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0.31.0: hardening and correctness pass across mux, codec, AACS/CSS, UDF/MPLS/CLPI, recovery, drive/SCSI, labels, and I/O

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Library-wide review-and-fix pass: tightened AACS keydb/handshake/variant
handling and trailing-partial-unit policy, corrected MPLS mark offset and
added UDF allocation bounds, hardened the mux/codec framing and M2TS paths,
guarded SCSI READ CAPACITY short transfers and unified error mapping, added
overflow guards on untrusted disc input, and made prefetch shutdown
deterministic. Release profile now builds with thin LTO + single codegen unit.
This commit is contained in:
Matthew Jackson
2026-06-07 17:37:38 -07:00
parent 5b6ea8f5c4
commit 061f68594a
128 changed files with 11838 additions and 3831 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
src/disc/encrypt.rs
+45 -33
View File
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ impl Disc {
}
let mut vid = [0u8; 16];
vid.copy_from_slice(&buf[4..20]);
tracing::warn!(
tracing::debug!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "oem_vid_ok",
"OEM VID retrieved"
@@ -119,10 +119,10 @@ impl Disc {
///
/// Returns `(handshake, error)`:
/// * `(Some(_), None)` — VID acquired
/// * `(None, Some(_))` — specific failure mode (see
/// `AacsHostCertRejected` / `AacsRawReadUnsupported` /
/// `AacsVidUnavailable` / `DriveProfileMissing` /
/// `VidCdbUnavailable` variants in `error.rs`)
/// * `(None, Some(_))` — specific failure mode; only
/// `AacsHostCertRejected` and `AacsVidUnavailable` are returned
/// here (the OEM-path `DriveProfileMissing` / `VidCdbUnavailable`
/// errors are caught internally and fall through to cert auth)
/// * `(None, None)` — handshake not attempted (no keydb;
/// resolution will proceed with VID=zero and rely on path 1
/// disc-hash → VUK lookup)
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ impl Disc {
opts: &ScanOptions,
) -> (Option<HandshakeResult>, Option<Error>) {
let unlocked = session.is_unlocked();
tracing::warn!(
tracing::debug!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_entry",
unlocked,
@@ -199,25 +199,24 @@ impl Disc {
};
let host_cert_count = host_certs.len();
tracing::warn!(
tracing::debug!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_start",
host_cert_count,
"handshake starting"
);
// v0.25.7 wedge fix. Pre-0.25.7 this loop fired up to 16 AACS
// authenticate attempts back-to-back with no pause. Each attempt
// is 5-10 SCSI REPORT_KEY/SEND_KEY exchanges. On a disc whose
// host cert isn't in our KEYDB (or one the drive rejects),
// that's 80-160 SCSI commands hammered at the drive in a
// few hundred milliseconds — and the BU40N (and most consumer
// optical drives) responds by entering a fast-fail firmware
// wedge state where every subsequent CDB returns
// ILLEGAL_REQUEST/INVALID_FIELD_IN_CDB (sense 05/24) until
// power-cycled. Hit live on rip1 2026-05-20 during a MOVIE
// UHD scan: KEYDB miss → 16 cert attempts in a tight loop →
// wedge → forced host reboot + drive disconnect to recover.
// Cert-attempt wedge guard. An earlier version fired up to 16
// AACS authenticate attempts back-to-back with no pause. Each
// attempt is 5-10 SCSI REPORT_KEY/SEND_KEY exchanges. On a disc
// whose host cert isn't in the KEYDB (or one the drive rejects),
// that's 80-160 SCSI commands hammered at the drive in a few
// hundred milliseconds — and consumer optical drives can respond
// by entering a fast-fail firmware wedge state where every
// subsequent CDB returns ILLEGAL_REQUEST/INVALID_FIELD_IN_CDB
// (sense 05/24) until power-cycled. Observed live on a UHD scan:
// KEYDB miss → many cert attempts in a tight loop → wedge →
// forced power cycle to recover.
//
// Defense-in-depth: cap attempts, sleep between, and bail
// early on the drive's wedge sense so any later regression
@@ -262,20 +261,31 @@ impl Disc {
);
}
Err(e) => {
let code = e.code();
last_err_code = Some(code);
// Drive wedge senses (any with high byte 0x05 =
// ILLEGAL_REQUEST). The drive isn't merely
// rejecting our cert — it's saying "I won't talk
// to you anymore." Trying more certs makes the
// wedge worse. Bail out immediately.
let sense_key = ((code >> 8) & 0xFF) as u8;
if sense_key == 0x05 {
last_err_code = Some(e.code());
// Log the real SCSI sense triple, not `e.code()` —
// `code()` collapses every ScsiError to the flat
// E_SCSI_ERROR constant and carries no sense key,
// so it has no diagnostic value for auth-failure
// routing.
let sense = e.scsi_sense();
// Drive wedge senses (ILLEGAL_REQUEST, sense key
// 0x05). The drive isn't merely rejecting our
// cert — it's signalling it won't talk to us
// anymore. Trying more certs makes the wedge worse,
// so bail out immediately. NOTE: this must read the
// sense key off the structured ScsiSense, NOT off
// `e.code()`; `code()` is a flat constant for every
// ScsiError so the old `(code >> 8) & 0xFF` guard
// never matched and was dead code (the very wedge
// this defense exists to prevent could recur).
if sense.map(|s| s.is_illegal_request()).unwrap_or(false) {
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_wedge_detected",
cert_index = idx,
error_code = code,
sense_key = sense.map(|s| s.sense_key),
asc = sense.map(|s| s.asc),
ascq = sense.map(|s| s.ascq),
"drive returned ILLEGAL_REQUEST during auth; bailing out to avoid wedge"
);
return (None, Some(Error::AacsHostCertRejected));
@@ -339,13 +349,15 @@ impl Disc {
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, "/AACS/MKB_RW.inf"))
.ok()
.unwrap_or_default();
// Trim to the real record length. truncate is a no-op when n >=
// len and correctly empties the vec when n == 0 (zeroed/corrupt
// MKB), so it never leaves the full ~128 MiB zero-pad on
// AacsState.mkb.
let n = aacs::mkb_content_len(&mkb_bytes);
if n > 0 && n < mkb_bytes.len() {
mkb_bytes.truncate(n);
}
mkb_bytes.truncate(n);
let mkb_ver = aacs::mkb_version(&mkb_bytes);
tracing::warn!(
tracing::debug!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "scan_aacs_vid_only",
disc_hash = %aacs::disc_hash_hex(&dh),