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unlock: dispatch via freemkv-unlock; delete in-tree handshake/css-auth/registry

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Rewire the three unlock dispatch points through the freemkv-unlock crate via a
private `unlock_bridge`: drive-prep (kind=Unknown) at `Drive::init`, AACS cert
(kind=Aacs) at `do_handshake_cert`, CSS bus-auth (kind=Css) at scan. The bridge
news up `all_unlockers()` and runs the first matching one, mapping its
`Unlocked` result to the bus-key gate. After a successful drive unlock,
libfreemkv issues a generic SET CD SPEED (max) itself — the old per-unlocker
trait method is gone.

Delete the in-tree unlock code now owned by freemkv-unlock: the AACS cert
handshake (`aacs/handshake.rs`), the CSS bus-auth (`css/auth.rs`), and the
unlock registry (`unlock.rs`). Host-cert collection (a keysource concern) stays
in a small `aacs/host_certs.rs`. No public unlock surface remains — clients
touch libfreemkv only, oblivious to unlockers (as they are to SCSI). 2277 tests
pass.
This commit is contained in:
Matthew Jackson
2026-06-29 20:45:00 -07:00
parent 3bdb6f8b1a
commit 2ba6274eae
12 changed files with 264 additions and 3987 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
src/css/auth.rs
-995
View File
@@ -1,995 +0,0 @@
//! CSS drive bus-authentication — read-unlock primitive.
//!
//! A CSS-enforcing DVD drive refuses to return scrambled sectors until a
//! CSS bus-auth handshake has set its Authentication Success Flag (ASF=1).
//! [`unlock_css_reads`] runs that bus-auth challenge-response (which is what
//! actually opens scrambled-sector reads), then a best-effort, non-fatal
//! disc-key REPORT KEY. The bytes are NOT used as keys: the descramble title
//! key is recovered keylessly by the Stevenson known-plaintext attack (see
//! [`super::crack_key`]).
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
use crate::scsi::ScsiTransport;
// ── CryptKey tables ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const CRYPT_TAB0: [u8; 256] = [
0xB7, 0xF4, 0x82, 0x57, 0xDA, 0x4D, 0xDB, 0xE2, 0x2F, 0x52, 0x1A, 0xA8, 0x68, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xFF,
0xFB, 0x0E, 0x6D, 0x35, 0xF7, 0x5C, 0x76, 0x12, 0xCE, 0x25, 0x79, 0x29, 0x39, 0x62, 0x08, 0x24,
0xA5, 0x85, 0x7B, 0x56, 0x01, 0x23, 0x68, 0xCF, 0x0A, 0xE2, 0x5A, 0xED, 0x3D, 0x59, 0xB0, 0xA9,
0xB0, 0x2C, 0xF2, 0xB8, 0xEF, 0x32, 0xA9, 0x40, 0x80, 0x71, 0xAF, 0x1E, 0xDE, 0x8F, 0x58, 0x88,
0xB8, 0x3A, 0xD0, 0xFC, 0xC4, 0x1E, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0xBB, 0x3B, 0x0F, 0x01, 0x7E, 0x1F, 0x9F, 0xD9,
0xAA, 0xB8, 0x3D, 0x9D, 0x74, 0x1E, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x37, 0x56, 0x8F, 0x16, 0xBA, 0x49, 0x2B, 0xAC,
0xD0, 0xBD, 0x95, 0x20, 0xBE, 0x7A, 0x28, 0xD0, 0x51, 0x64, 0x63, 0x1C, 0x7F, 0x66, 0x10, 0xBB,
0xC4, 0x56, 0x1A, 0x04, 0x6E, 0x0A, 0xEC, 0x9C, 0xD6, 0xE8, 0x9A, 0x7A, 0xCF, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0xB1,
0xEF, 0x71, 0xDE, 0x31, 0xFF, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x5E, 0x07, 0x69, 0x96, 0xB0, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x9E, 0x47,
0xC7, 0x96, 0x8F, 0xE4, 0x2B, 0x59, 0xC6, 0xEE, 0xB9, 0x86, 0x9A, 0x64, 0x84, 0x72, 0xE2, 0x5B,
0xA2, 0x96, 0x58, 0x99, 0x50, 0x03, 0xF5, 0x38, 0x4D, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xE7, 0x7D, 0x75, 0xA7, 0xB8,
0x67, 0x87, 0x84, 0x3F, 0x1D, 0x11, 0xE5, 0xFC, 0x1E, 0xD3, 0x83, 0x16, 0xA5, 0x29, 0xF6, 0xC7,
0x15, 0x61, 0x29, 0x1A, 0x43, 0x4F, 0x9B, 0xAF, 0xC5, 0x87, 0x34, 0x6C, 0x0F, 0x3B, 0xA8, 0x1D,
0x45, 0x58, 0x25, 0xDC, 0xA8, 0xA3, 0x3B, 0xD1, 0x79, 0x1B, 0x48, 0xF2, 0xE9, 0x93, 0x1F, 0xFC,
0xDB, 0x2A, 0x90, 0xA9, 0x8A, 0x3D, 0x39, 0x18, 0xA3, 0x8E, 0x58, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0x12, 0xBB, 0x25,
0xCD, 0x71, 0x22, 0xA2, 0x64, 0xC6, 0xE7, 0xFB, 0xAD, 0x94, 0x77, 0x04, 0x9A, 0x39, 0xCF, 0x7C,
];
const CRYPT_TAB1: [u8; 256] = [
0x8C, 0x47, 0xB0, 0xE1, 0xEB, 0xFC, 0xEB, 0x56, 0x10, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x5D, 0xEF, 0xBE, 0x4F,
0x08, 0x75, 0x97, 0x4B, 0x0E, 0x25, 0x8E, 0x6E, 0x39, 0x5A, 0x87, 0x53, 0xC4, 0x1F, 0xF4, 0x5C,
0x4E, 0xE6, 0x99, 0x30, 0xE0, 0x42, 0x88, 0xAB, 0xE5, 0x85, 0xBC, 0x8F, 0xD8, 0x3C, 0x54, 0xC9,
0x53, 0x47, 0x18, 0xD6, 0x06, 0x5B, 0x41, 0x2C, 0x67, 0x1E, 0x41, 0x74, 0x33, 0xE2, 0xB4, 0xE0,
0x23, 0x29, 0x42, 0xEA, 0x55, 0x0F, 0x25, 0xB4, 0x24, 0x2C, 0x99, 0x13, 0xEB, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0xC9,
0xF9, 0x63, 0x67, 0x43, 0x2D, 0xC7, 0x7D, 0x07, 0x60, 0x89, 0xD1, 0xCC, 0xE7, 0x94, 0x77, 0x74,
0x9B, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0xE6, 0xFF, 0xBB, 0x68, 0x14, 0x1E, 0xA3, 0x25, 0xDE, 0x3A, 0xA3, 0x54, 0x7B,
0x87, 0x9D, 0x50, 0xCA, 0x27, 0xC3, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x91, 0x27, 0xD4, 0xB0, 0x82, 0x41, 0x97, 0x79,
0x94, 0x82, 0xAC, 0xC7, 0x8E, 0xA5, 0x4E, 0xAA, 0x78, 0x9E, 0xE0, 0x42, 0xBA, 0x28, 0xEA, 0xB7,
0x74, 0xAD, 0x35, 0xDA, 0x92, 0x60, 0x7E, 0xD2, 0x0E, 0xB9, 0x24, 0x5E, 0x39, 0x4F, 0x5E, 0x63,
0x09, 0xB5, 0xFA, 0xBF, 0xF1, 0x22, 0x55, 0x1C, 0xE2, 0x25, 0xDB, 0xC5, 0xD8, 0x50, 0x03, 0x98,
0xC4, 0xAC, 0x2E, 0x11, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4D, 0xD0, 0xB9, 0xFC, 0x2D, 0x3C, 0x08, 0x04, 0x5A, 0xEF,
0xCE, 0x32, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0x92, 0x1E, 0x4B, 0xFB, 0x1A, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x3E, 0xDA, 0x6E, 0x7C, 0x4D,
0x56, 0xC3, 0x3F, 0x42, 0xB1, 0x3A, 0x23, 0x4D, 0x6E, 0x84, 0x56, 0x68, 0xF4, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x64,
0xD0, 0xA9, 0x92, 0x2F, 0x8B, 0xBC, 0x39, 0x9C, 0xAC, 0x09, 0x5E, 0xEE, 0xE5, 0x97, 0xBF, 0xA5,
0xCE, 0xFA, 0x28, 0x2C, 0x6D, 0x4F, 0xEF, 0x77, 0xAA, 0x1B, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x97, 0xB4, 0xC3, 0xF4,
];
const CRYPT_TAB2: [u8; 256] = [
0xB7, 0x75, 0x81, 0xD5, 0xDC, 0xCA, 0xDE, 0x66, 0x23, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x26, 0x62, 0xD1, 0x83, 0x77,
0xE3, 0x97, 0x76, 0xAF, 0xE9, 0xC3, 0x6B, 0x8E, 0xDA, 0xB0, 0x6E, 0xBF, 0x2B, 0xF1, 0x19, 0xB4,
0x95, 0x34, 0x48, 0xE4, 0x37, 0x94, 0x5D, 0x7B, 0x36, 0x5F, 0x65, 0x53, 0x07, 0xE2, 0x89, 0x11,
0x98, 0x85, 0xD9, 0x12, 0xC1, 0x9D, 0x84, 0xEC, 0xA4, 0xD4, 0x88, 0xB8, 0xFC, 0x2C, 0x79, 0x28,
0xD8, 0xDB, 0xB3, 0x1E, 0xA2, 0xF9, 0xD0, 0x44, 0xD7, 0xD6, 0x60, 0xEF, 0x14, 0xF4, 0xF6, 0x31,
0xD2, 0x41, 0x46, 0x67, 0x0A, 0xE1, 0x58, 0x27, 0x43, 0xA3, 0xF8, 0xE0, 0xC8, 0xBA, 0x5A, 0x5C,
0x80, 0x6C, 0xC6, 0xF2, 0xE8, 0xAD, 0x7D, 0x04, 0x0D, 0xB9, 0x3C, 0xC2, 0x25, 0xBD, 0x49, 0x63,
0x8C, 0x9F, 0x51, 0xCE, 0x20, 0xC5, 0xA1, 0x50, 0x92, 0x2D, 0xDD, 0xBC, 0x8D, 0x4F, 0x9A, 0x71,
0x2F, 0x30, 0x1D, 0x73, 0x39, 0x13, 0xFB, 0x1A, 0xCB, 0x24, 0x59, 0xFE, 0x05, 0x96, 0x57, 0x0F,
0x1F, 0xCF, 0x54, 0xBE, 0xF5, 0x06, 0x1B, 0xB2, 0x6D, 0xD3, 0x4D, 0x32, 0x56, 0x21, 0x33, 0x0B,
0x52, 0xE7, 0xAB, 0xEB, 0xA6, 0x74, 0x00, 0x4C, 0xB1, 0x7F, 0x82, 0x99, 0x87, 0x0E, 0x5E, 0xC0,
0x8F, 0xEE, 0x6F, 0x55, 0xF3, 0x7E, 0x08, 0x90, 0xFA, 0xB6, 0x64, 0x70, 0x47, 0x4A, 0x17, 0xA7,
0xB5, 0x40, 0x8A, 0x38, 0xE5, 0x68, 0x3E, 0x8B, 0x69, 0xAA, 0x9B, 0x42, 0xA5, 0x10, 0x01, 0x35,
0xFD, 0x61, 0x9E, 0xE6, 0x16, 0x9C, 0x86, 0xED, 0xCD, 0x2E, 0xFF, 0xC4, 0x5B, 0xA0, 0xAE, 0xCC,
0x4B, 0x3B, 0x03, 0xBB, 0x1C, 0x2A, 0xAC, 0x0C, 0x3F, 0x93, 0xC7, 0x72, 0x7A, 0x09, 0x22, 0x3D,
0x45, 0x78, 0xA9, 0xA8, 0xEA, 0xC9, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF0, 0x02, 0x18, 0x3A, 0x4E, 0x7C,
];
const CRYPT_TAB3: [u8; 256] = [
0x73, 0x51, 0x95, 0xE1, 0x12, 0xE4, 0xC0, 0x58, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x08, 0x1B, 0xA9, 0xFA, 0x98, 0x4C,
0xA7, 0x33, 0xE2, 0x1B, 0xA7, 0x6D, 0xF5, 0x30, 0x97, 0x1D, 0xF3, 0x02, 0x60, 0x5A, 0x82, 0x0F,
0x91, 0xD0, 0x9C, 0x10, 0x39, 0x7A, 0x83, 0x85, 0x3B, 0xB2, 0xB8, 0xAE, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x52, 0xEA,
0x1C, 0xE1, 0x8D, 0x66, 0x4F, 0xF3, 0xDA, 0x92, 0x29, 0xB9, 0xD5, 0xC5, 0x77, 0x47, 0x22, 0x53,
0x14, 0xF7, 0xAF, 0x22, 0x64, 0xDF, 0xC6, 0x72, 0x12, 0xF3, 0x75, 0xDA, 0xD7, 0xD7, 0xE5, 0x02,
0x9E, 0xED, 0xDA, 0xDB, 0x4C, 0x47, 0xCE, 0x91, 0x06, 0x06, 0x6D, 0x55, 0x8B, 0x19, 0xC9, 0xEF,
0x8C, 0x80, 0x1A, 0x0E, 0xEE, 0x4B, 0xAB, 0xF2, 0x08, 0x5C, 0xE9, 0x37, 0x26, 0x5E, 0x9A, 0x90,
0x00, 0xF3, 0x0D, 0xB2, 0xA6, 0xA3, 0xF7, 0x26, 0x17, 0x48, 0x88, 0xC9, 0x0E, 0x2C, 0xC9, 0x02,
0xE7, 0x18, 0x05, 0x4B, 0xF3, 0x39, 0xE1, 0x20, 0x02, 0x0D, 0x40, 0xC7, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0x48, 0x30,
0x57, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x06, 0xBF, 0xAC, 0x81, 0x08, 0x24, 0x7A, 0xD4, 0x8B, 0x19, 0x8E, 0xAC, 0xB4,
0x5A, 0x0F, 0x73, 0x13, 0xAC, 0x9E, 0xDA, 0xB6, 0xB8, 0x96, 0x5B, 0x60, 0x88, 0xE1, 0x81, 0x3F,
0x07, 0x86, 0x37, 0x2D, 0x79, 0x14, 0x52, 0xEA, 0x73, 0xDF, 0x3D, 0x09, 0xC8, 0x25, 0x48, 0xD8,
0x75, 0x60, 0x9A, 0x08, 0x27, 0x4A, 0x2C, 0xB9, 0xA8, 0x8B, 0x8A, 0x73, 0x62, 0x37, 0x16, 0x02,
0xBD, 0xC1, 0x0E, 0x56, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x14, 0x5F, 0x8C, 0x8F, 0x6E, 0x75, 0x1C, 0x07, 0x39, 0x7B,
0x4B, 0xDB, 0xD3, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0xC8, 0x7E, 0xFE, 0x3E, 0x72, 0x16, 0x83, 0x7D, 0xEE, 0xF5, 0xCA,
0xC5, 0x18, 0xF9, 0xD8, 0x68, 0xAB, 0x38, 0x85, 0xA8, 0xF0, 0xA1, 0x73, 0x9F, 0x5D, 0x19, 0x0B,
];
const VARIANTS: [u8; 32] = [
0xB7, 0x74, 0x85, 0xD0, 0xCC, 0xDB, 0xCA, 0x73, 0x03, 0xFE, 0x31, 0x03, 0x52, 0xE0, 0xB7, 0x42,
0x63, 0x16, 0xF2, 0x2A, 0x79, 0x52, 0xFF, 0x1B, 0x7A, 0x11, 0xCA, 0x1A, 0x9B, 0x40, 0xAD, 0x01,
];
const SECRET: [u8; 5] = [0x55, 0xD6, 0xC4, 0xC5, 0x28];
const PERM_CHALLENGE: [[usize; 10]; 3] = [
[1, 3, 0, 7, 5, 2, 9, 6, 4, 8],
[6, 1, 9, 3, 8, 5, 7, 4, 0, 2],
[4, 0, 3, 5, 7, 2, 8, 6, 1, 9],
];
const PERM_VARIANT: [[u8; 32]; 2] = [
[
0x0A, 0x08, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0x0B, 0x09, 0x0F, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0x18, 0x1E, 0x1C, 0x1B, 0x19, 0x1F,
0x1D, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x04, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x05, 0x12, 0x10, 0x16, 0x14, 0x13, 0x11,
0x17, 0x15,
],
[
0x12, 0x1A, 0x16, 0x1E, 0x02, 0x0A, 0x06, 0x0E, 0x10, 0x18, 0x14, 0x1C, 0x00, 0x08, 0x04,
0x0C, 0x13, 0x1B, 0x17, 0x1F, 0x03, 0x0B, 0x07, 0x0F, 0x11, 0x19, 0x15, 0x1D, 0x01, 0x09,
0x05, 0x0D,
],
];
// ── Public API ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// CSS bus-auth **unlock** primitive.
///
/// Runs the bus-auth challenge-response (which sets the drive's ASF=1 and is
/// what actually unlocks scrambled-sector reads), then a best-effort,
/// non-fatal disc-key REPORT KEY. The title-key REPORT KEY is NOT issued: it
/// is unnecessary (the descramble key is recovered keylessly by the Stevenson
/// attack in [`super::crack_key`]) and its hard failure on some USB bridges
/// used to abort the whole unlock (the 7014 bug). The bytes are discarded.
pub fn unlock_css_reads(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport, lba: u32) -> Result<()> {
let t0 = std::time::Instant::now();
tracing::info!(target: "freemkv::css", phase = "unlock_css_reads", lba, "begin");
let r = unlock_css_reads_inner(scsi, lba);
tracing::info!(
target: "freemkv::css",
phase = "unlock_css_reads",
lba,
ok = r.is_ok(),
elapsed_ms = t0.elapsed().as_millis() as u64,
"end"
);
r
}
/// The CSS unlocker — the DVD peer of the firmware and AACS-cert unlockers in
/// the uniform [`crate::unlock::Unlocker`] registry. It removes the CSS
/// scrambled-read barrier (drive ASF=1) and learns no VID or bus key — the
/// descramble key is recovered keylessly downstream (the Stevenson attack).
pub struct CssUnlocker;
impl crate::unlock::Unlocker for CssUnlocker {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"css"
}
fn matches(&self, ctx: &crate::unlock::UnlockCtx) -> bool {
ctx.kind == crate::unlock::DiscKind::Css
}
fn unlock(
&self,
scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport,
_ctx: &crate::unlock::UnlockCtx,
) -> std::result::Result<crate::unlock::Unlocked, crate::unlock::UnlockError> {
// Self-guard against the hardware — do NOT trust the caller-declared
// DiscKind alone. If the drive does not report a DVD profile, refuse
// (NotApplicable) WITHOUT issuing any CSS CDB, so a mis-routed
// Blu-ray/UHD is never sent CSS bus-auth.
if !mounted_disc_is_dvd(scsi) {
tracing::debug!(
target: "freemkv::css",
phase = "css_unlocker_not_dvd",
"CssUnlocker invoked on a non-DVD profile; refusing (NotApplicable)"
);
return Err(crate::unlock::UnlockError::NotApplicable);
}
// The bus-auth handshake is what unlocks scrambled-sector reads; the lba
// is not consumed by the unlock primitive (the disc-key REPORT KEY is
// best-effort). CSS yields neither a Volume ID nor an AACS bus key.
unlock_css_reads(scsi, 0)?;
Ok(crate::unlock::Unlocked::default())
}
}
/// Transport-level "is the mounted disc a DVD?" probe (GET CONFIGURATION
/// current-profile, DVD family `0x0010..=0x001F`). Lets the CssUnlocker
/// self-verify against the drive instead of trusting the caller's DiscKind.
fn mounted_disc_is_dvd(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> bool {
// RT=0: the 8-byte feature header carries the Current Profile in bytes 6-7.
let cdb = [
crate::scsi::SCSI_GET_CONFIGURATION,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x00,
0x08,
0x00,
];
let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
match scsi.execute(
&cdb,
crate::scsi::DataDirection::FromDevice,
&mut buf,
5_000,
) {
Ok(r) if r.bytes_transferred >= 8 => {
let profile = ((buf[6] as u16) << 8) | buf[7] as u16;
(0x0010..=0x001F).contains(&profile)
}
_ => false,
}
}
fn unlock_css_reads_inner(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport, _lba: u32) -> Result<()> {
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::css", "css unlock: begin");
// The bus-auth challenge-response sets the drive's Authentication Success
// Flag (ASF=1), which is what opens scrambled-sector reads. This is the
// ONLY step required to unlock reads; a failure here is fatal — we
// genuinely cannot read scrambled sectors.
let agid = establish_authenticated_session(scsi).inspect_err(|e| {
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::css", error_code = e.code(), "css unlock: bus authentication failed");
})?;
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::css", agid, "css unlock: bus authentication ok");
// Disc-key REPORT KEY: issued BEST-EFFORT for any firmware that ties part
// of its read-unlock to it. The bytes are unused (the descramble key is
// recovered keylessly) and a failure is NON-FATAL — the gate is already
// open from bus-auth. This replaces the title-key REPORT KEY, whose hard
// failure used to abort the whole unlock (the 7014 bug on USB bridges).
if let Err(e) = read_disc_key(scsi, agid) {
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::css", error_code = e.code(), "css unlock: disc-key REPORT KEY skipped (non-fatal)");
}
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::css", "css unlock: ok");
Ok(())
}
// ── Step 1: Bus Authentication ────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Run the CSS bus-authentication challenge-response (invalidate AGIDs →
/// allocate AGID → host challenge → brute-force the variant → drive challenge →
/// send host key). Completing the handshake sets the drive's Authentication
/// Success Flag (ASF=1) — which is the ENTIRE purpose: it unlocks
/// scrambled-sector reads. Returns the negotiated AGID (the caller needs it for
/// the best-effort disc-key REPORT KEY). The CSS bus key is intentionally NOT
/// derived: descrambling is keyless (the Stevenson known-plaintext attack), so
/// the bus key has no consumer.
fn establish_authenticated_session(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport) -> Result<u8> {
// Invalidate all AGIDs via REPORT KEY format 0x3F
for agid in 0..4u8 {
let mut cdb = [0u8; 12];
cdb[0] = crate::scsi::SCSI_REPORT_KEY;
// alloc_len = 0 (no data transfer)
cdb[10] = (agid << 6) | 0x3F;
let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
let _ = scsi.execute(
&cdb,
crate::scsi::DataDirection::FromDevice,
&mut buf,
5_000,
);
}
// Allocate AGID
let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
scsi.execute(
&report_key_cdb(0, 0x00, 8),
crate::scsi::DataDirection::FromDevice,
&mut buf,
5_000,
)
.map_err(|_| Error::CssAuthFailed)?;
let agid = (buf[7] >> 6) & 0x03;
// Host sends challenge. The spec wants a fresh per-session random nonce,
// not a fixed constant — a predictable challenge weakens the bus-auth
// handshake.
let mut host_challenge = [0u8; 10];
{
use rand::RngCore;
rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut host_challenge);
}
let mut hc_buf = [0u8; 16];
hc_buf[0] = 0x00;
hc_buf[1] = 0x0E;
for i in 0..10 {
hc_buf[4 + i] = host_challenge[9 - i];
}
scsi.execute(
&send_key_cdb(agid, 0x01, 16),
crate::scsi::DataDirection::ToDevice,
&mut hc_buf,
5_000,
)
.map_err(|_| Error::CssAuthFailed)?;
// Get Key1 from drive
let mut dk_buf = [0u8; 12];
scsi.execute(
&report_key_cdb(agid, 0x02, 12),
crate::scsi::DataDirection::FromDevice,
&mut dk_buf,
5_000,
)
.map_err(|_| Error::CssAuthFailed)?;
let mut key1 = [0u8; 5];
for i in 0..5 {
key1[i] = dk_buf[4 + (4 - i)];
}
// Brute-force variant (0-31)
let mut variant: Option<u8> = None;
for v in 0..32u8 {
if crypt_key(0, v, &host_challenge) == key1 {
variant = Some(v);
break;
}
}
let variant = variant.ok_or(Error::CssAuthFailed)?;
// Get drive challenge
let mut dc_buf = [0u8; 16];
scsi.execute(
&report_key_cdb(agid, 0x01, 16),
crate::scsi::DataDirection::FromDevice,
&mut dc_buf,
5_000,
)
.map_err(|_| Error::CssAuthFailed)?;
let mut drive_challenge = [0u8; 10];
for i in 0..10 {
drive_challenge[i] = dc_buf[4 + (9 - i)];
}
// Compute Key2 and send it
let key2 = crypt_key(1, variant, &drive_challenge);
let mut hk_buf = [0u8; 12];
hk_buf[0] = 0x00;
hk_buf[1] = 0x0A;
for i in 0..5 {
hk_buf[4 + i] = key2[4 - i];
}
scsi.execute(
&send_key_cdb(agid, 0x03, 12),
crate::scsi::DataDirection::ToDevice,
&mut hk_buf,
5_000,
)
.map_err(|_| Error::CssAuthFailed)?;
// The authenticated session (ASF=1) is now established — scrambled-sector
// reads are unlocked, which is the only thing we needed. The CSS bus key
// would be CryptKey(2, variant, key1 || key2), but it has no consumer
// (descrambling is keyless via the Stevenson attack), so it is not derived.
Ok(agid)
}
// ── Step 2: Disc Key ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Issue READ DVD STRUCTURE format 0x02 (Copyright Information — opcode 0xAD,
/// NOT the REPORT KEY 0xA4 disc-key block) purely for the bus-auth unlock side
/// effect. The returned block contents are not used — the descramble title key
/// is recovered keylessly elsewhere, so the genuine disc-key REPORT KEY is
/// intentionally skipped. (If a drive is ever found where bus-auth alone does
/// not open scrambled reads, a real REPORT KEY format 0x02 belongs here.)
fn read_disc_key(scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport, agid: u8) -> Result<()> {
// READ DVD STRUCTURE, format 0x02 (disc key), 2048+4 bytes
let alloc_len: u16 = 2048 + 4;
let mut cdb = [0u8; 12];
cdb[0] = crate::scsi::SCSI_READ_DISC_STRUCTURE;
// bytes 2-5: address = 0
cdb[6] = 0; // layer
cdb[7] = 0x02; // format = disc key
cdb[8] = (alloc_len >> 8) as u8;
cdb[9] = alloc_len as u8;
cdb[10] = agid << 6;
let mut buf = vec![0u8; alloc_len as usize];
let dvd_result = scsi.execute(
&cdb,
crate::scsi::DataDirection::FromDevice,
&mut buf,
5_000,
);
dvd_result.map_err(|_| Error::CssAuthFailed)?;
Ok(())
}
// ── CSSCryptKey ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
fn crypt_key(key_type: usize, variant: u8, challenge: &[u8; 10]) -> [u8; 5] {
// key_type indexes PERM_CHALLENGE ([_;3]); variant indexes
// VARIANTS/PERM_VARIANT ([_;32]). All internal callers pass key_type in
// 0..3 and variant in 0..32; the asserts document the contract for the
// pub(crate) test entry point test_crypt_key and turn a would-be
// out-of-bounds panic into an explicit precondition violation.
debug_assert!(key_type < 3, "crypt_key: key_type out of range");
debug_assert!((variant as usize) < 32, "crypt_key: variant out of range");
let perm = &PERM_CHALLENGE[key_type];
let mut scratch = [0u8; 10];
for i in 0..10 {
scratch[i] = challenge[perm[i]];
}
let css_variant = match key_type {
0 => variant as usize,
1 => PERM_VARIANT[0][variant as usize] as usize,
_ => PERM_VARIANT[1][variant as usize] as usize,
};
let cse = VARIANTS[css_variant] ^ CRYPT_TAB2[css_variant];
let mut tmp1 = [0u8; 5];
for i in 0..5 {
tmp1[i] = scratch[5 + i] ^ SECRET[i] ^ CRYPT_TAB2[i];
}
let mut lfsr0: u32 = ((tmp1[0] as u32) << 17)
| ((tmp1[1] as u32) << 9)
| (((tmp1[2] as u32) & !7) << 1)
| 8
| (tmp1[2] as u32 & 7);
let mut lfsr1: u32 = ((tmp1[3] as u32) << 9) | 0x100 | (tmp1[4] as u32);
let mut bits = [0u8; 30];
let mut carry: u32 = 0;
for idx in (0..30).rev() {
let mut val: u8 = 0;
for bit in 0..8u8 {
let lfsr0_out = ((lfsr0 >> 24) ^ (lfsr0 >> 21) ^ (lfsr0 >> 20) ^ (lfsr0 >> 12)) & 1;
lfsr0 = ((lfsr0 << 1) | lfsr0_out) & 0x1FFFFFF;
let lfsr1_out = ((lfsr1 >> 16) ^ (lfsr1 >> 2)) & 1;
lfsr1 = ((lfsr1 << 1) | lfsr1_out) & 0x1FFFF;
let combined = ((!lfsr1_out) & 1) + carry + ((!lfsr0_out) & 1);
carry = (combined >> 1) & 1;
val |= ((combined & 1) as u8) << bit;
}
bits[idx] = val;
}
let mut tmp1 = [scratch[0], scratch[1], scratch[2], scratch[3], scratch[4]];
let mut tmp2 = [0u8; 5];
// Round 1: bits[25..29] ^ scratch -> tmp1 (term from original scratch)
{
let mut term: u8 = 0;
for i in (0..5usize).rev() {
let idx = (bits[25 + i] ^ tmp1[i]) as usize;
let idx2 = (CRYPT_TAB1[idx] ^ (!CRYPT_TAB2[idx]) ^ cse) as usize;
tmp1[i] = CRYPT_TAB2[idx2] ^ CRYPT_TAB3[idx2] ^ term;
term = scratch[i]; // original challenge, NOT modified tmp1
}
tmp1[4] ^= tmp1[0];
}
// Round 2
{
let mut term: u8 = 0;
for i in (0..5usize).rev() {
let idx = (bits[20 + i] ^ tmp1[i]) as usize;
let idx2 = (CRYPT_TAB1[idx] ^ (!CRYPT_TAB2[idx]) ^ cse) as usize;
tmp2[i] = CRYPT_TAB2[idx2] ^ CRYPT_TAB3[idx2] ^ term;
term = tmp1[i];
}
tmp2[4] ^= tmp2[0];
}
// Round 3 (uses CRYPT_TAB0)
{
let mut term: u8 = 0;
for i in (0..5usize).rev() {
let idx = (bits[15 + i] ^ tmp2[i]) as usize;
let idx2 = (CRYPT_TAB1[idx] ^ (!CRYPT_TAB2[idx]) ^ cse) as usize;
let idx3 = (CRYPT_TAB2[idx2] ^ CRYPT_TAB3[idx2] ^ term) as usize;
tmp1[i] = CRYPT_TAB0[idx3] ^ CRYPT_TAB2[idx3];
term = tmp2[i];
}
tmp1[4] ^= tmp1[0];
}
// Round 4 (uses CRYPT_TAB0)
{
let mut term: u8 = 0;
for i in (0..5usize).rev() {
let idx = (bits[10 + i] ^ tmp1[i]) as usize;
let idx2 = (CRYPT_TAB1[idx] ^ (!CRYPT_TAB2[idx]) ^ cse) as usize;
let idx3 = (CRYPT_TAB2[idx2] ^ CRYPT_TAB3[idx2] ^ term) as usize;
tmp2[i] = CRYPT_TAB0[idx3] ^ CRYPT_TAB2[idx3];
term = tmp1[i];
}
tmp2[4] ^= tmp2[0];
}
// Round 5
{
let mut term: u8 = 0;
for i in (0..5usize).rev() {
let idx = (bits[5 + i] ^ tmp2[i]) as usize;
let idx2 = (CRYPT_TAB1[idx] ^ (!CRYPT_TAB2[idx]) ^ cse) as usize;
tmp1[i] = CRYPT_TAB2[idx2] ^ CRYPT_TAB3[idx2] ^ term;
term = tmp2[i];
}
tmp1[4] ^= tmp1[0];
}
// Round 6
let mut key = [0u8; 5];
{
let mut term: u8 = 0;
for i in (0..5usize).rev() {
let idx = (bits[i] ^ tmp1[i]) as usize;
let idx2 = (CRYPT_TAB1[idx] ^ (!CRYPT_TAB2[idx]) ^ cse) as usize;
key[i] = CRYPT_TAB2[idx2] ^ CRYPT_TAB3[idx2] ^ term;
term = tmp1[i];
}
}
key
}
// ── SCSI CDB builders ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
fn report_key_cdb(agid: u8, format: u8, alloc_len: u16) -> [u8; 12] {
let mut cdb = [0u8; 12];
cdb[0] = crate::scsi::SCSI_REPORT_KEY;
cdb[8] = (alloc_len >> 8) as u8;
cdb[9] = alloc_len as u8;
cdb[10] = (agid << 6) | (format & 0x3F);
cdb
}
fn send_key_cdb(agid: u8, format: u8, param_len: u16) -> [u8; 12] {
let mut cdb = [0u8; 12];
cdb[0] = crate::scsi::SCSI_SEND_KEY;
cdb[8] = (param_len >> 8) as u8;
cdb[9] = param_len as u8;
cdb[10] = (agid << 6) | (format & 0x3F);
cdb
}
// ── Tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// SECURITY REGRESSION GUARD: no instrumentation in libfreemkv may emit
/// raw key material. Scan every source file for a `tracing` field that
/// binds a forbidden key name to a value-producing expression (`= expr`
/// or `%expr` / `?expr`). The only allowed forms are a string literal
/// (e.g. `disc_key = "<redacted>"`) or a `_fp` fingerprint field.
///
/// This is a source-scan test (not a runtime capture) so it stays cheap
/// and catches re-introductions at compile/CI time.
#[test]
fn no_key_bytes_in_instrumentation() {
use std::path::Path;
// Forbidden field names whose VALUES must never be logged.
const FORBIDDEN: &[&str] = &[
"title_key",
"disc_key",
"unit_key",
"vuk",
"player_key",
"bus_key",
];
fn scan_dir(dir: &Path, forbidden: &[&str], violations: &mut Vec<String>) {
let entries = match std::fs::read_dir(dir) {
Ok(e) => e,
Err(_) => return,
};
for entry in entries.flatten() {
let path = entry.path();
if path.is_dir() {
scan_dir(&path, forbidden, violations);
continue;
}
if path.extension().and_then(|e| e.to_str()) != Some("rs") {
continue;
}
let src = match std::fs::read_to_string(&path) {
Ok(s) => s,
Err(_) => continue,
};
for (lineno, line) in src.lines().enumerate() {
let trimmed = line.trim_start();
// Only inspect tracing instrumentation lines.
if !(trimmed.contains("tracing::")
|| trimmed.starts_with("debug!")
|| trimmed.starts_with("info!")
|| trimmed.starts_with("warn!")
|| trimmed.starts_with("trace!")
|| trimmed.starts_with("error!"))
{
continue;
}
// This guard test itself contains the forbidden names.
if path.file_name().and_then(|n| n.to_str()) == Some("auth.rs")
&& line.contains("FORBIDDEN")
{
continue;
}
for &name in forbidden {
// A fingerprint field (`<name>_fp = ...`) is allowed.
// Match `<name>` followed by optional fingerprint
// suffix then `=` and a value that is NOT a string
// literal redaction marker.
if let Some(idx) = line.find(name) {
let after = &line[idx + name.len()..];
let after = after.trim_start();
// `<name>_fp` / `<name>_id` etc. are safe.
if after.starts_with('_') {
continue;
}
// Must be a field binding `name = ...`.
let Some(rest) = after.strip_prefix('=') else {
continue;
};
let rest = rest.trim_start();
// Redaction string literal is the only allowed value.
if rest.starts_with('"') {
continue;
}
// Anything else (`%expr`, `?expr`, bare expr) leaks bytes.
violations.push(format!(
"{}:{}: forbidden key field `{}` logged with a value: {}",
path.display(),
lineno + 1,
name,
line.trim()
));
}
}
}
}
}
// Scan this crate's `src` plus the sibling workspace crates so the
// key-material logging guard covers every crate that can reach the
// CSS/AACS internals, not just libfreemkv. Missing sibling dirs (e.g.
// when building the crate standalone) are simply skipped.
let manifest = Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"));
let workspace = manifest.parent().unwrap_or(manifest);
let mut violations = Vec::new();
scan_dir(&manifest.join("src"), FORBIDDEN, &mut violations);
for sibling in ["autorip", "freemkv", "freemkv-keysources"] {
let dir = workspace.join(sibling).join("src");
if dir.is_dir() {
scan_dir(&dir, FORBIDDEN, &mut violations);
}
}
assert!(
violations.is_empty(),
"key material logged in instrumentation:\n{}",
violations.join("\n")
);
}
#[test]
fn crypt_key_is_deterministic() {
let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
for v in 0..32u8 {
let r1 = crypt_key(0, v, &challenge);
let r2 = crypt_key(0, v, &challenge);
assert_eq!(r1, r2);
}
}
#[test]
fn crypt_key_varies_by_variant() {
let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
assert_ne!(crypt_key(0, 0, &challenge), crypt_key(0, 1, &challenge));
}
#[test]
fn crypt_key_varies_by_type() {
let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
assert_ne!(crypt_key(0, 5, &challenge), crypt_key(1, 5, &challenge));
}
#[test]
fn crypt_key_nonzero() {
let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
for v in 0..32u8 {
assert_ne!(crypt_key(0, v, &challenge), [0u8; 5]);
}
}
// ── CSS constant-table integrity ───────────────────────────────────────
/// Each PERM_CHALLENGE row is a permutation of indices 0..10 (it reorders
/// the 10 challenge bytes). A non-permutation would drop/duplicate
/// challenge bytes, weakening or corrupting the bus key derivation.
///
/// Grounding: crypt_key does `scratch[i] = challenge[perm[i]]` for i in
/// 0..10 — perm must be a bijection on 0..10 to use every challenge byte
/// exactly once.
/// Mutation: change PERM_CHALLENGE[0] entry `9` to `8` (duplicate) -> the
/// "covers 0..10" assert fires.
#[test]
fn perm_challenge_rows_are_permutations() {
for (row, perm) in PERM_CHALLENGE.iter().enumerate() {
let mut seen = [false; 10];
for &idx in perm.iter() {
assert!(idx < 10, "PERM_CHALLENGE[{row}] index {idx} out of range");
assert!(!seen[idx], "PERM_CHALLENGE[{row}] duplicates index {idx}");
seen[idx] = true;
}
assert!(
seen.iter().all(|&b| b),
"PERM_CHALLENGE[{row}] misses an index"
);
}
}
/// Each PERM_VARIANT row maps the 32 variants to 32 distinct 5-bit values
/// (it is a permutation of 0..32). key_type 1 uses PERM_VARIANT[0],
/// key_type 2 uses PERM_VARIANT[1] to pick the css_variant; a collision
/// would make two variants indistinguishable.
///
/// Grounding: `css_variant = PERM_VARIANT[k][variant]` then indexes
/// VARIANTS[css_variant] (0..32).
/// Mutation: set PERM_VARIANT[0][1] = PERM_VARIANT[0][0] -> duplicate
/// assert fires; also any value >= 32 would later index VARIANTS OOB.
#[test]
fn perm_variant_rows_are_permutations_of_0_31() {
for (row, perm) in PERM_VARIANT.iter().enumerate() {
let mut seen = [false; 32];
for &v in perm.iter() {
let v = v as usize;
assert!(v < 32, "PERM_VARIANT[{row}] value {v} out of 0..32");
assert!(!seen[v], "PERM_VARIANT[{row}] duplicates {v}");
seen[v] = true;
}
assert!(
seen.iter().all(|&b| b),
"PERM_VARIANT[{row}] misses a value"
);
}
}
// ── crypt_key behaviour ────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// crypt_key result depends on every challenge byte. The challenge is
/// permuted into `scratch` and folded through the LFSR seeding and the 6
/// XOR rounds. Flipping any single challenge byte must change the output.
///
/// Grounding: scratch[i]=challenge[perm[i]] for all 10 i, and scratch
/// seeds both LFSRs (bytes 5..10 via tmp1) and the round terms (bytes
/// 0..5).
/// Mutation: in `scratch[i] = challenge[perm[i]]` replace with
/// `challenge[i]` for a perm that drops a byte — or hardcode one scratch
/// entry — and some challenge byte stops mattering; this fails.
#[test]
fn crypt_key_depends_on_every_challenge_byte() {
let base: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
let base_out = crypt_key(0, 5, &base);
for i in 0..10 {
let mut c = base;
c[i] ^= 0x55;
assert_ne!(
crypt_key(0, 5, &c),
base_out,
"flipping challenge byte {i} did not change the bus-key derivation"
);
}
}
/// crypt_key(0, v, ..) must produce a DISTINCT result for each of the 32
/// variants on a fixed challenge. bus_auth brute-forces the variant by
/// matching crypt_key(0, v, host_challenge) == key1; if two variants
/// collided, the wrong variant could be selected and the whole auth
/// derail.
///
/// Grounding: variant selects css_variant -> VARIANTS[css_variant] -> cse,
/// which feeds every round; distinct variants give distinct cse-driven
/// keys in practice.
/// Mutation: make `cse` ignore the variant (e.g. `let cse = 0`) -> all 32
/// outputs collapse to one value; the distinctness assert fires.
#[test]
fn crypt_key_type0_distinct_per_variant() {
let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
let mut outs = Vec::new();
for v in 0..32u8 {
let k = crypt_key(0, v, &challenge);
assert!(
!outs.contains(&k),
"variant {v} collides with an earlier variant"
);
outs.push(k);
}
}
/// crypt_key enforces its documented precondition `key_type < 3` via
/// debug_assert (active in test builds). A key_type of 3 would index
/// PERM_CHALLENGE (len 3) out of bounds; the assert turns that into an
/// explicit precondition panic.
///
/// Grounding: `debug_assert!(key_type < 3, ...)`; PERM_CHALLENGE has 3
/// rows (indices 0,1,2).
/// Mutation: delete the debug_assert AND the match-arm guard — but the
/// match `_ =>` arm would then index PERM_CHALLENGE[3] OOB and panic
/// differently; with the assert in place this test pins the contract.
#[test]
#[should_panic]
fn crypt_key_rejects_out_of_range_key_type() {
let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
let _ = crypt_key(3, 0, &challenge);
}
/// crypt_key enforces `variant < 32` via debug_assert. A variant of 32
/// would index VARIANTS / PERM_VARIANT (len 32) out of bounds.
///
/// Grounding: `debug_assert!((variant as usize) < 32, ...)`.
/// Mutation: removing the assert makes this index VARIANTS[32] (still a
/// panic, but unguarded); the assert documents/enforces the contract.
#[test]
#[should_panic]
fn crypt_key_rejects_out_of_range_variant() {
let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
let _ = crypt_key(0, 32, &challenge);
}
// ── SCSI CDB builders (MMC REPORT KEY / SEND KEY layout) ───────────────
/// report_key_cdb encodes a 12-byte MMC REPORT KEY (opcode 0xA4) CDB:
/// byte 0 = operation code 0xA4
/// bytes 8-9 = allocation length, big-endian
/// byte 10 = (AGID << 6) | (key_format & 0x3F)
/// All other bytes are zero.
///
/// Grounding: MMC REPORT KEY CDB; the AGID is the top 2 bits of byte 10,
/// key format the low 6 bits.
/// Mutation: change `(alloc_len >> 8)` to `alloc_len` for byte 8 (lose the
/// big-endian split) -> byte 8/9 assert fails. Change `agid << 6` to
/// `agid << 5` -> the AGID-position assert fails.
#[test]
fn report_key_cdb_matches_mmc_layout() {
let cdb = report_key_cdb(0b10, 0x04, 0x010C); // AGID=2, format=0x04, len=268
assert_eq!(cdb[0], 0xA4, "REPORT KEY opcode");
assert_eq!(cdb[8], 0x01, "alloc_len high byte (big-endian)");
assert_eq!(cdb[9], 0x0C, "alloc_len low byte");
assert_eq!(
cdb[10],
(0b10 << 6) | 0x04,
"AGID in bits 6-7, format in bits 0-5"
);
// Every other byte must be zero.
for (i, &b) in cdb.iter().enumerate() {
if ![0, 8, 9, 10].contains(&i) {
assert_eq!(b, 0, "CDB byte {i} must be zero");
}
}
assert_eq!(cdb.len(), 12, "REPORT KEY is a 12-byte CDB");
}
/// The key format field is masked to 6 bits: a format with high bits set
/// must not corrupt the AGID. report_key_cdb(0, 0xFF, _) -> byte 10 low 6
/// bits = 0x3F, AGID = 0.
///
/// Grounding: `(agid << 6) | (format & 0x3F)`.
/// Mutation: drop the `& 0x3F` mask -> 0xFF would overwrite the AGID bits;
/// byte 10 would be 0xFF not 0x3F, this fails.
#[test]
fn report_key_cdb_masks_format_to_6_bits() {
let cdb = report_key_cdb(0, 0xFF, 8);
assert_eq!(cdb[10], 0x3F, "format masked to 6 bits, AGID stays 0");
}
/// send_key_cdb encodes a 12-byte MMC SEND KEY (opcode 0xA3) CDB with the
/// parameter-list length at bytes 8-9 (big-endian) and AGID/format at byte
/// 10.
///
/// Grounding: MMC SEND KEY CDB layout.
/// Mutation: change opcode to SCSI_REPORT_KEY -> opcode assert fails;
/// swap bytes 8/9 -> length assert fails.
#[test]
fn send_key_cdb_matches_mmc_layout() {
let cdb = send_key_cdb(0b11, 0x03, 0x000C); // AGID=3, format=3, param_len=12
assert_eq!(cdb[0], 0xA3, "SEND KEY opcode");
assert_eq!(cdb[8], 0x00, "param_len high byte");
assert_eq!(cdb[9], 0x0C, "param_len low byte");
assert_eq!(
cdb[10],
(0b11 << 6) | 0x03,
"AGID bits 6-7, format bits 0-5"
);
assert_eq!(cdb.len(), 12);
}
/// Allocation length larger than 255 must split across bytes 8 (high) and
/// 9 (low) — a 16-bit big-endian field. report_key_cdb with alloc_len
/// 0x0804 (2052, the disc-key block size used in read_disc_key) -> byte 8
/// = 0x08, byte 9 = 0x04.
///
/// Grounding: read_disc_key uses `alloc_len = 2048 + 4 = 2052 = 0x0804`
/// and writes `cdb[8] = (alloc_len >> 8); cdb[9] = alloc_len`.
/// Mutation: write only byte 9 (`cdb[9] = alloc_len as u8`) without byte 8
/// -> the drive sees a 4-byte transfer, truncating the disc-key block;
/// this asserts the high byte is present.
#[test]
fn report_key_cdb_alloc_len_is_16bit_big_endian() {
let cdb = report_key_cdb(0, 0x00, 0x0804);
assert_eq!(cdb[8], 0x08, "high byte of 2052-byte transfer");
assert_eq!(cdb[9], 0x04, "low byte of 2052-byte transfer");
}
/// The CssUnlocker is the DVD member of the uniform registry: it matches
/// ONLY `DiscKind::Css` (so it never fires during drive-prep or on a
/// Blu-ray), and carries the stable language-neutral name "css".
#[test]
fn css_unlocker_matches_only_css_kind() {
use crate::unlock::{DiscKind, UnlockCtx, Unlocker};
let mut inquiry = vec![0u8; 96];
inquiry[8..16].copy_from_slice(b"FAKEVNDR");
let id = crate::identity::DriveId::from_inquiry(&inquiry, "");
let u = CssUnlocker;
assert_eq!(u.name(), "css");
assert!(
u.matches(&UnlockCtx::new(&id, DiscKind::Css)),
"matches a CSS DVD"
);
for k in [DiscKind::Unknown, DiscKind::Unencrypted, DiscKind::Aacs] {
assert!(
!u.matches(&UnlockCtx::new(&id, k)),
"CssUnlocker must not match {k:?}"
);
}
}
/// Defense in depth: even when the caller declares `DiscKind::Css`, the
/// CssUnlocker self-verifies against the drive's GET CONFIGURATION profile.
/// A drive reporting a Blu-ray profile → `NotApplicable`, and NOT a single
/// CSS CDB is issued (no bus-auth fired at a BD).
#[test]
fn css_unlocker_self_guards_against_non_dvd() {
use crate::scsi::{DataDirection, ScsiResult};
use crate::unlock::{DiscKind, UnlockCtx, UnlockError, Unlocker};
/// Reports a BD-ROM profile (0x0040) to GET CONFIGURATION and counts any
/// other CDB (i.e. CSS bus-auth activity).
struct BdTransport {
non_config_cdbs: usize,
}
impl ScsiTransport for BdTransport {
fn execute(
&mut self,
cdb: &[u8],
_dir: DataDirection,
data: &mut [u8],
_timeout_ms: u32,
) -> Result<ScsiResult> {
if cdb[0] == crate::scsi::SCSI_GET_CONFIGURATION {
if data.len() >= 8 {
data[6] = 0x00;
data[7] = 0x40; // BD-ROM current profile
}
return Ok(ScsiResult {
status: 0,
bytes_transferred: 8,
sense: [0u8; 32],
});
}
self.non_config_cdbs += 1;
Ok(ScsiResult {
status: 0,
bytes_transferred: 0,
sense: [0u8; 32],
})
}
}
let mut inquiry = vec![0u8; 96];
inquiry[8..16].copy_from_slice(b"FAKEVNDR");
let id = crate::identity::DriveId::from_inquiry(&inquiry, "");
let mut t = BdTransport { non_config_cdbs: 0 };
let r = CssUnlocker.unlock(&mut t, &UnlockCtx::new(&id, DiscKind::Css));
assert_eq!(
r.unwrap_err(),
UnlockError::NotApplicable,
"a BD-profile drive must be refused"
);
assert_eq!(
t.non_config_cdbs, 0,
"no CSS CDB may be issued at a non-DVD drive"
);
}
}
src/css/mod.rs
-1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
//! }
//! ```
pub mod auth;
pub mod lfsr;
pub mod stevenson;
pub(crate) mod tables;