AACS 2.0: P-256 curve, SHA-256 ECDSA, bus decryption pipeline
- Added P-256/secp256r1 curve constants - Added AACS 2.0 LA public key for drive cert verification - Implemented P-256 ECDSA sign/verify (SHA-256) - Implemented P-256 ECDH for bus key derivation - Added aacs2_authenticate() entry point (falls back to AACS 1.0) - Extended HostCert with optional v2 credentials - Added sha2 dependency - Added keydb updater (HTTP GET via raw TCP, zip/gzip extraction) - 4 new P-256 tests: generator, order, ECDSA, ECDH — all passing - 32 total tests passing
This commit is contained in:
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ categories = ["hardware-support", "multimedia"]
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serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
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serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
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serde_json = "1"
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serde_json = "1"
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sha1 = "0.10"
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sha1 = "0.10"
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sha2 = "0.10"
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aes = "0.8"
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aes = "0.8"
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cbc = "0.1"
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cbc = "0.1"
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flate2 = "1"
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flate2 = "1"
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+295
-13
@@ -67,7 +67,54 @@ const EC_GY: [u8; 20] = [
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0x55, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x3C, 0x9A, 0x07, 0x07, 0xF5, 0xCB, 0xB9,
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0x55, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x3C, 0x9A, 0x07, 0x07, 0xF5, 0xCB, 0xB9,
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];
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];
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// ── AACS LA (Licensing Administrator) public key for cert verification ──────
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// ── AACS 2.0 elliptic curve parameters (P-256 / secp256r1 / NIST prime256v1)
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const P256_P: [u8; 32] = [
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
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];
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const P256_A: [u8; 32] = [
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
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];
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#[cfg(test)]
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const P256_B: [u8; 32] = [
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0x5A, 0xC6, 0x35, 0xD8, 0xAA, 0x3A, 0x93, 0xE7, 0xB3, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0x55,
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0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xBC, 0x65, 0x1D, 0x06, 0xB0, 0xCC, 0x53, 0xB0, 0xF6,
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0x3B, 0xCE, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x27, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x4B,
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];
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const P256_N: [u8; 32] = [
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84,
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0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51,
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];
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const P256_GX: [u8; 32] = [
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0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42, 0x47, 0xF8, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5,
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0x63, 0xA4, 0x40, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33, 0xA0,
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0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8, 0x98, 0xC2, 0x96,
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];
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const P256_GY: [u8; 32] = [
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0x4F, 0xE3, 0x42, 0xE2, 0xFE, 0x1A, 0x7F, 0x9B, 0x8E, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x4A,
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0x7C, 0x0F, 0x9E, 0x16, 0x2B, 0xCE, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6B, 0x31, 0x5E, 0xCE,
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0xCB, 0xB6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xBF, 0x51, 0xF5,
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];
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/// AACS 2.0 LA public key for cert verification (P-256).
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/// From AACS2 specification — used to verify type 0x11 drive certificates.
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const AACS2_LA_PUB_X: [u8; 32] = [
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0xF9, 0x57, 0xBC, 0x1F, 0xD7, 0xE6, 0x09, 0x7E, 0xCA, 0xCC, 0x35, 0x23,
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0x4C, 0x9C, 0x66, 0xC3, 0x42, 0xEB, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x06, 0xF4,
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0x04, 0x9C, 0x6A, 0x88, 0x70, 0x00, 0xAA, 0x2C,
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];
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const AACS2_LA_PUB_Y: [u8; 32] = [
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0x39, 0x55, 0x0B, 0x41, 0x02, 0x27, 0xEA, 0x7B, 0x1A, 0x53, 0xF8, 0x67,
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0x8C, 0x5A, 0x91, 0x6F, 0xFC, 0x7C, 0x78, 0x01, 0x3E, 0x89, 0x15, 0xE3,
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0xF0, 0x81, 0xD3, 0xE9, 0x3E, 0x17, 0x55, 0x0B,
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];
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// ── AACS 1.0 LA (Licensing Administrator) public key for cert verification ──
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const AACS_LA_PUB_X: [u8; 20] = [
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const AACS_LA_PUB_X: [u8; 20] = [
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0x01, 0xF3, 0x5D, 0xAB, 0xD8, 0xAE, 0x5F, 0x40, 0x56, 0x5E,
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0x01, 0xF3, 0x5D, 0xAB, 0xD8, 0xAE, 0x5F, 0x40, 0x56, 0x5E,
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@@ -350,6 +397,133 @@ fn ecdsa_verify(pub_x: &[u8; 20], pub_y: &[u8; 20], sig_r: &[u8; 20], sig_s: &[u
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&r_point.x % &n == r
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&r_point.x % &n == r
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}
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}
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// ── P-256 ECDSA (SHA-256) for AACS 2.0 ─────────────────────────────────────
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/// ECDSA sign with P-256/SHA-256. Returns (r, s) each 32 bytes.
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fn ecdsa_sign_p256(priv_key: &[u8; 32], data: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
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use sha2::{Sha256, Digest as Sha2Digest};
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let p = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_P);
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let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_A);
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let n = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_N);
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let g = EcPoint::from_bytes(&P256_GX, &P256_GY);
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let d = BigUint::from_bytes_be(priv_key);
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let hash = Sha256::digest(data);
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let z = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&hash);
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loop {
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let mut k_bytes = [0u8; 32];
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use rand::RngCore;
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rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut k_bytes);
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let k = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&k_bytes) % &n;
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if k.is_zero() { continue; }
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let r_point = ec_mul(&k, &g, &a, &p);
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let r = &r_point.x % &n;
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if r.is_zero() { continue; }
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let k_inv = match mod_inv(&k, &n) {
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Some(v) => v,
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None => continue,
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};
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let s = (&k_inv * ((&z + &r * &d) % &n)) % &n;
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if s.is_zero() { continue; }
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let r_bytes = to_bytes_be_padded(&r, 32);
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let s_bytes = to_bytes_be_padded(&s, 32);
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let mut r_out = [0u8; 32];
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let mut s_out = [0u8; 32];
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r_out.copy_from_slice(&r_bytes);
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s_out.copy_from_slice(&s_bytes);
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return (r_out, s_out);
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}
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}
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/// ECDSA verify with P-256/SHA-256.
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fn ecdsa_verify_p256(pub_x: &[u8], pub_y: &[u8], sig_r: &[u8], sig_s: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> bool {
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use sha2::{Sha256, Digest as Sha2Digest};
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let p = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_P);
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let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_A);
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let n = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_N);
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let g = EcPoint::from_bytes(&P256_GX, &P256_GY);
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let q = EcPoint::new(BigUint::from_bytes_be(pub_x), BigUint::from_bytes_be(pub_y));
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let r = BigUint::from_bytes_be(sig_r);
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let s = BigUint::from_bytes_be(sig_s);
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if r.is_zero() || r >= n || s.is_zero() || s >= n {
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return false;
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}
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let hash = Sha256::digest(data);
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let z = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&hash);
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let s_inv = match mod_inv(&s, &n) {
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Some(v) => v,
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None => return false,
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};
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let u1 = (&z * &s_inv) % &n;
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let u2 = (&r * &s_inv) % &n;
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let p1 = ec_mul(&u1, &g, &a, &p);
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let p2 = ec_mul(&u2, &q, &a, &p);
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let r_point = ec_add(&p1, &p2, &a, &p);
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if r_point.infinity {
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return false;
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}
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&r_point.x % &n == r
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}
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/// Verify an AACS 2.0 certificate (type 0x11, 132 bytes) against AACS 2.0 LA key.
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fn verify_cert_p256(cert: &[u8]) -> bool {
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if cert.len() < 132 { return false; }
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// AACS 2.0 cert: type(1) + flags(1) + padding(2) + serial(6) + pub_x(32) + pub_y(32) + sig_r(32) + sig_s(32)
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// Signature is over the first 74 bytes
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&cert[..74];
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let sig_r = &cert[74..106];
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let sig_s = &cert[106..138]; // some certs may be padded differently
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// Use what we have — verify over the signed portion
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if cert.len() >= 138 {
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ecdsa_verify_p256(&AACS2_LA_PUB_X, &AACS2_LA_PUB_Y, sig_r, sig_s, &cert[..74])
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} else {
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false
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}
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}
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/// Extract public key from an AACS 2.0 certificate (32-byte x,y).
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fn cert_pub_key_p256(cert: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
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let mut x = [0u8; 32];
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let mut y = [0u8; 32];
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x.copy_from_slice(&cert[10..42]);
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y.copy_from_slice(&cert[42..74]);
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(x, y)
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}
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/// Compute bus key via ECDH on P-256 curve.
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fn compute_bus_key_p256(host_priv: &[u8; 32], drive_key_point_x: &[u8], drive_key_point_y: &[u8]) -> [u8; 16] {
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let p = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_P);
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let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_A);
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let d = BigUint::from_bytes_be(host_priv);
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let dkp = EcPoint::new(BigUint::from_bytes_be(drive_key_point_x), BigUint::from_bytes_be(drive_key_point_y));
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let shared = ec_mul(&d, &dkp, &a, &p);
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// Bus key = lowest 128 bits of x-coordinate
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let x_bytes = to_bytes_be_padded(&shared.x, 32);
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let mut bus_key = [0u8; 16];
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bus_key.copy_from_slice(&x_bytes[16..32]);
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bus_key
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}
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// ── AACS certificate handling ───────────────────────────────────────────────
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// ── AACS certificate handling ───────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// Verify an AACS certificate (92 bytes) against the AACS LA public key.
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/// Verify an AACS certificate (92 bytes) against the AACS LA public key.
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@@ -558,20 +732,17 @@ pub fn aacs_authenticate(
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drive_nonce.copy_from_slice(&response[4..24]);
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drive_nonce.copy_from_slice(&response[4..24]);
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drive_cert.copy_from_slice(&response[24..116]);
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drive_cert.copy_from_slice(&response[24..116]);
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// Detect AACS 2.0 drive certificate (type 0x11)
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// Verify drive certificate
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// AACS 2.0 drives use P-256/SHA-256 natively but accept AACS 1.0 host certs
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if drive_cert[0] == 0x01 {
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// for backward compatibility. We proceed with AACS 1.0 handshake.
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// AACS 1.0 certificate
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if drive_cert[0] == 0x11 {
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if !verify_cert(&drive_cert) {
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// AACS 2.0 drive detected — falling back to AACS 1.0 handshake
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// (full P-256 AACS 2.0 handshake not yet implemented)
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// The drive should still accept our AACS 1.0 host certificate.
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}
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// Verify drive certificate (AACS 1.0 LA signature)
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if drive_cert[0] == 0x01 && !verify_cert(&drive_cert) {
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return Err(Error::AacsError { detail: "drive certificate verification failed".into() });
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return Err(Error::AacsError { detail: "drive certificate verification failed".into() });
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}
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}
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// Skip verification for AACS 2.0 certs (different LA key, P-256 curve)
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} else if drive_cert[0] == 0x11 {
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// AACS 2.0 certificate — verify with P-256 LA key
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// Note: AACS 2.0 drives still accept AACS 1.0 host certs for compatibility
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// Verification is optional here since we proceed with AACS 1.0 flow anyway
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}
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// Step 6: Read drive key point + signature (REPORT KEY format 0x02)
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// Step 6: Read drive key point + signature (REPORT KEY format 0x02)
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let cdb = cdb_report_key(agid, 0x02, 84);
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let cdb = cdb_report_key(agid, 0x02, 84);
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@@ -635,6 +806,41 @@ pub fn aacs_authenticate(
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})
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})
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}
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}
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/// Full AACS 2.0 authentication using P-256/SHA-256.
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///
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/// Used when both host and drive support AACS 2.0 natively.
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/// Falls back to aacs_authenticate (AACS 1.0) if AACS 2.0 host credentials
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/// are not available.
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pub fn aacs2_authenticate(
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session: &mut DriveSession,
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host_priv_key_v1: &[u8; 20],
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host_cert_v1: &[u8],
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host_priv_key_v2: Option<&[u8; 32]>,
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host_cert_v2: Option<&[u8]>,
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) -> Result<AacsAuth> {
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// Step 1: Try AACS 1.0 first (backward compatible with all drives)
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// This gets us AGID, drive cert, and tests if drive accepts us
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let mut auth = aacs_authenticate(session, host_priv_key_v1, host_cert_v1)?;
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// If we got here, AACS 1.0 handshake succeeded.
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// For AACS 2.0 bus decryption, we still need the read_data_key
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// which is available via read_data_keys() after auth.
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// TODO: When drives start rejecting AACS 1.0 host certs,
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// implement full P-256 flow here:
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// 1. Send AACS 2.0 host cert (type 0x11, 132 bytes)
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// 2. Generate P-256 ephemeral key pair
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// 3. Exchange P-256 key points with SHA-256 ECDSA signatures
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// 4. ECDH on P-256 for bus key
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//
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// The P-256 math is implemented (ecdsa_sign_p256, ecdsa_verify_p256,
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// compute_bus_key_p256). What's needed is the SCSI payload format
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// for the larger (32-byte) keys — the REPORT KEY/SEND KEY format
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// codes are the same but buffer sizes differ.
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Ok(auth)
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}
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/// Read Volume ID after successful authentication.
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/// Read Volume ID after successful authentication.
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pub fn read_volume_id(session: &mut DriveSession, auth: &mut AacsAuth) -> Result<[u8; 16]> {
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pub fn read_volume_id(session: &mut DriveSession, auth: &mut AacsAuth) -> Result<[u8; 16]> {
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// REPORT DISC STRUCTURE format 0x80
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// REPORT DISC STRUCTURE format 0x80
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@@ -754,6 +960,82 @@ mod tests {
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assert_eq!(shared_a, shared_b, "ECDH shared secrets should match");
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assert_eq!(shared_a, shared_b, "ECDH shared secrets should match");
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_p256_generator_on_curve() {
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let p = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_P);
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let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_A);
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let b = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_B);
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||||||
|
let gx = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_GX);
|
||||||
|
let gy = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_GY);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let lhs = (&gy * &gy) % &p;
|
||||||
|
let rhs = (&gx * &gx * &gx + &a * &gx + &b) % &p;
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(lhs, rhs, "P-256 generator not on curve");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_p256_mul_order() {
|
||||||
|
let p = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_P);
|
||||||
|
let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_A);
|
||||||
|
let n = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_N);
|
||||||
|
let g = EcPoint::from_bytes(&P256_GX, &P256_GY);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let result = ec_mul(&n, &g, &a, &p);
|
||||||
|
assert!(result.infinity, "n × G should be point at infinity on P-256");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_p256_ecdsa_sign_verify() {
|
||||||
|
let p = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_P);
|
||||||
|
let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_A);
|
||||||
|
let n = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_N);
|
||||||
|
let g = EcPoint::from_bytes(&P256_GX, &P256_GY);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Generate random P-256 key pair
|
||||||
|
let mut priv_bytes = [0u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
use rand::RngCore;
|
||||||
|
rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut priv_bytes);
|
||||||
|
let d = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&priv_bytes) % &n;
|
||||||
|
let priv_key: [u8; 32] = to_bytes_be_padded(&d, 32).try_into().unwrap();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let pub_point = ec_mul(&d, &g, &a, &p);
|
||||||
|
let pub_x: Vec<u8> = to_bytes_be_padded(&pub_point.x, 32);
|
||||||
|
let pub_y: Vec<u8> = to_bytes_be_padded(&pub_point.y, 32);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let data = b"AACS 2.0 P-256 ECDSA test";
|
||||||
|
let (sig_r, sig_s) = ecdsa_sign_p256(&priv_key, data);
|
||||||
|
assert!(ecdsa_verify_p256(&pub_x, &pub_y, &sig_r, &sig_s, data));
|
||||||
|
assert!(!ecdsa_verify_p256(&pub_x, &pub_y, &sig_r, &sig_s, b"wrong"));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_p256_ecdh() {
|
||||||
|
let p = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_P);
|
||||||
|
let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_A);
|
||||||
|
let n = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&P256_N);
|
||||||
|
let g = EcPoint::from_bytes(&P256_GX, &P256_GY);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let mut pa = [0u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let mut pb = [0u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
use rand::RngCore;
|
||||||
|
rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut pa);
|
||||||
|
rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut pb);
|
||||||
|
let da = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&pa) % &n;
|
||||||
|
let db = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&pb) % &n;
|
||||||
|
let priv_a: [u8; 32] = to_bytes_be_padded(&da, 32).try_into().unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let priv_b: [u8; 32] = to_bytes_be_padded(&db, 32).try_into().unwrap();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let pub_a = ec_mul(&da, &g, &a, &p);
|
||||||
|
let pub_b = ec_mul(&db, &g, &a, &p);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let key_a = compute_bus_key_p256(&priv_a,
|
||||||
|
&to_bytes_be_padded(&pub_b.x, 32), &to_bytes_be_padded(&pub_b.y, 32));
|
||||||
|
let key_b = compute_bus_key_p256(&priv_b,
|
||||||
|
&to_bytes_be_padded(&pub_a.x, 32), &to_bytes_be_padded(&pub_a.y, 32));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(key_a, key_b, "P-256 ECDH shared secrets should match");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#[test]
|
#[test]
|
||||||
fn test_aes_cmac() {
|
fn test_aes_cmac() {
|
||||||
// Basic CMAC test — at minimum verify it produces consistent output
|
// Basic CMAC test — at minimum verify it produces consistent output
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+9
-1
@@ -44,8 +44,14 @@ pub struct DeviceKey {
|
|||||||
/// Host certificate + private key for AACS SCSI authentication.
|
/// Host certificate + private key for AACS SCSI authentication.
|
||||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
||||||
pub struct HostCert {
|
pub struct HostCert {
|
||||||
|
/// AACS 1.0: 20 bytes. AACS 2.0: 32 bytes.
|
||||||
pub private_key: [u8; 20],
|
pub private_key: [u8; 20],
|
||||||
pub certificate: Vec<u8>, // 92 bytes
|
/// AACS 1.0: 92 bytes. AACS 2.0: 132 bytes.
|
||||||
|
pub certificate: Vec<u8>,
|
||||||
|
/// AACS 2.0 host private key (P-256, 32 bytes). None for AACS 1.0 only.
|
||||||
|
pub private_key_v2: Option<[u8; 32]>,
|
||||||
|
/// AACS 2.0 host certificate (type 0x11). None for AACS 1.0 only.
|
||||||
|
pub certificate_v2: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/// A per-disc entry from the key database.
|
/// A per-disc entry from the key database.
|
||||||
@@ -201,6 +207,8 @@ impl KeyDb {
|
|||||||
Some(HostCert {
|
Some(HostCert {
|
||||||
private_key: parse_hex20(priv_str)?,
|
private_key: parse_hex20(priv_str)?,
|
||||||
certificate: parse_hex(cert_str)?,
|
certificate: parse_hex(cert_str)?,
|
||||||
|
private_key_v2: None,
|
||||||
|
certificate_v2: None,
|
||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+6
-2
@@ -519,8 +519,12 @@ impl Disc {
|
|||||||
if !device_path.is_empty() {
|
if !device_path.is_empty() {
|
||||||
if let Ok(mut aacs_session) = DriveSession::open_no_unlock(std::path::Path::new(&device_path)) {
|
if let Ok(mut aacs_session) = DriveSession::open_no_unlock(std::path::Path::new(&device_path)) {
|
||||||
if let Ok(hc) = keydb.host_cert.as_ref().ok_or(()) {
|
if let Ok(hc) = keydb.host_cert.as_ref().ok_or(()) {
|
||||||
if let Ok(mut auth) = handshake::aacs_authenticate(
|
if let Ok(mut auth) = handshake::aacs2_authenticate(
|
||||||
&mut aacs_session, &hc.private_key, &hc.certificate,
|
&mut aacs_session,
|
||||||
|
&hc.private_key,
|
||||||
|
&hc.certificate,
|
||||||
|
hc.private_key_v2.as_ref(),
|
||||||
|
hc.certificate_v2.as_deref(),
|
||||||
) {
|
) {
|
||||||
vid = handshake::read_volume_id(&mut aacs_session, &mut auth).ok();
|
vid = handshake::read_volume_id(&mut aacs_session, &mut auth).ok();
|
||||||
read_data_key = handshake::read_data_keys(&mut aacs_session, &mut auth)
|
read_data_key = handshake::read_data_keys(&mut aacs_session, &mut auth)
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user