aacs: source OEM host certs from keysource layer

Complete the OEM/AACS cert baseline so host certs are a KeySource output,
never compiled in. With an unlocker present the OEM route is unused
(unlocker_read_volume_id short-circuits); without one, the cert handshake
runs when a keysource supplies a host cert and fails gracefully when none
does.

- KeySource trait gains host_certs() (default empty), reusing the existing
  aacs::HostCert type. A source holds certs as its second kind of AACS
  material alongside decryption keys.
- ScanOptions gains key_sources so the handshake can collect certs across
  the app's keysource layer, unioned with DriveCredentials.
- do_handshake_cert collects certs via collect_host_certs (credentials +
  every key source). Zero certs from any source now returns the new
  graceful Error::AacsNoHostCert (code 7024, sentinel <no host cert>)
  instead of silently skipping; resolution still falls back to the
  path-1 disc-hash -> VUK lookup, which drops the error on a hit.
- error.rs: add E_AACS_NO_HOST_CERT / Error::AacsNoHostCert, wired into
  code(), Display, and the round-trip + sentinel tests.

HandshakeResult { volume_id, read_data_key } unchanged: the cert path
still yields both the VID and the bus key.

src/disc/encrypt.rs

@@ -65,6 +65,23 @@ impl Disc {
     /// read_data_key for bus decryption must still use the cert path, so an
     /// unlocker with no OEM VID capability returns `None` and we fall through
     /// to cert auth unchanged.
+    /// Collect every AACS host cert the caller carries, from BOTH the explicit
+    /// [`DriveCredentials`] and the key-source layer
+    /// ([`crate::KeySource::host_certs`] across each source), unioned. Host certs
+    /// are keysource-served, never compiled in; this is the one place the OEM
+    /// cert route gathers them. An empty result is the graceful no-cert signal
+    /// (the caller turns it into [`Error::AacsNoHostCert`]).
+    fn collect_host_certs(opts: &ScanOptions) -> Vec<crate::aacs::HostCert> {
+        let mut host_certs: Vec<crate::aacs::HostCert> = Vec::new();
+        if let Some(c) = &opts.credentials {
+            host_certs.extend(c.host_certs.iter().cloned());
+        }
+        for src in &opts.key_sources {
+            host_certs.extend(src.host_certs());
+        }
+        host_certs
+    }
+
     fn do_handshake_cert(
         session: &mut crate::drive::Drive,
         opts: &ScanOptions,
@@ -105,21 +122,33 @@ impl Disc {
             }
         }
 
-        // Host certs come from the caller's DriveCredentials (e.g. the keydb's
+        // Host certs are keysource-served, never compiled in. Collect them from
-        // host_certs(), sourced app-side) — the library does not load a keydb.
+        // BOTH places the caller may carry them:
-        // Absent ⇒ no cert auth: resolution proceeds with VID=zero and relies
+        //   1. the explicit `DriveCredentials` (certs the app pre-extracted), and
-        // on the path-1 disc-hash → VUK lookup.
+        //   2. the key-source layer (`KeySource::host_certs()` across every
-        let host_certs: &[aacs::HostCert] = match &opts.credentials {
+        //      registered source — the keydb source exposes its `| HC |`/`| HC2 |`
-            Some(c) if !c.host_certs.is_empty() => &c.host_certs,
+        //      rows here; an online source whose cert-serving isn't yet designed
-            _ => {
+        //      contributes none).
-                tracing::warn!(
+        // The two are unioned so either wiring works. With ZERO certs from any
-                    target: "freemkv::disc",
+        // source the OEM cert route cannot run: we fail GRACEFULLY with
-                    phase = "handshake_no_credentials",
+        // `AacsNoHostCert` (no panic, no generic failure). Resolution then
-                    "no drive credentials supplied; cert handshake skipped"
+        // proceeds with VID=zero and relies on the path-1 disc-hash → VUK lookup,
-                );
+        // which drops the error when it hits.
-                return (None, None);
+        let host_certs = Self::collect_host_certs(opts);
-            }
+        if host_certs.is_empty() {
-        };
+            tracing::warn!(
+                target: "freemkv::disc",
+                phase = "handshake_no_host_cert",
+                "no host cert from credentials or any key source; OEM cert route unavailable"
+            );
+            return (
+                None,
+                Some(Error::AacsNoHostCert {
+                    path: "<no host cert>".into(),
+                }),
+            );
+        }
+        let host_certs: &[aacs::HostCert] = &host_certs;
 
         let host_cert_count = host_certs.len();
         tracing::debug!(
@@ -743,4 +772,83 @@ mod tests {
     // construction requires a live transport; the parsing branches are
     // exercised through `read_vid_oem`'s callers in integration.
     // ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
+    // Tests: collect_host_certs — the OEM cert route's cert-gathering.
+    // Unions DriveCredentials with the key-source layer; empty means
+    // the route fails gracefully (AacsNoHostCert), never panics.
+    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    fn fake_cert(tag: u8) -> aacs::HostCert {
+        aacs::HostCert {
+            private_key: [tag; 20],
+            certificate: vec![tag; 92],
+            private_key_v2: None,
+            certificate_v2: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// A minimal in-test KeySource that yields no keys but a fixed cert list.
+    struct CertSource(Vec<aacs::HostCert>);
+    impl crate::KeySource for CertSource {
+        fn next_key(&mut self, _inputs: &crate::keysource::DiscInputs) -> Option<crate::disc::Key> {
+            None
+        }
+        fn host_certs(&self) -> Vec<aacs::HostCert> {
+            self.0.clone()
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn collect_host_certs_empty_when_no_credentials_no_sources() {
+        let opts = ScanOptions::default();
+        assert!(Disc::collect_host_certs(&opts).is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn collect_host_certs_from_credentials_only() {
+        let opts = ScanOptions {
+            credentials: Some(crate::DriveCredentials {
+                host_certs: vec![fake_cert(1)],
+            }),
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        let certs = Disc::collect_host_certs(&opts);
+        assert_eq!(certs.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(certs[0].private_key, [1u8; 20]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn collect_host_certs_from_key_source_only() {
+        let opts = ScanOptions {
+            key_sources: vec![Box::new(CertSource(vec![fake_cert(2)]))],
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        let certs = Disc::collect_host_certs(&opts);
+        assert_eq!(certs.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(certs[0].private_key, [2u8; 20]);
+    }
+
+    /// The two routes union: a cert in credentials AND one in a key source both
+    /// reach the handshake.
+    #[test]
+    fn collect_host_certs_unions_credentials_and_sources() {
+        let opts = ScanOptions {
+            credentials: Some(crate::DriveCredentials {
+                host_certs: vec![fake_cert(1)],
+            }),
+            key_sources: vec![
+                Box::new(CertSource(vec![fake_cert(2)])),
+                Box::new(CertSource(vec![])), // a source with no cert (e.g. online stub)
+                Box::new(CertSource(vec![fake_cert(3)])),
+            ],
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        let mut tags: Vec<u8> = Disc::collect_host_certs(&opts)
+            .iter()
+            .map(|c| c.private_key[0])
+            .collect();
+        tags.sort_unstable();
+        assert_eq!(tags, vec![1, 2, 3]);
+    }
 }

src/disc/mod.rs

@@ -1135,7 +1135,22 @@ pub struct DriveCredentials {
 pub struct ScanOptions {
     /// Host credentials for the live-drive AACS handshake. `None` for ISO
     /// scans, or a live drive where cert auth should be skipped.
+    ///
+    /// Host certs may ALSO be supplied through [`Self::key_sources`]: the
+    /// handshake unifies certs from both, so the app can pass its already-built
+    /// keysource layer rather than (or in addition to) pre-extracting certs into
+    /// `DriveCredentials`. Either route is keysource-served — certs are never
+    /// compiled into the library.
     pub credentials: Option<DriveCredentials>,
+    /// The application's key-source layer. The handshake collects host certs
+    /// across these (via [`crate::KeySource::host_certs`]) for the OEM/AACS
+    /// cert-auth route, unioned with [`Self::credentials`]. Empty by default —
+    /// an ISO scan supplies none, and a live-drive caller that pre-extracted
+    /// certs into `credentials` may leave it empty too. The library still
+    /// resolves NO keys from these at scan time; they are consulted only for
+    /// their host certs here (key *resolution* stays out-of-band via
+    /// `Disc::decrypt_with`).
+    pub key_sources: Vec<Box<dyn crate::KeySource>>,
     /// Optional cooperative-cancellation token. When set, long scan-time
     /// loops (notably the CSS known-plaintext crack, which can scan up to
     /// 50_000 sectors on a live DVD) poll it and bail out cleanly so a

src/error.rs

@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ pub const E_DRIVE_PROFILE_MISSING: u16 = 7020;
 pub const E_VID_CDB_UNAVAILABLE: u16 = 7021;
 pub const E_NO_DISC_KEY: u16 = 7022;
 pub const E_CSS_KEY_MISSING: u16 = 7023;
+pub const E_AACS_NO_HOST_CERT: u16 = 7024;
 
 // Keydb (8xxx)
 pub const E_KEYDB_CONNECT: u16 = 8000;
@@ -311,6 +312,18 @@ pub enum Error {
     /// re-cracked). Muxing would emit scrambled ciphertext, so the caller
     /// fails fast instead. CSS analogue of [`Error::NoDiscKey`].
     CssKeyMissing,
+    /// The live-drive AACS cert-auth handshake (the OEM/AACS baseline route)
+    /// could not run because NO host certificate was available from any key
+    /// source. Host certs are keysource-served, never compiled in, so without
+    /// a keysource that supplies one the OEM route fails gracefully here — this
+    /// is the intended outcome, not a panic. Resolution still proceeds with a
+    /// zero Volume ID and relies on the path-1 disc-hash → VUK lookup, so the
+    /// error is dropped when that lookup hits. `path` carries the sentinel
+    /// `<no host cert>` (mirroring [`Error::KeydbLoad`]'s sentinel) so a CLI can
+    /// render "No Host Certs Found."
+    AacsNoHostCert {
+        path: String,
+    },
 
     // Keydb (8xxx)
     KeydbConnect {
@@ -487,6 +500,7 @@ impl Error {
             Error::VidCdbUnavailable => E_VID_CDB_UNAVAILABLE,
             Error::NoDiscKey { .. } => E_NO_DISC_KEY,
             Error::CssKeyMissing => E_CSS_KEY_MISSING,
+            Error::AacsNoHostCert { .. } => E_AACS_NO_HOST_CERT,
             Error::KeydbConnect { .. } => E_KEYDB_CONNECT,
             Error::KeydbHttp { .. } => E_KEYDB_HTTP,
             Error::KeydbInvalid => E_KEYDB_INVALID,
@@ -632,6 +646,7 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for Error {
             Error::KeydbHttp { status } => write!(f, "E{}: {}", self.code(), status),
             Error::KeydbWrite { path } => write!(f, "E{}: {}", self.code(), path),
             Error::KeydbLoad { path } => write!(f, "E{}: {}", self.code(), path),
+            Error::AacsNoHostCert { path } => write!(f, "E{}: {}", self.code(), path),
             Error::KeydbUnsupportedScheme { scheme } => {
                 write!(f, "E{}: {}", self.code(), scheme)
             }
@@ -1078,6 +1093,8 @@ mod tests {
             E_DRIVE_PROFILE_MISSING,
             E_VID_CDB_UNAVAILABLE,
             E_NO_DISC_KEY,
+            E_CSS_KEY_MISSING,
+            E_AACS_NO_HOST_CERT,
             E_KEYDB_CONNECT,
             E_KEYDB_HTTP,
             E_KEYDB_INVALID,
@@ -1478,6 +1495,14 @@ mod tests {
             "KeydbLoad display must include the sentinel path"
         );
 
+        let e_no_cert = Error::AacsNoHostCert {
+            path: "<no host cert>".into(),
+        };
+        assert!(
+            e_no_cert.to_string().contains("<no host cert>"),
+            "AacsNoHostCert display must include the sentinel path"
+        );
+
         let e_scheme = Error::KeydbUnsupportedScheme {
             scheme: "ftp".into(),
         };

src/keysource.rs

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 //! out of the library while all key *mechanism* (the AACS derivation chain)
 //! stays in it.
 
+use crate::aacs::HostCert;
 use crate::disc::Key;
 
 /// The public AACS inputs a key source needs to look a disc up. Captured at
@@ -92,6 +93,25 @@ pub trait KeySource {
     fn errored(&self) -> bool {
         false
     }
+
+    /// The AACS host certificate(s) this source can supply for the live-drive
+    /// SCSI mutual-auth handshake (the OEM/AACS baseline route). A host cert is
+    /// the *second* kind of AACS material a source may hold, distinct from the
+    /// decryption keys handed out by [`KeySource::next_key`]: it unlocks the
+    /// authenticated bus so the drive will report the Volume ID and bus key,
+    /// whereas the keys decrypt content once the disc is read.
+    ///
+    /// Returned, never compiled in: a host cert is **perishable** — it can be
+    /// revoked on a given drive's Host Revocation List (carried forward by newer
+    /// discs' MKBs), so it must be rotatable, hence served by a source rather
+    /// than baked into the binary. A source that holds no cert (a mapfile, or an
+    /// online service whose cert-serving isn't yet designed) returns the empty
+    /// vec — the default. The handshake collects across every source and tries
+    /// each candidate; with no candidate from any source the OEM route fails
+    /// gracefully ([`crate::Error::AacsNoHostCert`]), it never panics.
+    fn host_certs(&self) -> Vec<HostCert> {
+        Vec::new()
+    }
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]