//! AACS key resolution — VUK derivation, MKB processing, disc hash, unit key parsing. use super::decrypt::{aes_ecb_decrypt, aes_ecb_encrypt}; use super::keydb::{DeviceKey, KeyDb}; // ── VUK derivation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── /// Derive VUK from Media Key and Volume ID. /// VUK = AES-128-ECB-DECRYPT(media_key, volume_id) XOR volume_id pub fn derive_vuk(media_key: &[u8; 16], volume_id: &[u8; 16]) -> [u8; 16] { let mut vuk = aes_ecb_decrypt(media_key, volume_id); for i in 0..16 { vuk[i] ^= volume_id[i]; } vuk } /// Decrypt an encrypted unit key using the VUK (AES-128-ECB). pub fn decrypt_unit_key(vuk: &[u8; 16], encrypted_uk: &[u8; 16]) -> [u8; 16] { aes_ecb_decrypt(vuk, encrypted_uk) } // ── Unit_Key_RO.inf parsing ───────────────────────────────────────────────── /// Parsed Unit_Key_RO.inf file. #[derive(Debug)] pub struct UnitKeyFile { /// Disc hash (SHA1 of the entire file) — used as KEYDB lookup key pub disc_hash: [u8; 20], /// Application type (1 = BD-ROM) pub app_type: u8, /// Number of BDMV directories pub num_bdmv_dir: u8, /// Whether SKB MKB is used pub use_skb_mkb: bool, /// Whether this is AACS 2.0 pub aacs2: bool, /// Encrypted unit keys (CPS unit number, encrypted key) pub encrypted_keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])>, /// Title → CPS unit index mapping (title_idx → unit_key_idx) pub title_cps_unit: Vec, } /// Compute disc hash (SHA1 of Unit_Key_RO.inf content). pub fn disc_hash(data: &[u8]) -> [u8; 20] { use sha1::{Digest, Sha1}; let hash = Sha1::digest(data); let mut out = [0u8; 20]; out.copy_from_slice(&hash); out } /// Format disc hash as hex string with 0x prefix (for KEYDB lookup). pub fn disc_hash_hex(hash: &[u8; 20]) -> String { let mut s = String::with_capacity(42); s.push_str("0x"); for b in hash { s.push_str(&format!("{b:02X}")); } s } /// Parse Unit_Key_RO.inf from raw bytes. /// /// Format (from AACS spec): /// [0..4] BE32: offset to key storage area (uk_pos) /// [16] app_type (1 = BD-ROM) /// [17] num_bdmv_dir /// [18] bit 7: use_skb_mkb /// [20..22] BE16: first_play CPS unit /// [22..24] BE16: top_menu CPS unit /// [24..26] BE16: num_titles /// [26..] title entries: 2 bytes padding + 2 bytes CPS unit, × num_titles /// /// Key storage at uk_pos: /// [uk_pos..uk_pos+2] BE16: num_unit_keys /// [uk_pos+48..] encrypted keys, 16 bytes each /// AACS 1.0: 48-byte stride /// AACS 2.0: 64-byte stride (48 + 16 extra) pub fn parse_unit_key_ro(data: &[u8], aacs2: bool) -> Option { if data.len() < 20 { return None; } let hash = disc_hash(data); // Header let app_type = data[16]; let num_bdmv_dir = data[17]; let use_skb_mkb = (data[18] >> 7) & 1 == 1; // Key storage offset let uk_pos = u32::from_be_bytes([data[0], data[1], data[2], data[3]]) as usize; if uk_pos + 2 > data.len() { return None; } // Number of unit keys let num_uk = u16::from_be_bytes([data[uk_pos], data[uk_pos + 1]]) as usize; if num_uk == 0 { return Some(UnitKeyFile { disc_hash: hash, app_type, num_bdmv_dir, use_skb_mkb, aacs2, encrypted_keys: Vec::new(), title_cps_unit: Vec::new(), }); } // Stride between keys let stride = if aacs2 { 64 } else { 48 }; // Validate size let keys_start = uk_pos + 48; // first key at uk_pos + 48 if keys_start + 16 > data.len() { return None; } // Extract encrypted keys let mut encrypted_keys = Vec::with_capacity(num_uk); let mut pos = keys_start; for i in 0..num_uk { if pos + 16 > data.len() { break; } let mut key = [0u8; 16]; key.copy_from_slice(&data[pos..pos + 16]); encrypted_keys.push(((i + 1) as u32, key)); pos += stride; } // Title → CPS unit mapping let mut title_cps_unit = Vec::new(); if data.len() >= 26 { let first_play = u16::from_be_bytes([data[20], data[21]]); let top_menu = u16::from_be_bytes([data[22], data[23]]); let num_titles = u16::from_be_bytes([data[24], data[25]]) as usize; title_cps_unit.push(first_play); title_cps_unit.push(top_menu); for i in 0..num_titles { let off = 26 + i * 4 + 2; // 2 bytes padding + 2 bytes CPS unit if off + 2 <= data.len() { let cps = u16::from_be_bytes([data[off], data[off + 1]]); title_cps_unit.push(cps); } } } Some(UnitKeyFile { disc_hash: hash, app_type, num_bdmv_dir, use_skb_mkb, aacs2, encrypted_keys, title_cps_unit, }) } // ── MKB processing ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── /// Derive Media Key from MKB data using processing keys. /// /// Processing keys are pre-computed keys that work for specific MKB versions. /// This is the fast path — no subset-difference tree traversal needed. /// /// MKB format: /// Record type 0x10 = Verify Media Key Record (has mk_dv) /// Record type 0x81 = Type and Version Record (has MKB version) /// Record type 0x04 = Subset-Difference Index (has UVS entries) /// Record type 0x07 = Explicit Subset-Difference Record (has cvalues) pub fn derive_media_key_from_pk(mkb: &[u8], processing_keys: &[[u8; 16]]) -> Option<[u8; 16]> { // Parse MKB records let mk_dv = mkb_find_mk_dv(mkb)?; let uvs = mkb_find_subdiff_records(mkb)?; let cvalues = mkb_find_cvalues(mkb)?; // Count UV entries (each 5 bytes, stop when high bits set) let num_uvs = uvs .chunks(5) .take_while(|c| c.len() == 5 && (c[0] & 0xC0) == 0) .count(); // Try each processing key against each UV/cvalue pair for pk in processing_keys { for i in 0..num_uvs { if (i + 1) * 16 > cvalues.len() { continue; } let record_start = i * 5; if record_start + 5 > uvs.len() { continue; } let _u_mask_shift = uvs[record_start]; let uv = &uvs[record_start + 1..record_start + 5]; let cv = &cvalues[i * 16..(i + 1) * 16]; if let Some(mk) = validate_processing_key(pk, cv, uv, &mk_dv) { return Some(mk); } } } None } /// Validate a processing key against a cvalue/UV pair. /// Returns the Media Key if valid. fn validate_processing_key( pk: &[u8; 16], cvalue: &[u8], _uv: &[u8], mk_dv: &[u8; 16], ) -> Option<[u8; 16]> { if cvalue.len() < 16 { return None; } // mk = AES-DEC(pk, cvalue) XOR cvalue let mut cv = [0u8; 16]; cv.copy_from_slice(&cvalue[..16]); let mut mk = aes_ecb_decrypt(pk, &cv); for i in 0..16 { mk[i] ^= cv[i]; } // Verify: AES-ECB(mk, mk_dv) should produce a specific pattern let _verify = aes_ecb_encrypt(&mk, mk_dv); // mk_dv verification: the first 12 bytes of AES(mk, mk_dv) should be all 0xDEADBEEF... // Actually per AACS spec: verify record value is AES(mk, all_zeros) // No — the mk_dv IS the verification value. We compute AES-ECB(mk, verify_data) // and check it matches. // From libaacs _validate_pk: // crypto_aes128d(pk, rec + a*16, mk) → decrypt cvalue with PK // mk[i] ^= rec[i] → XOR with cvalue // crypto_aes128e(mk, mk_dv, test) → encrypt mk_dv with derived mk // if first 12 bytes of test are zero → valid media key let test = aes_ecb_encrypt(&mk, mk_dv); // AACS spec: Verify Media Key record — first 12 bytes must be zero if test[..12] == [0u8; 12] { return Some(mk); } None } /// Find Verify Media Key Record (type 0x10) in MKB. fn mkb_find_mk_dv(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<[u8; 16]> { let mut pos = 0; while pos + 4 <= mkb.len() { let rec_type = mkb[pos]; let rec_len = u32::from_be_bytes([0, mkb[pos + 1], mkb[pos + 2], mkb[pos + 3]]) as usize; if rec_len < 4 || pos + rec_len > mkb.len() { break; } if rec_type == 0x10 && rec_len >= 20 { // mk_dv is at offset 4 (after record header) let mut dv = [0u8; 16]; dv.copy_from_slice(&mkb[pos + 4..pos + 20]); return Some(dv); } pos += rec_len; } None } /// Find Subset-Difference records (type 0x04) in MKB. fn mkb_find_subdiff_records(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option> { let mut pos = 0; while pos + 4 <= mkb.len() { let rec_type = mkb[pos]; let rec_len = u32::from_be_bytes([0, mkb[pos + 1], mkb[pos + 2], mkb[pos + 3]]) as usize; if rec_len < 4 || pos + rec_len > mkb.len() { break; } if rec_type == 0x04 && rec_len > 4 { return Some(mkb[pos + 4..pos + rec_len].to_vec()); } pos += rec_len; } None } /// Find Conditional Values (cvalues) record (type 0x07) in MKB. fn mkb_find_cvalues(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option> { let mut pos = 0; while pos + 4 <= mkb.len() { let rec_type = mkb[pos]; let rec_len = u32::from_be_bytes([0, mkb[pos + 1], mkb[pos + 2], mkb[pos + 3]]) as usize; if rec_len < 4 || pos + rec_len > mkb.len() { break; } if rec_type == 0x07 && rec_len > 4 { return Some(mkb[pos + 4..pos + rec_len].to_vec()); } pos += rec_len; } None } /// Get MKB version from Type and Version Record (type 0x81). pub fn mkb_version(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option { let mut pos = 0; while pos + 4 <= mkb.len() { let rec_type = mkb[pos]; let rec_len = u32::from_be_bytes([0, mkb[pos + 1], mkb[pos + 2], mkb[pos + 3]]) as usize; if rec_len < 4 || pos + rec_len > mkb.len() { break; } if rec_type == 0x81 && rec_len >= 8 { return Some(u32::from_be_bytes([ mkb[pos + 4], mkb[pos + 5], mkb[pos + 6], mkb[pos + 7], ])); } pos += rec_len; } None } // ── AACS-G3 key derivation (subset-difference tree) ───────────────────────── /// AACS-G3 seed constant. const AESG3_SEED: [u8; 16] = [ 0x7B, 0x10, 0x3C, 0x5D, 0xCB, 0x08, 0xC4, 0xE5, 0x1A, 0x27, 0xB0, 0x17, 0x99, 0x05, 0x3B, 0xD9, ]; /// AACS-G3: derive a subkey from a parent key. /// seed[15] += inc, then AES-DEC(key, seed) XOR seed. fn aesg3(key: &[u8; 16], inc: u8) -> [u8; 16] { let mut seed = AESG3_SEED; seed[15] = seed[15].wrapping_add(inc); let mut out = aes_ecb_decrypt(key, &seed); for i in 0..16 { out[i] ^= seed[i]; } out } /// Compute v_mask from a UV value. fn calc_v_mask(uv: u32) -> u32 { let mut v_mask: u32 = 0xFFFF_FFFF; while (uv & !v_mask) == 0 && v_mask != 0 { v_mask <<= 1; } v_mask } /// Derive processing key from device key using subset-difference tree traversal. fn calc_pk_from_dk(dk: &[u8; 16], uv: u32, v_mask: u32, dev_key_v_mask: u32) -> [u8; 16] { // Initial derivation: left_child = aesg3(dk, 0), pk = aesg3(dk, 1), right_child = aesg3(dk, 2) let mut left_child = aesg3(dk, 0); let mut pk = aesg3(dk, 1); let mut right_child = aesg3(dk, 2); let mut current_v_mask = dev_key_v_mask; while current_v_mask != v_mask { // Find the highest unset bit in current_v_mask let mut bit_pos: i32 = -1; for i in (0..32).rev() { if (current_v_mask & (1u32 << i)) == 0 { bit_pos = i; break; } } let curr_key = if bit_pos < 0 || (uv & (1u32 << bit_pos as u32)) == 0 { left_child } else { right_child }; left_child = aesg3(&curr_key, 0); pk = aesg3(&curr_key, 1); right_child = aesg3(&curr_key, 2); current_v_mask = ((current_v_mask as i32) >> 1) as u32; } pk } /// Derive Media Key from MKB using device keys (subset-difference tree). pub fn derive_media_key_from_dk(mkb: &[u8], device_keys: &[DeviceKey]) -> Option<[u8; 16]> { let mk_dv = mkb_find_mk_dv(mkb)?; let uvs = mkb_find_subdiff_records(mkb)?; let cvalues = mkb_find_cvalues(mkb)?; // Count UV entries let num_uvs = uvs .chunks(5) .take_while(|c| c.len() == 5 && (c[0] & 0xC0) == 0) .count(); for dk in device_keys { let device_number = dk.node as u32; // Find applying subset-difference for this device for uvs_idx in 0..num_uvs { let p_uv = &uvs[1 + 5 * uvs_idx..]; let u_mask_shift = uvs[5 * uvs_idx]; // byte before the UV value if u_mask_shift & 0xC0 != 0 { break; // device revoked } let uv = u32::from_be_bytes([p_uv[0], p_uv[1], p_uv[2], p_uv[3]]); if uv == 0 { continue; } let u_mask: u32 = 0xFFFF_FFFF << u_mask_shift; let v_mask = calc_v_mask(uv); if ((device_number & u_mask) == (uv & u_mask)) && ((device_number & v_mask) != (uv & v_mask)) { // Found matching subset-difference — find the right device key let dev_key_v_mask = calc_v_mask(dk.uv); let dev_key_u_mask: u32 = 0xFFFF_FFFF << dk.u_mask_shift; if u_mask == dev_key_u_mask && (uv & dev_key_v_mask) == (dk.uv & dev_key_v_mask) { // Derive processing key via tree traversal let pk = calc_pk_from_dk(&dk.key, uv, v_mask, dev_key_v_mask); // Validate and derive media key if uvs_idx < cvalues.len() / 16 { let cv = &cvalues[uvs_idx * 16..(uvs_idx + 1) * 16]; if let Some(mk) = validate_processing_key(&pk, cv, &uvs[1 + uvs_idx * 5..], &mk_dv) { return Some(mk); } } } } } } None } /// MKB disc structure format code. const MKB_DISC_STRUCTURE_FORMAT: u8 = 0x83; /// MKB pack buffer size. const MKB_PACK_SIZE: usize = 32772; /// Read MKB from drive via SCSI (REPORT DISC STRUCTURE format 0x83). /// Returns the concatenated MKB data from all packs. pub fn read_mkb_from_drive( session: &mut crate::drive::Drive, ) -> crate::error::Result> { use crate::scsi::{DataDirection, SCSI_READ_DISC_STRUCTURE}; let cdb = [ SCSI_READ_DISC_STRUCTURE, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, MKB_DISC_STRUCTURE_FORMAT, (MKB_PACK_SIZE >> 8) as u8, (MKB_PACK_SIZE & 0xFF) as u8, 0x00, 0x00, ]; let mut buf = vec![0u8; 32772]; session.scsi_execute(&cdb, DataDirection::FromDevice, &mut buf, 10_000)?; let data_len = u16::from_be_bytes([buf[0], buf[1]]) as usize; if data_len < 2 { return Ok(Vec::new()); } let len = data_len - 2; let num_packs = buf[3] as usize; let mut mkb = Vec::with_capacity(32768 * num_packs.max(1)); if len > 0 && len <= 32768 { mkb.extend_from_slice(&buf[4..4 + len]); } // Read remaining packs for pack in 1..num_packs { let mut cdb = [ SCSI_READ_DISC_STRUCTURE, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, MKB_DISC_STRUCTURE_FORMAT, (MKB_PACK_SIZE >> 8) as u8, (MKB_PACK_SIZE & 0xFF) as u8, 0x00, 0x00, ]; // Pack number goes in address field cdb[2] = ((pack >> 24) & 0xFF) as u8; cdb[3] = ((pack >> 16) & 0xFF) as u8; cdb[4] = ((pack >> 8) & 0xFF) as u8; cdb[5] = (pack & 0xFF) as u8; let mut buf = vec![0u8; 32772]; if session .scsi_execute(&cdb, DataDirection::FromDevice, &mut buf, 10_000) .is_ok() { let len = u16::from_be_bytes([buf[0], buf[1]]) as usize; if len > 2 && len - 2 <= 32768 { mkb.extend_from_slice(&buf[4..4 + len - 2]); } } } Ok(mkb) } // ── Content Certificate parsing ───────────────────────────────────────────── /// AACS Content Certificate — identifies disc AACS version and features. #[derive(Debug)] pub struct ContentCert { /// Bus encryption enabled flag pub bus_encryption: bool, /// Content Certificate ID (6 bytes) pub cc_id: [u8; 6], /// AACS version: false = AACS 1.0, true = AACS 2.0 pub aacs2: bool, } /// Parse a Content Certificate (ContentXXX.cer) file. pub fn parse_content_cert(data: &[u8]) -> Option { if data.len() < 8 { return None; } // Content Certificate format: // [0] certificate type (0x00 = AACS1, 0x01 = AACS2) // [1] bus_encryption_enabled (bit 0) // [2..8] cc_id (6 bytes) let aacs2 = data[0] != 0x00; let bus_encryption = (data[1] & 0x01) != 0; let mut cc_id = [0u8; 6]; cc_id.copy_from_slice(&data[2..8]); Some(ContentCert { bus_encryption, cc_id, aacs2, }) } // ── Full VUK resolution chain ─────────────────────────────────────────────── /// Result of resolving a disc's VUK. #[derive(Debug)] pub struct ResolvedKeys { /// Disc hash (SHA1 of Unit_Key_RO.inf) pub disc_hash: [u8; 20], /// Volume Unique Key pub vuk: [u8; 16], /// Decrypted unit keys (CPS unit number, key) pub unit_keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])>, /// Title → CPS unit index mapping pub title_cps_unit: Vec, /// Whether AACS 2.0 pub aacs2: bool, /// Whether bus encryption is enabled (from Content Certificate) pub bus_encryption: bool, /// Which resolution path succeeded (1=KEYDB, 2=KEYDB derived, 3=PK, 4=DK) pub key_source: u8, } /// Resolve all AACS keys for a disc given: /// - Unit_Key_RO.inf raw data /// - Content Certificate raw data (optional, for AACS version detection) /// - Volume ID (from SCSI handshake) /// - KEYDB /// /// Tries in order: /// 1. Disc hash → KEYDB → VUK (fast path) /// 2. KEYDB media key + volume ID → VUK (if disc hash not in KEYDB but MK is) /// 3. MKB + processing keys → media key → VUK (full derivation) pub fn resolve_keys( unit_key_ro_data: &[u8], content_cert_data: Option<&[u8]>, volume_id: &[u8; 16], keydb: &KeyDb, mkb_data: Option<&[u8]>, ) -> Option { // Detect AACS version let aacs2 = content_cert_data .and_then(parse_content_cert) .map(|cc| cc.aacs2) .unwrap_or(false); let bus_encryption = content_cert_data .and_then(parse_content_cert) .map(|cc| cc.bus_encryption) .unwrap_or(false); // Parse Unit_Key_RO.inf let uk_file = parse_unit_key_ro(unit_key_ro_data, aacs2)?; let hash_hex = disc_hash_hex(&uk_file.disc_hash); // Helper to build result let build = |vuk: [u8; 16], key_source: u8| -> ResolvedKeys { let unit_keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])> = uk_file .encrypted_keys .iter() .map(|(num, enc_key)| (*num, decrypt_unit_key(&vuk, enc_key))) .collect(); ResolvedKeys { disc_hash: uk_file.disc_hash, vuk, unit_keys, title_cps_unit: uk_file.title_cps_unit.clone(), aacs2, bus_encryption, key_source, } }; // Path 1: Look up VUK by disc hash in KEYDB if let Some(entry) = keydb.find_disc(&hash_hex) { if let Some(vuk) = entry.vuk { return Some(build(vuk, 1)); } } // Path 2: Find entry with matching VID → derive VUK from MK + VID for entry in keydb.disc_entries.values() { if let (Some(mk), Some(did)) = (entry.media_key, entry.disc_id) { if did == *volume_id { return Some(build(derive_vuk(&mk, volume_id), 2)); } } } // Path 3: MKB + processing keys → media key → VUK if let Some(mkb) = mkb_data { if let Some(mk) = derive_media_key_from_pk(mkb, &keydb.processing_keys) { return Some(build(derive_vuk(&mk, volume_id), 3)); } // Path 4: MKB + device keys → processing key → media key → VUK if let Some(mk) = derive_media_key_from_dk(mkb, &keydb.device_keys) { return Some(build(derive_vuk(&mk, volume_id), 4)); } } None } #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use super::super::decrypt::{aes_ecb_encrypt, ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN}; use super::super::keydb::{DiscEntry, KeyDb}; use super::*; /// Get KEYDB path from KEYDB_PATH environment variable. Returns None if not set or not found. fn keydb_path() -> Option { let path = std::path::PathBuf::from(std::env::var("KEYDB_PATH").ok()?); if path.exists() { Some(path) } else { None } } #[test] fn test_vuk_derivation() { // Civil War UHD: known MK, VID, VUK from KEYDB // MK = 15665F98..., VID (disc_id) = from entry, VUK = F96D7908... // VUK = AES-DEC(MK, VID) XOR VID let path = match keydb_path() { Some(p) => p, None => return, }; let db = KeyDb::load(&path).unwrap(); // Find a disc with both MK, disc_id, and VUK so we can verify derivation let entry = db .disc_entries .values() .find(|e| e.media_key.is_some() && e.disc_id.is_some() && e.vuk.is_some()) .expect("No disc with MK + VID + VUK"); let mk = entry.media_key.unwrap(); let vid = entry.disc_id.unwrap(); let expected_vuk = entry.vuk.unwrap(); let derived = derive_vuk(&mk, &vid); assert_eq!( derived, expected_vuk, "VUK derivation failed for disc: {} (hash {})", entry.title, entry.disc_hash ); eprintln!("VUK derivation verified for: {}", entry.title); } #[test] fn test_decrypt_unit_key_from_vuk() { // Test the full chain: VUK → decrypt encrypted unit key → unit key // Use a known disc from KEYDB that has both VUK and unit keys let path = match keydb_path() { Some(p) => p, None => return, }; let db = KeyDb::load(&path).unwrap(); // Find a disc with VUK and unit keys let entry = db .disc_entries .values() .find(|e| e.vuk.is_some() && !e.unit_keys.is_empty()) .expect("No disc with VUK + unit keys"); eprintln!( "Testing unit key decrypt for: {} ({})", entry.title, entry.disc_hash ); eprintln!(" VUK: {:02X?}", entry.vuk.unwrap()); for (num, key) in &entry.unit_keys { eprintln!(" Unit key {}: {:02X?}", num, key); } // The unit keys in KEYDB are already decrypted — we can verify the chain // by encrypting with VUK and then decrypting let vuk = entry.vuk.unwrap(); for (num, expected_uk) in &entry.unit_keys { let encrypted = aes_ecb_encrypt(&vuk, expected_uk); let decrypted = decrypt_unit_key(&vuk, &encrypted); assert_eq!( &decrypted, expected_uk, "Unit key {} roundtrip failed for {}", num, entry.title ); } eprintln!(" All {} unit key roundtrips passed", entry.unit_keys.len()); } #[test] fn test_decrypt_real_unit() { // Try decrypting a real encrypted aligned unit from Civil War UHD // This disc is AACS 2.0 (BEE) so unit key alone won't work — // we need bus decryption first. But this verifies the pipeline. let unit_path = std::path::Path::new("/tmp/encrypted_unit.bin"); if !unit_path.exists() { return; } let original = std::fs::read(unit_path).unwrap(); assert_eq!(original.len(), ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN); assert!( super::super::decrypt::is_unit_encrypted(&original), "Unit should be encrypted" ); let kp = match keydb_path() { Some(p) => p, None => return, }; let db = KeyDb::load(&kp).unwrap(); // Civil War UHD entries let civil_war_entries: Vec<&DiscEntry> = db .disc_entries .values() .filter(|e| e.title.contains("CIVIL WAR") && !e.unit_keys.is_empty()) .collect(); eprintln!( "Found {} Civil War entries with unit keys", civil_war_entries.len() ); // Try each entry's unit keys for entry in &civil_war_entries { let keys: Vec<[u8; 16]> = entry.unit_keys.iter().map(|(_, k)| *k).collect(); let mut unit = original.clone(); if let Some(idx) = super::super::decrypt::decrypt_unit_try_keys(&mut unit, &keys) { eprintln!( "SUCCESS: Decrypted with entry {} key {}", entry.disc_hash, idx ); // Count TS sync bytes let ts = (0..32).filter(|&i| unit[4 + i * 192] == 0x47).count(); eprintln!(" TS sync bytes: {}/32", ts); return; } } // Expected: none work because this is AACS 2.0 and needs bus decryption first eprintln!("No unit key worked (expected for AACS 2.0 BEE disc — needs read_data_key)"); } #[test] fn test_disc_hash() { // SHA1 of a known byte sequence let data = b"test unit key ro inf data"; let hash = disc_hash(data); assert_ne!(hash, [0u8; 20]); // Same input → same hash assert_eq!(hash, disc_hash(data)); } #[test] fn test_disc_hash_hex() { let hash = [ ***REMOVED***, ]; let hex = disc_hash_hex(&hash); assert_eq!(hex, "***REMOVED***"); } #[test] fn test_parse_unit_key_ro_synthetic() { // Build a synthetic Unit_Key_RO.inf // Header: uk_pos at offset 0 (BE32), points to key storage // Keys at uk_pos + 48 (16 bytes each, 48-byte stride for AACS 1.0) let mut data = vec![0u8; 256]; // uk_pos = 0x60 (96) data[0] = 0x00; data[1] = 0x00; data[2] = 0x00; data[3] = 0x60; // Header fields at 16-18 data[16] = 1; // app_type = BD-ROM data[17] = 1; // num_bdmv_dir data[18] = 0; // no SKB // Title mapping at 20-25 data[20] = 0; data[21] = 1; // first_play = CPS unit 1 data[22] = 0; data[23] = 1; // top_menu = CPS unit 1 data[24] = 0; data[25] = 1; // num_titles = 1 // Title 0 entry: 2 bytes pad + CPS unit data[28] = 0; data[29] = 1; // CPS unit 1 // Key storage at offset 0x60 let uk_pos = 0x60usize; data[uk_pos] = 0; data[uk_pos + 1] = 2; // 2 unit keys // Key 1 at uk_pos + 48 let key1_pos = uk_pos + 48; for i in 0..16 { data[key1_pos + i] = 0xAA; } // Key 2 at uk_pos + 48 + 48 let key2_pos = key1_pos + 48; for i in 0..16 { data[key2_pos + i] = 0xBB; } let parsed = parse_unit_key_ro(&data, false).unwrap(); assert_eq!(parsed.app_type, 1); assert_eq!(parsed.num_bdmv_dir, 1); assert!(!parsed.aacs2); assert_eq!(parsed.encrypted_keys.len(), 2); assert_eq!(parsed.encrypted_keys[0].0, 1); // CPS unit 1 assert_eq!(parsed.encrypted_keys[0].1, [0xAA; 16]); assert_eq!(parsed.encrypted_keys[1].0, 2); // CPS unit 2 assert_eq!(parsed.encrypted_keys[1].1, [0xBB; 16]); } #[test] fn test_mkb_version_parse() { // Synthetic MKB with Type and Version record (0x81) let mut mkb = vec![0u8; 32]; // Record: type=0x81, length=12 (BE24) mkb[0] = 0x81; mkb[1] = 0x00; mkb[2] = 0x00; mkb[3] = 0x0C; // Version = 77 mkb[4] = 0x00; mkb[5] = 0x00; mkb[6] = 0x00; mkb[7] = 77; assert_eq!(mkb_version(&mkb), Some(77)); } #[test] fn test_resolve_keys_vuk_path() { // Test the full resolve chain using VUK path let path = match keydb_path() { Some(p) => p, None => return, }; let db = KeyDb::load(&path).unwrap(); // Find V for Vendetta BD — has VUK and unit keys // hash: ***REMOVED*** let entry = db.find_disc("***REMOVED***"); if entry.is_none() { return; } let entry = entry.unwrap(); let vuk = entry.vuk.unwrap(); let vid = entry.disc_id.unwrap(); // We need the actual Unit_Key_RO.inf from the disc to compute disc hash. // Since we don't have it, we can at least test that the KEYDB lookup // works with a known hash. let hash_hex = "***REMOVED***"; let found = db.find_disc(hash_hex); assert!(found.is_some()); assert_eq!(found.unwrap().vuk, Some(vuk)); // Verify VUK derivation if we have MK + VID if let Some(mk) = entry.media_key { let derived = derive_vuk(&mk, &vid); assert_eq!(derived, vuk, "VUK derivation mismatch for V for Vendetta"); eprintln!("V for Vendetta VUK derivation verified"); } } #[test] fn test_content_cert_parse() { // AACS 1.0 cert let mut data = vec![0u8; 16]; data[0] = 0x00; // AACS 1.0 data[1] = 0x00; // no bus encryption let cc = parse_content_cert(&data).unwrap(); assert!(!cc.aacs2); assert!(!cc.bus_encryption); // AACS 2.0 with bus encryption data[0] = 0x01; // AACS 2.0 data[1] = 0x01; // bus encryption enabled let cc = parse_content_cert(&data).unwrap(); assert!(cc.aacs2); assert!(cc.bus_encryption); } }