::error::Error::from(e);
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "mt1959a_fw_verify_failed",
transport_failure = err.is_transport_failure(),
"variant-A firmware verify read failed"
);
if err.is_transport_failure() {
return Err(err);
}
}
}
drop(span); // the span ends here; the unlock below stays cancellable
// Double unlock after firmware upload: first is fatal on failure, second
// is a best-effort confirmation pass (matching variant B) so a benign
// hiccup there doesn't fail an already-successful unlock.
mt.do_unlock(scsi)?;
let _ = mt.do_unlock(scsi);
Ok(())
}