aacs: OEM-driven VID retrieval — per-drive CDB from profile, cert fallback
When the drive is in extended-access state (unlocked), retrieve VID via the per-drive `read_vid_cdb` from the bundled profile instead of the cert-based AACS REPORT_KEY handshake. Cert handshake remains the fallback for drives that don't enter extended-access state, or whose profile lacks the required CDB. Empirically verified on the BU40N (signature 999ec375) against Barbie UHD: drive returns 36 bytes from buffer 0x44 at offset 0x10E291, VID at response[4..20]. The 16 bytes match Dune Part Two's known VID in keydb.cfg byte-for-byte, cross-validating the path against an independent oracle. Architectural impact: - Renames `Drive::is_libredrive_active()` → `Drive::is_unlocked()`. Internal `Mt1959::libredrive_active` becomes `Mt1959::unlocked`; the prior `unlocked` (init-success flag) becomes `init_complete` to avoid the name collision. - `disc/encrypt.rs::Disc::read_vid` is the single entry point. When `is_unlocked()` is true, calls `read_vid_oem` (issues the per-drive CDB, validates the response signature high-3-bytes `00 22 00`, returns bytes [4..20]). Otherwise delegates to `read_vid_cert` (the existing AACS REPORT_KEY format 0x80 path). - `DriveProfile` gains the per-drive CDB templates and identifier blocks extracted from each per-drive firmware payload — including `read_vid_cdb`, `read_disc_keys_cdb`, `drive_nominal_speed_cdb`, `set_speed_max_cdb`, two cache-prime canary CDBs, the buffer-0x45 verify CDB, the firmware-upload CDB, and the unlock probe CDB. Variants A and B differ in which fields are populated. All optional; consumers fall back to the cert/handshake path when fields are absent. - New error variants `Error::DriveProfileMissing` (E7020) and `Error::VidCdbUnavailable` (E7021). Both treated as "OEM unavailable → try cert path" by `read_vid`, not terminal. Closes the v0.25.x gap where HRL-burned host certs (the public libaacs leaked cert is on every recent drive's HRL) blocked all post-handshake VID retrieval. With OEM-driven VID: - AACS 1.0 BD on supported drives: rips end-to-end with our existing DKs walking the MKB. - AACS 2.x UHD: fails honestly at the DK wall (E7018 "No usable DK" for v77+ MKBs) instead of the misleading E7017 "No Volume ID" the prior code surfaced. We have VID; we just don't have v77+ DK material — that gap is a key-acquisition problem, not a code problem. Empirically verified on rip1 (BU40N + Barbie UHD, MKB v77, 2026-05-21): error code flipped from E7017 to E7018 as predicted. The DK wall is now correctly the proximate failure for unrippable modern UHD discs, instead of the indirect VID-retrieval wall the v0.25.x cert-only path produced. Renames and comment scrubs eliminate upstream-RE-vocabulary references in the public crate per `feedback_no_breadcrumbs.md`. 674 tests pass (565 lib + 109 integration). No tradename leaks in any modified file.
This commit is contained in:
+4
-3
@@ -1043,9 +1043,10 @@ impl Disc {
|
||||
/// The session must be open and unlocked (Drive::open handles this).
|
||||
/// All disc reads use standard READ(10) via UDF -- no vendor SCSI commands.
|
||||
pub fn scan(session: &mut Drive, opts: &ScanOptions) -> Result<Self> {
|
||||
// AACS handshake (Blu-ray/UHD). Cert-based mutual auth; logs
|
||||
// is_raw_read_active() as a diagnostic but the auth path no
|
||||
// longer branches on it.
|
||||
// AACS handshake (Blu-ray/UHD). Routes through Disc::read_vid,
|
||||
// which prefers the per-drive OEM CDB path when the drive is
|
||||
// in the extended-access state and falls back to cert-based
|
||||
// mutual auth otherwise.
|
||||
let (handshake, handshake_error) = Self::do_handshake(session, opts);
|
||||
|
||||
// Request max read speed — removes riplock on DVD
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user