Fix FMTS per-title resolve, extract multi-CPS keying, trailing-partial guard

- resolve_fmts_key_map: filter segments to those addressable within THIS
  title's extents; a title with no forensic content (menu/extras playlist,
  or a different clip) returns Ok(None) and takes the base Unit-Key/CPS
  path instead of hard-failing FmtsKeyMissing. Previously the first
  non-forensic title aborted the entire whole-disc sweep
  (resolve_content_key_map iterates every title) and blocked muxing any
  non-main title.
- FMTS phase probe: an even/odd is_clean tie now only fails loud when
  BOTH halves are 0 (no clean decrypt). A both-clean tie is source-zero
  padding (is_clean is true for any key on all-zero content) — the key is
  valid, default Even, never abort the rip on a padding-heavy sample.
- extract_tree: multi-CPS discs now build the exact per-CPS content map
  (resolve_content_key_map) instead of a blanket key-0 map that silently
  mis-decrypted every secondary-CPS file into garbage. Single-CPS keeps
  the blanket key-0 map (one key opens every unit, incl. orphan clips).
- decrypt_sectors_mapped: a trailing partial unit that is inside a mapped
  range AND flagged encrypted in its clear seed now fails loud (a CBC
  fragment split across a boundary can't be decrypted) instead of being
  emitted as clear. New aacs_unit_seed_encrypted reads the flag on a
  partial.
- Correct the stale decrypt_sectors doc (AACS arm now always errors;
  AACS decrypts only via decrypt_sectors_mapped).

src/aacs/content.rs

@@ -106,6 +106,23 @@ pub fn aacs_unit_encrypted(unit: &[u8], format: crate::disc::ContentFormat) -> b
     }
 }
 
+/// The AACS encrypted flag from an aligned unit's CLEAR seed, readable even on a
+/// trailing PARTIAL unit (unlike [`aacs_unit_encrypted`], which requires a whole
+/// 6144-byte unit). The flag lives at a fixed low offset in the clear header, so a
+/// fragment that still contains that byte can be classified. Used to catch an
+/// encrypted unit truncated across a buffer/extent boundary — a fragment we cannot
+/// CBC-decrypt and must not emit as clear. `false` for a slice too short to hold
+/// the flag byte. Same clip-anchored-read caveat as [`aacs_unit_encrypted`].
+pub fn aacs_unit_seed_encrypted(unit: &[u8], format: crate::disc::ContentFormat) -> bool {
+    use crate::disc::ContentFormat;
+    match format {
+        ContentFormat::BdTs => unit.first().is_some_and(|b| b & 0xC0 != 0),
+        ContentFormat::MpegPs => unit
+            .get(PS_SCRAMBLE_OFF)
+            .is_some_and(|b| b & PS_SCRAMBLE_MASK != 0),
+    }
+}
+
 /// True when an aligned unit is flagged encrypted AND still looks scrambled
 /// (structure not yet restored) — i.e. genuine encrypted content NOT yet decrypted.
 ///

src/decrypt.rs

@@ -408,7 +408,20 @@ pub fn decrypt_sectors_mapped(
 
     let decrypt_one = |idx_in_buf: usize, chunk: &mut [u8]| {
         if chunk.len() != unit_len {
-            return; // trailing partial unit: clear tail on disc, leave as-is
+            // Trailing partial unit (buffer/region tail shorter than a whole unit).
+            // Normally a genuinely-clear content tail (source-zero padding or a
+            // short final fragment) — leave as-is. But a partial that is BOTH inside
+            // a mapped (encrypted) range AND flagged encrypted in its clear seed is
+            // an encrypted unit split across a boundary: a CBC fragment we cannot
+            // decrypt, so emitting it verbatim would ship ciphertext as clear. Fail
+            // loud instead (restores the guard the removed `decrypt_sectors` had).
+            let unit_lba = base_lba.saturating_add((idx_in_buf as u32) * unit_sectors);
+            if map.entry_for(unit_lba).is_some()
+                && aacs::content::aacs_unit_seed_encrypted(chunk, format)
+            {
+                verify_failed.store(true, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+            }
+            return;
         }
         let unit_lba = base_lba.saturating_add((idx_in_buf as u32) * unit_sectors);
         // No range covers this LBA → the map keys no content here, so pass the
@@ -470,30 +483,21 @@ pub fn decrypt_sectors_mapped(
     Ok(())
 }
 
-/// Decrypt a buffer of sectors in-place.
+/// Decrypt a buffer of sectors in-place — the CSS / clear path only.
 ///
-/// For AACS: processes in 6144-byte aligned units (3 sectors).
+/// For CSS: descrambles per 2048-byte sector, self-cracking the title key from the
-/// For CSS: processes per 2048-byte sector.
+/// data (no external input). For `None`: a no-op. For AACS: **always** returns
-/// For None: no-op.
+/// `Err(DecryptFailed)` — AACS decrypts exclusively through the resolved key map
+/// ([`decrypt_sectors_mapped`]), which keys every content unit up front and fails
+/// at RESOLVE time when a key is missing. Reaching this arm with AACS keys means a
+/// reader was built without installing its map (a bug), so it fails loud rather
+/// than apply a guessed key.
 ///
-/// `unit_key_idx` is the initial AACS unit-key hint (0 for most discs). On a
+/// `unit_key_idx` and `content` are legacy parameters kept so the CSS / `None`
-/// multi-CPS-unit disc every key is tried per unit until the TS-sync verify
+/// wrapper signatures stay stable; they are ignored (the CSS arm self-gates on its
-/// passes; `unit_key_idx` is tried first so single-CPS-unit discs pay zero
+/// per-sector scramble flag). Returns `Err` if decryption was expected but
-/// overhead. An out-of-range `unit_key_idx` is always an error.
+/// impossible; never produces silently corrupted output. The `usize` return is a
-///
+/// legacy unverified-byte count that is always `0` for the CSS / `None` arms.
-/// Returns `Err` if decryption was expected but keys are missing or invalid.
-/// Never produces silently corrupted output.
-///
-/// Pure decrypt: every encrypted unit has a key APPLIED in place and the
-/// plaintext is left as-is — this function applies NO policy (it never restores
-/// ciphertext, nulls, or re-fetches). On success it returns the number of bytes
-/// belonging to units a key was applied to but that did NOT reassemble to clean
-/// MPEG-TS ("unverified"). "Did a key open it to clean TS?" is a key-SELECTION /
-/// read-VERIFY signal, NOT a "did we decrypt?" verdict — a correct key can
-/// decrypt content whose encoding is broken. The caller decides what an
-/// unverified unit means: the mux passes the bytes to the muxer; the sweep/patch
-/// verify path recovers a key and retries, or fails the read. `0` for `None` /
-/// `Css` and for any AACS buffer where every unit reached clean TS.
 pub fn decrypt_sectors(
     buf: &mut [u8],
     keys: &mut DecryptKeys,

src/disc/extract.rs

@@ -185,22 +185,43 @@ impl Disc {
         // Per-VTS CSS key map (DVD only): "VTS_xx" -> DecryptKeys. Built lazily
         // when a scrambled VOB group needs it. AACS / None discs keep the
         // disc-wide keys for every file.
-        let base_keys = self.decrypt_keys();
+        let mut base_keys = self.decrypt_keys();
+
+        // AACS key map for the extract, chosen by CPS-unit count:
+        //
+        // * SINGLE CPS (the overwhelming majority, incl. every single-key UHD): one
+        //   Unit Key opens EVERY encrypted unit on the disc — content in a parsed
+        //   title AND an orphan clip that no playlist references. A blanket key-0
+        //   map over the whole LBA space is exact and covers orphans; clear
+        //   filesystem/nav (encrypted-flag off) passes through untouched.
+        //
+        // * MULTI-CPS: each clip is protected by a different Unit Key, so a blanket
+        //   key-0 map would mis-decrypt every secondary-CPS file into garbage
+        //   (silently, since Phase::All is trust-only). Build the EXACT per-CPS
+        //   content map instead (each title's extents → the CPS key that opens a
+        //   real sample from it), up front before the decorator takes the reader. A
+        //   content unit whose key the pool lacks fails loud at resolve (extract has
+        //   no CPS/forensic fetch source), never emits a wrong-key garble.
+        let key_map =
+            match &base_keys {
+                DecryptKeys::Aacs { unit_keys, .. } if unit_keys.len() <= 1 => {
+                    Some(std::sync::Arc::new(
+                        crate::decrypt::AacsKeyMap::from_ranges(vec![(0, u32::MAX, 0)]),
+                    ))
+                }
+                DecryptKeys::Aacs { .. } => Some(std::sync::Arc::new(
+                    self.resolve_content_key_map(reader, &mut base_keys, None)?,
+                )),
+                _ => None,
+            };
 
         // ── Phase 2: stream each file through the decrypting decorator ────
         // The decorator owns its inner source for its lifetime. We hand it a
         // borrowing wrapper (so the caller keeps `reader`), swap keys per CSS
         // VTS group via `set_keys`; AACS/None keep `base_keys` throughout.
         let mut dec = DecryptingSectorSource::new(Borrowed(reader), base_keys.clone());
-        // AACS decrypts via the key map. Extract reads arbitrary files (not resolved
+        if let Some(map) = key_map {
-        // title extents), so key every unit with the disc's base Unit Key: the mapped
+            dec = dec.with_key_map(map);
-        // decrypt applies it to encrypted units and passes clear filesystem/nav
-        // through (its encrypted-flag gate). Single-CPS is exact; a multi-CPS disc's
-        // secondary units are not separately keyed here (extract is not the mux path).
-        if matches!(base_keys, DecryptKeys::Aacs { .. }) {
-            dec = dec.with_key_map(std::sync::Arc::new(
-                crate::decrypt::AacsKeyMap::from_ranges(vec![(0, u32::MAX, 0)]),
-            ));
         }
 
         let mut result = ExtractResult::default();

src/mux/resolve.rs

@@ -786,11 +786,27 @@ fn resolve_fmts_key_map(
     if segments.is_empty() {
         return Ok(None);
     }
-    // This IS an FMTS disc, so the forensic index keys are REQUIRED — exactly like
+    // The segment SPNs are in the FORENSIC FEATURE clip's byte space. A title
-    // a Unit Key. Without a configured key source we cannot obtain them, so we
+    // whose extents do not cover any segment's clip bytes carries no forensic
-    // cannot produce a complete rip: fail loud rather than silently drop the
+    // content (a menu/extras playlist, or simply a different clip): its base Unit
-    // forensic segments. (The caller may still choose `--raw`, which never reaches
+    // Key/CPS map applies and there is nothing forensic to resolve. Filter to the
-    // this path.)
+    // segments addressable within THIS title; if none, fall back (`Ok(None)`)
+    // rather than hard-failing. Without this, `resolve_content_key_map` — which
+    // resolves EVERY title for the whole-disc sweep — aborts the entire decrypt on
+    // the first non-forensic title (a menu playlist), and `build_iso_pipeline`
+    // aborts muxing any non-main title.
+    let segments: Vec<crate::aacs::segment::Segment> = segments
+        .into_iter()
+        .filter(|s| clip_byte_to_lba(&title.extents, s.start_spn as u64 * 192).is_some())
+        .collect();
+    if segments.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    // This title HAS forensic content, so the forensic index keys are REQUIRED —
+    // exactly like a Unit Key. Without a configured key source we cannot obtain
+    // them, so we cannot produce a complete rip: fail loud rather than silently
+    // drop the forensic segments. (The caller may still choose `--raw`, which never
+    // reaches this path.)
     let Some(fetch) = fetch else {
         return Err(crate::error::Error::FmtsKeyMissing.into());
     };
@@ -918,12 +934,22 @@ fn resolve_fmts_key_map(
         let phase = match even.cmp(&odd) {
             std::cmp::Ordering::Greater => crate::decrypt::Phase::Even,
             std::cmp::Ordering::Less => crate::decrypt::Phase::Odd,
-            std::cmp::Ordering::Equal => {
+            std::cmp::Ordering::Equal if even == 0 => {
-                // Neither half decrypts clean under this index's key: the map would
+                // NEITHER half decrypts clean under this index's key: the key is
-                // be wrong. Fail loud rather than emit a broken segment map.
+                // wrong or the sampled units aren't this index's real content. The
+                // map would be wrong — fail loud rather than emit a broken segment.
                 tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::keysource", index = tag, even, odd, "fmts: no clean phase under index key — refusing broken map");
                 return Err(crate::error::Error::FmtsKeyMissing.into());
             }
+            std::cmp::Ordering::Equal => {
+                // BOTH halves decrypt clean: the sampled units are source-zero
+                // padding (`is_clean_ts` is true for all-zero content under ANY
+                // key), so the key is valid and the parity is immaterial here —
+                // default Even (we decrypt one parity; padding in the dropped parity
+                // is harmless). A padding-heavy sample must NOT abort the rip.
+                tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::keysource", index = tag, even, odd, "fmts: padding tie — defaulting Even");
+                crate::decrypt::Phase::Even
+            }
         };
         phase_of_index.insert(tag, phase);
     }