Pull the wedge-guarded cert loop and host-cert collection out of the in-tree
AacsCertUnlocker into public aacs::handshake primitives (run_cert_handshake +
CertHandshake, collect_host_certs). The in-tree path now delegates to them, so
the external freemkv-unlock-aacs plugin runs the IDENTICAL cert handshake — one
implementation, two callers. Pure refactor of the live AACS path; the existing
handshake + collect_host_certs unit tests validate it unchanged.
Replace route_unlock's Option<(name, Vid)> with a structured UnlockRoute
{ Unlocked(name, Unlocked) | Failed(UnlockError) | NoMatch } so a single
dispatch serves every caller: drive-prep wants "did anything unlock", and the
AACS cert route (next) needs the FAILURE REASON to render "missing keys" vs
"host cert rejected" instead of collapsing it to a bare None. Only a genuine
SCSI transport fault still returns Err (abort). UnlockCtx gains an optional
ScanOptions (the cert route's host-cert source), and read_mkb_from_drive now
takes &mut dyn ScsiTransport — both prerequisites for the cert handshake to
become an external freemkv-unlock-aacs unlocker. Drive-prep + CSS callers fold
the new outcome; no behavior change.
Convert the CSS read-unlock into a first-class registry Unlocker (CssUnlocker)
dispatched through route_unlock like every other barrier removal, instead of
a direct call in scan. libfreemkv appends the built-in CSS unlocker (and, next,
the AACS cert handshake) exactly once via ensure_builtins(), AFTER any
client-registered firmware unlocker — so the registry order is firmware → cert
→ css, owned by the lib, not the client.
Defense in depth: the unlocker does NOT trust the caller-declared DiscKind.
matches() filters on the declared kind (Css), but unlock() self-verifies
against the drive's GET CONFIGURATION profile and refuses (UnlockError::
NotApplicable, a new shared "this unlocker doesn't apply" variant) WITHOUT
issuing a single CSS CDB if the drive reports a non-DVD profile — so a
mis-routed Blu-ray is never sent CSS bus-auth. Guard the firmware unlocker the
same structural way (it matches only the drive-prep phase, kind == Unknown).
Tests: CssUnlocker matches only DiscKind::Css; a BD-profile drive yields
NotApplicable with zero CSS CDBs issued.
The AACS cert-auth primitives (aacs_authenticate, the AACS 2.0 P-256
variants, read_volume_id, read_data_keys) and their scsi_read/scsi_write
helpers touched the drive ONLY through Drive::scsi_execute — a pure
pass-through to the transport. Thread &mut dyn ScsiTransport instead of
&mut Drive so these primitives are transport-level, matching the firmware
Unlocker seam (which hands out &mut dyn ScsiTransport for testability).
Pure mechanical signature change, no logic change; the cert orchestrator
(do_handshake_cert) keeps &mut Drive for the OEM-VID shortcut and passes
session.scsi_mut() into the primitives. Step toward making the cert
handshake a uniform registry unlocker.
The bus-key gate only credited the cert handshake's read_data_key as proof
bus encryption was removed. A firmware unlocker removes it AT THE DRIVE
(serves clear content) and yields no read_data_key — so a SUCCESSFUL
firmware unlock (VID present, read_data_key None) tripped the gate and
blocked ALL key resolution, including the online source. That was the
root cause of live UHD discs reporting "missing keys" after an unlock.
Now a single predicate answers "is bus encryption gone?": never-had-it ||
file/ISO || firmware-unlocked || cert-bus-key. The gate is just
`if !bus_encryption_removed { error }` — no enumerated cases. HandshakeResult
gains `drive_unlocked`, and the read_data_key failure reason is captured so
the warn says WHY the bus key is missing.
Also: reword the first hardware-sense escalation as "fast-fail escalation"
(it is often transient — the drive recovers), reserving "wedge" for a
persistent run; and scrub the product name from core comments (it belongs
only in the unlocker crate).
When a bus-encrypted disc's handshake yields no read_data_key, the gate
logged a bare "bus_key_unavailable" with no indication of WHY — turning
every occurrence into archaeology (is the bus key not-attempted, or did
the read fail?).
Now:
- read_data_keys failure is captured (error code) instead of swallowed by
`.ok()`, and logged at the handshake with its consequence.
- HandshakeResult carries `read_data_key_err: Option<u16>` so the gate
distinguishes "never attempted" (None — VID-only/OEM path) from "read
FAILED" (a code), and the bus_key_unavailable warn now reports the code
plus whether a Volume ID was present.
No behavior change — purely diagnostic. The handshake_ok debug also now
reports has_volume_id.
Decrypt-verify is a RIP gate, not a MUX gate. On the mux read path an
undecryptable content unit must never abort the mux:
- DecryptingSectorSource gains tolerate_decrypt_loss(): when set, an
undecryptable in-content unit is tallied, overwritten with valid NULL
TS packets (PID 0x1FFF) via aacs::fill_null_ts_unit, logged loud with
its LBA, and the read returns Ok — the stream keeps flowing. The rip
paths keep the fail-loud DECRYPT_VERIFY_READ decorator (re-read off the
disc); only the mux opts in.
- Wire it into both mux read paths: the file-backed highway
(build_iso_pipeline) and the inline DiscStream.
- NULL-TS fill keeps the demuxer byte-synced on the 192-byte stride; the
lost video/audio PID packets surface as a CC gap the TS assembler
already drops a partial PES on (the B1 foundation). Ciphertext is never
passed downstream either way.
- Fix stale resolve_vid_only no-cert test: default is UHD (audit #4).
Tests: conceal-as-NULL-TS, fill well-formedness, fail-loud still holds.
- read_aacs_inputs* now returns the AACS major version; DiscInputs carries it,
and DiscInputsCtx parses Unit_Key_RO.inf at the disc's own stride (fixes the
hardcoded-V20 read-time fetch for V10 discs). One source of truth, no version
argument to drift.
- Disc::inputs() is the single complete AACS-input source (inf/MKB/VID/hash/
version); the out-of-band duplicate readers go away.
- Named constants for AACS file paths (aacs::PATH_*) and the AACS majors
(aacs::AACS_MAJOR_*, AacsVersion::major/from_major) replace magic strings/ints.
- push_ranges saturating (corrupt-disc panic guard).
- decrypt_unit: padding-aware acceptance — recover real video at content-
fragment tails (the phantom mux-loss class) without weakening wrong-key
rejection (a full content unit still needs all 32 TS syncs).
- scan: read the MKB via the bounded read_mkb_content so Disc::inputs()
carries it. Online key resolution was shipping mkb=0 (a full read of the
~128 MiB MKB_RO allocation fails) → the decode service 404'd.
- resolve_vid_only: surface an MKB read error instead of silently emptying.
- fetch: a per-sample dry-set replaces the global fetch_spent latch, so a
second CPS unit's key can still be fetched after the first came back empty.
- verify::push_ranges: saturating arithmetic (corrupt-disc panic guard).
- Tests for all of the above.
Rewrite the AACS scan/VID trace lines so a reader understands them without
opening the source: name the real thing (AACS host certificate, Volume ID,
decryption key), say "key source" not "keydb", and describe what happened.
The VID flow is unchanged (unlocker OEM VID → cert handshake → continue); a
missing VID is logged, never fatal. All strings are in tracing macros (the
sanctioned debug-log channel) — no English added to any Error.
Complete the OEM/AACS cert baseline so host certs are a KeySource output,
never compiled in. With an unlocker present the OEM route is unused
(unlocker_read_volume_id short-circuits); without one, the cert handshake
runs when a keysource supplies a host cert and fails gracefully when none
does.
- KeySource trait gains host_certs() (default empty), reusing the existing
aacs::HostCert type. A source holds certs as its second kind of AACS
material alongside decryption keys.
- ScanOptions gains key_sources so the handshake can collect certs across
the app's keysource layer, unioned with DriveCredentials.
- do_handshake_cert collects certs via collect_host_certs (credentials +
every key source). Zero certs from any source now returns the new
graceful Error::AacsNoHostCert (code 7024, sentinel <no host cert>)
instead of silently skipping; resolution still falls back to the
path-1 disc-hash -> VUK lookup, which drops the error on a hit.
- error.rs: add E_AACS_NO_HOST_CERT / Error::AacsNoHostCert, wired into
code(), Display, and the round-trip + sentinel tests.
HandshakeResult { volume_id, read_data_key } unchanged: the cert path
still yields both the VID and the bus key.
Rename the trait to a generic, drive-neutral capability contract so future
unlockers don't conform to LibreDrive specifics:
- unlock(...) -> unlock_drive(...) (the one required capability)
- read_vid(...) -> read_volume_id(...) (no-op default)
- add set_max_read_speed(...) (no-op default)
The trait doc now states the contract in one place: unlockers are optional
drive-capability providers; the AACS layer is the always-present baseline and
falls back to the full cert handshake when no unlocker matches. Implement only
the capabilities your drive supports.
Registry: route_unlock now calls unlock_drive; unlocker_read_vid renamed to
unlocker_read_volume_id; add unlocker_set_max_read_speed (mirrors route_unlock
resolution, first matching unlocker, no-op if none match). drive::init calls
it on a matched drive in the post-unlock path; a speed-set failure is logged
and does not fail the rip. encrypt.rs handshake updated to the new VID helper.
Tests updated for the renames; added a set_max_read_speed routing test
(match invokes, no-match is a safe no-op).
An Unlocker unlocks drive functionality, not just the disc: unlock() is
one capability, OEM VID retrieval is another. Widen the Unlocker trait
with a default-no-op read_vid(), add an unlocker_read_vid registry helper
that mirrors route_unlock resolution, and consult it in do_handshake_cert
before the cert-based VID read. A matching unlocker that serves a VID via
its OEM path short-circuits the cert handshake — VID is obtained without
the host certificate + HRL (restoring the pre-refactor decoupled OEM VID
path, now living inside the unlocker). Non-matching drives, and unlockers
without an OEM VID path, fall through to cert auth unchanged.
is_unlocked() now reports the honest signal (a registered unlocker matched
this drive) instead of const false.
libfreemkv must stay firmware-clean for crates.io. Move ALL drive-unlock
knowledge — firmware blobs, WRITE_BUFFER/MODE SELECT upload, unlock CDBs,
the MT1959 variant-A/B handshake, the 800 KB profiles.json database, and
the DriveProfile parsing — out into the freemkv-unlock-ld crate.
libfreemkv now keeps only the seam:
- Unlocker trait (name/matches/unlock) + a process-wide ordered registry
(register_unlocker / route_unlock) in src/unlock.rs
- Drive::init() walks the registry; the first unlocker whose matches(id)
is true runs unlock(scsi, id); if none match the drive is left in
stock mode and the host-cert AACS handshake (the OEM route) carries
the disc.
The unlocker issues its own CDBs through the public ScsiTransport::execute,
so libfreemkv knows nothing about how unlocking happens.
Removed:
- profiles.json
- src/platform/mt1959/{mod,variant_a,variant_b}.rs
- src/profile.rs (DriveProfile, ProfilesFile, find_by_drive_id, ...)
- the PlatformDriver trait
Because the Unlocker seam reports only success/failure (no extended-access
marker), VID acquisition is now always via the cert-based handshake; the
per-drive OEM-VID-CDB shortcut and Drive::is_unlocked() (now const false)
are removed/neutralized. Disc-speed calibration moved into the unlocker's
unlock(); Drive::probe_disc() is a no-op.
git grep over src/ is firmware-blob/profiles/WRITE_BUFFER/mt1959-free.
All tests pass on Rust 1.86 (precommit green).
Test-hardening release, no runtime changes. Adds spec-grounded unit tests
across the silent-corruption surfaces — UDF/MPLS/CLPI/IFO parsing, BD/DVD
title + extent assembly, AACS/CSS key handling, TS/PS demux + codec parsers,
MKV/EBML container output, the mux pipeline, sector prefetch + decrypt
decorator, drive/SCSI sense decoding, label extraction, and core I/O. Each
test is grounded in the format spec or real on-disc behavior and verified to
fail under a targeted source mutation. No behavior changed.
Library-wide review-and-fix pass: tightened AACS keydb/handshake/variant
handling and trailing-partial-unit policy, corrected MPLS mark offset and
added UDF allocation bounds, hardened the mux/codec framing and M2TS paths,
guarded SCSI READ CAPACITY short transfers and unified error mapping, added
overflow guards on untrusted disc input, and made prefetch shutdown
deterministic. Release profile now builds with thin LTO + single codegen unit.
The library no longer loads a keydb anywhere. The scan path always captures the
disc's AACS inputs (MKB, VID, Unit_Key_RO.inf) and resolves NO key; a caller
resolves a Key from a key source and applies it via Disc::decrypt_with.
- ScanOptions loses keydb_path / unit_key / disable_keydb (and the path search);
it now carries only optional DriveCredentials (host certs) for the live-drive
AACS handshake. do_handshake_cert uses those instead of loading the keydb.
An unlocked / LibreDrive drive takes the OEM Volume-ID path and needs none.
- The mux input() path takes caller-resolved unit_keys instead of a keydb_path,
and applies them via decrypt_with.
- Deleted the now-dead inline resolve_encryption / resolve_encryption_static.
All 700+ lib tests pass.
The VID-only scan path stashed MKB_RO/RW raw — those files are allocated to a
fixed ~128 MiB and zero-padded, so the MKB on AacsState (consumed by
Disc::inputs() and the device/processing-key decrypt_with derivation) was the
full pad, not the ~few-MB record stream. Trim to mkb_content_len, matching
read_aacs_inputs.
Disc::decrypt_with now takes Device / Processing / Media / Volume keys in
addition to Unit. A caller hands in whatever level it resolved and the
library derives down the AACS chain to the per-CPS-unit keys, then
decrypts:
Device -> MKB walk -> media key -> VUK -> per-CPS unit keys
Processing -> MKB -> media key -> VUK -> per-CPS unit keys
Media -> Volume ID -> VUK -> per-CPS unit keys
Volume -> Unit_Key_RO.inf, one unit key per CPS unit
Unit -> used directly (terminal)
Derivation stays centralized in the version-dispatched resolver
(1.0 / 2.0 / 2.1), fed by a single-key provider built from the supplied
key — no new crypto. Volume notably does NOT stop at the volume key: it
decrypts every CPS unit's key.
Scan stashes the AACS inputs (Unit_Key_RO.inf and MKB) on AacsState so an
out-of-band decrypt_with can derive without re-reading the disc.
Non-breaking: Key is #[non_exhaustive] and the existing Unit path is
unchanged. New tests cover the Volume -> per-CPS derive-down, the
missing-inputs error, and the no-units rejection.
scan now stashes the raw Unit_Key_RO.inf + MKB bytes on AacsState (via
resolve_vid_only, the disable_keydb path), so an external key-resolver can
derive unit keys from a resolved VUK without re-reading the disc — the
foundation for moving lookup/derivation out of libfreemkv. Additive: the keydb
path is untouched, all existing constructors default the new fields empty.
584 lib tests green. Builds on the KeyOrigin rename + the Key/decrypt_with API.
Disambiguates the key vocabulary: Key (the input handed to decrypt_with),
key sources (the resolver's lookup list), and KeyOrigin (how a key was
resolved). Internal-only rename — no dependents import it.
- read_aacs_inputs / read_aacs_inputs_from_drive now read MKB_RO.inf first.
MKB_RW.inf is a fixed ~128 MiB rewritable region that is mostly zero
padding; reading it shipped 124 MiB of nothing. MKB_RO is the real,
correctly-sized MKB (a few MB). Fall back to RW only if RO is absent.
- disable_keydb no longer drops the Volume ID. A caller resolving Unit Keys
out-of-band needs the VID (on-disc content read during the handshake).
New resolve_vid_only builds a keys-free AacsState carrying just the VID +
version metadata, so the disc reports 'encrypted, no keys' (resolved
out-of-band) instead of discarding the VID.
The ScanOptions.unit_key path is a generic primitive — a caller-supplied Unit
Key that bypasses keydb lookup. Doc comments + a tracing log named a specific
external source; reworded to neutral 'out-of-band / external key service' so
the library makes no assumptions about where the key came from.
Two coherent additions to the AACS resolver:
KeyProvider abstraction (provider.rs) — key material comes from pluggable
backends; KeyDb implements it (device/processing keys, host certs,
disc-by-hash / disc-by-vid lookup) plus orphan-DK parsing. ResolveContext
takes a provider array. Adds the SD-tree PK walker
(derive_media_key_from_pk_walked) and a `probe` module (km_verifies MK
oracle, mkb_* record parsers) used for offline key verification. Cvalue
record selection prefers 0x05, falls back to 0x07.
External-UK key source — the second, mutually-exclusive key source for the
keyserver path. ScanOptions/InputOptions gain `unit_key`; when set,
resolve_encryption_static skips keydb entirely and uses the caller-supplied
Unit Key directly (KeySource::ExternalUk). Disc::read_aacs_inputs exposes a
disc's Unit_Key_RO.inf + MKB so a caller can fetch the UK out-of-band; the
library makes no network call itself.
CHANGELOG: redact test-disc title in historical notes.
Adds a 5th key-resolution path that consumes pre-decrypted unit keys
directly from KEYDB when the entry has no VUK field. Covers ~4,572
entries in the public keydb (~2.5%), heavily skewed toward MKBv76+ UHD
discs where DVDFab/FindVUK can no longer extract a VUK but does extract
unit keys. Partial CPS-unit coverage is rejected so a disc is never
half-decrypted.
Resolver path order reordered root-to-leaf: DK (1) → PK (2) →
KEYDB-derived MK+VID (3) → KEYDB VUK (4) → KEYDB unit keys (5).
Previous order was leaf-first.
API:
- AacsState::vuk is now Option<[u8; 16]> (was [u8; 16])
- ResolvedKeys::vuk is now Option<[u8; 16]> (was [u8; 16])
- KeySource variants reordered + new KeyDbUnitKeys variant
3 new resolver tests (path 4 still works without VID; path 5 succeeds
with pre-decrypted unit keys; path 5 rejects partial CPS coverage).
When the drive is in extended-access state (unlocked), retrieve VID via
the per-drive `read_vid_cdb` from the bundled profile instead of the
cert-based AACS REPORT_KEY handshake. Cert handshake remains the
fallback for drives that don't enter extended-access state, or whose
profile lacks the required CDB.
Empirically verified on the BU40N (signature 999ec375) against
Barbie UHD: drive returns 36 bytes from buffer 0x44 at offset
0x10E291, VID at response[4..20]. The 16 bytes match Dune Part Two's
known VID in keydb.cfg byte-for-byte, cross-validating the path
against an independent oracle.
Architectural impact:
- Renames `Drive::is_libredrive_active()` → `Drive::is_unlocked()`.
Internal `Mt1959::libredrive_active` becomes `Mt1959::unlocked`;
the prior `unlocked` (init-success flag) becomes `init_complete`
to avoid the name collision.
- `disc/encrypt.rs::Disc::read_vid` is the single entry point.
When `is_unlocked()` is true, calls `read_vid_oem` (issues the
per-drive CDB, validates the response signature high-3-bytes
`00 22 00`, returns bytes [4..20]). Otherwise delegates to
`read_vid_cert` (the existing AACS REPORT_KEY format 0x80 path).
- `DriveProfile` gains the per-drive CDB templates and identifier
blocks extracted from each per-drive firmware payload — including
`read_vid_cdb`, `read_disc_keys_cdb`, `drive_nominal_speed_cdb`,
`set_speed_max_cdb`, two cache-prime canary CDBs, the buffer-0x45
verify CDB, the firmware-upload CDB, and the unlock probe CDB.
Variants A and B differ in which fields are populated. All optional;
consumers fall back to the cert/handshake path when fields are
absent.
- New error variants `Error::DriveProfileMissing` (E7020) and
`Error::VidCdbUnavailable` (E7021). Both treated as
"OEM unavailable → try cert path" by `read_vid`, not terminal.
Closes the v0.25.x gap where HRL-burned host certs (the public
libaacs leaked cert is on every recent drive's HRL) blocked all
post-handshake VID retrieval. With OEM-driven VID:
- AACS 1.0 BD on supported drives: rips end-to-end with our existing
DKs walking the MKB.
- AACS 2.x UHD: fails honestly at the DK wall (E7018 "No usable DK"
for v77+ MKBs) instead of the misleading E7017 "No Volume ID"
the prior code surfaced. We have VID; we just don't have v77+ DK
material — that gap is a key-acquisition problem, not a code
problem.
Empirically verified on rip1 (BU40N + Barbie UHD, MKB v77,
2026-05-21): error code flipped from E7017 to E7018 as predicted.
The DK wall is now correctly the proximate failure for unrippable
modern UHD discs, instead of the indirect VID-retrieval wall the
v0.25.x cert-only path produced.
Renames and comment scrubs eliminate upstream-RE-vocabulary
references in the public crate per `feedback_no_breadcrumbs.md`.
674 tests pass (565 lib + 109 integration). No tradename leaks in
any modified file.
- Introduce DrmScheme enum (Css/Aacs10/Aacs20/Aacs21) + drm module with
uniform detect/load dispatch across all four protection schemes.
- Land AACS 2.1 Media Key Variant framework in aacs::variants: chain
derivation, MKB record types 0x82/0x83, bit-0x02 SoftKCD and bit-0x04
online-challenge detection. Aacs21 dispatcher arm wired but commented
out pending validation against a Variant-scheme disc.
- Replace aacs2: bool with AacsVersion enum across ContentCertificate,
UnitKeyFile, ResolvedKeys. resolve_keys splits into _v1/_v2/_v21.
- Delete the libredrive raw-read VID shortcut from do_handshake; the
drive enforces the AGID requirement regardless of firmware-upload
state, so the shortcut spuriously dispatched E7017 instead of
surfacing the real downstream walls.
Three coherent threads landing for v0.25.11:
1. Libredrive raw-read VID path. When Mt1959::do_unlock sees both the
MMkv active-mode marker at [12..16] and the LbDr mode-ID marker at
[16..20], Drive::is_libredrive_active() returns true and
do_handshake skips the AACS cert dance — VID is retrieved via
READ_DISC_STRUCTURE format 0x80 with AGID=0 and bus encryption is
already off. This unblocks UHD ripping on drives whose leaked host
cert is on the AACS HRL.
- platform/mt1959/mod.rs: detection + active flag + 4 unit tests.
- platform/mod.rs: PlatformDriver::is_libredrive_active trait method.
- drive/mod.rs: Drive::is_libredrive_active accessor.
- disc/encrypt.rs: do_handshake branches on the flag; new
read_volume_id_libredrive helper. Return type widened to
(Option<HandshakeResult>, Option<Error>) so callers see which
specific failure happened.
- disc/mod.rs: scan_with plumbs the new tuple through and preserves
handshake errors as disc.aacs_error.
2. Revert v0.25.9 built-in AACS keys + plugin slot. Single source of
AACS truth: keydb.cfg. The compiled-in DKs/PKs were a slim
convenience that didn't move the hard problem (no v77+ DKs) and
added a maintenance surface. Plugin slot was overlapping
functionality with the main keydb.
- Deleted src/aacs/builtin_keys.rs (4 DKs + 3 PKs).
- Removed KeyDb::with_builtins, load_or_builtins, merge_from,
merge_local_plugin, local_plugin_path, internal dedup helpers.
KeyDb::empty kept for unit-test use.
- KeyDb::load reverts to pre-0.25.9 form: read file or return I/O
error; no fallback.
- disc::encrypt::resolve_encryption keydb_path back to required
(&Path), not Option<&Path>.
- disc::scan_with surfaces KeydbLoad { path: "<no keydb in search
paths>" } sentinel when encrypted + no keydb — same sentinel
autorip's message switch already handles.
- CSS player keys in src/css/auth.rs stay compiled in; they're
1999-era public inputs separate from AACS and pre-date the 0.25.9
additions.
3. Walker fix follow-through (libaacs-parity validate_processing_key,
cvalues 0x07-then-0x05 preference, path-2/3/4 short-circuit on
zero VID) + NIST AES-CMAC KAT + VID MAC round-trip / mutation /
zero-rejection tests.
5 new Error variants for finer-grained AACS failure reporting:
AacsHostCertRejected (E7015), AacsLibredriveUnsupported (E7016),
AacsVidUnavailable (E7017), AacsMkUnavailable (E7018),
AacsVukNotInKeydb (E7019). Lets CLIs/UIs render which piece of the
AACS chain failed instead of always saying "no keys."
Two changes that make AACS 1.0 / DVD self-sufficient:
1. MKB record-type identification bug fix. `mkb_find_mk_dv` was
searching for type 0x10 (which is Type-and-Version, 12 bytes)
when the Verify Media Key Record is actually type 0x81 for
AACS 1.0 or type 0x86 for AACS 2.0/2.1. `mkb_version` had the
inverse bug. PK and DK derivation paths therefore silently
failed on every disc, masking how often the fallback paths
could have worked. Fix searches the correct types; tests added
covering both the 0x81 and 0x86 verify-record forms and the
0x10 version record at offset 8 of the body.
2. Built-in AACS keys + operator plugin slot. Four device keys
(covering MKB v01-v82+) and three processing keys (covering
v63-v68) compiled directly into the library. Combined with the
31 CSS player keys already in css/auth.rs, DVDs and Blu-rays
(AACS 1.0) now decrypt with zero external files. New plugin
path at ~/.config/freemkv/local_keys.cfg (same syntax as
keydb.cfg) layered additively on top of built-ins and main
keydb. `Disc::scan` no longer errors when keydb.cfg is absent;
AACS 2.0 / UHD still surfaces a specific error when the disc
needs keys none of the layers provide.
Public docstrings in project docs + README updated to describe the
three additive layers (built-ins → keydb.cfg → local_keys.cfg).
Pre-0.25.7 the AACS authenticate loop fired up to 16 host-cert
attempts back-to-back with no pause. Each attempt is 5-10 SCSI
REPORT_KEY/SEND_KEY exchanges, so on a disc whose host cert isn't
in our KEYDB (or one the drive rejects), the drive saw 80-160 SCSI
commands in a few hundred ms and entered a fast-fail firmware
wedge state where every subsequent CDB returns sense 05/24 until
power-cycled.
Three defences:
- MAX_CERT_ATTEMPTS capped at 3 (was 16)
- 1-second sleep between attempts
- Bail immediately on any sense_key == 0x05 (ILLEGAL_REQUEST) so
the loop can't deepen the wedge if a regression undoes the
attempt cap.
WO-2 (delete SectorReader trait):
- The 0.18 trait split into SectorSource (read-only) and SectorSink
(write-only) is final; the legacy SectorReader alias was a bridge.
- Renames every internal &mut dyn SectorReader (~25 sites) to
&mut dyn SectorSource. The trait method capacity() becomes
capacity_sectors() with a default of 0 (preserves SectorReader's
default-0 behavior).
- Deletes the SectorReader trait, its blanket-to-Source bridge, and
the FileSectorReader type alias. Adds explicit forwarding impls
for Box<dyn SectorSource> and &mut dyn SectorSource so generic
decorators like DecryptingSectorSource<S: SectorSource> compose.
WO-3a (extract Disc::patch):
- Moves Disc::patch (1230 lines) and bytes_bad_in_title from
disc/mod.rs into disc/patch.rs as a split inherent impl. Zero
behavior change — pure mechanical relocation. disc/mod.rs drops
from 3,945 to 2,714 LOC.
WO-6 (partial):
- Deletes src/labels/png_filenames.rs — was a 72-LOC stub with
detect() returning false, never wired into the PARSERS registry.
project docs doc drift fixes (audited 2026-05-13):
- JUMP_BASE_SECTORS: 256→1024 (64 MB base for UHD, not 8 MB)
- PASSN_DAMAGE_THRESHOLD_PCT: 12→6
- PASSN_SKIP_SECTORS_BASE: 64→32
- MAX_RANGE_SECS=180: replaced by proportional range_sectors × 25,
capped at RANGE_BUDGET_CAP_SECS=1800.
scan_with() collapsed every failure path from resolve_encryption() into
None via .ok(), so callers couldn't tell the difference between "no
KEYDB found", "KEYDB failed to parse", "disc hash not in KEYDB and
fallback derivation failed", "AACS files unreadable on disc", and a
handshake that rejected every host cert. autorip's UI was stuck
printing "no decryption keys found (check KEYDB)" for all of them,
which is a particularly bad message when the user has actually loaded
a KEYDB and the real failure is something else.
Changes:
- New pub field Disc.aacs_error: Option<Error>. Populated by scan_with
whenever encrypted && aacs.is_none(). Sentinel KeydbLoad path
"<no keydb in search paths>" distinguishes the no-keydb case from
a real load failure without adding a new Error variant (which would
be a breaking change for downstream exhaustive matches).
- tracing::warn in scan_with at scan_aacs_resolve_failed and
scan_aacs_no_keydb, with error_code and keydb path for grepping.
- tracing in do_handshake: keydb load failure, host-cert exhaustion
(with cert count and last error code), VID read failure post-auth,
and a debug-level success log. Lets us see whether handshake even
got off the ground for a given disc.
Test fixtures updated to set aacs_error: None.
Previously returned HandshakeResult with zeros when all host certs
failed. Now returns None. Also propagates volume_id read failure
instead of silently using zeros.
- Rename DriveSession → Drive across entire codebase
- find_drives() returns Vec<Drive>, find_drive() returns Option<Drive>
- resolve_device() now pub(crate) — internal only
- StreamUrl is now a typed enum (Disc, Mkv, M2ts, Iso, Network, Stdio, Null)
with scheme() and path_str() accessors, replacing struct of Strings
- Add lock_tray() / unlock_tray() for safe disc access during rips
- Improve reset() with eject cycle that clears LibreDrive stuck state
- Add Send bounds to ScsiTransport and PlatformDriver traits
- DiscOptions uses PathBuf instead of String for device/keydb paths
- Update doc example to use new Drive API
Matthew Jackson