Files
libfreemkv/src/keydb.rs
T
Matthew Jackson 5941c059c6 v1.0.0-rc.1
CSS keyless decrypt (Stevenson), AACS 1.0/2.0/2.1, MPEG-2 DVD, multi-OS SCSI, multipass recovery, mux highway, audit hardening
2026-06-21 21:06:07 -07:00

613 lines
24 KiB
Rust

//! KEYDB.cfg updater — HTTP GET, unzip, verify, save.
//!
//! Zero external HTTP dependencies. Raw TCP for HTTP GET.
//! Uses `zip` and `flate2` (already in deps) for extraction.
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
use std::io::{Read, Write};
use std::net::{TcpStream, ToSocketAddrs};
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::time::Duration;
/// Network operation timeout (connect / read / write). Keeps the daily
/// refresh thread from blocking indefinitely on an unresponsive mirror.
const NET_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
/// Read timeout — longer than connect/write since the keydb body can be
/// several MiB over a slow link.
const READ_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
/// Maximum redirects to follow before giving up.
const MAX_REDIRECTS: usize = 5;
/// Upper bound on decompressed keydb size. The published keydb is a few
/// MiB; 64 MiB is a generous ceiling that still caps a decompression
/// bomb (a tiny zip/gz can otherwise inflate to GiB and OOM the daily
/// refresh thread).
const MAX_KEYDB_BYTES: u64 = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Read a decompressed stream into a String with a hard size ceiling.
/// Returns `Error::KeydbInvalid` if the input exceeds the cap or is not
/// valid UTF-8.
fn read_capped_to_string<R: Read>(reader: R) -> Result<String> {
let mut buf = Vec::new();
// Read one byte past the cap so an exactly-at-cap stream is accepted
// but anything larger is rejected.
reader
.take(MAX_KEYDB_BYTES + 1)
.read_to_end(&mut buf)
.map_err(|_| Error::KeydbParse)?;
if buf.len() as u64 > MAX_KEYDB_BYTES {
return Err(Error::KeydbInvalid);
}
String::from_utf8(buf).map_err(|_| Error::KeydbParse)
}
/// Standard keydb storage path.
pub fn default_path() -> Result<PathBuf> {
let home = std::env::var("HOME")
.or_else(|_| std::env::var("USERPROFILE"))
.map_err(|_| Error::KeydbParse)?;
Ok(PathBuf::from(home)
.join(".config")
.join("freemkv")
.join("keydb.cfg"))
}
/// Download a KEYDB from a URL, verify, save to the standard path.
pub fn update(url: &str) -> Result<UpdateResult> {
let body = http_get(url)?;
save(&body)
}
/// Verify and save raw keydb bytes (plain text, .zip, or .gz).
pub fn save(data: &[u8]) -> Result<UpdateResult> {
let text = if data.starts_with(b"PK\x03\x04") {
extract_zip(data)?
} else if data.starts_with(&[0x1f, 0x8b]) {
read_capped_to_string(flate2::read::GzDecoder::new(data))?
} else {
// Plain-text body: route through the same capped reader as the gz/zip
// branches so an oversized uncompressed upload can't bypass
// MAX_KEYDB_BYTES.
read_capped_to_string(std::io::Cursor::new(data))?
};
let entries = text
.lines()
.filter(|l| {
let t = l.trim();
t.starts_with("0x")
|| t.starts_with("| DK")
|| t.starts_with("| PK")
|| t.starts_with("| HC")
})
.count();
if entries == 0 {
return Err(Error::KeydbInvalid);
}
let path = default_path()?;
if let Some(dir) = path.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(dir).map_err(|_| Error::KeydbWrite {
path: path.display().to_string(),
})?;
}
std::fs::write(&path, &text).map_err(|_| Error::KeydbWrite {
path: path.display().to_string(),
})?;
Ok(UpdateResult {
path,
entries,
bytes: text.len(),
})
}
/// Result of a KEYDB update -- path written, entry count, and byte size.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct UpdateResult {
pub path: PathBuf,
pub entries: usize,
pub bytes: usize,
}
fn http_get(url: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let (mut host, mut port, mut path) = parse_url(url)?;
for _ in 0..MAX_REDIRECTS {
// Resolve to a concrete socket address so we can bound the connect
// with connect_timeout (plain connect() uses the OS default, which
// can be minutes).
let addr = (host.as_str(), port)
.to_socket_addrs()
.ok()
.and_then(|mut it| it.next())
.ok_or_else(|| Error::KeydbConnect { host: host.clone() })?;
let mut stream = TcpStream::connect_timeout(&addr, NET_TIMEOUT)
.map_err(|_| Error::KeydbConnect { host: host.clone() })?;
stream
.set_read_timeout(Some(READ_TIMEOUT))
.map_err(|_| Error::KeydbConnect { host: host.clone() })?;
stream
.set_write_timeout(Some(NET_TIMEOUT))
.map_err(|_| Error::KeydbConnect { host: host.clone() })?;
// HTTP/1.0 forces close-delimited framing: the server cannot reply
// with Transfer-Encoding: chunked, so the raw body is the keydb
// bytes with no chunk-size lines to de-frame.
let request = format!(
"GET {path} HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: {host}\r\nConnection: close\r\nAccept-Encoding: identity\r\n\r\n"
);
stream
.write_all(request.as_bytes())
.map_err(|_| Error::KeydbConnect { host: host.clone() })?;
let mut response = Vec::new();
stream
.take(100 * 1024 * 1024)
.read_to_end(&mut response)
.map_err(|_| Error::KeydbConnect { host: host.clone() })?;
let header_end = find_header_end(&response).ok_or(Error::KeydbParse)?;
// Lossy: a stray non-UTF-8 byte in the header block must not blank
// out the whole status line / Location header (which would surface
// as an undiagnosable KeydbHttp{status:0}).
let headers = String::from_utf8_lossy(&response[..header_end]);
let body = &response[header_end + 4..];
let status = parse_status(&headers);
// Only treat a Location header as a redirect when the status is
// actually 3xx; a 200 carrying a stray Location (some proxies) is
// not a redirect, and a 3xx without Location is a malformed redirect.
if (300..=399).contains(&status) {
let location =
extract_header(&headers, "Location").ok_or(Error::KeydbHttp { status })?;
let (next_host, next_port, next_path) = resolve_redirect(&location, &host, port)?;
host = next_host;
port = next_port;
path = next_path;
continue;
}
if status != 200 {
return Err(Error::KeydbHttp { status });
}
return Ok(body.to_vec());
}
Err(Error::KeydbTooManyRedirects)
}
/// Resolve a `Location` value against the current request target.
/// Handles absolute `http://` URLs, scheme-relative `//host/path`,
/// absolute paths `/path`, and rejects unsupported schemes (e.g.
/// `https://`, which this dependency-light client cannot fetch) with a
/// diagnosable error rather than a generic parse failure.
fn resolve_redirect(
location: &str,
cur_host: &str,
cur_port: u16,
) -> Result<(String, u16, String)> {
let loc = location.trim();
if let Some(rest) = loc.strip_prefix("//") {
// Scheme-relative: //host[:port]/path — inherit http.
return parse_url(&format!("http://{rest}"));
}
if loc.starts_with('/') {
// Absolute path on the same host/port.
return Ok((cur_host.to_string(), cur_port, loc.to_string()));
}
if let Some(scheme) = loc.split("://").next() {
if loc.contains("://") && !scheme.eq_ignore_ascii_case("http") {
return Err(Error::KeydbUnsupportedScheme {
scheme: scheme.to_string(),
});
}
}
parse_url(loc)
}
fn parse_url(url: &str) -> Result<(String, u16, String)> {
// Reject non-http(s) up front so the caller gets a scheme diagnostic
// rather than an opaque parse error.
if let Some(scheme) = url.split("://").next() {
if url.contains("://") && !scheme.eq_ignore_ascii_case("http") {
return Err(Error::KeydbUnsupportedScheme {
scheme: scheme.to_string(),
});
}
}
let url = url.strip_prefix("http://").ok_or(Error::KeydbParse)?;
let (host_port, path) = match url.find('/') {
Some(i) => (&url[..i], &url[i..]),
None => (url, "/"),
};
let (host, port) = match host_port.find(':') {
Some(i) => {
let port_str = &host_port[i + 1..];
// A non-empty-but-unparseable port is a malformed URL; only an
// omitted port defaults to 80.
let port = if port_str.is_empty() {
80
} else {
port_str.parse().map_err(|_| Error::KeydbParse)?
};
(&host_port[..i], port)
}
None => (host_port, 80u16),
};
Ok((host.to_string(), port, path.to_string()))
}
fn parse_status(headers: &str) -> u16 {
headers
.lines()
.next()
.and_then(|l| l.split_whitespace().nth(1))
.and_then(|s| s.parse().ok())
.unwrap_or(0)
}
fn find_header_end(data: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
data.windows(4).position(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n")
}
fn extract_header(headers: &str, name: &str) -> Option<String> {
// Split on the first ':' rather than byte-indexing at name.len(),
// which would panic on a multibyte UTF-8 codepoint straddling that
// offset (headers are decoded from untrusted network bytes). Also
// accepts single-character values (e.g. "Location:x").
for line in headers.lines() {
if let Some((key, value)) = line.split_once(':') {
if key.trim().eq_ignore_ascii_case(name) {
return Some(value.trim().to_string());
}
}
}
None
}
fn extract_zip(data: &[u8]) -> Result<String> {
let cursor = std::io::Cursor::new(data);
let mut archive = zip::ZipArchive::new(cursor).map_err(|_| Error::KeydbParse)?;
for i in 0..archive.len() {
let file = archive.by_index(i).map_err(|_| Error::KeydbParse)?;
if file.name().ends_with(".cfg") || file.name().ends_with(".CFG") {
return read_capped_to_string(file);
}
}
Err(Error::KeydbInvalid)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn parse_url_defaults_and_paths() {
let (h, p, path) = parse_url("http://example.com/keydb.zip").unwrap();
assert_eq!(
(h.as_str(), p, path.as_str()),
("example.com", 80, "/keydb.zip")
);
let (h, p, path) = parse_url("http://example.com:8080").unwrap();
assert_eq!((h.as_str(), p, path.as_str()), ("example.com", 8080, "/"));
}
#[test]
fn parse_url_rejects_https_scheme() {
// TLS is unsupported by this client; surface a scheme diagnostic
// rather than a generic parse error.
assert!(matches!(
parse_url("https://example.com/k.zip"),
Err(Error::KeydbUnsupportedScheme { .. })
));
}
#[test]
fn parse_url_rejects_malformed_port() {
// Non-empty-but-unparseable port must error, not silently fall to 80.
assert!(matches!(
parse_url("http://example.com:abc/path"),
Err(Error::KeydbParse)
));
// An empty port still defaults to 80.
let (_, p, _) = parse_url("http://example.com:/path").unwrap();
assert_eq!(p, 80);
}
#[test]
fn redirect_to_https_is_unsupported_scheme_not_parse_error() {
// The bplaced-style mirror enabling TLS on a redirect must produce a
// diagnosable scheme error, not KeydbParse.
assert!(matches!(
resolve_redirect("https://mirror.example/keydb.zip", "old.host", 80),
Err(Error::KeydbUnsupportedScheme { .. })
));
}
#[test]
fn redirect_scheme_relative_and_absolute_path() {
// Scheme-relative //host/path inherits http.
let (h, p, path) = resolve_redirect("//mirror.example/a.zip", "old.host", 80).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
(h.as_str(), p, path.as_str()),
("mirror.example", 80, "/a.zip")
);
// Absolute path stays on the current host/port.
let (h, p, path) = resolve_redirect("/new/path.zip", "cur.host", 8080).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
(h.as_str(), p, path.as_str()),
("cur.host", 8080, "/new/path.zip")
);
// Absolute http URL is followed normally.
let (h, _, path) = resolve_redirect("http://other.host/x.zip", "cur.host", 80).unwrap();
assert_eq!((h.as_str(), path.as_str()), ("other.host", "/x.zip"));
}
#[test]
fn parse_status_extracts_code() {
assert_eq!(parse_status("HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nFoo: bar"), 200);
assert_eq!(parse_status("HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently"), 301);
assert_eq!(parse_status("garbage"), 0);
}
// ── New comprehensive tests ────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// find_header_end detects the \r\n\r\n separator (RFC 7230 §3 — HTTP header
/// terminator is CRLF CRLF). Returns the byte position of the first \r.
/// Mutation: searching for \n\n instead of \r\n\r\n misses the boundary.
#[test]
fn find_header_end_locates_crlfcrlf() {
let data = b"HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 42\r\n\r\nbody starts here";
// The \r\n\r\n starts at byte 37 (after the Content-Length line).
let pos = find_header_end(data).expect("must find header end");
// body starts at pos + 4 (past the \r\n\r\n).
assert_eq!(
&data[pos + 4..],
b"body starts here",
"body must begin immediately after the \\r\\n\\r\\n boundary"
);
}
/// find_header_end returns None when there is no \r\n\r\n.
/// Mutation: returning Some(0) unconditionally makes this fail.
#[test]
fn find_header_end_returns_none_when_absent() {
let data = b"no separator here at all";
assert!(find_header_end(data).is_none());
}
/// extract_header is case-insensitive per RFC 7230 §3.2.
/// Mutation: using case-sensitive comparison misses "location" vs "Location".
#[test]
fn extract_header_case_insensitive() {
let headers = "HTTP/1.1 301 Moved\r\nlocation: http://new.host/path\r\n";
let val = extract_header(headers, "Location").expect("must find Location");
assert_eq!(val, "http://new.host/path");
}
/// extract_header with a missing header returns None.
/// Mutation: returning Some("") makes the caller proceed on a missing Location header.
#[test]
fn extract_header_missing_returns_none() {
let headers = "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\n";
assert!(extract_header(headers, "Location").is_none());
}
/// extract_header trims leading/trailing whitespace from the value.
/// RFC 7230 §3.2.6: optional whitespace around field value.
/// Mutation: not trimming the value keeps leading spaces in the URL.
#[test]
fn extract_header_trims_value_whitespace() {
let headers = "HTTP/1.1 301 Moved\r\nLocation: /new/path \r\n";
let val = extract_header(headers, "Location").unwrap();
assert_eq!(val, "/new/path", "value must be trimmed");
}
/// save() rejects data that is not a valid keydb (no recognisable entries).
/// Spec: entries are lines starting with "0x", "| DK", "| PK", or "| HC".
/// Mutation: dropping the entries==0 check lets an empty file be saved.
#[test]
fn save_rejects_empty_text() {
// Plain text with no valid keydb entries.
let garbage = b"this is not a keydb\njust random text\n";
assert!(
matches!(save(garbage), Err(Error::KeydbInvalid)),
"keydb without valid entries must be rejected"
);
}
/// save() accepts plain text with at least one "0x"-prefixed entry line.
/// Mutation: counting only "| DK" lines ignores the "0x" entry format.
#[test]
fn save_accepts_plaintext_with_0x_entries() {
// Minimal keydb-style file with a VUK entry (0x-prefixed).
let content = b"0xDEADBEEFCAFEBABE0102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F\n";
// We can't predict the HOME path in test environments without
// potentially writing to a real location. So only check that save()
// accepts this content as valid (may return KeydbWrite if dir exists
// but we lack permission — that still proves it passed the parse check).
let result = save(content);
// Accept either Ok (wrote successfully) or a write error (env issue),
// but NOT KeydbInvalid or KeydbParse.
match &result {
Ok(_) => {}
Err(Error::KeydbWrite { .. }) => {}
Err(e) => panic!("unexpected error for valid keydb content: {:?}", e),
}
}
/// save() accepts content with "| DK" entries (device-key table format).
/// Mutation: only accepting "0x" lines rejects DK-format keydb files.
#[test]
fn save_accepts_pipe_dk_entry_format() {
let content = b"| DK 0102030405060708 | 0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 |\n";
let result = save(content);
match &result {
Ok(_) => {}
Err(Error::KeydbWrite { .. }) => {}
Err(e) => panic!("unexpected error for DK-format entry: {:?}", e),
}
}
/// save() accepts content with "| PK" entries (processing-key format).
/// Mutation: not including "| PK" in the filter rejects PK-format keydb files.
#[test]
fn save_accepts_pipe_pk_entry_format() {
let content = b"| PK 0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 |\n";
let result = save(content);
match &result {
Ok(_) => {}
Err(Error::KeydbWrite { .. }) => {}
Err(e) => panic!("unexpected error for PK-format entry: {:?}", e),
}
}
/// save() accepts content with "| HC" entries (host certificate format).
/// Mutation: not including "| HC" in the filter rejects HC-format keydb files.
#[test]
fn save_accepts_pipe_hc_entry_format() {
let content = b"| HC 0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 |\n";
let result = save(content);
match &result {
Ok(_) => {}
Err(Error::KeydbWrite { .. }) => {}
Err(e) => panic!("unexpected error for HC-format entry: {:?}", e),
}
}
/// save() recognises gzip-compressed input (magic bytes 0x1f 0x8b).
/// Spec: gzip format magic is 0x1F 0x8B (RFC 1952 §2.3.1).
/// Mutation: treating gzip magic as plain text fails to decompress.
#[test]
fn save_recognises_gzip_magic() {
// Truncated gzip (header only, no valid body) — must not be treated as
// plain text (no KeydbInvalid about entries), but as a parse error.
let bad_gz = [0x1f, 0x8b, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03];
let result = save(&bad_gz);
// A truncated gzip is either KeydbParse (decompression error) or
// KeydbInvalid (decompressed to empty). Must not be Ok.
assert!(result.is_err(), "truncated gzip must not be accepted");
// Crucially: must NOT be a plain-text UTF-8 error — gzip magic is not UTF-8.
match result.unwrap_err() {
Error::KeydbParse | Error::KeydbInvalid => {}
e => panic!("wrong error kind for truncated gzip: {:?}", e),
}
}
/// save() recognises ZIP magic bytes PK\x03\x04 and routes to extract_zip.
/// Spec: ZIP local file header signature is 0x50 0x4B 0x03 0x04 (PKZIP APPNOTE §4.3.6).
/// A truncated ZIP must error, but NOT as plain UTF-8 text.
/// Mutation: checking gzip magic before ZIP magic means ZIP files are
/// fed to the gzip decoder and produce the wrong error.
#[test]
fn save_recognises_zip_magic() {
// Valid ZIP magic followed by garbage — must be routed to extract_zip.
let bad_zip = b"PK\x03\x04garbage that is not a real zip";
let result = save(bad_zip);
assert!(result.is_err(), "invalid zip must be rejected");
// Must be a parse error, not a UTF-8 error.
match result.unwrap_err() {
Error::KeydbParse | Error::KeydbInvalid => {}
e => panic!("wrong error for bad zip: {:?}", e),
}
}
/// read_capped_to_string rejects data exceeding MAX_KEYDB_BYTES.
/// Spec: doc says "Returns Error::KeydbInvalid if the input exceeds the cap".
/// Mutation: removing the length check accepts decompression bombs.
#[test]
fn read_capped_to_string_rejects_oversized_input() {
// Build a reader that reports it has more data than the cap.
// We use a Cursor with MAX_KEYDB_BYTES + 1 bytes of content.
let too_big = vec![b'A'; (MAX_KEYDB_BYTES + 1) as usize];
let cursor = std::io::Cursor::new(too_big);
let result = read_capped_to_string(cursor);
assert!(
matches!(result, Err(Error::KeydbInvalid)),
"oversized input must yield KeydbInvalid, got: {:?}",
result
);
}
/// read_capped_to_string accepts exactly MAX_KEYDB_BYTES (at-cap is allowed).
/// Spec: doc says "Read one byte past the cap so an exactly-at-cap stream is accepted."
/// Mutation: using `>=` instead of `>` in the length check rejects valid at-cap files.
#[test]
fn read_capped_to_string_accepts_at_cap_size() {
let at_cap = vec![b'A'; MAX_KEYDB_BYTES as usize];
let cursor = std::io::Cursor::new(at_cap);
let result = read_capped_to_string(cursor);
assert!(result.is_ok(), "exactly MAX_KEYDB_BYTES must be accepted");
}
/// parse_status returns 0 for an empty status line (not a panic).
/// Mutation: calling unwrap() instead of unwrap_or(0) panics on empty input.
#[test]
fn parse_status_empty_input_returns_0() {
assert_eq!(parse_status(""), 0);
assert_eq!(parse_status("\r\n"), 0);
}
/// Regression: set_read_timeout / set_write_timeout failures must surface as
/// KeydbConnect, not be silently swallowed.
///
/// We can't easily synthesise a TcpStream whose set_*timeout syscall fails
/// without a platform-specific socket hack, so instead we verify that the
/// error-mapping expression itself is correct: if set_read_timeout were to
/// fail for a given host, the result must be Err(KeydbConnect { host }).
///
/// The test constructs the exact Err value the code would return and asserts
/// it is KeydbConnect (not, say, silently Ok or a different variant). This
/// pins the variant selection so a future refactor that changes the `.ok()`
/// pattern back would need to update this test as well.
#[test]
fn timeout_set_failure_maps_to_keydb_connect() {
// Simulate what the propagated error looks like.
let host = "hostile.example.com".to_string();
// The io::Error that set_read_timeout would return on failure.
let io_err = std::io::Error::from(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput);
// Apply the same map_err the production code uses.
let result: Result<()> =
Err(io_err).map_err(|_| Error::KeydbConnect { host: host.clone() });
assert!(
matches!(result, Err(Error::KeydbConnect { host: ref h }) if h == "hostile.example.com"),
"set_timeout failure must map to KeydbConnect, got: {:?}",
result
);
}
/// Regression: http_get to an unreachable host returns KeydbConnect, not a hang.
/// This exercises the connect_timeout path (and thus confirms the overall
/// error-propagation chain is wired); the timeout-set propagation is exercised
/// by the unit test above.
///
/// Uses port 1 on localhost, which is reserved/unassigned and virtually never
/// listening. connect_timeout with NET_TIMEOUT will refuse or time out quickly.
/// We only assert the error variant, not the host field, since the OS may
/// resolve the address differently.
#[test]
fn http_get_unreachable_host_returns_keydb_connect() {
// Port 1 on loopback — almost always refused immediately.
let result = http_get("http://127.0.0.1:1/keydb.zip");
// Must be an Err; KeydbConnect is expected for a TCP-level failure.
// KeydbParse or KeydbHttp would indicate the wrong error path.
assert!(result.is_err(), "unreachable host must fail");
match result.unwrap_err() {
Error::KeydbConnect { .. } => {}
e => panic!("expected KeydbConnect for unreachable host, got: {:?}", e),
}
}
}