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aacs: libredrive raw-read VID path + revert v0.25.9 built-ins + walker fix follow-through

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Three coherent threads landing for v0.25.11:

1. Libredrive raw-read VID path. When Mt1959::do_unlock sees both the
   MMkv active-mode marker at [12..16] and the LbDr mode-ID marker at
   [16..20], Drive::is_libredrive_active() returns true and
   do_handshake skips the AACS cert dance — VID is retrieved via
   READ_DISC_STRUCTURE format 0x80 with AGID=0 and bus encryption is
   already off. This unblocks UHD ripping on drives whose leaked host
   cert is on the AACS HRL.

   - platform/mt1959/mod.rs: detection + active flag + 4 unit tests.
   - platform/mod.rs: PlatformDriver::is_libredrive_active trait method.
   - drive/mod.rs: Drive::is_libredrive_active accessor.
   - disc/encrypt.rs: do_handshake branches on the flag; new
     read_volume_id_libredrive helper. Return type widened to
     (Option<HandshakeResult>, Option<Error>) so callers see which
     specific failure happened.
   - disc/mod.rs: scan_with plumbs the new tuple through and preserves
     handshake errors as disc.aacs_error.

2. Revert v0.25.9 built-in AACS keys + plugin slot. Single source of
   AACS truth: keydb.cfg. The compiled-in DKs/PKs were a slim
   convenience that didn't move the hard problem (no v77+ DKs) and
   added a maintenance surface. Plugin slot was overlapping
   functionality with the main keydb.

   - Deleted src/aacs/builtin_keys.rs (4 DKs + 3 PKs).
   - Removed KeyDb::with_builtins, load_or_builtins, merge_from,
     merge_local_plugin, local_plugin_path, internal dedup helpers.
     KeyDb::empty kept for unit-test use.
   - KeyDb::load reverts to pre-0.25.9 form: read file or return I/O
     error; no fallback.
   - disc::encrypt::resolve_encryption keydb_path back to required
     (&Path), not Option<&Path>.
   - disc::scan_with surfaces KeydbLoad { path: "<no keydb in search
     paths>" } sentinel when encrypted + no keydb — same sentinel
     autorip's message switch already handles.
   - CSS player keys in src/css/auth.rs stay compiled in; they're
     1999-era public inputs separate from AACS and pre-date the 0.25.9
     additions.

3. Walker fix follow-through (libaacs-parity validate_processing_key,
   cvalues 0x07-then-0x05 preference, path-2/3/4 short-circuit on
   zero VID) + NIST AES-CMAC KAT + VID MAC round-trip / mutation /
   zero-rejection tests.

5 new Error variants for finer-grained AACS failure reporting:
AacsHostCertRejected (E7015), AacsLibredriveUnsupported (E7016),
AacsVidUnavailable (E7017), AacsMkUnavailable (E7018),
AacsVukNotInKeydb (E7019). Lets CLIs/UIs render which piece of the
AACS chain failed instead of always saying "no keys."
This commit is contained in:
MattJackson
2026-05-21 11:10:35 -07:00
parent 7dbbfc6726
commit 4d83b69c20
13 changed files with 818 additions and 490 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
src/disc/encrypt.rs
+160 -28
View File
@@ -13,20 +13,126 @@ pub(super) struct HandshakeResult {
pub read_data_key: Option<[u8; 16]>,
}
/// Retrieve VID via the libredrive alternate read path. The drive's
/// runtime firmware has cleared bus encryption AND no longer requires
/// a cert-based AGID for protected-area queries — standard
/// READ_DISC_STRUCTURE format 0x80 with AGID = 0 returns the raw VID.
///
/// Layout matches the spec response (4-byte header + 16-byte VID +
/// 16-byte MAC), but MAC is meaningless without a bus key derivation;
/// libredrive mode delivers `[0u8; 16]` (or stale bytes) in the MAC
/// field. We extract the VID bytes only and skip MAC validation
/// entirely — this is the documented behavior gap when bus encryption
/// is off.
fn read_volume_id_libredrive(session: &mut crate::drive::Drive) -> Result<[u8; 16]> {
// CDB: READ_DISC_STRUCTURE (0xAD), media=Blu-ray (0x01), AGID=0,
// format=0x80 (AACS Volume ID), allocation_length=36 (4-byte
// header + 16-byte VID + 16-byte MAC).
let mut cdb = [0u8; 12];
cdb[0] = crate::scsi::SCSI_READ_DISC_STRUCTURE;
cdb[1] = 0x01; // Blu-ray media type
cdb[7] = 0x80; // format = Volume ID
cdb[8] = 0x00;
cdb[9] = 36;
cdb[10] = 0; // AGID = 0 (no auth session)
let mut buf = [0u8; 36];
let result = session.scsi_execute(
&cdb,
crate::scsi::DataDirection::FromDevice,
&mut buf,
5_000,
)?;
if result.bytes_transferred < 20 {
return Err(Error::AacsVidRead);
}
let mut vid = [0u8; 16];
vid.copy_from_slice(&buf[4..20]);
Ok(vid)
}
impl Disc {
/// SCSI handshake result — volume ID and bus keys from ECDH authentication.
/// Only available when scanning from a real drive (not ISO images).
/// SCSI handshake — retrieve VID (and bus keys when applicable).
///
/// Branches on `Drive::is_libredrive_active()`:
/// * libredrive raw-read mode active → skip cert auth, read VID
/// directly via the alternate path (bus encryption is already
/// off; the drive accepts standard READ_DISC_STRUCTURE format
/// 0x80 without an AGID).
/// * libredrive inactive → traditional AACS mutual auth using
/// host certs from the keydb. Caps attempts at 3 with a 1 s
/// backoff to avoid the firmware-wedge hammering we hit in
/// v0.25.7.
///
/// Returns `(handshake, error)`:
/// * `(Some(_), None)` — VID acquired
/// * `(None, Some(_))` — specific failure mode (see new
/// `AacsHostCertRejected` / `AacsLibredriveUnsupported` /
/// `AacsVidUnavailable` variants in `error.rs`)
/// * `(None, None)` — handshake not attempted (no keydb;
/// resolution will proceed with built-in keys and VID=zero)
pub(super) fn do_handshake(
session: &mut crate::drive::Drive,
opts: &ScanOptions,
) -> Option<HandshakeResult> {
use crate::aacs::{self, KeyDb};
) -> (Option<HandshakeResult>, Option<Error>) {
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_entry",
libredrive_active = session.is_libredrive_active(),
"do_handshake entered"
);
// Libredrive mode: skip cert auth entirely. The drive returns
// VID via READ_DISC_STRUCTURE format 0x80 with no AGID and no
// bus encryption applied. This is what MakeMKV does on the
// same drive + disc combination where libfreemkv used to fail
// with E7000 — empirically confirmed 2026-05-21 on rip1
// (BU40N + Barbie UHD, MKB v77, libaacs leaked cert revoked
// by HRL but disc rips cleanly via libredrive).
if session.is_libredrive_active() {
return match read_volume_id_libredrive(session) {
Ok(vid) => {
tracing::debug!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_libredrive_ok",
"libredrive VID acquired without cert auth"
);
(
Some(HandshakeResult {
volume_id: vid,
// No bus key in libredrive mode -> no
// encrypted-read-data-key to decrypt.
// AACS 2.0 bus-encrypted sectors are
// already plaintext when libredrive is
// active, so consumers don't need RDK.
read_data_key: None,
}),
None,
)
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_libredrive_vid_failed",
error_code = e.code(),
"libredrive VID read failed"
);
(None, Some(Error::AacsVidUnavailable))
}
};
}
Self::do_handshake_cert(session, opts)
}
/// Cert-based AACS handshake. Only called when libredrive mode is
/// NOT active — see `do_handshake` for the dispatch.
fn do_handshake_cert(
session: &mut crate::drive::Drive,
opts: &ScanOptions,
) -> (Option<HandshakeResult>, Option<Error>) {
use crate::aacs::{self, KeyDb};
let keydb_path = match opts.resolve_keydb() {
Some(p) => p,
None => {
@@ -35,7 +141,7 @@ impl Disc {
phase = "handshake_no_keydb",
"no KEYDB found in search paths; handshake skipped"
);
return None;
return (None, None);
}
};
let keydb = match KeyDb::load(&keydb_path) {
@@ -48,7 +154,12 @@ impl Disc {
keydb = %keydb_path.display(),
"KEYDB load failed; handshake skipped"
);
return None;
return (
None,
Some(Error::KeydbLoad {
path: keydb_path.display().to_string(),
}),
);
}
};
@@ -61,6 +172,14 @@ impl Disc {
"handshake starting"
);
if host_cert_count == 0 {
// Drive isn't in libredrive mode AND keydb has no host
// certs -> cert auth cannot proceed. Surface as
// LibredriveUnsupported so the caller knows neither path
// is available on this configuration.
return (None, Some(Error::AacsLibredriveUnsupported));
}
// v0.25.7 wedge fix. Pre-0.25.7 this loop fired up to 16 AACS
// authenticate attempts back-to-back with no pause. Each attempt
// is 5-10 SCSI REPORT_KEY/SEND_KEY exchanges. On a disc whose
@@ -96,7 +215,7 @@ impl Disc {
error_code = e.code(),
"auth ok but volume ID read failed"
);
return None;
return (None, Some(Error::AacsVidUnavailable));
}
};
let read_data_key = aacs::handshake::read_data_keys(session, &mut auth)
@@ -108,10 +227,13 @@ impl Disc {
cert_index = idx,
has_read_data_key = read_data_key.is_some(),
);
return Some(HandshakeResult {
volume_id,
read_data_key,
});
return (
Some(HandshakeResult {
volume_id,
read_data_key,
}),
None,
);
}
Err(e) => {
let code = e.code();
@@ -130,7 +252,7 @@ impl Disc {
error_code = code,
"drive returned ILLEGAL_REQUEST during auth; bailing out to avoid wedge"
);
return None;
return (None, Some(Error::AacsHostCertRejected));
}
continue;
}
@@ -145,8 +267,7 @@ impl Disc {
"all host certs in KEYDB rejected by drive (capped at {} attempts to prevent firmware wedge)",
MAX_CERT_ATTEMPTS
);
// All host certs failed — return None, not a fake success
None
(None, Some(Error::AacsHostCertRejected))
}
/// Resolve disc encryption — AACS 1.0, AACS 2.0, CSS, or none.
@@ -157,20 +278,14 @@ impl Disc {
pub(super) fn resolve_encryption(
udf_fs: &udf::UdfFs,
reader: &mut dyn SectorSource,
keydb_path: Option<&std::path::Path>,
keydb_path: &std::path::Path,
handshake: Option<&HandshakeResult>,
) -> Result<AacsState> {
use crate::aacs::{self, KeyDb};
// Built-in AACS 1.0 keys are always available. When a keydb.cfg
// path is supplied, layer it on top; otherwise fall back to
// built-ins (plus the operator local-plugin slot, if any).
let keydb = match keydb_path {
Some(path) => KeyDb::load(path).map_err(|_| Error::KeydbLoad {
path: path.display().to_string(),
})?,
None => KeyDb::load_or_builtins(),
};
let keydb = KeyDb::load(keydb_path).map_err(|_| Error::KeydbLoad {
path: keydb_path.display().to_string(),
})?;
// Read AACS files from disc/image via UDF
let uk_ro_data = udf_fs
@@ -225,11 +340,28 @@ impl Disc {
);
// Use handshake volume ID if available, otherwise zeros
// (KEYDB VUK lookup by disc hash works without volume ID)
// (KEYDB VUK lookup by disc hash works without volume ID;
// paths 2/3/4 in `resolve_keys` short-circuit on the zero
// sentinel and don't waste cycles trying to derive against
// garbage input).
let volume_id = handshake.map(|h| h.volume_id).unwrap_or([0u8; 16]);
let vid_available = volume_id != [0u8; 16];
let read_data_key = handshake.and_then(|h| h.read_data_key);
// Resolve: tries all available paths — KEYDB VUK, media key, processing key, device key
// Resolve: tries all available paths — KEYDB VUK, media key, processing key, device key.
//
// Distinguish "we had every input and still missed" from "we
// never had VID so the derivation paths couldn't run." The
// former points at a stale keydb / unsupported MKB; the
// latter points at a failed handshake upstream. Path 1
// (disc-hash lookup) ran without VID and missed -> disc isn't
// in the keydb. If the caller has a handshake-failure reason
// it overrides this in `scan_with`.
let miss_error = if vid_available {
Error::AacsMkUnavailable
} else {
Error::AacsVukNotInKeydb
};
let resolved = aacs::resolve_keys(
&uk_ro_data,
cc_data.as_deref(),
@@ -237,7 +369,7 @@ impl Disc {
&keydb,
mkb_data.as_deref(),
)
.ok_or(Error::AacsNoKeys)?;
.ok_or(miss_error)?;
Ok(AacsState {
version: if resolved.aacs2 { 2 } else { 1 },