is_unit_encrypted read the TP_extra copy-control bits (byte 0), which are a
copy-permission flag, not an encryption flag. On discs whose sampled units are
clear navigation packets (PAT/PMT) those bits can be set while the unit is not
scrambled, so a correct Unit Key was used to 'decrypt' already-plaintext data,
produced garbage, and the key was wrongly treated as failing.
Read the actual flag instead: the TS transport_scrambling_control bits (top two
of TS-header byte 3 = byte 7 of the aligned unit, inside the clear seed). AACS
encrypts whole aligned units, so this one packet's TSC reflects the unit.
decrypt_unit now clears the TSC bits of every packet on the way out so the
result is valid unscrambled TS. Tests updated to the TSC flag.
src/disc/mod.rs:
- Cache priming (3-sector lookback) before patch's single-sector reads.
Drive read-ahead pulls in adjacent pages so the target may already be
cached when we ask for it. Throwaway reads — failures here don't
update mapfile state.
- When patch hits skip-limit on a range, leave remaining sectors
NonTrimmed instead of marking Unreadable. We never tried to read those
sectors, so don't give them terminal status — drive state evolves
between passes (cache, mechanical settle), and a later pass may
succeed.
tests/pass_n_patch_fix.rs:
- New regression test for the decrypt key inversion bug at
src/disc/mod.rs:1938-1942. Asserts decrypt_sectors is invoked with
the correct key when opts.decrypt=true.
tests/pass_n_size_aware_skip.rs:
- rustfmt-only changes.
Cargo.toml: 0.17.0 -> 0.17.1.
MattJackson