Mux decrypt/verify redesign, HD DVD first-class, MVC 3D

decrypt:
- decrypt_sectors is now a pure decrypt (apply key, leave plaintext, report
  unverified bytes); TS-structure is a separate primitive (is_clean_ts/ps) used
  only for key selection and read-verify. The mux passes decrypted bytes through
  (the demuxer drops non-conforming packets), ending the NULL-TS conceal loop and
  the per-unit key-server refetch storm. Key-proof floor replaces the 75%
  supermajority.

recovery:
- Removed the post-read decrypt-verify gate (verify.rs) that mis-aligned the
  disc-absolute unit grid against clip-anchored AACS units and false-failed good
  clips (e.g. Dunkirk's orphan-CPS clip). Bad sectors are marked by physical read
  result; decryptability is proven at scan + mux time.

HD DVD (first-class AACS):
- Role-based candidate-list file sourcing so an HD DVD's /ANY!/ files
  (MKBROM.AACS, VTKF000.AACS, CONTENT_CERT.AACS) are found with no disc-type
  branch. parse_vtkf parses VTKF000.AACS into the same UnitKeyFile as a BD
  Unit_Key_RO.inf, so the shared VUK unwrap applies unchanged. set_unit_base
  clip-anchoring. Two decrypt-axis assumptions remain UNVERIFIED-HDDVD-DECRYPT
  (no encrypted disc to test).

mux:
- MVC (Blu-ray 3D) track signals unified into one MVCDecoderConfigurationRecord;
  release-safe track_vint (3-byte VINT) and pid_index (i32) guards.

hardening:
- Container-aware is_clean / encryption detection; bytes_bad_in_title fail-safe
  on a corrupt mapfile; CSS crack gated on DiscFormat::Dvd (HD DVD excluded);
  non-vacuous CSS tests; patch NOT_READY/HARDWARE/ILLEGAL_REQUEST/ABORTED
  sense-path tests.
This commit is contained in:
Matthew Jackson
2026-07-15 19:35:12 -07:00
parent 04728d7d94
commit 830d1e360c
32 changed files with 1589 additions and 3126 deletions
+3 -7
View File
@@ -311,15 +311,11 @@ impl Disc {
) -> Result<AacsState> {
use crate::aacs;
let uk_ro_data = udf_fs
.read_file(reader, crate::aacs::PATH_UNIT_KEY_RO)
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, crate::aacs::PATH_UNIT_KEY_RO_DUPLICATE))
.map_err(|_| Error::AacsNoKeys)?;
let uk_ro_data =
aacs::read_first(aacs::UNIT_KEY_RO_PATHS, |p| udf_fs.read_file(reader, p))?;
let dh = aacs::inf::disc_hash(&uk_ro_data);
let cc = udf_fs
.read_file(reader, crate::aacs::PATH_CONTENT_CERT)
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, crate::aacs::PATH_CONTENT_CERT_ALT))
let cc = aacs::read_first(aacs::CONTENT_CERT_PATHS, |p| udf_fs.read_file(reader, p))
.ok()
.as_deref()
.and_then(aacs::inf::parse_content_cert);
-57
View File
@@ -288,63 +288,6 @@ impl Disc {
}
}
/// True for the AACS-encrypted stream files (`.m2ts`, `.ssif`). Every other UDF
/// file is clear (nav / playlists / filesystem) and needs no decrypt verify.
fn is_aacs_clip(name: &str) -> bool {
let lower = name.to_ascii_lowercase();
lower.ends_with(".m2ts") || lower.ends_with(".ssif")
}
/// Enumerate the disc's AACS clip (`.m2ts`/`.ssif`) files as
/// [`crate::disc::verify::ClipLayout`]s for the post-read verify gate: each
/// clip's declared size plus its absolute disc extents in FILE order. Reads the
/// UDF tree through `reader`.
///
/// FAIL-SAFE: any enumeration error (bad UDF read, name collision, …) yields an
/// EMPTY list — the verify gate then covers nothing and the sweep behaves as
/// today. Enumeration must never break a rip, so the error is logged, not
/// propagated.
pub(crate) fn clip_layouts(reader: &mut dyn SectorSource) -> Vec<crate::disc::verify::ClipLayout> {
let result = (|| -> Result<Vec<crate::disc::verify::ClipLayout>> {
let fs = udf::read_filesystem(reader)?;
let mut planned: Vec<PlannedFile> = Vec::new();
let mut dirs: Vec<PathBuf> = Vec::new();
let mut seen_hosts: std::collections::HashMap<PathBuf, String> =
std::collections::HashMap::new();
plan_tree(
reader,
&fs,
&fs.root,
Path::new(""),
"",
true,
&mut planned,
&mut dirs,
&mut seen_hosts,
)?;
Ok(planned
.into_iter()
.filter(|pf| pf.inline.is_none() && is_aacs_clip(&pf.disc_name))
.map(|pf| crate::disc::verify::ClipLayout {
size: pf.size,
extents: pf.extents,
// Every AACS clip we enumerate today is BD-TS (`.m2ts`/`.ssif`).
// HD-DVD `.evo` (program stream) maps to `ContainerKind::Ps` here
// once `is_aacs_clip` recognises it — the one-line HD-DVD hook.
container: crate::disc::verify::ContainerKind::Ts,
})
.collect())
})();
result.unwrap_or_else(|e| {
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::verify",
error = %e,
"clip enumeration failed; post-read verify disabled for this pass"
);
Vec::new()
})
}
/// A borrowing `SectorSource` wrapper. Lets the decrypting decorator "own" an
/// inner source for its lifetime while the caller keeps the underlying
/// `&mut dyn SectorSource` (the decorator is a `DecryptingSectorSource<S>`
+76 -124
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
mod bluray;
mod dvd;
pub mod dvd_audio_probe;
pub(crate) mod dvd_audio_probe;
mod encrypt;
mod extract;
mod hddvd;
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ mod patch;
pub mod read_error;
mod section_recover;
mod sweep;
pub mod verify;
use crate::drive::{Drive, extract_scsi_context};
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
@@ -85,7 +84,8 @@ pub struct Disc {
pub enum ContentFormat {
/// Blu-ray BD Transport Stream (192-byte packets)
BdTs,
/// DVD MPEG-2 Program Stream (VOB)
/// MPEG-2 Program Stream — DVD (`.vob`) and HD-DVD (`.evo`). For AACS content
/// this selects the PS-aware encrypted-flag / structural checks.
MpegPs,
}
@@ -1623,12 +1623,11 @@ impl Disc {
// detection needs the read, the read needs auth, auth needs detection.
// The handshake is itself the detector: on a non-CSS (unencrypted) DVD
// the disc-key read fails, `resolve` returns None, and the disc is left
// in the clear. This block is DVD-only (MPEG-PS); BD/UHD (MPEG-TS) goes
// through the AACS handshake above and never reaches here.
if disc.css.is_none()
&& disc.content_format == ContentFormat::MpegPs
&& !disc.titles.is_empty()
{
// in the clear. This block is DVD-only: gate on `DiscFormat::Dvd`, NOT
// `content_format == MpegPs` — HD-DVD `.evo` is ALSO MPEG-PS but is AACS,
// not CSS, so it must never enter the CSS/REPORT-KEY handshake (it goes
// through the AACS path above). BD/UHD are MPEG-TS and never reach here.
if disc.css.is_none() && disc.format == DiscFormat::Dvd && !disc.titles.is_empty() {
// CSS title keys are per-VTS, and ONLY the scrambled movie content
// carries a non-zero key. Menu / VMG / logo cells (often the
// low-LBA first extent) return a ZERO title key over REPORT KEY —
@@ -1744,10 +1743,13 @@ impl Disc {
// pre-decrypted one. A pre-decrypted image has its scramble flags clear,
// so `crack_key` finds no crackable sector and the disc stays in the
// clear. AACS images go through KEYDB VUK lookup, not here.
if disc.css.is_none()
&& disc.content_format == ContentFormat::MpegPs
&& !disc.titles.is_empty()
{
//
// Gate on `DiscFormat::Dvd`, NOT `content_format == MpegPs`: HD-DVD
// `.evo` images are ALSO MPEG-PS but are AACS, not CSS — they must not
// enter the CSS crack path. A CSS DVD's IFO (which defines the titles
// this branch reads) is unscrambled, so `detect_format` reliably sets
// `Dvd` from the SD-resolution titles even on a still-scrambled image.
if disc.css.is_none() && disc.format == DiscFormat::Dvd && !disc.titles.is_empty() {
let main_extents = match disc
.titles
.iter()
@@ -1799,10 +1801,9 @@ impl Disc {
reader: &mut dyn SectorSource,
udf_fs: &udf::UdfFs,
) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, u8)> {
let inf = udf_fs
.read_file(reader, crate::aacs::PATH_UNIT_KEY_RO)
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, crate::aacs::PATH_UNIT_KEY_RO_DUPLICATE))
.map_err(|_| Error::AacsNoKeys)?;
let inf = crate::aacs::read_first(crate::aacs::UNIT_KEY_RO_PATHS, |p| {
udf_fs.read_file(reader, p)
})?;
let mkb = Self::read_mkb_content(reader, udf_fs)?;
let version = Self::read_aacs_version(reader, udf_fs);
Ok((inf, mkb, version))
@@ -1820,12 +1821,12 @@ impl Disc {
/// mis-strided title keys (silent wrong unit keys), so a missing cert must
/// not quietly pick the V10 stride for a UHD disc.
fn read_aacs_version(reader: &mut dyn SectorSource, udf_fs: &udf::UdfFs) -> u8 {
match udf_fs
.read_file(reader, crate::aacs::PATH_CONTENT_CERT)
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, crate::aacs::PATH_CONTENT_CERT_ALT))
.ok()
.as_deref()
.and_then(crate::aacs::inf::parse_content_cert)
match crate::aacs::read_first(crate::aacs::CONTENT_CERT_PATHS, |p| {
udf_fs.read_file(reader, p)
})
.ok()
.as_deref()
.and_then(crate::aacs::inf::parse_content_cert)
{
Some(c) => c.version.major(),
None => {
@@ -1856,10 +1857,9 @@ impl Disc {
const MAX_BYTES: usize = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
let mut want = START_BYTES;
loop {
let buf = udf_fs
.read_file_prefix(reader, crate::aacs::PATH_MKB_RO, want)
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file_prefix(reader, crate::aacs::PATH_MKB_RW, want))
.map_err(|_| Error::AacsNoKeys)?;
let buf = crate::aacs::read_first(crate::aacs::MKB_PATHS, |p| {
udf_fs.read_file_prefix(reader, p, want)
})?;
let n = crate::aacs::mkb::mkb_content_len(&buf);
// `n` strictly inside `buf` => the record walk reached the padding
// boundary (full content captured). `buf` shorter than `want` =>
@@ -2297,12 +2297,15 @@ fn aligned_unit_keys_validate(
unit_keys: &[(u32, [u8; 16])],
read_data_key: Option<&[u8; 16]>,
samples: &[Vec<u8>],
format: ContentFormat,
) -> bool {
use crate::aacs::content::{ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN, aacs_unit_needs_decrypt, decrypt_unit_full};
use crate::aacs::content::{
ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN, aacs_unit_needs_decrypt, decrypt_bus, decrypt_unit, is_clean,
};
let scrambled: Vec<&[u8]> = samples
.iter()
.map(|s| s.as_slice())
.filter(|s| aacs_unit_needs_decrypt(s))
.filter(|s| aacs_unit_needs_decrypt(s, format))
.collect();
if scrambled.is_empty() {
return true; // nothing to disprove against — accept
@@ -2324,7 +2327,13 @@ fn aligned_unit_keys_validate(
hb.tick_cpu(tried, total);
tried += 1;
probe.copy_from_slice(&sample[..ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN]);
if decrypt_unit_full(&mut probe, k, read_data_key) {
// bus layer (AACS 2.0) first, then the CPS unit key, then the structural
// proof — the composed form of the old `decrypt_unit_full`.
if let Some(rdk) = read_data_key {
decrypt_bus(&mut probe, rdk);
}
decrypt_unit(&mut probe, k);
if is_clean(&probe, format) {
covered = true;
break;
}
@@ -2351,6 +2360,7 @@ impl Disc {
crate::decrypt::DecryptKeys::Aacs {
unit_keys: aacs.unit_keys.clone(),
read_data_key: aacs.read_data_key,
format: self.content_format,
}
} else if let Some(ref css) = self.css {
crate::decrypt::DecryptKeys::Css {
@@ -2840,7 +2850,12 @@ impl Disc {
// de-scramble it. With no samples (or only clear ones) there is nothing
// to disprove against, so the key is accepted as-is — keeping the
// sample-less paths (resume / mapfile cache) byte-for-byte unchanged.
if !aligned_unit_keys_validate(&candidate_unit_keys, read_data_key.as_ref(), samples) {
if !aligned_unit_keys_validate(
&candidate_unit_keys,
read_data_key.as_ref(),
samples,
self.content_format,
) {
return Err(crate::error::Error::AacsKeyRejected);
}
@@ -3073,10 +3088,6 @@ impl Disc {
progress: opts.progress,
halt: opts.halt.clone(),
key_fetch: opts.key_fetch.clone(),
// Disc::copy's internal patch grinds each range fully (it's a
// single-call recovery); the breadth-first fast-capture ordering is
// an autorip multi-pass concern.
fast_capture: false,
};
let pr = self.patch(reader, path, &patch_opts)?;
tracing::info!(
@@ -3131,27 +3142,15 @@ impl Disc {
// A decrypting sweep (`opts.decrypt`, e.g. `disc:// → iso://` without
// `--raw`) decrypts each unit IN PLACE → the ISO holds plaintext.
//
// A NON-decrypting MULTIPASS sweep (`!opts.decrypt && skip_on_error`, the
// autorip / `--multipass` path) writes the ISO as CIPHERTEXT, but we
// still resolve the keys and VERIFY each unit on a scratch copy: a unit
// that won't decrypt fails the read (`DECRYPT_VERIFY_READ`) exactly like
// a SCSI error, and flows into the SAME read-error recovery (skip /
// NonTrimmed / patch). This is the one spot that makes "a read succeeded"
// mean "read AND decrypts" — everything downstream is unchanged. With no
// usable AACS keys (no keydb) it degrades to a plain pass-through.
//
// A plain `--raw` single-pass (no `skip_on_error`) stays a pass-through:
// the user asked for the raw image, untouched and unchecked.
// The sweep COPIES ciphertext (multipass / `--raw`) or decrypts IN PLACE
// (`opts.decrypt`, the rare disc→decrypted-ISO). It deliberately does NOT
// decrypt-VERIFY: a whole-disc sweep reads disc-absolute, but AACS aligned
// units are anchored to each clip's FILE start and clips can be non-6144-
// aligned OR fragmented across UDF extents — so a disc-absolute verify
// mis-aligns the unit grid and false-fails good clips (it skipped the
// ~990 MB orphan-CPS clip on Dunkirk). Verification moved to the
// clip-anchored [`Disc::verify_clips`] pass that runs AFTER the sweep,
// reading each clip file-order-anchored from the ISO. The read here stays
// a fail-safe copy; alignment is never assumed.
// Every other sweep (`!opts.decrypt`: the autorip / `--multipass` path and
// plain `--raw`) writes the ISO as CIPHERTEXT verbatim — keys = `None`, a
// pure pass-through. Bad sectors are found by PHYSICAL read success (a SCSI
// read error → skip / NonTrimmed → patch re-read), NOT by decrypt structure.
// (The old decrypt-VERIFY read gate — which mis-aligned the disc-absolute
// unit grid against clip-file-anchored AACS units and false-failed good
// clips like Dunkirk's orphan-CPS clip — was removed. There is no scratch
// verify and no post-sweep clip-anchored pass; decryptability is proven at
// mux time, not at capture time.)
let keys = if opts.decrypt {
self.decrypt_keys()
} else {
@@ -3177,22 +3176,6 @@ impl Disc {
};
let reader = &mut reader;
// Post-read verify gate (universal `read -> verify -> sign-off`). Built
// ONLY for the ciphertext sweep (`!opts.decrypt`, the multipass rip
// path) so `observe` always sees on-disc ciphertext and never
// double-decrypts already-plaintext bytes. `UnitVerifier::new` is itself
// fail-safe: it returns `None` (verify disabled, behavior unchanged) for
// a non-AACS disc, no keys, the kill-switch off, or an empty clip
// enumeration. We resolve the REAL AACS keys here even though the sweep
// copies ciphertext, and reuse the application's key-fetch seam.
let mut verifier = if opts.decrypt {
None
} else {
let verify_keys = self.decrypt_keys();
let layouts = extract::clip_layouts(&mut *reader);
crate::disc::verify::UnitVerifier::new(&layouts, &verify_keys, opts.key_fetch.clone())
};
// Mapfile: load if resuming, else wipe + recreate.
let mapfile_path = self.mapfile_for(path);
// covers_disc reconciliation. A resume against a mapfile whose total
@@ -3483,18 +3466,6 @@ impl Disc {
// The consumer thread sees decrypted bytes; the
// pre-0.18 inline decrypt_sectors call lived here.
// Post-read verify: observe the just-read ciphertext
// BEFORE it is moved into the channel, collecting the
// clip units this batch completes that are confidently
// undecryptable. Sent as `MarkBad` AFTER the `Good`
// below so the FIFO pipe records `Finished` first and the
// downgrade to `NonTrimmed` last. No-op when the gate is
// disabled (`verifier` is `None`).
let verify_bad = verifier
.as_mut()
.map(|v| v.observe(block_lba, &buf[..block_bytes as usize]))
.unwrap_or_default();
// Move the batch into the channel via fresh
// owned Vec. The producer's `buf` is reused
// for the next read.
@@ -3503,26 +3474,6 @@ impl Disc {
producer_err = Some(consumer_gone());
break 'outer;
}
// Downgrade any unit that failed verify (decrypt-fail ==
// bad read). decrypt-fail is NOT physical damage, so it
// deliberately does not touch the damage-jump window.
let mut send_failed = false;
for (bad_lba, bad_cnt) in verify_bad {
if pipe
.send(WorkItem::MarkBad {
pos: bad_lba as u64 * 2048,
len: bad_cnt as u64 * 2048,
})
.is_err()
{
producer_err = Some(consumer_gone());
send_failed = true;
break;
}
}
if send_failed {
break 'outer;
}
bytes_done = bytes_done.saturating_add(block_bytes);
pos += block_bytes;
}
@@ -4009,18 +3960,6 @@ pub struct PatchOptions<'a> {
/// On-decrypt-miss key fetch (see [`CopyOptions::key_fetch`]). Lets Pass N
/// recover an orphan CPS unit's key when re-reading its bad range.
pub key_fetch: Option<crate::sector::KeyFetch>,
/// Fast-capture pass: read each bad range ONCE at the full batch and leave
/// every failed block `NonTrimmed` for a later pass — WITHOUT bisecting,
/// re-reading, or grinding it here. This lets a first retry pass grab the
/// readable blocks (the sweep's good skip-ahead overshoot) of EVERY range
/// quickly, before any single range's slow per-sector recovery — so
/// recovered data surfaces across the whole disc first instead of grinding
/// section 1 to exhaustion before even touching section 2. A later pass
/// (`fast_capture = false`) does the granular bisect/retry on what's left.
/// No data is dropped: a failed block stays `NonTrimmed` until a granular
/// pass recovers it or finally gives up. A transport fault (bridge crash)
/// still aborts — it isn't a recoverable bad sector.
pub fast_capture: bool,
}
/// Result returned by [`Disc::patch`].
@@ -4867,6 +4806,7 @@ mod tests {
crate::decrypt::DecryptKeys::Aacs {
unit_keys,
read_data_key,
..
} => {
assert_eq!(unit_keys, uk, "injected UK must be the decrypt key");
assert_eq!(read_data_key, None, "ISO mux needs no bus key");
@@ -5393,7 +5333,8 @@ mod tests {
assert!(super::aligned_unit_keys_validate(
&[(0, [0x11u8; 16])],
None,
&[]
&[],
ContentFormat::BdTs
));
// A clear unit (TS syncs intact) is not scrambled -> proves nothing ->
@@ -5408,7 +5349,8 @@ mod tests {
assert!(super::aligned_unit_keys_validate(
&[(0, [0x11u8; 16])],
None,
&[clear.clone()]
&[clear.clone()],
ContentFormat::BdTs
));
// A genuinely scrambled unit the RIGHT key restores to clear TS.
@@ -5423,16 +5365,23 @@ mod tests {
assert!(super::aligned_unit_keys_validate(
&[(7, uk)],
None,
&[enc.clone()]
&[enc.clone()],
ContentFormat::BdTs
));
// Wrong key -> cannot de-scramble a scrambled sample -> reject.
assert!(!super::aligned_unit_keys_validate(
&[(7, [0x00u8; 16])],
None,
&[enc.clone()]
&[enc.clone()],
ContentFormat::BdTs
));
// Empty key set against a scrambled sample -> reject.
assert!(!super::aligned_unit_keys_validate(&[], None, &[enc]));
assert!(!super::aligned_unit_keys_validate(
&[],
None,
&[enc],
ContentFormat::BdTs
));
}
#[test]
@@ -5467,21 +5416,24 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!super::aligned_unit_keys_validate(
&[(0, uk0)],
None,
&samples
&samples,
ContentFormat::BdTs
));
// Complete key set (both CPS units) -> accept.
assert!(super::aligned_unit_keys_validate(
&[(0, uk0), (1, uk1)],
None,
&samples
&samples,
ContentFormat::BdTs
));
// Order-independent: covering key present anywhere in the set is fine.
assert!(super::aligned_unit_keys_validate(
&[(1, uk1), (0, uk0)],
None,
&samples
&samples,
ContentFormat::BdTs
));
}
+32 -86
View File
@@ -405,9 +405,15 @@ pub(super) fn compute_initial_state(
bad_ranges.reverse();
}
let work_total: u64 = bad_ranges.iter().map(|(_, sz)| *sz).sum();
// Fail SAFE when metadata is indeterminate: assume a regular file so a
// real `sync_all` failure is surfaced, not swallowed. `/dev/null` and pipes
// report success-with-non-file here (so they still correctly map to
// `false`); only a genuine metadata error (e.g. transient NFS ESTALE) hits
// the default, and for a data-integrity guard "surface the error" is the
// right side to err on.
let is_regular = std::fs::metadata(path)
.map(|m| m.file_type().is_file())
.unwrap_or(false);
.unwrap_or(true);
Ok((
map,
initial_stats,
@@ -1247,7 +1253,24 @@ impl Disc {
pub fn bytes_bad_in_title(&self, mapfile_path: &std::path::Path, title: &DiscTitle) -> u64 {
let map = match mapfile::Mapfile::load(mapfile_path) {
Ok(m) => m,
Err(_) => return 0,
// A MISSING mapfile is legitimate (no damage was ever tracked — e.g. a
// clean single-pass rip): 0 bad bytes is correct. Any OTHER load error
// (corrupt / unreadable mapfile) means we CANNOT know the damage — and
// a returned 0 reads to the caller as "clean." Logging alone is not
// fail-safe: the RETURN VALUE drives the loss/abort accounting, not the
// log. So fail safe by reporting the ENTIRE title as bad (its full
// in-extent byte count) — a corrupt damage record must surface as
// maximal loss, never as a clean rip.
Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => return 0,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
path = %mapfile_path.display(),
error = %e,
"bytes_bad_in_title: mapfile load failed; reporting whole title bad (fail-safe: cannot confirm clean)"
);
return bytes_bad_in_title(title, &[(0, u64::MAX)]);
}
};
let bad_ranges = map.ranges_with(&[
mapfile::SectorStatus::NonTrimmed,
@@ -1299,33 +1322,13 @@ impl Disc {
let bytes_good_before = initial_stats.bytes_good;
let bytes_good_start = bytes_good_before;
// Post-read verify gate for the patch pass (ciphertext multipass only,
// `!opts.decrypt`). Built here from the raw reader's UDF enumeration;
// reused AFTER the recovery loop (`reverify_iso`) to re-check the units
// this pass touched by reading them WHOLE back from the patched ISO —
// patch re-reads only the bad sectors of a unit, so per-unit verify
// can't run live. Fail-safe `None` when disabled / non-AACS / no keys.
let mut verifier = if opts.decrypt {
None
} else {
let verify_keys = self.decrypt_keys();
let layouts = crate::disc::extract::clip_layouts(&mut *reader);
crate::disc::verify::UnitVerifier::new(&layouts, &verify_keys, opts.key_fetch.clone())
};
// Decrypt-aware read — symmetric with `Disc::sweep`. A decrypting patch
// (`opts.decrypt`) decrypts in place (plaintext ISO). A NON-decrypting
// patch (the multipass / `--raw --multipass` path) resolves the keys and
// VERIFIES each unit on a scratch copy: a re-read that STILL won't decrypt
// fails the read (`DECRYPT_VERIFY_READ`) and stays NonTrimmed, so the
// retry loop keeps re-reading it "until it decrypts or retries exhaust"
// exactly as for a SCSI read error — and a unit that DOES decrypt on a
// fresh read (the drive returned different bytes) is recovered for free.
// With no usable AACS keys this degrades to a plain pass-through.
// Symmetric with `Disc::sweep`: the patch COPIES ciphertext (multipass /
// `--raw`) or decrypts IN PLACE (`opts.decrypt`). It does NOT decrypt-
// VERIFY — the disc-absolute read can't anchor to a clip's file-relative
// unit grid (see `Disc::sweep` + `Disc::verify_clips`). Re-reads recover
// bad sectors; the clip-anchored verify pass re-checks them afterward.
// (`opts.decrypt`) decrypts in place (plaintext ISO); a NON-decrypting
// patch (the multipass / `--raw --multipass` path) copies ciphertext
// verbatim (keys = `None` → pass-through). Bad sectors are found by
// PHYSICAL read success, not by decrypt structure: a re-read that returns
// good bytes recovers the range; a read that errors leaves it NonTrimmed
// for the next pass. (The old decrypt-VERIFY read gate was removed.)
let keys = if opts.decrypt {
self.decrypt_keys()
} else {
@@ -1435,64 +1438,7 @@ impl Disc {
// sink's summary. `close` failing on a regular-file sync_all is
// surfaced here as `Error::IoError`, matching pre-split
// behaviour.
let mut summary = pipe.finish()?;
// Scoped post-read re-verify (decrypt-fail == bad read). The consumer
// has flushed the ISO + mapfile; re-read each clip unit this pass touched
// WHOLE from the patched ISO and downgrade any that still won't decrypt
// to NonTrimmed, so the orchestrator's end-of-recovery promotion
// terminalizes it. Reuses the same verifier as the sweep. Fail-safe:
// disabled gate / unreadable ISO / load failure all leave the pass as-is.
if let Some(mut v) = verifier.take() {
if let Ok(mut m) = mapfile::Mapfile::load(&mapfile_path) {
// Only units whose every backing sector was actually READ
// (Finished) may be re-verified — we can't verify what wasn't read
// (a non-Finished sector is zero-filled because the read failed),
// and must not waste a key lookup on a known-bad block.
let finished = m.ranges_with(&[mapfile::SectorStatus::Finished]);
let is_finished = |lba: u32| -> bool {
let p = lba as u64 * 2048;
finished.iter().any(|&(s, sz)| p >= s && p < s + sz)
};
if let Ok(mut iso) = crate::io::file_sector_source::FileSectorSource::open(path) {
let bad = v.reverify_iso(&mut iso, &bad_ranges, &is_finished);
if !bad.is_empty() {
let n: usize = bad.len();
for (lba, cnt) in bad {
if let Err(e) = m.record(
lba as u64 * 2048,
cnt as u64 * 2048,
mapfile::SectorStatus::NonTrimmed,
) {
tracing::warn!(
lba,
"reverify downgrade: mapfile record failed ({e}) — unit may stay mismarked as good"
);
}
}
if let Err(e) = m.flush() {
tracing::warn!(
"reverify downgrade: mapfile flush failed ({e}) — downgrade not persisted; a resume could mismark it good"
);
}
// The re-verify ran AFTER `pipe.finish()` snapshotted
// `summary.stats`, so those stats still count the just-
// downgraded units as good. Refresh from the mapfile so
// `build_outcome` reports the true post-downgrade picture
// (bytes_good ↓, bytes_pending ↑) — otherwise the caller
// over-reports recovery and can call an imperfect rip
// "complete".
summary.stats = m.stats();
tracing::info!(
target: "freemkv::verify",
phase = "patch.reverify",
downgraded_ranges = n,
"post-read re-verify downgraded undecryptable units to NonTrimmed"
);
}
}
}
}
let summary = pipe.finish()?;
let outcome = build_outcome(
&state,
-14
View File
@@ -66,14 +66,6 @@ pub(super) enum WorkItem {
/// tell them apart without parsing a flag.
GapFill { pos: u64, len: u64 },
/// Post-read verify downgrade. The producer's `UnitVerifier` found that the
/// just-`Finished` clip unit at `[pos, pos+len)` is confidently undecryptable
/// (a silent bad read). The consumer re-records the range as `NonTrimmed` so
/// the patch pass re-reads it — the ISO bytes (ciphertext) already written by
/// the preceding `Good` are left in place for the patch to overwrite. FIFO
/// pipe ordering guarantees this arrives AFTER the `Good` that wrote them.
MarkBad { pos: u64, len: u64 },
/// Producer wants the latest mapfile stats for the progress
/// callback. Consumer responds on `prog_tx` with a fresh
/// [`ProgressSnapshot`]. Best-effort: if the producer hasn't
@@ -182,12 +174,6 @@ impl Sink<WorkItem> for SweepSink {
}
self.map.record(pos, len, SectorStatus::NonTrimmed)?;
}
WorkItem::MarkBad { pos, len } => {
// Verify downgrade: the ISO bytes are already written by the
// preceding Good; only the mapfile status changes so patch
// re-reads this range. No file write.
self.map.record(pos, len, SectorStatus::NonTrimmed)?;
}
WorkItem::StatsRequest => {
let stats = self.map.stats();
// DAMAGE only — NOT NonTried. NonTried is the unread remainder
-1085
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff