Mux decrypt/verify redesign, HD DVD first-class, MVC 3D

decrypt:
- decrypt_sectors is now a pure decrypt (apply key, leave plaintext, report
  unverified bytes); TS-structure is a separate primitive (is_clean_ts/ps) used
  only for key selection and read-verify. The mux passes decrypted bytes through
  (the demuxer drops non-conforming packets), ending the NULL-TS conceal loop and
  the per-unit key-server refetch storm. Key-proof floor replaces the 75%
  supermajority.

recovery:
- Removed the post-read decrypt-verify gate (verify.rs) that mis-aligned the
  disc-absolute unit grid against clip-anchored AACS units and false-failed good
  clips (e.g. Dunkirk's orphan-CPS clip). Bad sectors are marked by physical read
  result; decryptability is proven at scan + mux time.

HD DVD (first-class AACS):
- Role-based candidate-list file sourcing so an HD DVD's /ANY!/ files
  (MKBROM.AACS, VTKF000.AACS, CONTENT_CERT.AACS) are found with no disc-type
  branch. parse_vtkf parses VTKF000.AACS into the same UnitKeyFile as a BD
  Unit_Key_RO.inf, so the shared VUK unwrap applies unchanged. set_unit_base
  clip-anchoring. Two decrypt-axis assumptions remain UNVERIFIED-HDDVD-DECRYPT
  (no encrypted disc to test).

mux:
- MVC (Blu-ray 3D) track signals unified into one MVCDecoderConfigurationRecord;
  release-safe track_vint (3-byte VINT) and pid_index (i32) guards.

hardening:
- Container-aware is_clean / encryption detection; bytes_bad_in_title fail-safe
  on a corrupt mapfile; CSS crack gated on DiscFormat::Dvd (HD DVD excluded);
  non-vacuous CSS tests; patch NOT_READY/HARDWARE/ILLEGAL_REQUEST/ABORTED
  sense-path tests.
This commit is contained in:
Matthew Jackson
2026-07-15 19:35:12 -07:00
parent 04728d7d94
commit 830d1e360c
32 changed files with 1589 additions and 3126 deletions
+52 -52
View File
@@ -134,11 +134,7 @@ fn aacs_decrypt_unit_roundtrip() {
assert!(aacs::content::ts_sync_destroyed(&plain));
// Now decrypt
let result = aacs::content::decrypt_unit(&mut plain, &unit_key);
assert!(
result,
"decrypt_unit should return true on valid encrypted unit"
);
aacs::content::decrypt_unit(&mut plain, &unit_key);
assert!(
!aacs::content::ts_sync_destroyed(&plain),
"decrypted unit should read as clear (TS syncs restored)"
@@ -298,13 +294,16 @@ fn aacs_ts_sync_destroyed_detection() {
);
}
/// Test: aacs_decrypt_unit_unencrypted_passthrough
/// Test: aacs_clear_unit_reports_not_encrypted
///
/// A clear unit (TS syncs intact) should pass through decrypt_unit unchanged.
/// `decrypt_unit` is now PURE (applies the key unconditionally). The "leave a
/// clear unit untouched" policy lives at the caller's gate `aacs_unit_encrypted`:
/// a CPI-clear unit reports not-encrypted, so the caller never hands it to
/// decrypt_unit.
#[test]
fn aacs_decrypt_unit_unencrypted_passthrough() {
fn aacs_clear_unit_reports_not_encrypted() {
let mut unit = vec![0x42u8; aacs::content::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN];
// Intact TS syncs every 192 bytes → not scrambled → passthrough.
// Intact TS syncs every 192 bytes → not scrambled.
let mut off = 4;
while off < aacs::content::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN {
unit[off] = 0x47;
@@ -312,13 +311,12 @@ fn aacs_decrypt_unit_unencrypted_passthrough() {
}
// CPI bits (byte 0) CLEAR → the authoritative gate reads this as plaintext.
unit[0] &= 0x3F;
let original = unit.clone();
let key = [0xAA; 16];
assert!(!aacs::content::ts_sync_destroyed(&unit));
let result = aacs::content::decrypt_unit(&mut unit, &key);
assert!(result, "clear unit should return true");
assert_eq!(unit, original, "clear unit should be unchanged");
assert!(
!aacs::content::aacs_unit_encrypted(&unit, libfreemkv::disc::ContentFormat::BdTs),
"CPI-clear unit reports not-encrypted; the caller never decrypts it"
);
}
// ── AACS cross-validation with independent AES implementation ──────────────
@@ -413,11 +411,7 @@ fn aacs_cross_validation_encrypt_then_decrypt() {
);
// -- Decrypt with the library --
let ok = aacs::content::decrypt_unit(&mut plaintext, &unit_key);
assert!(
ok,
"decrypt_unit returned false (TS sync verification failed)"
);
aacs::content::decrypt_unit(&mut plaintext, &unit_key);
// Decryption clears no flag, so the unit round-trips byte-for-byte.
assert_eq!(
@@ -458,44 +452,14 @@ fn aacs_cross_validation_alternate_key() {
&mut plaintext[16..aacs::content::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN],
);
assert!(aacs::content::decrypt_unit(&mut plaintext, &unit_key));
aacs::content::decrypt_unit(&mut plaintext, &unit_key);
// Decryption clears no flag, so the unit round-trips byte-for-byte.
assert_eq!(&plaintext[..], &expected[..]);
}
/// Verify that `decrypt_bus` correctly reverses AES-CBC encryption applied
/// per-sector to bytes 16..2048 (bus encryption layer).
#[test]
fn aacs_bus_decrypt_cross_validation() {
let read_data_key: [u8; 16] = [
0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF,
0x00,
];
let mut plaintext = vec![0u8; aacs::content::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN];
#[allow(clippy::needless_range_loop)]
for i in 0..aacs::content::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN {
plaintext[i] = ((i * 3 + 17) & 0xFF) as u8;
}
let expected = plaintext.clone();
// Encrypt per-sector: AES-CBC encrypt bytes 16..2048 of each 2048-byte sector
for sector_start in (0..aacs::content::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN).step_by(2048) {
ref_aes_cbc_encrypt(
&read_data_key,
&CROSS_AACS_IV,
&mut plaintext[sector_start + 16..sector_start + 2048],
);
}
assert_ne!(&plaintext[16..32], &expected[16..32]);
aacs::content::decrypt_bus(&mut plaintext, &read_data_key);
assert_eq!(
plaintext, expected,
"bus decrypt did not recover original plaintext"
);
}
// (`decrypt_bus` is a crate-internal layer — its cross-validation lives in-crate
// in `aacs::content`'s unit tests, not here.)
// ── CSS roundtrip test vectors ─────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -663,6 +627,28 @@ fn css_stevenson_attack_validates_cracked_key() {
This is expected: synthetic sectors lack the TAB1 output encoding \
present in real CSS-encrypted DVD sectors."
);
// Never let this test pass vacuously: when the attack can't converge on
// synthetic data, still assert always-true properties of the CSS keystream
// so a real regression is caught on every run — descramble_sector is
// DETERMINISTIC (same key/seed/data → same output) and NON-TRIVIAL (it
// actually transforms the payload, not a silent no-op).
for (key, seed) in candidates {
let mut base = vec![0x00u8; 2048];
base[0x14] = 0x30;
base[0x54..0x59].copy_from_slice(seed);
base[0x80..0x8A]
.copy_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x80, 0x05, 0x21]);
let mut a = base.clone();
let mut b = base.clone();
css::lfsr::descramble_sector(key, &mut a);
css::lfsr::descramble_sector(key, &mut b);
assert_eq!(a, b, "descramble must be deterministic for key={key:02X?}");
assert_ne!(
&a[0x80..2048],
&base[0x80..2048],
"descramble must transform the payload for key={key:02X?}"
);
}
}
}
@@ -707,6 +693,20 @@ fn css_recover_title_key_with_exact_plaintext() {
The LFSR0 recovery phase may not converge for this combination.",
title_key, seed
);
// Never pass vacuously: when LFSR0 recovery can't converge on this
// synthetic sector, still assert always-true properties of the cipher so
// a real regression is caught on every run — descramble_sector is
// DETERMINISTIC and NON-TRIVIAL (actually transforms the payload).
let mut a = original.clone();
let mut b = original.clone();
css::lfsr::descramble_sector(&title_key, &mut a);
css::lfsr::descramble_sector(&title_key, &mut b);
assert_eq!(a, b, "descramble must be deterministic");
assert_ne!(
&a[0x80..2048],
&original[0x80..2048],
"descramble must transform the payload"
);
}
}