aacs: KeyProvider abstraction + PK walker + external-UK key source

Two coherent additions to the AACS resolver:

KeyProvider abstraction (provider.rs) — key material comes from pluggable
backends; KeyDb implements it (device/processing keys, host certs,
disc-by-hash / disc-by-vid lookup) plus orphan-DK parsing. ResolveContext
takes a provider array. Adds the SD-tree PK walker
(derive_media_key_from_pk_walked) and a `probe` module (km_verifies MK
oracle, mkb_* record parsers) used for offline key verification. Cvalue
record selection prefers 0x05, falls back to 0x07.

External-UK key source — the second, mutually-exclusive key source for the
keyserver path. ScanOptions/InputOptions gain `unit_key`; when set,
resolve_encryption_static skips keydb entirely and uses the caller-supplied
Unit Key directly (KeySource::ExternalUk). Disc::read_aacs_inputs exposes a
disc's Unit_Key_RO.inf + MKB so a caller can fetch the UK out-of-band; the
library makes no network call itself.

CHANGELOG: redact test-disc title in historical notes.
This commit is contained in:
MattJackson
2026-06-01 20:47:14 -07:00
parent c0478e1273
commit 8d54a3c64e
10 changed files with 785 additions and 90 deletions
+65 -2
View File
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ impl Disc {
// optical drives) responds by entering a fast-fail firmware
// wedge state where every subsequent CDB returns
// ILLEGAL_REQUEST/INVALID_FIELD_IN_CDB (sense 05/24) until
// power-cycled. Hit live on rip1 2026-05-20 during a Barbie
// power-cycled. Hit live on rip1 2026-05-20 during a MOVIE
// UHD scan: KEYDB miss → 16 cert attempts in a tight loop →
// wedge → forced host reboot + drive disconnect to recover.
//
@@ -424,11 +424,12 @@ impl Disc {
Some(s) => s,
None => return Err(miss_error),
};
let providers: &[&dyn aacs::KeyProvider] = &[&keydb];
let aacs_ctx = aacs::ResolveContext {
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro_data,
content_cert: cc_data.as_deref(),
volume_id: &volume_id,
keydb: &keydb,
providers,
mkb: mkb_data.as_deref(),
};
let mut ctx = DrmContext {
@@ -466,4 +467,66 @@ impl Disc {
volume_id,
})
}
/// Resolve encryption from a caller-supplied Unit Key (the keyserver
/// path). No keydb, no derivation: read `Unit_Key_RO.inf` for the disc
/// hash + version/bus-encryption flags, then use `unit_key` directly as
/// CPS unit 1's decryption key. The handshake (if any) still supplies the
/// volume ID and AACS 2.0 read-data key for bus decryption.
pub(super) fn resolve_encryption_static(
udf_fs: &udf::UdfFs,
reader: &mut dyn SectorSource,
unit_key: [u8; 16],
handshake: Option<&HandshakeResult>,
) -> Result<AacsState> {
use crate::aacs;
let uk_ro_data = udf_fs
.read_file(reader, "/AACS/Unit_Key_RO.inf")
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, "/AACS/DUPLICATE/Unit_Key_RO.inf"))
.map_err(|_| Error::AacsNoKeys)?;
let dh = aacs::disc_hash(&uk_ro_data);
let cc = udf_fs
.read_file(reader, "/AACS/Content000.cer")
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, "/AACS/Content001.cer"))
.ok()
.as_deref()
.and_then(aacs::parse_content_cert);
let bus_encryption = cc.as_ref().map(|c| c.bus_encryption).unwrap_or(false);
let version = match cc.as_ref().map(|c| c.version) {
Some(aacs::AacsVersion::V10) => 1,
Some(_) => 2,
None if bus_encryption => 2,
None => 1,
};
let mkb_ver = udf_fs
.read_file(reader, "/AACS/MKB_RW.inf")
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, "/AACS/MKB_RO.inf"))
.ok()
.as_deref()
.and_then(aacs::mkb_version);
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "scan_aacs_external_uk",
disc_hash = %aacs::disc_hash_hex(&dh),
version,
bus_encryption,
"using caller-supplied unit key (keyserver path)"
);
Ok(AacsState {
version,
bus_encryption,
mkb_version: mkb_ver,
disc_hash: aacs::disc_hash_hex(&dh),
key_source: KeySource::ExternalUk,
vuk: None,
unit_keys: vec![(1, unit_key)],
read_data_key: handshake.and_then(|h| h.read_data_key),
volume_id: handshake.map(|h| h.volume_id).unwrap_or([0u8; 16]),
})
}
}