Matthew Jackson
61b6070f03
A Processing Key is the key at its Subset-Difference node — one AES-G from the Media Key — so it is tried directly against the MKB cvalue tables, matching libaacs _calc_mk_pks (iterate PKs × cvalues). The prior code treated every PK entry as a device-node label at unknown depth and BFS-walked the SD tree (depth 3, capped 5), which was both wrong for terminal PKs and ~15x slower on a large UHD MKB (~181k cvalues): PK derivation on UHD dropped from ~37s to ~2.4s. The Subset-Difference tree walk now lives solely in the device-key path (derive_media_key_from_dk), which owns per-node path bits; the PK path never descends. Removed PK_WALK_MAX_DEPTH / _CAP / _walked / walk_pk_against_tables_impl; renamed the core scan try_pk_against_tables and its probe test. Precommit (Rust 1.86): fmt + clippy + tests green.
3055 lines
125 KiB
Rust
3055 lines
125 KiB
Rust
//! AACS key resolution — VUK derivation, MKB processing, disc hash, unit key parsing.
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use super::decrypt::aes_ecb_decrypt;
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use super::types::DeviceKey;
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// ── AACS version ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// AACS protection generation a disc carries.
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///
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/// The content cert byte distinguishes V10 (`0x00`) from V20 (`0x01`). V21
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/// cannot be detected from the cert alone — a V21 disc carries a V20 cert
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/// and is upgraded to `V21` only after the MKB walk turns up record types
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/// `0x82` / `0x83` (Media Key Variant Data and Variant Number).
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///
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/// Key-storage stride in `Unit_Key_RO.inf` is 48 bytes for V10 and 64
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/// bytes for V20 / V21.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum AacsVersion {
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/// AACS 1.0 — original BD-ROM.
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V10,
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/// AACS 2.0 — UHD-BD, classical Media Key derivation.
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V20,
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/// AACS 2.1 — UHD-BD with Media Key Variant chain on top of V20.
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V21,
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}
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/// AACS major version as the small integer threaded through the scan / key
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/// paths (`AacsState.version`, `DiscInputs.version`, `DiscInputsCtx::new`):
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/// 1 = AACS 1.0 (BD), 2 = AACS 2.x (UHD). Centralised so the bare `1`/`2` — and
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/// the V10-vs-else stride choice it drives — lives in exactly one place.
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pub const AACS_MAJOR_BD: u8 = 1;
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pub const AACS_MAJOR_UHD: u8 = 2;
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impl AacsVersion {
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/// Stride (in bytes) between successive encrypted unit keys in
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/// `Unit_Key_RO.inf`.
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fn unit_key_stride(self) -> usize {
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match self {
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AacsVersion::V10 => 48,
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AacsVersion::V20 | AacsVersion::V21 => 64,
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}
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}
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/// This version as the major integer ([`AACS_MAJOR_BD`] / [`AACS_MAJOR_UHD`]).
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pub fn major(self) -> u8 {
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match self {
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AacsVersion::V10 => AACS_MAJOR_BD,
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AacsVersion::V20 | AacsVersion::V21 => AACS_MAJOR_UHD,
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}
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}
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/// The version a bare major integer selects for stride purposes: only the
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/// BD major is V10; every other value takes the V20/V21 64-byte stride.
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pub fn from_major(major: u8) -> Self {
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if major == AACS_MAJOR_BD {
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AacsVersion::V10
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} else {
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AacsVersion::V20
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}
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}
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}
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// ── VUK derivation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// Derive VUK from Media Key and Volume ID.
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/// VUK = AES-128-ECB-DECRYPT(media_key, volume_id) XOR volume_id
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pub fn derive_vuk(media_key: &[u8; 16], volume_id: &[u8; 16]) -> [u8; 16] {
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let mut vuk = aes_ecb_decrypt(media_key, volume_id);
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for i in 0..16 {
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vuk[i] ^= volume_id[i];
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}
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vuk
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}
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/// Decrypt an encrypted unit key using the VUK (AES-128-ECB).
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pub fn decrypt_unit_key(vuk: &[u8; 16], encrypted_uk: &[u8; 16]) -> [u8; 16] {
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aes_ecb_decrypt(vuk, encrypted_uk)
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}
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/// Decrypt every encrypted unit key in a parsed `Unit_Key_RO.inf` with a VUK,
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/// paired with its declared CPS-unit number. THE single VUK→unit-keys step:
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/// both classical/v21 resolvers and `boil::resolve_candidate` call this, so the
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/// map cannot drift between the player and harvest paths.
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pub(crate) fn derive_unit_keys(uk_file: &UnitKeyFile, vuk: &[u8; 16]) -> Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])> {
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uk_file
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.encrypted_keys
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.iter()
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.map(|(num, enc_key)| (*num, decrypt_unit_key(vuk, enc_key)))
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.collect()
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}
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// ── Unit_Key_RO.inf parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// Parsed Unit_Key_RO.inf file.
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#[derive(Debug)]
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pub struct UnitKeyFile {
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/// Disc hash (SHA1 of the entire file) — used as KEYDB lookup key
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pub disc_hash: [u8; 20],
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/// Application type (1 = BD-ROM)
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pub app_type: u8,
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/// Number of BDMV directories
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pub num_bdmv_dir: u8,
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/// Whether SKB MKB is used
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pub use_skb_mkb: bool,
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/// AACS generation this file's stride matches
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pub version: AacsVersion,
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/// Encrypted unit keys (CPS unit number, encrypted key)
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pub encrypted_keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])>,
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/// Title → CPS unit index mapping (title_idx → unit_key_idx)
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pub title_cps_unit: Vec<u16>,
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}
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/// Compute disc hash (SHA1 of Unit_Key_RO.inf content).
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pub fn disc_hash(data: &[u8]) -> [u8; 20] {
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use sha1::{Digest, Sha1};
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let hash = Sha1::digest(data);
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let mut out = [0u8; 20];
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out.copy_from_slice(&hash);
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out
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}
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/// Format disc hash as hex string with 0x prefix (for KEYDB lookup).
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pub fn disc_hash_hex(hash: &[u8; 20]) -> String {
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let mut s = String::with_capacity(42);
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s.push_str("0x");
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for b in hash {
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s.push_str(&format!("{b:02X}"));
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}
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s
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}
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/// Parse Unit_Key_RO.inf from raw bytes.
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///
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/// Format (from AACS spec):
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/// [0..4] BE32: offset to key storage area (uk_pos)
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/// [16] app_type (1 = BD-ROM)
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/// [17] num_bdmv_dir
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/// [18] bit 7: use_skb_mkb
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/// [20..22] BE16: first_play CPS unit
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/// [22..24] BE16: top_menu CPS unit
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/// [24..26] BE16: num_titles
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/// [26..] title entries: 2 bytes padding + 2 bytes CPS unit, × num_titles
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///
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/// Key storage at uk_pos:
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/// [uk_pos..uk_pos+2] BE16: num_unit_keys
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/// [uk_pos+48..] encrypted keys, 16 bytes each
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/// AACS 1.0: 48-byte stride
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/// AACS 2.0 / 2.1: 64-byte stride (48 + 16 extra)
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pub fn parse_unit_key_ro(data: &[u8], version: AacsVersion) -> Option<UnitKeyFile> {
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if data.len() < 20 {
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return None;
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}
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let hash = disc_hash(data);
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// Header
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let app_type = data[16];
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let num_bdmv_dir = data[17];
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let use_skb_mkb = (data[18] >> 7) & 1 == 1;
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// Key storage offset
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let uk_pos = u32::from_be_bytes([data[0], data[1], data[2], data[3]]) as usize;
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if uk_pos + 2 > data.len() {
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return None;
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}
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// Number of unit keys
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let num_uk = u16::from_be_bytes([data[uk_pos], data[uk_pos + 1]]) as usize;
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if num_uk == 0 {
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return Some(UnitKeyFile {
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disc_hash: hash,
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app_type,
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num_bdmv_dir,
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use_skb_mkb,
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version,
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encrypted_keys: Vec::new(),
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title_cps_unit: Vec::new(),
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});
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}
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// Stride between keys
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let stride = version.unit_key_stride();
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// Validate size
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let keys_start = uk_pos + 48; // first key at uk_pos + 48
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if keys_start + 16 > data.len() {
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return None;
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}
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// Extract encrypted keys
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let mut encrypted_keys = Vec::with_capacity(num_uk);
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let mut pos = keys_start;
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for i in 0..num_uk {
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if pos + 16 > data.len() {
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break;
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}
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let mut key = [0u8; 16];
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key.copy_from_slice(&data[pos..pos + 16]);
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encrypted_keys.push(((i + 1) as u32, key));
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pos += stride;
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}
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// The loop above `break`s if the buffer runs out mid-key. A short list
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// means the .inf is malformed/truncated — reject it rather than silently
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// accepting fewer keys than the header declared, which would later map
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// title CPS units to nonexistent keys.
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if encrypted_keys.len() != num_uk {
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return None;
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}
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// Title → CPS unit mapping. libaacs (unit_key.c) validates each on-disc CPS
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// value is in `1..=num_uk` (else zeroes it) and converts the 1-based on-disc
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// index to a 0-based key index. We mirror that so the stored value is a safe,
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// ready-to-use key index rather than a raw 1-based number.
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let to_key_idx = |cps: u16| -> u16 {
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if cps >= 1 && cps as usize <= num_uk {
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cps - 1
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} else {
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0
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}
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};
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let mut title_cps_unit = Vec::new();
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if data.len() >= 26 {
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let first_play = u16::from_be_bytes([data[20], data[21]]);
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let top_menu = u16::from_be_bytes([data[22], data[23]]);
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let num_titles = u16::from_be_bytes([data[24], data[25]]) as usize;
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title_cps_unit.push(to_key_idx(first_play));
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title_cps_unit.push(to_key_idx(top_menu));
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for i in 0..num_titles {
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let off = 26 + i * 4 + 2; // 2 bytes padding + 2 bytes CPS unit
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if off + 2 <= data.len() {
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let cps = u16::from_be_bytes([data[off], data[off + 1]]);
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title_cps_unit.push(to_key_idx(cps));
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}
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}
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}
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Some(UnitKeyFile {
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disc_hash: hash,
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app_type,
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num_bdmv_dir,
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use_skb_mkb,
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version,
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encrypted_keys,
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title_cps_unit,
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})
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}
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// ── MKB processing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// Derive Media Key from MKB data using processing keys.
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///
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/// A Processing Key is **terminal**: it is the key at its Subset-Difference
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/// node, one `AES-G` from the Media Key. So this is the fast path — each PK is
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/// tried *directly* against the MKB cvalue tables (no tree descent), matching
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/// libaacs `_calc_mk_pks` (iterate PKs × cvalues). On a large AACS 2.x UHD MKB
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/// (~181k cvalues) this is ~15x faster than treating a PK as a device-node
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/// label and walking the tree.
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///
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/// If you hold a **device-node label** at unknown tree depth (not a terminal
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/// PK), derive its Media Key through the device-key path
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/// ([`derive_media_key_from_dk`]) — that path owns the Subset-Difference tree
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/// walk; the PK path never descends.
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///
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/// MKB format:
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/// Record type 0x10 = Type and Version Record (has MKB version)
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/// Record type 0x81 = Verify Media Key Record, AACS 1.0 (has mk_dv)
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/// Record type 0x86 = Verify Media Key Record, AACS 2.0/2.1 (has mk_dv)
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/// Record type 0x04 = Subset-Difference Index (has UVS entries)
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/// Record type 0x05 = Media Key Data Record (cvalues, 1:1 with 0x04)
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/// Record type 0x07 = Explicit Subset-Difference Record (NOT cvalues)
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pub fn derive_media_key_from_pk(mkb: &[u8], processing_keys: &[[u8; 16]]) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
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let mk_dv = mkb_find_mk_dv(mkb)?;
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let uvs = mkb_find_subdiff_records(mkb)?;
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let cvalues = mkb_find_cvalues(mkb)?;
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try_pk_against_tables(processing_keys, &uvs, &cvalues, &mk_dv)
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}
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/// Core terminal-PK table scan over explicit record bodies. Each processing
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/// key is tried **directly** against every `(uv, cvalue)` pair — no tree
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/// descent. Reached in production via [`derive_media_key_from_pk`]; factored
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/// out so reproduction harnesses can drive it with explicit tables.
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fn try_pk_against_tables(
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processing_keys: &[[u8; 16]],
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uvs: &[u8],
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cvalues: &[u8],
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mk_dv: &[u8; 16],
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) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
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let num_uvs = uvs
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.chunks(5)
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.take_while(|c| c.len() == 5 && (c[0] & 0xC0) == 0)
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.count();
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for pk in processing_keys {
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for i in 0..num_uvs {
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if (i + 1) * 16 > cvalues.len() {
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continue;
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}
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let record_start = i * 5;
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if record_start + 5 > uvs.len() {
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continue;
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}
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let uv = &uvs[record_start + 1..record_start + 5];
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let cv = &cvalues[i * 16..(i + 1) * 16];
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if let Some(mk) = validate_processing_key(pk, cv, uv, mk_dv) {
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return Some(mk);
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}
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}
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}
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None
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}
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/// Validate a processing key against a cvalue/UV pair.
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/// Returns the Media Key if valid.
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///
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/// Steps:
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/// 1. `mk = AES-128D(pk, cvalue)`
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/// 2. `mk[12..16] ^= uv` (4 bytes XOR into the last 4 bytes only)
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/// 3. `dec_vd = AES-128D(mk, mk_dv)`
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/// 4. If `dec_vd[0..8] == 01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF` → valid.
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fn validate_processing_key(
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pk: &[u8; 16],
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cvalue: &[u8],
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uv: &[u8],
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mk_dv: &[u8; 16],
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) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
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if cvalue.len() < 16 || uv.len() < 4 {
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return None;
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}
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// Step 1: mk = AES-128D(pk, cvalue)
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let mut cv = [0u8; 16];
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cv.copy_from_slice(&cvalue[..16]);
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let mut mk = aes_ecb_decrypt(pk, &cv);
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// Step 2: XOR uv into the last 4 bytes of mk (mk[12..16]).
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for a in 0..4 {
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mk[12 + a] ^= uv[a];
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}
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// Step 3 + 4: dec_vd = AES-128D(mk, mk_dv); verify magic.
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let dec_vd = aes_ecb_decrypt(&mk, mk_dv);
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const VERIFY_MAGIC: [u8; 8] = [0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF];
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if dec_vd[..8] == VERIFY_MAGIC {
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return Some(mk);
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}
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None
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}
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/// Public, side-effect-free accessors over the MKB record helpers, exposed so
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/// independent reproduction harnesses (e.g. `examples/prove_hkd_aacs.rs`) can
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/// exercise the exact same parser + verify primitives the production walk uses.
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/// These are thin wrappers — no new logic.
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pub mod probe {
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use super::aes_ecb_decrypt;
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/// `mk_dv` from the MKB's Verify-Media-Key record (type 0x81 / 0x86).
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pub fn mkb_mk_dv(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
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super::mkb_find_mk_dv(mkb)
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}
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/// Body of the MKB's Subset-Difference Index record (type 0x04).
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pub fn mkb_subdiff(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
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super::mkb_find_subdiff_records(mkb)
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}
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/// Body of the MKB's Media-Key-Data (cvalues) record. Selects record
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/// `0x05` (the large cvalue table, 1:1 with the `0x04` Subset-Difference
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/// index on AACS 2.x UHD MKBs), falling back to `0x07` only when `0x05`
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/// is absent.
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pub fn mkb_cvalues(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
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super::mkb_find_cvalues(mkb)
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}
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/// Body (header stripped) of the first MKB record of `rec_type`. Lets a
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/// harness pin an exact record type for cross-checking the production
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/// cvalue selection (e.g. compare record `0x05` vs `0x07` sizes).
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pub fn mkb_record_body(mkb: &[u8], rec_type: u8) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
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super::find_record_body(mkb, rec_type)
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}
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|
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/// AES-128-ECB single-block decrypt (the AACS verify primitive).
|
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pub fn aes_dec(key: &[u8; 16], block: &[u8; 16]) -> [u8; 16] {
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aes_ecb_decrypt(key, block)
|
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}
|
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|
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/// Does `km` satisfy the MKB's Verify-Media-Key relation?
|
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/// `AES-D(km, mk_dv)[0..8] == 01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF`.
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pub fn km_verifies(mkb: &[u8], km: &[u8; 16]) -> bool {
|
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match super::mkb_find_mk_dv(mkb) {
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Some(mk_dv) => {
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aes_ecb_decrypt(km, &mk_dv)[..8] == [0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF]
|
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}
|
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None => false,
|
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}
|
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}
|
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}
|
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|
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/// Find Verify Media Key Record (type 0x81 for AACS 1.0, 0x86 for AACS 2.0/2.1) in MKB.
|
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fn mkb_find_mk_dv(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
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// Verify-Media-Key record (0x81 for AACS 1.0, 0x86 for AACS 2.x): mk_dv is
|
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// the 16 bytes at record offset 4 (body offset 0). Needs rec_len >= 20.
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let found = crate::aacs::variants::mkb_records(mkb)
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.find(|&(_, rt, len)| (rt == 0x81 || rt == 0x86) && len >= 20);
|
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match found {
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Some((o, rec_type, rec_len)) => {
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let mut dv = [0u8; 16];
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dv.copy_from_slice(&mkb[o + 4..o + 20]);
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tracing::debug!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
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phase = "mkb_mk_dv_found",
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rec_type,
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pos = o,
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rec_len,
|
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"mk_dv extracted from MKB"
|
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);
|
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Some(dv)
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||
}
|
||
None => {
|
||
tracing::warn!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "mkb_mk_dv_not_found",
|
||
"no 0x81/0x86 record with rec_len>=20 found"
|
||
);
|
||
None
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Find Subset-Difference records (type 0x04) in MKB.
|
||
fn mkb_find_subdiff_records(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
|
||
find_record_body(mkb, 0x04)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Find the Media Key Data Record (cvalues table) in an MKB.
|
||
///
|
||
/// The cvalue table is record type `0x05` (Media Key Data) on BOTH AACS
|
||
/// 1.0 and AACS 2.x MKBs — its 16-byte cvalue entries are 1:1 with the
|
||
/// 5-byte Subset-Difference index entries in record `0x04`. This matches
|
||
/// libaacs, whose `mkb_cvalues()` reads `0x05` and `mkb_subdiff_records()`
|
||
/// reads `0x04`.
|
||
///
|
||
/// On AACS 2.x in-drive UHD MKBs the `0x05` table is large (the full
|
||
/// subset-difference cvalue set: ~181k entries on a retail MKB, 1:1 with
|
||
/// the giant `0x04` index), while record `0x07` (Explicit
|
||
/// Subset-Difference Record) is a much smaller structure (~96 entries) and
|
||
/// is NOT the cvalue table. An earlier version of this function preferred
|
||
/// `0x07`, which under-tested the Subset-Difference walk on UHD discs and
|
||
/// prevented the DK→walk path from ever finding the matching uv. The
|
||
/// selection MUST therefore be `0x05`-first; `0x07` is only a fallback for
|
||
/// malformed/legacy MKBs that somehow lack a `0x05` record.
|
||
fn mkb_find_cvalues(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
|
||
if let Some(body) = find_record_body(mkb, 0x05) {
|
||
return Some(body);
|
||
}
|
||
find_record_body(mkb, 0x07)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Walk an MKB and return the payload (header stripped) of the first
|
||
/// record matching `rec_type`. Returns `None` if no such record exists or
|
||
/// the record is empty.
|
||
fn find_record_body(mkb: &[u8], rec_type_wanted: u8) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
|
||
crate::aacs::variants::mkb_records(mkb)
|
||
.find(|&(_, rt, len)| rt == rec_type_wanted && len > 4)
|
||
.map(|(o, _, len)| mkb[o + 4..o + len].to_vec())
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Real content length of an MKB: the byte offset where the record stream
|
||
/// ends. MKB files (especially `MKB_RW.inf`, but `MKB_RO.inf` too on some
|
||
/// discs) are allocated to a fixed size — often ~128 MiB — with the records at
|
||
/// the front and the rest zero padding. Walking records (type+len) and stopping
|
||
/// at the first padding byte (`type == 0` / zero-length / overrun) gives the
|
||
/// actual size so callers can trim off megabytes of zeros before sending or
|
||
/// archiving. Returns `mkb.len()` only if the whole buffer parsed as records.
|
||
pub fn mkb_content_len(mkb: &[u8]) -> usize {
|
||
// End of the last framed record = where the fixed-region zero padding begins.
|
||
// (The `00 000000` terminator / overrun stops the walk; real MKBs pad with
|
||
// zeros, so this matches the prior "stop at the first padding byte".)
|
||
crate::aacs::variants::mkb_records(mkb)
|
||
.last()
|
||
.map(|(o, _, len)| o + len)
|
||
.unwrap_or(0)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Trim an MKB's trailing fixed-region padding to its real content length —
|
||
/// but ONLY when [`mkb_content_len`] actually found one. It returns 0 for an
|
||
/// MKB whose first record cannot be parsed; truncating to 0 in that case would
|
||
/// hand downstream consumers (and the online key service) an EMPTY MKB that can
|
||
/// never resolve. So a 0 (or a length that isn't strictly inside the buffer)
|
||
/// leaves the MKB untouched. A 0.31.0 regression dropped this guard and
|
||
/// `truncate`-d unconditionally, zeroing unrecognised MKBs.
|
||
pub fn trim_mkb(mut mkb: Vec<u8>) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let n = mkb_content_len(&mkb);
|
||
if n > 0 && n < mkb.len() {
|
||
mkb.truncate(n);
|
||
}
|
||
mkb
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Get MKB version from Type and Version Record (type 0x10).
|
||
/// Layout: 4-byte record header at `pos` (type + BE24 length), then the
|
||
/// record body starts at `pos + 4`. The body holds the BE u32 Type field at
|
||
/// body offset 0 (`pos + 4`), then the BE u32 version at body offset 4
|
||
/// (`pos + 8`).
|
||
pub fn mkb_version(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<u32> {
|
||
// Type-and-Version record (0x10): version is the BE u32 at body offset 4
|
||
// (record offset 8). Needs rec_len >= 12 (4 header + 4 type + 4 version).
|
||
crate::aacs::variants::mkb_records(mkb)
|
||
.find(|&(_, rt, len)| rt == 0x10 && len >= 12)
|
||
.map(|(o, _, _)| u32::from_be_bytes([mkb[o + 8], mkb[o + 9], mkb[o + 10], mkb[o + 11]]))
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── MKB Type field (Type-and-Version record 0x10, bytes 4-7) ────────────────
|
||
//
|
||
// Canonical form is `<category>1003` (low 16 bits `0x1003` is a fixed marker).
|
||
// Types 3/4/10 are from the AACS Common Cryptographic Elements spec (0.953,
|
||
// §3.2.5.1.1); the Category-C 2.0/2.1 values match libaacs `mkb.h` constants.
|
||
|
||
/// `0x00031003` — recordable media MKB (Class I & II compute Km directly).
|
||
pub const MKB_TYPE_3_RECORDABLE: u32 = 0x0003_1003;
|
||
/// `0x00041003` — AACS 1.0 pre-recorded content MKB (KCD-based). Standard BD.
|
||
pub const MKB_TYPE_4_PRERECORDED: u32 = 0x0004_1003;
|
||
/// `0x000A1003` — Class II / Unified MKB (Sequence-Key-Block functionality).
|
||
pub const MKB_TYPE_10_CLASS_II: u32 = 0x000A_1003;
|
||
/// `0x48141003` — AACS 2.0 Category C (UHD content). libaacs `MKB_20_CATEGORY_C`.
|
||
pub const MKB_20_CATEGORY_C: u32 = 0x4814_1003;
|
||
/// `0x48151003` — AACS 2.1 Category C (UHD content). libaacs `MKB_21_CATEGORY_C`.
|
||
pub const MKB_21_CATEGORY_C: u32 = 0x4815_1003;
|
||
|
||
/// The AACS MKB Type field, decoded.
|
||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||
pub enum MkbType {
|
||
/// Type 3 — recordable media.
|
||
Recordable,
|
||
/// Type 4 — AACS 1.0 pre-recorded content (KCD). Standard Blu-ray.
|
||
Prerecorded,
|
||
/// Type 10 — Class II / Unified (SKB).
|
||
ClassII,
|
||
/// AACS 2.0 Category C — UHD content.
|
||
CategoryC20,
|
||
/// AACS 2.1 Category C — UHD content.
|
||
CategoryC21,
|
||
/// Unrecognized MKBType value (raw field preserved).
|
||
Other(u32),
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl MkbType {
|
||
fn from_raw(raw: u32) -> Self {
|
||
match raw {
|
||
MKB_TYPE_3_RECORDABLE => MkbType::Recordable,
|
||
MKB_TYPE_4_PRERECORDED => MkbType::Prerecorded,
|
||
MKB_TYPE_10_CLASS_II => MkbType::ClassII,
|
||
MKB_20_CATEGORY_C => MkbType::CategoryC20,
|
||
MKB_21_CATEGORY_C => MkbType::CategoryC21,
|
||
other => MkbType::Other(other),
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// AACS generation this MKB belongs to (Category C → 2.0/2.1, else 1.0).
|
||
pub fn generation(self) -> AacsVersion {
|
||
match self {
|
||
MkbType::CategoryC21 => AacsVersion::V21,
|
||
MkbType::CategoryC20 => AacsVersion::V20,
|
||
_ => AacsVersion::V10,
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// `true` for UHD (AACS 2.x Category C); `false` for Blu-ray (AACS 1.x).
|
||
pub fn is_uhd(self) -> bool {
|
||
matches!(self, MkbType::CategoryC20 | MkbType::CategoryC21)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// The raw 32-bit MKBType field from the Type-and-Version record (0x10), bytes
|
||
/// 4-7. `None` if no 0x10 record is present.
|
||
pub fn mkb_type_raw(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<u32> {
|
||
// Type-and-Version record (0x10): the 32-bit MKBType is bytes 4-7 (body
|
||
// offset 0). Needs rec_len >= 8 (4 header + 4 type).
|
||
crate::aacs::variants::mkb_records(mkb)
|
||
.find(|&(_, rt, len)| rt == 0x10 && len >= 8)
|
||
.map(|(o, _, _)| u32::from_be_bytes([mkb[o + 4], mkb[o + 5], mkb[o + 6], mkb[o + 7]]))
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Decode an MKB's Type field. `None` if no Type-and-Version record is present.
|
||
pub fn mkb_type(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<MkbType> {
|
||
mkb_type_raw(mkb).map(MkbType::from_raw)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// `Some(true)` if this MKB is a UHD (AACS 2.x Category C) block, `Some(false)`
|
||
/// for Blu-ray (AACS 1.x), `None` if the Type record is absent.
|
||
pub fn mkb_is_uhd(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<bool> {
|
||
mkb_type(mkb).map(MkbType::is_uhd)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── AACS-G3 key derivation (subset-difference tree) ─────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
/// AACS-G3 seed constant.
|
||
const AESG3_SEED: [u8; 16] = [
|
||
0x7B, 0x10, 0x3C, 0x5D, 0xCB, 0x08, 0xC4, 0xE5, 0x1A, 0x27, 0xB0, 0x17, 0x99, 0x05, 0x3B, 0xD9,
|
||
];
|
||
|
||
/// AACS-G3: derive a subkey from a parent key.
|
||
/// seed[15] += inc, then AES-DEC(key, seed) XOR seed.
|
||
///
|
||
/// Shared with [`super::variants`] (its variant chain runs the same SD
|
||
/// tree); a single definition keeps the two walks byte-identical.
|
||
pub(super) fn aesg3(key: &[u8; 16], inc: u8) -> [u8; 16] {
|
||
let mut seed = AESG3_SEED;
|
||
seed[15] = seed[15].wrapping_add(inc);
|
||
let mut out = aes_ecb_decrypt(key, &seed);
|
||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||
out[i] ^= seed[i];
|
||
}
|
||
out
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Compute v_mask from a UV value. Shared with [`super::variants`].
|
||
pub(super) fn calc_v_mask(uv: u32) -> u32 {
|
||
let mut v_mask: u32 = 0xFFFF_FFFF;
|
||
while (uv & !v_mask) == 0 && v_mask != 0 {
|
||
v_mask <<= 1;
|
||
}
|
||
v_mask
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Derive processing key from device key using subset-difference tree traversal.
|
||
/// Shared with [`super::variants`].
|
||
pub(super) fn calc_pk_from_dk(
|
||
dk: &[u8; 16],
|
||
uv: u32,
|
||
v_mask: u32,
|
||
dev_key_v_mask: u32,
|
||
) -> [u8; 16] {
|
||
// Descend from the device node to the record node, following the record's
|
||
// `uv` bits. At each level only the child we descend INTO is needed (the
|
||
// sibling is computed but never used), and the Processing Key is the
|
||
// `aesg3(.,1)` of the FINAL node — so we derive ONE child per level and the
|
||
// PK once at the end, instead of left/pk/right at every level. Identical
|
||
// result, ~3x fewer block ops. (left child = `aesg3(node,0)`, right = `,2`.)
|
||
let mut node = *dk;
|
||
let mut current_v_mask = dev_key_v_mask;
|
||
|
||
// The subset-difference tree is at most 32 levels deep (u32 mask), so the
|
||
// walk must converge in <= 32 steps. The arithmetic `>> 1` sign-extends
|
||
// current_v_mask, so a v_mask coarser than dev_key_v_mask (reachable from
|
||
// a crafted/corrupt MKB) would otherwise saturate at 0xFFFF_FFFF and spin
|
||
// forever — bound the loop to keep a bad disc from hanging the rip thread.
|
||
let mut steps = 0u32;
|
||
while current_v_mask != v_mask {
|
||
if steps >= 32 {
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
steps += 1;
|
||
// Find the highest unset bit in current_v_mask
|
||
let mut bit_pos: i32 = -1;
|
||
for i in (0..32).rev() {
|
||
if (current_v_mask & (1u32 << i)) == 0 {
|
||
bit_pos = i;
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let inc = if bit_pos < 0 || (uv & (1u32 << bit_pos as u32)) == 0 {
|
||
0 // left child
|
||
} else {
|
||
2 // right child
|
||
};
|
||
node = aesg3(&node, inc);
|
||
|
||
current_v_mask = ((current_v_mask as i32) >> 1) as u32;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
aesg3(&node, 1)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Derive Media Key from MKB using device keys (subset-difference tree).
|
||
///
|
||
/// Thin wrapper over [`derive_media_key_and_pk_from_dk`] that drops the
|
||
/// intermediate Processing Key. Callers that need the PK lineage (e.g.
|
||
/// the key service banking DK·PK·MK) should call the `_and_pk_` form.
|
||
pub fn derive_media_key_from_dk(mkb: &[u8], device_keys: &[DeviceKey]) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
|
||
derive_media_key_and_pk_from_dk(mkb, device_keys).map(|(mk, _pk)| mk)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Derive both the Media Key and the intermediate Processing Key from an
|
||
/// MKB using device keys (subset-difference tree).
|
||
///
|
||
/// Identical walk to [`derive_media_key_from_dk`]; this form additionally
|
||
/// returns the Processing Key `Kp` derived at the matching subset-difference
|
||
/// node — the value `calc_pk_from_dk` produces immediately before it
|
||
/// validates into the Media Key. Returns `Some((mk, pk))` for the first DK
|
||
/// that walks a uv slot whose Processing Key validates against the MKB.
|
||
pub fn derive_media_key_and_pk_from_dk(
|
||
mkb: &[u8],
|
||
device_keys: &[DeviceKey],
|
||
) -> Option<([u8; 16], [u8; 16])> {
|
||
let mk_dv = mkb_find_mk_dv(mkb)?;
|
||
let uvs = mkb_find_subdiff_records(mkb)?;
|
||
let cvalues = mkb_find_cvalues(mkb)?;
|
||
|
||
// Count UV entries
|
||
let num_uvs = uvs
|
||
.chunks(5)
|
||
.take_while(|c| c.len() == 5 && (c[0] & 0xC0) == 0)
|
||
.count();
|
||
|
||
for dk in device_keys {
|
||
let device_number = dk.node as u32;
|
||
|
||
// Find applying subset-difference for this device
|
||
for uvs_idx in 0..num_uvs {
|
||
let p_uv = &uvs[1 + 5 * uvs_idx..];
|
||
let u_mask_shift = uvs[5 * uvs_idx]; // byte before the UV value
|
||
|
||
if u_mask_shift & 0xC0 != 0 {
|
||
break; // device revoked
|
||
}
|
||
// Shifts of 32..=63 (0x20..=0x3F pass the 0xC0 mask above) would
|
||
// panic in debug / wrap to a wrong mask in release. The MKB byte
|
||
// is disc-controlled, so a crafted/corrupt MKB must not crash the
|
||
// ripper: skip an out-of-range slot rather than `<<` it.
|
||
if u_mask_shift >= 32 {
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let uv = u32::from_be_bytes([p_uv[0], p_uv[1], p_uv[2], p_uv[3]]);
|
||
if uv == 0 {
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let u_mask: u32 = 0xFFFF_FFFF << u_mask_shift;
|
||
let v_mask = calc_v_mask(uv);
|
||
|
||
if ((device_number & u_mask) == (uv & u_mask))
|
||
&& ((device_number & v_mask) != (uv & v_mask))
|
||
{
|
||
// Found matching subset-difference — find the right device key.
|
||
// dk.u_mask_shift is a u8 from keydb with no range check;
|
||
// guard the shift the same way as the MKB byte above.
|
||
if dk.u_mask_shift >= 32 {
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
let dev_key_v_mask = calc_v_mask(dk.uv);
|
||
let dev_key_u_mask: u32 = 0xFFFF_FFFF << dk.u_mask_shift;
|
||
|
||
if u_mask == dev_key_u_mask && (uv & dev_key_v_mask) == (dk.uv & dev_key_v_mask) {
|
||
// Derive processing key via tree traversal
|
||
let pk = calc_pk_from_dk(&dk.key, uv, v_mask, dev_key_v_mask);
|
||
|
||
// Validate and derive media key
|
||
if uvs_idx < cvalues.len() / 16 {
|
||
let cv = &cvalues[uvs_idx * 16..(uvs_idx + 1) * 16];
|
||
if let Some(mk) =
|
||
validate_processing_key(&pk, cv, &uvs[1 + uvs_idx * 5..], &mk_dv)
|
||
{
|
||
return Some((mk, pk));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
None
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Recover the subset-difference position (`node`, `uv`, `u_mask_shift`) of an
|
||
/// UNPOSITIONED device key by scanning a disc MKB. A device key alone (just the
|
||
/// 16 bytes) cannot be walked — the walk needs its tree node. This finds that
|
||
/// node empirically: for each MKB subset-difference record, it tries the device
|
||
/// at the record's node AND at every ancestor v-position (the device may sit one
|
||
/// or more levels ABOVE the record, descending via AES-G to reach it), deriving
|
||
/// the candidate Processing Key DIRECTLY (one [`calc_pk_from_dk`] per candidate,
|
||
/// no full re-walk) and checking it validates against that record's cvalue.
|
||
///
|
||
/// On the first verifying candidate it pins `(uv, u_mask_shift)` — invariant for
|
||
/// the key across all discs — and resolves a gate-passing `node` (a one-time
|
||
/// ≤32-try search at the single hit). Returns a [`DeviceKey`] ready to bank and
|
||
/// reuse on every future disc via [`derive_media_key_from_dk`]. `None` if the
|
||
/// key does not apply to this MKB.
|
||
///
|
||
/// Cost is `O(slots × tree_depth)` — linear in the MKB's subset-difference
|
||
/// index, not the quartic cost of re-deriving per candidate.
|
||
pub fn recover_dk_position(mkb: &[u8], key: &[u8; 16]) -> Option<DeviceKey> {
|
||
let mk_dv = mkb_find_mk_dv(mkb)?;
|
||
let uvs = mkb_find_subdiff_records(mkb)?;
|
||
let cvalues = mkb_find_cvalues(mkb)?;
|
||
let num_uvs = uvs
|
||
.chunks(5)
|
||
.take_while(|c| c.len() == 5 && (c[0] & 0xC0) == 0)
|
||
.count();
|
||
let n_cv = cvalues.len() / 16;
|
||
|
||
// Hoisted ONCE for the whole scan: the Processing Key the device produces if
|
||
// it sits EXACTLY at a record (zero descent) is `AES-G3(key, 1)` — it does
|
||
// not depend on the record, so the zero-descent probe of every slot reuses
|
||
// this single value instead of re-deriving it per slot.
|
||
let pk_zero_descent = aesg3(key, 1);
|
||
|
||
// The slots are independent, so the scan parallelises — a UHD MKB has ~181k
|
||
// slots (~26s single-threaded). `find_map_any` returns the first matching
|
||
// node found by any thread and cancels the rest; a valid MKB has exactly one
|
||
// matching subset-difference, so which thread finds it is immaterial.
|
||
use rayon::prelude::*;
|
||
let found = (0..num_uvs.min(n_cv)).into_par_iter().find_map_any(|i| {
|
||
let u_mask_shift = uvs[5 * i];
|
||
if u_mask_shift >= 32 {
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
let p_uv = &uvs[1 + 5 * i..];
|
||
let uv_r = u32::from_be_bytes([p_uv[0], p_uv[1], p_uv[2], p_uv[3]]);
|
||
if uv_r == 0 {
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
let v_mask = calc_v_mask(uv_r);
|
||
let cv = &cvalues[i * 16..(i + 1) * 16];
|
||
let uv_bytes = &uvs[1 + i * 5..];
|
||
|
||
// Zero descent (device sits at this slot's node): cheapest, most common.
|
||
if validate_processing_key(&pk_zero_descent, cv, uv_bytes, &mk_dv).is_some() {
|
||
return Some((uv_r, u_mask_shift));
|
||
}
|
||
// Descent: device is an ANCESTOR of the slot. Walk the depth bit up from
|
||
// the slot's lowest set bit; each level descends to the slot's node.
|
||
let p = uv_r.trailing_zeros();
|
||
for k in (p + 1)..32 {
|
||
let uv_d = if k + 1 >= 32 {
|
||
1u32 << k
|
||
} else {
|
||
(uv_r & (0xFFFF_FFFFu32 << (k + 1))) | (1u32 << k)
|
||
};
|
||
let pk = calc_pk_from_dk(key, uv_r, v_mask, calc_v_mask(uv_d));
|
||
if validate_processing_key(&pk, cv, uv_bytes, &mk_dv).is_some() {
|
||
return Some((uv_d, u_mask_shift));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
None
|
||
});
|
||
found.and_then(|(uv, mask)| resolve_dk_node(mkb, key, uv, mask))
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Resolve a positioned [`DeviceKey`] for an orphan `key` known to sit at
|
||
/// `(uv, u_mask_shift)`: find a `device_number` (node) that passes the walk's
|
||
/// subset-difference gate on `mkb`. The derived key is independent of the exact
|
||
/// node (it only gates), so any gating node yields the same Media Key — a
|
||
/// one-time ≤32-try search, run only once at the recovered position.
|
||
fn resolve_dk_node(mkb: &[u8], key: &[u8; 16], uv: u32, u_mask_shift: u8) -> Option<DeviceKey> {
|
||
for b in 0..u_mask_shift {
|
||
let dk = DeviceKey {
|
||
key: *key,
|
||
node: ((uv ^ (1u32 << b)) & 0xFFFF) as u16,
|
||
uv,
|
||
u_mask_shift,
|
||
};
|
||
if derive_media_key_from_dk(mkb, std::slice::from_ref(&dk)).is_some() {
|
||
return Some(dk);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
// Degenerate MKB (no gating bit): fall back to the node itself.
|
||
Some(DeviceKey {
|
||
key: *key,
|
||
node: (uv & 0xFFFF) as u16,
|
||
uv,
|
||
u_mask_shift,
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// MKB disc structure format code.
|
||
const MKB_DISC_STRUCTURE_FORMAT: u8 = 0x83;
|
||
/// MKB pack buffer size.
|
||
const MKB_PACK_SIZE: usize = 32772;
|
||
|
||
/// Read MKB from drive via SCSI (REPORT DISC STRUCTURE format 0x83).
|
||
/// Returns the concatenated MKB data from all packs.
|
||
pub fn read_mkb_from_drive(
|
||
session: &mut dyn crate::scsi::ScsiTransport,
|
||
) -> crate::error::Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||
use crate::scsi::{DataDirection, SCSI_READ_DISC_STRUCTURE};
|
||
|
||
let cdb = [
|
||
SCSI_READ_DISC_STRUCTURE,
|
||
0x01,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
MKB_DISC_STRUCTURE_FORMAT,
|
||
(MKB_PACK_SIZE >> 8) as u8,
|
||
(MKB_PACK_SIZE & 0xFF) as u8,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
];
|
||
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 32772];
|
||
session.execute(&cdb, DataDirection::FromDevice, &mut buf, 10_000)?;
|
||
|
||
let data_len = u16::from_be_bytes([buf[0], buf[1]]) as usize;
|
||
if data_len < 2 {
|
||
return Ok(Vec::new());
|
||
}
|
||
let len = data_len - 2;
|
||
let num_packs = buf[3] as usize;
|
||
|
||
let mut mkb = Vec::with_capacity(32768 * num_packs.max(1));
|
||
if len > 0 && len <= 32768 {
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&buf[4..4 + len]);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Read remaining packs
|
||
for pack in 1..num_packs {
|
||
let mut cdb = [
|
||
SCSI_READ_DISC_STRUCTURE,
|
||
0x01,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
MKB_DISC_STRUCTURE_FORMAT,
|
||
(MKB_PACK_SIZE >> 8) as u8,
|
||
(MKB_PACK_SIZE & 0xFF) as u8,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
];
|
||
// Pack number goes in address field
|
||
cdb[2] = ((pack >> 24) & 0xFF) as u8;
|
||
cdb[3] = ((pack >> 16) & 0xFF) as u8;
|
||
cdb[4] = ((pack >> 8) & 0xFF) as u8;
|
||
cdb[5] = (pack & 0xFF) as u8;
|
||
|
||
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 32772];
|
||
if session
|
||
.execute(&cdb, DataDirection::FromDevice, &mut buf, 10_000)
|
||
.is_ok()
|
||
{
|
||
let len = u16::from_be_bytes([buf[0], buf[1]]) as usize;
|
||
if len > 2 && len - 2 <= 32768 {
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&buf[4..4 + len - 2]);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
Ok(mkb)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Content Certificate parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
/// AACS Content Certificate — identifies disc AACS version and features.
|
||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||
pub struct ContentCert {
|
||
/// Bus encryption enabled flag
|
||
pub bus_encryption: bool,
|
||
/// Content Certificate ID (6 bytes)
|
||
pub cc_id: [u8; 6],
|
||
/// AACS generation indicated by the certificate type byte.
|
||
///
|
||
/// Cert type `0x00` → [`AacsVersion::V10`]; any other value →
|
||
/// [`AacsVersion::V20`]. The certificate alone cannot distinguish
|
||
/// V20 from V21 — Variant detection happens after the MKB walk.
|
||
pub version: AacsVersion,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Parse a Content Certificate (ContentXXX.cer) file.
|
||
pub fn parse_content_cert(data: &[u8]) -> Option<ContentCert> {
|
||
if data.len() < 20 {
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Content Certificate layout (matches libaacs content_cert.c):
|
||
// [0] certificate type (0x00 = AACS1, 0x10 = AACS2)
|
||
// [1] bit7 bus_encryption_enabled_flag (libaacs: `p[1] >> 7`)
|
||
// [14..20] cc_id (6 bytes) (libaacs: `p + 14`)
|
||
let version = if data[0] == 0x00 {
|
||
AacsVersion::V10
|
||
} else {
|
||
AacsVersion::V20
|
||
};
|
||
// The flag is bit 7 of byte 1, NOT bit 0. Reading bit 0 (the prior bug) made
|
||
// a bus-encrypted cert (byte1=0x80) read as `false`, defeating the
|
||
// AacsBusKeyUnavailable fail-loud gate in disc/encrypt.rs.
|
||
let bus_encryption = (data[1] >> 7) & 1 == 1;
|
||
let mut cc_id = [0u8; 6];
|
||
cc_id.copy_from_slice(&data[14..20]);
|
||
|
||
Some(ContentCert {
|
||
bus_encryption,
|
||
cc_id,
|
||
version,
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Full VUK resolution chain ───────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
/// Result of resolving a disc's VUK.
|
||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||
pub struct ResolvedKeys {
|
||
/// Disc hash (SHA1 of Unit_Key_RO.inf)
|
||
pub disc_hash: [u8; 20],
|
||
/// Volume Unique Key. `None` for path 5 — the KEYDB unit-keys
|
||
/// fallback consumes pre-decrypted unit keys directly and has no
|
||
/// VUK to surface.
|
||
pub vuk: Option<[u8; 16]>,
|
||
/// Decrypted unit keys (CPS unit number, key)
|
||
pub unit_keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])>,
|
||
/// Title → CPS unit index mapping
|
||
pub title_cps_unit: Vec<u16>,
|
||
/// AACS generation that drove the resolution
|
||
pub version: AacsVersion,
|
||
/// Whether bus encryption is enabled (from Content Certificate)
|
||
pub bus_encryption: bool,
|
||
/// Which resolution path succeeded (1=DK, 2=PK, 3=KEYDB derived,
|
||
/// 4=KEYDB VUK, 5=KEYDB unit keys)
|
||
pub key_source: u8,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Inputs shared by every classical-path resolver. References only —
|
||
/// callers retain ownership of all buffers.
|
||
pub struct ResolveContext<'a> {
|
||
/// `Unit_Key_RO.inf` raw bytes.
|
||
pub unit_key_ro: &'a [u8],
|
||
/// Content Certificate raw bytes (optional — used for bus-encryption flag).
|
||
pub content_cert: Option<&'a [u8]>,
|
||
/// 16-byte Volume ID from SCSI handshake. `[0u8; 16]` is the
|
||
/// "no VID" sentinel and disables paths 1-3.
|
||
pub volume_id: &'a [u8; 16],
|
||
/// Key sources — checked in array order for disc-keyed lookups,
|
||
/// union'd across all entries for bulk material (DKs, PKs, HCs).
|
||
/// A keydb file, a webservice, an OEM provider can all coexist.
|
||
pub providers: &'a [&'a dyn super::provider::KeyProvider],
|
||
/// MKB raw bytes (optional — paths 1/2 require it).
|
||
pub mkb: Option<&'a [u8]>,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Why a key resolution attempt produced no usable key.
|
||
///
|
||
/// Distinguishes the two no-key outcomes that an application must report
|
||
/// differently:
|
||
/// * [`ResolveFailure::VidUnavailable`] — the key source DID provide
|
||
/// derivation material (device or processing keys), but no Volume ID
|
||
/// (VID) was available to derive the Volume Unique Key. The fix is to
|
||
/// recover the VID (a drive / handshake problem), not to add keys.
|
||
/// * [`ResolveFailure::NoMaterial`] — no usable key material was found at
|
||
/// all (no DK/PK material, no disc-keyed hit). The fix is to add keys.
|
||
///
|
||
/// This carries no key bytes and is independent of the decryption math; it
|
||
/// is purely the *reason* a resolution returned no key.
|
||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||
pub enum ResolveFailure {
|
||
/// Derivation material was present (DKs or PKs) but no VID was available
|
||
/// to derive the unit key. Surfaced as [`crate::error::Error::AacsVidUnavailable`].
|
||
VidUnavailable,
|
||
/// No usable key material at all. Surfaced as
|
||
/// [`crate::error::Error::NoDiscKey`].
|
||
NoMaterial,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Version-dispatched resolution that preserves the *reason* on failure.
|
||
///
|
||
/// Identical key derivation to the [`resolve_keys_v1`] / [`resolve_keys_v2`] /
|
||
/// [`resolve_keys_v21`] chain (it calls straight through to them); the only
|
||
/// addition is that an unresolved disc returns a typed [`ResolveFailure`]
|
||
/// instead of a bare `None`, so callers can report E7017 (material but no VID)
|
||
/// vs E7022 (no material). `version_u8` is the on-disc AACS major (1 → V10,
|
||
/// anything else → the V20/V21 chain), matching `AacsState::version`.
|
||
pub fn resolve_keys_with_reason(
|
||
ctx: &ResolveContext<'_>,
|
||
version_u8: u8,
|
||
) -> std::result::Result<ResolvedKeys, ResolveFailure> {
|
||
let resolved = match version_u8 {
|
||
1 => resolve_keys_v1(ctx),
|
||
_ => resolve_keys_v2(ctx).or_else(|| resolve_keys_v21(ctx)),
|
||
};
|
||
match resolved {
|
||
Some(r) => Ok(r),
|
||
None => Err(classify_resolve_failure(ctx)),
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Classify why resolution found no key. The key source provided derivation
|
||
/// material (device or processing keys) but the VID sentinel is all-zero →
|
||
/// [`ResolveFailure::VidUnavailable`]; otherwise → [`ResolveFailure::NoMaterial`].
|
||
///
|
||
/// Reads only what the resolver already had (provider material + the VID
|
||
/// sentinel) — no key derivation, no descramble.
|
||
fn classify_resolve_failure(ctx: &ResolveContext<'_>) -> ResolveFailure {
|
||
let has_vid = *ctx.volume_id != [0u8; 16];
|
||
let providers = super::provider::Providers(ctx.providers);
|
||
let has_derivation_material =
|
||
!providers.device_keys().is_empty() || !providers.processing_keys().is_empty();
|
||
if !has_vid && has_derivation_material {
|
||
ResolveFailure::VidUnavailable
|
||
} else {
|
||
ResolveFailure::NoMaterial
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// AACS 1.0 key resolution. Parses `Unit_Key_RO.inf` with 48-byte
|
||
/// stride. Tries paths 1 → 4 in order.
|
||
pub fn resolve_keys_v1(ctx: &ResolveContext<'_>) -> Option<ResolvedKeys> {
|
||
resolve_keys_classical(ctx, AacsVersion::V10)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// AACS 2.0 key resolution. Parses `Unit_Key_RO.inf` with 64-byte
|
||
/// stride. Tries paths 1 → 4 in order. When paths 3/4 succeed against
|
||
/// an MKB carrying Variant records (`0x82` / `0x83`), the result's
|
||
/// `version` is upgraded to [`AacsVersion::V21`] — derivation still
|
||
/// runs through the classical V2 path; the V21-specific Variant chain
|
||
/// is wired separately via [`resolve_keys_v21`].
|
||
pub fn resolve_keys_v2(ctx: &ResolveContext<'_>) -> Option<ResolvedKeys> {
|
||
let mut resolved = resolve_keys_classical(ctx, AacsVersion::V20)?;
|
||
if let Some(mkb) = ctx.mkb {
|
||
let recs = super::variants::walk_mkb(mkb);
|
||
if super::variants::is_variant_mkb(&recs) {
|
||
resolved.version = AacsVersion::V21;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
Some(resolved)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// AACS 2.1 key resolution via the Media Key Variant chain.
|
||
///
|
||
/// Paths run in root-of-trust → per-disc-leaf order:
|
||
/// 1. Variant chain: MKB Variant records + device keys → Km → Kvu
|
||
/// (currently unreachable in production — requires an
|
||
/// integrator-supplied Key Correction Data constant; see
|
||
/// [`super::variants::KEY_CORRECTION_DATA_PLACEHOLDER`])
|
||
/// 3. KEYDB MK + matching VID → derived VUK (V21 discs already in
|
||
/// the keydb decrypt identically to V20)
|
||
/// 4. KEYDB disc-hash → VUK
|
||
/// 5. KEYDB disc-hash → pre-decrypted unit keys (no VUK)
|
||
///
|
||
/// (Numbering preserves the cross-resolver convention; AACS 2.1 has no
|
||
/// equivalent of path 2 — there's no host-side PK derivation against a
|
||
/// Variant MKB.)
|
||
pub fn resolve_keys_v21(ctx: &ResolveContext<'_>) -> Option<ResolvedKeys> {
|
||
let uk_file = parse_unit_key_ro(ctx.unit_key_ro, AacsVersion::V20)?;
|
||
let hash_hex = disc_hash_hex(&uk_file.disc_hash);
|
||
let bus_encryption = ctx
|
||
.content_cert
|
||
.and_then(parse_content_cert)
|
||
.map(|cc| cc.bus_encryption)
|
||
.unwrap_or(false);
|
||
let has_vid = *ctx.volume_id != [0u8; 16];
|
||
|
||
let derive_uks = |vuk: &[u8; 16]| derive_unit_keys(&uk_file, vuk);
|
||
|
||
let build =
|
||
|vuk: Option<[u8; 16]>, unit_keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])>, key_source: u8| -> ResolvedKeys {
|
||
ResolvedKeys {
|
||
disc_hash: uk_file.disc_hash,
|
||
vuk,
|
||
unit_keys,
|
||
title_cps_unit: uk_file.title_cps_unit.clone(),
|
||
version: AacsVersion::V21,
|
||
bus_encryption,
|
||
key_source,
|
||
}
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
tracing::info!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_v21_start",
|
||
bus_encryption,
|
||
disc_hash = %hash_hex,
|
||
has_vid,
|
||
mkb_present = ctx.mkb.is_some(),
|
||
"resolve_keys_v21: starting"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
let providers = super::provider::Providers(ctx.providers);
|
||
|
||
if has_vid {
|
||
// Path 1: Variant chain (V21's analogue of classical Path 1's
|
||
// DK derivation). Placeholder until KCD constant is supplied.
|
||
if let Some(mkb) = ctx.mkb {
|
||
let recs = super::variants::walk_mkb(mkb);
|
||
let all_dks = providers.device_keys();
|
||
match super::variants::derive_media_key_variant(
|
||
&recs,
|
||
&all_dks,
|
||
&super::variants::KEY_CORRECTION_DATA_PLACEHOLDER,
|
||
ctx.volume_id,
|
||
) {
|
||
Ok((_km, kvu)) => {
|
||
tracing::debug!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_v21_path1_hit",
|
||
"Variant chain produced Km + Kvu"
|
||
);
|
||
return Some(build(Some(kvu), derive_uks(&kvu), 1));
|
||
}
|
||
Err(e) => {
|
||
tracing::debug!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_v21_path1_miss",
|
||
error_code = %e,
|
||
"Variant chain failed"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Path 3: pre-computed MK + matching VID → derived VUK.
|
||
// Short-circuit: first provider with a matching VID wins.
|
||
if let Some(entry) = providers.lookup_disc_by_vid(ctx.volume_id) {
|
||
// The entry already matched by VID and derive_vuk needs only mk +
|
||
// ctx.volume_id, so a provider that matches by VID without
|
||
// populating disc_id (e.g. a webservice) must not have its MK
|
||
// dropped — gate on the MK alone.
|
||
if let Some(mk) = entry.media_key {
|
||
let vuk = derive_vuk(&mk, ctx.volume_id);
|
||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_v21_path3_hit", "MK+VID entry matched volume_id");
|
||
return Some(build(Some(vuk), derive_uks(&vuk), 3));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
} else {
|
||
tracing::debug!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_v21_no_vid",
|
||
"VID unavailable; paths 1/3 skipped"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Paths 4 and 5: hash lookup, prefer V over U on the same entry.
|
||
if let Some(entry) = providers.lookup_disc_by_hash(&uk_file.disc_hash) {
|
||
if let Some(vuk) = entry.vuk {
|
||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_v21_path4_hit", "VUK from KEYDB");
|
||
return Some(build(Some(vuk), derive_uks(&vuk), 4));
|
||
} else if let Some(unit_keys) = match_keydb_unit_keys(&uk_file, &entry.unit_keys) {
|
||
tracing::debug!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_v21_path5_hit",
|
||
uk_count = unit_keys.len(),
|
||
"unit keys from KEYDB (no VUK)"
|
||
);
|
||
return Some(build(None, unit_keys, 5));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
None
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Resolve all AACS keys for a disc using the classical (single-stage
|
||
/// Media Key derivation) paths. Used by both V10 and V20.
|
||
///
|
||
/// Paths run in root-of-trust → per-disc-leaf order. A match at any
|
||
/// path returns immediately:
|
||
/// 1. MKB + device keys → processing key → media key → VUK
|
||
/// 2. MKB + processing keys → media key → VUK
|
||
/// 3. KEYDB MK + matching VID → derived VUK
|
||
/// 4. KEYDB disc-hash → VUK
|
||
/// 5. KEYDB disc-hash → pre-decrypted unit keys (no VUK)
|
||
fn resolve_keys_classical(ctx: &ResolveContext<'_>, version: AacsVersion) -> Option<ResolvedKeys> {
|
||
let bus_encryption = ctx
|
||
.content_cert
|
||
.and_then(parse_content_cert)
|
||
.map(|cc| cc.bus_encryption)
|
||
.unwrap_or(false);
|
||
|
||
// Parse Unit_Key_RO.inf at the version-appropriate stride.
|
||
let uk_file = parse_unit_key_ro(ctx.unit_key_ro, version)?;
|
||
|
||
let hash_hex = disc_hash_hex(&uk_file.disc_hash);
|
||
let has_vid = *ctx.volume_id != [0u8; 16];
|
||
|
||
// Decrypt the disc's encrypted unit keys with a freshly-derived VUK.
|
||
let derive_uks = |vuk: &[u8; 16]| derive_unit_keys(&uk_file, vuk);
|
||
|
||
// Common result constructor — paths 1-4 supply Some(VUK) + derived
|
||
// unit keys; path 5 supplies None + pre-decrypted unit keys from
|
||
// KEYDB.
|
||
let build =
|
||
|vuk: Option<[u8; 16]>, unit_keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])>, key_source: u8| -> ResolvedKeys {
|
||
ResolvedKeys {
|
||
disc_hash: uk_file.disc_hash,
|
||
vuk,
|
||
unit_keys,
|
||
title_cps_unit: uk_file.title_cps_unit.clone(),
|
||
version,
|
||
bus_encryption,
|
||
key_source,
|
||
}
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
tracing::info!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_start",
|
||
version = ?version,
|
||
bus_encryption,
|
||
disc_hash = %hash_hex,
|
||
has_vid,
|
||
mkb_present = ctx.mkb.is_some(),
|
||
"resolve_keys: starting"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
let providers = super::provider::Providers(ctx.providers);
|
||
|
||
// Paths 1 and 2 need both MKB and VID. Logged as a single skip when
|
||
// either is absent so operators see one reason, not two.
|
||
if has_vid {
|
||
if let Some(mkb) = ctx.mkb {
|
||
let mk_dv = mkb_find_mk_dv(mkb);
|
||
let subdiff = mkb_find_subdiff_records(mkb);
|
||
let cvalues = mkb_find_cvalues(mkb);
|
||
tracing::debug!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_mkb_records",
|
||
mk_dv_found = mk_dv.is_some(),
|
||
subdiff_found = subdiff.is_some(),
|
||
subdiff_len = subdiff.as_ref().map(|s| s.len()).unwrap_or(0),
|
||
cvalues_found = cvalues.is_some(),
|
||
cvalues_len = cvalues.as_ref().map(|c| c.len()).unwrap_or(0),
|
||
"MKB record scan results"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
// Path 1: MKB + device keys → media key → VUK
|
||
let all_dks = providers.device_keys();
|
||
if let Some(mk) = derive_media_key_from_dk(mkb, &all_dks) {
|
||
let vuk = derive_vuk(&mk, ctx.volume_id);
|
||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path1_hit", "media key derived from device key");
|
||
return Some(build(Some(vuk), derive_uks(&vuk), 1));
|
||
}
|
||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path1_miss", dk_count = all_dks.len(), "DK derivation failed");
|
||
|
||
// Path 2: MKB + processing keys → media key → VUK
|
||
let all_pks = providers.processing_keys();
|
||
if let Some(mk) = derive_media_key_from_pk(mkb, &all_pks) {
|
||
let vuk = derive_vuk(&mk, ctx.volume_id);
|
||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path2_hit", "media key derived from processing key");
|
||
return Some(build(Some(vuk), derive_uks(&vuk), 2));
|
||
}
|
||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path2_miss", pk_count = all_pks.len(), "PK derivation failed");
|
||
|
||
// Path 2.5: MK-pool brute. keydb stores Media Keys per-disc, but an
|
||
// MK is MKB-scoped (shared across a pressing/MKB-family). A disc
|
||
// whose own hash/VID isn't keyed can still resolve if ANY stored MK
|
||
// verifies against its MKB. Try every distinct MK via km_verifies;
|
||
// a UNIQUE pass is this disc's Km → derive VUK (needs VID) → UK.
|
||
// One AES-D + magic check per candidate (cheap). mk_dv is hoisted
|
||
// out of the loop so the MKB is not re-walked per candidate.
|
||
let mks = providers.media_keys();
|
||
let mut mk_hits: Vec<[u8; 16]> = Vec::new();
|
||
if let Some(mk_dv) = mkb_find_mk_dv(mkb) {
|
||
for mk in &mks {
|
||
let verifies = aes_ecb_decrypt(mk, &mk_dv)[..8]
|
||
== [0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF];
|
||
if verifies && !mk_hits.contains(mk) {
|
||
mk_hits.push(*mk);
|
||
if mk_hits.len() > 1 {
|
||
break; // ambiguous — bail to avoid a wrong key
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if mk_hits.len() == 1 {
|
||
let vuk = derive_vuk(&mk_hits[0], ctx.volume_id);
|
||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path2_5_hit", mk_pool = mks.len(), "media key from keydb MK-pool brute (km_verifies)");
|
||
// Same class as path 3 (KEYDB MK → derived VUK).
|
||
return Some(build(Some(vuk), derive_uks(&vuk), 3));
|
||
}
|
||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path2_5_miss", mk_pool = mks.len(), mk_hits = mk_hits.len(), "MK-pool brute: no unique verifying MK");
|
||
} else {
|
||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_no_mkb", "no MKB; paths 1/2 skipped");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Path 3: pre-computed MK + matching VID → derived VUK.
|
||
// Short-circuit: first provider with a matching VID wins.
|
||
if let Some(entry) = providers.lookup_disc_by_vid(ctx.volume_id) {
|
||
// The entry already matched by VID and derive_vuk needs only mk +
|
||
// ctx.volume_id, so a provider that matches by VID without
|
||
// populating disc_id (e.g. a webservice) must not have its MK
|
||
// dropped — gate on the MK alone.
|
||
if let Some(mk) = entry.media_key {
|
||
let vuk = derive_vuk(&mk, ctx.volume_id);
|
||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path3_hit", "MK+VID entry matched volume_id");
|
||
return Some(build(Some(vuk), derive_uks(&vuk), 3));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path3_miss", "no MK+VID entry matched volume_id");
|
||
} else {
|
||
tracing::debug!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_no_vid",
|
||
"VID unavailable; paths 1/2/3 require VID and are skipped"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Paths 4 and 5: single hash-keyed lookup, prefer V (path 4) over
|
||
// U (path 5). They are not independent checks — path 5 only fires
|
||
// because path 4 had no VUK on the same entry.
|
||
if let Some(entry) = providers.lookup_disc_by_hash(&uk_file.disc_hash) {
|
||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_keydb_hit_entry", "disc hash found in provider");
|
||
if let Some(vuk) = entry.vuk {
|
||
tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path4_hit", "VUK from provider");
|
||
return Some(build(Some(vuk), derive_uks(&vuk), 4));
|
||
} else if let Some(unit_keys) = match_keydb_unit_keys(&uk_file, &entry.unit_keys) {
|
||
tracing::debug!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_path5_hit",
|
||
uk_count = unit_keys.len(),
|
||
"unit keys from provider (no VUK)"
|
||
);
|
||
return Some(build(None, unit_keys, 5));
|
||
}
|
||
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_keydb_no_keys", "provider entry has neither VUK nor matching unit keys");
|
||
} else {
|
||
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_keydb_miss", "disc hash NOT found in any provider");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
None
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// For path 5: cross-reference the disc's `Unit_Key_RO.inf` CPS-unit
|
||
/// numbering against the KEYDB entry's pre-decrypted unit keys. Every
|
||
/// CPS unit the disc declares must have a matching entry in KEYDB;
|
||
/// partial coverage returns `None` so the resolver doesn't half-decrypt
|
||
/// a disc.
|
||
fn match_keydb_unit_keys(
|
||
uk_file: &UnitKeyFile,
|
||
keydb_unit_keys: &[(u32, [u8; 16])],
|
||
) -> Option<Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])>> {
|
||
if keydb_unit_keys.is_empty() {
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
let mut matched = Vec::with_capacity(uk_file.encrypted_keys.len());
|
||
for (disc_num, _enc_key) in &uk_file.encrypted_keys {
|
||
let entry = keydb_unit_keys.iter().find(|(n, _)| n == disc_num)?;
|
||
matched.push(*entry);
|
||
}
|
||
Some(matched)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||
mod tests {
|
||
use super::super::provider::SuppliedKey;
|
||
use super::super::types::DiscEntry;
|
||
use super::*;
|
||
|
||
/// Audit #5: the `major` / `from_major` mapping is load-bearing for the
|
||
/// Unit_Key_RO stride, so pin it as a table. V10 ↔ BD; V20/V21 → UHD; any
|
||
/// non-BD major selects the V20/V21 64-byte stride (V10 is the only 48-byte).
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn aacs_major_round_trips_and_strides_differ() {
|
||
assert_eq!(AacsVersion::V10.major(), AACS_MAJOR_BD);
|
||
assert_eq!(AacsVersion::V20.major(), AACS_MAJOR_UHD);
|
||
assert_eq!(AacsVersion::V21.major(), AACS_MAJOR_UHD);
|
||
assert_eq!(AacsVersion::from_major(AACS_MAJOR_BD), AacsVersion::V10);
|
||
assert_eq!(AacsVersion::from_major(AACS_MAJOR_UHD), AacsVersion::V20);
|
||
assert_eq!(AacsVersion::from_major(99), AacsVersion::V20); // any non-BD → V20
|
||
assert_ne!(
|
||
AacsVersion::from_major(AACS_MAJOR_BD).unit_key_stride(),
|
||
AacsVersion::from_major(AACS_MAJOR_UHD).unit_key_stride()
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Finding #5 regression: parse_unit_key_ro must REJECT a Unit_Key_RO.inf
|
||
/// whose declared `num_unit_keys` exceeds the keys actually present in the
|
||
/// buffer, instead of silently returning a short list. A truncated list
|
||
/// would later map title CPS units to nonexistent keys.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_unit_key_ro_rejects_truncated_key_list() {
|
||
// V10 layout: stride 48, keys start at uk_pos + 48.
|
||
// uk_pos = 32; num_uk = 2; keys at 80 and 128.
|
||
let uk_pos = 32usize;
|
||
let build = |total_len: usize| -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let mut data = vec![0u8; total_len];
|
||
// uk_pos as BE32 at [0..4].
|
||
data[0..4].copy_from_slice(&(uk_pos as u32).to_be_bytes());
|
||
// num_unit_keys = 2 (BE16) at uk_pos.
|
||
data[uk_pos] = 0x00;
|
||
data[uk_pos + 1] = 0x02;
|
||
data
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
// Full buffer: room for both keys (keys_start 80, key1 at 128..144).
|
||
let full = build(144);
|
||
let ok =
|
||
parse_unit_key_ro(&full, AacsVersion::V10).expect("a full 2-key buffer must parse");
|
||
assert_eq!(ok.encrypted_keys.len(), 2);
|
||
|
||
// Truncated buffer: header still declares 2 keys, but only the first
|
||
// fits (len 128 — the second key's 16 bytes run off the end). Must be
|
||
// rejected, not silently accepted with one key.
|
||
let short = build(128);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
parse_unit_key_ro(&short, AacsVersion::V10).is_none(),
|
||
"a buffer declaring more keys than it contains must be rejected"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn derive_media_key_from_dk_survives_out_of_range_u_mask_shift() {
|
||
// Regression: a crafted/corrupt MKB with a Subset-Difference
|
||
// u_mask_shift of 32..=63 (passes the 0xC0 revoked-marker check but
|
||
// overflows `0xFFFF_FFFF << shift`) used to panic in debug / compute a
|
||
// wrong mask in release. The walk must now skip the bad slot and
|
||
// return cleanly (no panic) on disc-controlled bytes.
|
||
let mut mkb: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
|
||
// 0x81 record: 4-byte header + 16-byte mk_dv body (rec_len = 20).
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x81, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0xAB; 16]);
|
||
// 0x04 Subset-Difference: one 5-byte entry with u_mask_shift = 0x30
|
||
// (48 — out of range, but 0x30 & 0xC0 == 0 so the revoke check passes).
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01]);
|
||
// 0x05 cvalues: one 16-byte entry (rec_len = 20).
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0xCD; 16]);
|
||
|
||
let dk = DeviceKey {
|
||
key: [0x11; 16],
|
||
node: 1,
|
||
uv: 1,
|
||
u_mask_shift: 0x30, // also out of range on the device-key side
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
// Must not panic; no valid derivation is expected from this junk.
|
||
let _ = derive_media_key_from_dk(&mkb, &[dk]);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn test_decrypt_unit_key_from_vuk() {
|
||
// VUK → encrypted unit key → unit key roundtrip. The keydb-sourced
|
||
// variant of this test (which scanned a real KEYDB for VUK + unit
|
||
// keys) moved to freemkv-keysources; this rebuilt version exercises
|
||
// the same AES-G primitive (decrypt_unit_key ∘ aes_ecb_encrypt under a
|
||
// VUK) with directly-constructed material, so it needs no parser and
|
||
// keeps the crypto covered in libfreemkv. `aes_ecb_encrypt` is
|
||
// pub(crate), reachable here but not from keysources — the reason this
|
||
// half stays.
|
||
use super::super::decrypt::aes_ecb_encrypt;
|
||
let vuk = [0x5Au8; 16];
|
||
// A few representative "decrypted" unit keys.
|
||
for expected_uk in [[0x11u8; 16], [0x22u8; 16], [0xCDu8; 16]] {
|
||
let encrypted = aes_ecb_encrypt(&vuk, &expected_uk);
|
||
let decrypted = decrypt_unit_key(&vuk, &encrypted);
|
||
assert_eq!(decrypted, expected_uk, "unit key roundtrip under VUK");
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn test_disc_hash() {
|
||
// SHA1 of a known byte sequence
|
||
let data = b"test unit key ro inf data";
|
||
let hash = disc_hash(data);
|
||
assert_ne!(hash, [0u8; 20]);
|
||
// Same input → same hash
|
||
assert_eq!(hash, disc_hash(data));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn test_disc_hash_hex() {
|
||
let hash = [
|
||
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D,
|
||
0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13,
|
||
];
|
||
let hex = disc_hash_hex(&hash);
|
||
assert_eq!(hex, "0x000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F10111213");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn test_parse_unit_key_ro_synthetic() {
|
||
// Build a synthetic Unit_Key_RO.inf
|
||
// Header: uk_pos at offset 0 (BE32), points to key storage
|
||
// Keys at uk_pos + 48 (16 bytes each, 48-byte stride for AACS 1.0)
|
||
let mut data = vec![0u8; 256];
|
||
|
||
// uk_pos = 0x60 (96)
|
||
data[0] = 0x00;
|
||
data[1] = 0x00;
|
||
data[2] = 0x00;
|
||
data[3] = 0x60;
|
||
|
||
// Header fields at 16-18
|
||
data[16] = 1; // app_type = BD-ROM
|
||
data[17] = 1; // num_bdmv_dir
|
||
data[18] = 0; // no SKB
|
||
|
||
// Title mapping at 20-25
|
||
data[20] = 0;
|
||
data[21] = 1; // first_play = CPS unit 1
|
||
data[22] = 0;
|
||
data[23] = 1; // top_menu = CPS unit 1
|
||
data[24] = 0;
|
||
data[25] = 1; // num_titles = 1
|
||
// Title 0 entry: 2 bytes pad + CPS unit
|
||
data[28] = 0;
|
||
data[29] = 1; // CPS unit 1
|
||
|
||
// Key storage at offset 0x60
|
||
let uk_pos = 0x60usize;
|
||
data[uk_pos] = 0;
|
||
data[uk_pos + 1] = 2; // 2 unit keys
|
||
|
||
// Key 1 at uk_pos + 48
|
||
let key1_pos = uk_pos + 48;
|
||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||
data[key1_pos + i] = 0xAA;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Key 2 at uk_pos + 48 + 48
|
||
let key2_pos = key1_pos + 48;
|
||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||
data[key2_pos + i] = 0xBB;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let parsed = parse_unit_key_ro(&data, AacsVersion::V10).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.app_type, 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.num_bdmv_dir, 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.version, AacsVersion::V10);
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.encrypted_keys.len(), 2);
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.encrypted_keys[0].0, 1); // CPS unit 1
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.encrypted_keys[0].1, [0xAA; 16]);
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.encrypted_keys[1].0, 2); // CPS unit 2
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.encrypted_keys[1].1, [0xBB; 16]);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_version_recognizes_type_0x10() {
|
||
// Type-and-Version record: type=0x10, rec_len=12 (BE24).
|
||
// Body is 8 bytes; the version u32 sits at offset 8 of the record.
|
||
let mkb = [
|
||
0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x14, 0x10, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4D,
|
||
];
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_version(&mkb), Some(77));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_content_len_trims_trailing_padding() {
|
||
// Two real records (0x10 type/version + 0x86 verify), then 128 KiB of
|
||
// zero padding (the fixed-region tail). Content length must stop at the
|
||
// end of the records, not include the padding.
|
||
let mut mkb = vec![
|
||
0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4D,
|
||
];
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x86, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0xAB; 16]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]);
|
||
let records_len = mkb.len();
|
||
mkb.extend(std::iter::repeat_n(0u8, 128 * 1024)); // padding
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_content_len(&mkb), records_len);
|
||
// No padding → returns the full length.
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_content_len(&mkb[..records_len]), records_len);
|
||
// Empty → 0.
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_content_len(&[]), 0);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn trim_mkb_never_zeroes_an_unrecognised_mkb() {
|
||
// Regression: the 0.31.0 read_aacs_inputs path truncated the MKB to
|
||
// mkb_content_len() unconditionally. For an MKB whose first record the
|
||
// parser can't read, mkb_content_len() returns 0 → an unconditional
|
||
// truncate zeroed the MKB, so autorip sent an EMPTY MKB to the key
|
||
// service (or skipped the request). trim_mkb must leave it intact.
|
||
let unrecognised = vec![0xFFu8; 4096]; // first "rec_type" 0xFF, rec_len huge → content_len 0
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
mkb_content_len(&unrecognised),
|
||
0,
|
||
"precondition: unparseable → 0"
|
||
);
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
trim_mkb(unrecognised.clone()),
|
||
unrecognised,
|
||
"unrecognised MKB must be returned untouched, never zeroed"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
// A parseable MKB with trailing padding IS trimmed to its records.
|
||
let mut mkb = vec![
|
||
0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4D,
|
||
];
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x86, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0xAB; 16]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]);
|
||
let records_len = mkb.len();
|
||
mkb.extend(std::iter::repeat_n(0u8, 1024));
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
trim_mkb(mkb).len(),
|
||
records_len,
|
||
"padded MKB trims to records"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
// Empty stays empty (n==0 → untouched).
|
||
assert!(trim_mkb(Vec::new()).is_empty());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_version_returns_none_on_empty() {
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_version(&[]), None);
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_version(&[0x10, 0x00]), None);
|
||
// Type 0x10 record but rec_len < 12 → no version available.
|
||
let short = [0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01];
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_version(&short), None);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_find_mk_dv_recognizes_type_0x81() {
|
||
// First: type-0x10 type/version record (12 bytes), then type-0x81 verify record.
|
||
// Verify record carries a known 16-byte mk_dv at offset 4 of the record body.
|
||
let expected: [u8; 16] = [
|
||
0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE,
|
||
0xFF, 0x00,
|
||
];
|
||
let mut mkb = vec![
|
||
0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
|
||
];
|
||
// type=0x81, rec_len=24 (4-byte header + 16-byte mk_dv + 4-byte trailing zeros)
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x81, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&expected);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]);
|
||
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_find_mk_dv(&mkb), Some(expected));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn probe_try_pk_against_tables_accepts_planted_pk_rejects_corrupt() {
|
||
// Lock in the terminal PK scan (`try_pk_against_tables`) used by the
|
||
// production PK path (`derive_media_key_from_pk`). Plant a terminal PK
|
||
// whose derived Media Key satisfies a synthetic verify record; confirm
|
||
// the scan ACCEPTS it against caller-supplied SD/cvalue tables and
|
||
// REJECTS a 1-byte corruption.
|
||
use super::super::decrypt::aes_ecb_encrypt as enc;
|
||
|
||
let pk: [u8; 16] = [
|
||
0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE,
|
||
0xFF, 0x00,
|
||
];
|
||
let mk: [u8; 16] = [
|
||
0xA0, 0xA1, 0xA2, 0xA3, 0xA4, 0xA5, 0xA6, 0xA7, 0xA8, 0xA9, 0xAA, 0xAB, 0xAC, 0xAD,
|
||
0xAE, 0xAF,
|
||
];
|
||
let uv: [u8; 4] = [0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00];
|
||
|
||
let mut mk_raw = mk;
|
||
for a in 0..4 {
|
||
mk_raw[12 + a] ^= uv[a];
|
||
}
|
||
let cv = enc(&pk, &mk_raw); // AES-D(pk, cv) == mk_raw
|
||
let mut vd = [0u8; 16];
|
||
vd[..8].copy_from_slice(&[0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF]);
|
||
let mk_dv = enc(&mk, &vd); // AES-D(mk, mk_dv) starts with sentinel
|
||
|
||
// 0x04 SD body: one entry [u_mask_shift=0][uv].
|
||
let mut subdiff = vec![0u8];
|
||
subdiff.extend_from_slice(&uv);
|
||
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
try_pk_against_tables(std::slice::from_ref(&pk), &subdiff, &cv, &mk_dv),
|
||
Some(mk),
|
||
"planted terminal PK must verify"
|
||
);
|
||
let mut bad = pk;
|
||
bad[0] ^= 0xFF;
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
try_pk_against_tables(std::slice::from_ref(&bad), &subdiff, &cv, &mk_dv),
|
||
None,
|
||
"corrupted PK must be rejected"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn validate_processing_key_round_trip_with_nonzero_uv() {
|
||
// Synthesise a (pk, uv, mk, cvalue, mk_dv) tuple that satisfies the
|
||
// libaacs _validate_pk relation, then confirm validate_processing_key
|
||
// recovers mk. Catches the bugs that landed pre-fix:
|
||
// * uv XOR step was missing → mk wrong whenever uv != 0
|
||
// * AES-128E + 12-zero check instead of AES-128D + magic
|
||
use super::super::decrypt::{aes_ecb_decrypt as dec, aes_ecb_encrypt as enc};
|
||
|
||
let pk: [u8; 16] = [
|
||
0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE,
|
||
0xFF, 0x00,
|
||
];
|
||
let mk: [u8; 16] = [
|
||
0xA0, 0xA1, 0xA2, 0xA3, 0xA4, 0xA5, 0xA6, 0xA7, 0xA8, 0xA9, 0xAA, 0xAB, 0xAC, 0xAD,
|
||
0xAE, 0xAF,
|
||
];
|
||
let uv: [u8; 4] = [0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00];
|
||
|
||
// cvalue is what AES-128E(pk, mk') gives, where mk' = mk with the
|
||
// last-4-bytes-uv XOR pre-undone:
|
||
// mk_raw[12..16] = mk[12..16] XOR uv (so the validate step XORs
|
||
// uv back in and recovers mk).
|
||
let mut mk_raw = mk;
|
||
for a in 0..4 {
|
||
mk_raw[12 + a] ^= uv[a];
|
||
}
|
||
let cvalue = enc(&pk, &mk_raw);
|
||
|
||
// mk_dv is the encryption (under the correct mk) of the verify
|
||
// magic, padded with arbitrary bytes — when decrypted with mk we
|
||
// recover the magic.
|
||
let mut plaintext_vd = [0u8; 16];
|
||
plaintext_vd[..8].copy_from_slice(&[0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF]);
|
||
// Trailing 8 bytes are don't-cares in the magic check.
|
||
plaintext_vd[8..].copy_from_slice(&[0x11; 8]);
|
||
let mk_dv = enc(&mk, &plaintext_vd);
|
||
// Sanity: decrypting mk_dv with mk yields the magic.
|
||
let _check = dec(&mk, &mk_dv);
|
||
|
||
let recovered = validate_processing_key(&pk, &cvalue, &uv, &mk_dv)
|
||
.expect("validate_processing_key must accept a correct pk + uv pair");
|
||
assert_eq!(recovered, mk, "recovered mk must match the planted mk");
|
||
|
||
// And a wrong pk must be rejected.
|
||
let mut wrong_pk = pk;
|
||
wrong_pk[0] ^= 0xFF;
|
||
assert!(validate_processing_key(&wrong_pk, &cvalue, &uv, &mk_dv).is_none());
|
||
|
||
// And a uv mismatch must be rejected.
|
||
let wrong_uv = [0x00u8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00];
|
||
assert!(validate_processing_key(&pk, &cvalue, &wrong_uv, &mk_dv).is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── MKB cvalue-record selection (issue #259 / #281) ─────────────────
|
||
//
|
||
// The cvalue (Media Key Data) table is record 0x05; the
|
||
// Subset-Difference index is record 0x04. This matches libaacs
|
||
// (`mkb_cvalues` → 0x05, `mkb_subdiff_records` → 0x04). Record 0x07
|
||
// (Explicit Subset-Difference Record) is NOT the cvalue table. On real
|
||
// in-drive AACS 2.x UHD MKBs 0x07 is small (~96 entries) while the 0x05
|
||
// table is large (181270 entries, 1:1 with 0x04). An earlier
|
||
// `mkb_find_cvalues` preferred 0x07, which under-tested the SD walk and
|
||
// broke the DK→walk path. The selector must prefer 0x05.
|
||
|
||
/// Build a 4-byte MKB record header (type + 3-byte big-endian total
|
||
/// length, header included) and append `body`.
|
||
fn mkb_record(rec_type: u8, body: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let total = 4 + body.len();
|
||
let mut rec = Vec::with_capacity(total);
|
||
rec.push(rec_type);
|
||
rec.push(((total >> 16) & 0xFF) as u8);
|
||
rec.push(((total >> 8) & 0xFF) as u8);
|
||
rec.push((total & 0xFF) as u8);
|
||
rec.extend_from_slice(body);
|
||
rec
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Synthesize an AACS-2.x-shaped MKB carrying BOTH a small 0x07 record
|
||
/// and the real 0x05 cvalue table, with 0x07 placed first so a
|
||
/// "0x07-first" selector would pick the wrong record. The 0x05 table
|
||
/// has `n` 16-byte entries (1:1 with the `n`-entry 0x04 SD index); the
|
||
/// 0x07 decoy has `decoy` 16-byte entries.
|
||
fn synth_aacs2_mkb(n: usize, decoy: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let mut mkb = Vec::new();
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&mkb_record(0x10, &[0, 0, 0, 0x20, 0, 0, 0, 0x52]));
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&mkb_record(0x86, &[0xABu8; 16]));
|
||
let mut sd = Vec::with_capacity(n * 5);
|
||
for i in 0..n {
|
||
sd.push(0x00); // u_mask_shift, top bits clear → not revoked
|
||
sd.extend_from_slice(&((i as u32) + 1).to_be_bytes());
|
||
}
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&mkb_record(0x04, &sd));
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&mkb_record(0x07, &vec![0x11u8; decoy * 16])); // decoy first
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&mkb_record(0x05, &vec![0x22u8; n * 16])); // real cvalues
|
||
mkb
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn cvalue_selection_prefers_0x05_over_0x07() {
|
||
// AACS-2.x layout: large 0x05 (1:1 with 0x04) + smaller decoy 0x07
|
||
// placed earlier in the record stream.
|
||
let n = 1500;
|
||
let decoy = 96;
|
||
let mkb = synth_aacs2_mkb(n, decoy);
|
||
|
||
let sd = probe::mkb_subdiff(&mkb).expect("0x04 present");
|
||
let r05 = probe::mkb_record_body(&mkb, 0x05).expect("0x05 present");
|
||
let r07 = probe::mkb_record_body(&mkb, 0x07).expect("0x07 present");
|
||
let selected = mkb_find_cvalues(&mkb).expect("cvalues selected");
|
||
|
||
assert_eq!(sd.len() / 5, n, "0x04 SD index entry count");
|
||
assert_eq!(r05.len() / 16, n, "0x05 cvalue entry count");
|
||
assert_eq!(r07.len() / 16, decoy, "0x07 decoy entry count");
|
||
|
||
// The fix: selection MUST pick 0x05 (the large 1:1 table), NOT the
|
||
// 0x07 decoy a "0x07-first" rule would return.
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
selected.len() / 16,
|
||
n,
|
||
"cvalue selection must use the large 0x05 table, not the {decoy}-entry 0x07 decoy"
|
||
);
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
selected, r05,
|
||
"selected body must be the 0x05 record verbatim"
|
||
);
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
selected.len() / 16,
|
||
sd.len() / 5,
|
||
"cvalue table must be 1:1 with the 0x04 Subset-Difference index"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn cvalue_selection_falls_back_to_0x07_when_no_0x05() {
|
||
// Malformed/legacy MKB with only a 0x07 record and no 0x05: the
|
||
// selector falls back to 0x07 rather than returning None.
|
||
let mut mkb = Vec::new();
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&mkb_record(0x10, &[0, 0, 0, 0x10, 0, 0, 0, 1]));
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&mkb_record(0x86, &[0xCDu8; 16]));
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&mkb_record(0x04, &[0x00, 0, 0, 0, 1]));
|
||
let only07 = vec![0x33u8; 16];
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&mkb_record(0x07, &only07));
|
||
|
||
assert!(probe::mkb_record_body(&mkb, 0x05).is_none());
|
||
let selected = mkb_find_cvalues(&mkb).expect("falls back to 0x07");
|
||
assert_eq!(selected, only07, "fallback returns the 0x07 body");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Locate a captured MKB sample under the optional `MKB_SAMPLE_DIR`.
|
||
/// Returns `None` (skip) when the directory or file is absent.
|
||
fn mkb_sample(rel: &str) -> Option<std::path::PathBuf> {
|
||
let dir = std::env::var("MKB_SAMPLE_DIR").ok()?;
|
||
let p = std::path::Path::new(&dir).join(rel);
|
||
if p.exists() { Some(p) } else { None }
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn real_aacs2_samples_select_large_0x05_not_small_0x07() {
|
||
// Real in-drive AACS 2.x UHD MKBs carry BOTH a small 0x07
|
||
// Explicit-Subset-Difference record (96 16-byte entries) AND the
|
||
// large 0x05 Media Key Data / cvalue table (181270 entries, 1:1
|
||
// with the 0x04 index). The production selector must return the
|
||
// LARGE 0x05 body, not the small 0x07 one. This is the exact
|
||
// regression #259 found. Skips when no sample dir is present.
|
||
let samples = [
|
||
"sample-a/MKB_RO.inf",
|
||
"sample-b/MKB_RO.inf",
|
||
"sample-c/MKB_RO.inf",
|
||
];
|
||
let mut checked = 0;
|
||
for rel in samples {
|
||
let path = match mkb_sample(rel) {
|
||
Some(p) => p,
|
||
None => continue,
|
||
};
|
||
let data = std::fs::read(&path).expect("read sample MKB");
|
||
|
||
let r05 = probe::mkb_record_body(&data, 0x05)
|
||
.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{rel}: expected a 0x05 Media Key Data record"));
|
||
let r07 = probe::mkb_record_body(&data, 0x07)
|
||
.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{rel}: expected a 0x07 record"));
|
||
let sd = probe::mkb_subdiff(&data)
|
||
.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{rel}: expected a 0x04 Subset-Difference index"));
|
||
|
||
let n05 = r05.len() / 16;
|
||
let n07 = r07.len() / 16;
|
||
|
||
// The discriminating facts the bug report cited.
|
||
assert!(
|
||
n05 > n07 * 100,
|
||
"{rel}: 0x05 ({n05}) must dwarf 0x07 ({n07})"
|
||
);
|
||
assert_eq!(n05, 181270, "{rel}: full 0x05 cvalue table size");
|
||
assert_eq!(n07, 96, "{rel}: small 0x07 record size");
|
||
|
||
// Production selection must be the large 0x05 table.
|
||
let selected = mkb_find_cvalues(&data)
|
||
.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{rel}: cvalue selection returned None"));
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
selected, r05,
|
||
"{rel}: selector must return the large 0x05 body, not 0x07"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
// And it is 1:1 with the 0x04 SD index the walk iterates: the
|
||
// walk's UV count (take_while top-2-bits clear) lines up with
|
||
// the cvalue count to within the trailing padding entry.
|
||
let uv_entries = sd
|
||
.chunks(5)
|
||
.take_while(|c| c.len() == 5 && (c[0] & 0xC0) == 0)
|
||
.count();
|
||
assert!(
|
||
uv_entries >= n05 - 2 && uv_entries <= n05,
|
||
"{rel}: 0x04 UV count ({uv_entries}) should match 0x05 cvalue count ({n05})"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
eprintln!(
|
||
"{rel}: 0x05={n05} cvalues, 0x07={n07}, 0x04 UVs={uv_entries} — selected 0x05"
|
||
);
|
||
checked += 1;
|
||
}
|
||
if checked == 0 {
|
||
eprintln!("no MKB samples present; skipping real-sample assertion");
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_find_mk_dv_recognizes_type_0x86() {
|
||
// AACS 2.0 form uses type 0x86 for the verify record.
|
||
let expected: [u8; 16] = [
|
||
0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A,
|
||
0x0B, 0x0C,
|
||
];
|
||
let mut mkb = vec![
|
||
0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4D,
|
||
];
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x86, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&expected);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]);
|
||
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_find_mk_dv(&mkb), Some(expected));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Build a minimal Unit_Key_RO.inf with `num_unit_keys = 1`. The
|
||
/// disc hash won't be in any synthetic keydb so path 1 misses,
|
||
/// which lets us isolate the path-2/3/4 short-circuit behavior.
|
||
fn minimal_unit_key_ro() -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let mut data = vec![0u8; 256];
|
||
// uk_pos = 0x60
|
||
data[3] = 0x60;
|
||
data[16] = 1; // app_type = BD-ROM
|
||
data[17] = 1; // num_bdmv_dir
|
||
let uk_pos = 0x60usize;
|
||
data[uk_pos + 1] = 1; // 1 unit key
|
||
// Key at uk_pos + 48 — value doesn't matter, just needs to fit.
|
||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||
data[uk_pos + 48 + i] = 0xCC;
|
||
}
|
||
data
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn resolve_keys_skips_paths_2_through_4_when_vid_is_zero() {
|
||
// No VID -> paths 2/3/4 cannot succeed. The function must
|
||
// return None WITHOUT touching the MKB / device keys, so we
|
||
// can pass an MKB that would otherwise cause expensive
|
||
// derivation work — it must not be consumed.
|
||
let uk_ro = minimal_unit_key_ro();
|
||
let zero_vid = [0u8; 16];
|
||
|
||
// A provider carrying a dummy processing key but NO disc entry that
|
||
// matches this disc. `disc_entry: None` preserves the negative-miss
|
||
// the test asserts: with VID=0, paths 1/2/3 are skipped and the
|
||
// path-4/5 hash lookup must MISS (a SuppliedKey returns its
|
||
// disc_entry unconditionally, so the planted entry would WRONGLY hit
|
||
// path 4 — None keeps the miss).
|
||
let keydb = SuppliedKey {
|
||
device_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
processing_keys: vec![[0u8; 16]],
|
||
media_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
disc_entry: None,
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[&keydb];
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &zero_vid,
|
||
providers,
|
||
mkb: None,
|
||
};
|
||
let result = resolve_keys_v1(&ctx);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
result.is_none(),
|
||
"resolve_keys with VID=0 and no matching disc-hash entry must return None"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn resolve_keys_path4_still_runs_when_vid_is_zero() {
|
||
// Path 4 (disc-hash → VUK) doesn't need VID. Confirm the
|
||
// short-circuit doesn't block it: install a keydb entry whose
|
||
// disc_hash matches the fixture's hash, with a known VUK, and
|
||
// verify resolve_keys returns it with key_source = 4.
|
||
let uk_ro = minimal_unit_key_ro();
|
||
let hash = disc_hash(&uk_ro);
|
||
// `find_disc` lowercases the incoming hash; the entry map is
|
||
// keyed lowercase too, so we have to lowercase here.
|
||
let hash_hex = disc_hash_hex(&hash).to_lowercase();
|
||
|
||
let known_vuk = [0xABu8; 16];
|
||
let keydb = SuppliedKey {
|
||
device_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
processing_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
media_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
disc_entry: Some(DiscEntry {
|
||
disc_hash: hash_hex,
|
||
title: "fixture".to_string(),
|
||
media_key: None,
|
||
disc_id: None,
|
||
vuk: Some(known_vuk),
|
||
unit_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
}),
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
let vid = [0u8; 16];
|
||
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[&keydb];
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &vid,
|
||
providers,
|
||
mkb: None,
|
||
};
|
||
let resolved =
|
||
resolve_keys_v1(&ctx).expect("path 4 must run regardless of VID availability");
|
||
assert_eq!(resolved.vuk, Some(known_vuk));
|
||
assert_eq!(resolved.key_source, 4);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn resolve_keys_path5_uses_keydb_unit_keys_when_vuk_absent() {
|
||
// Path 5: an entry with no VUK but with pre-decrypted unit
|
||
// keys matching the disc's CPS-unit numbering decrypts the
|
||
// disc directly. Covers the ~4,572 U-only KEYDB entries
|
||
// (mostly MKBv76+ UHDs) that the resolver previously ignored.
|
||
let uk_ro = minimal_unit_key_ro();
|
||
let hash = disc_hash(&uk_ro);
|
||
let hash_hex = disc_hash_hex(&hash).to_lowercase();
|
||
|
||
// `minimal_unit_key_ro` declares CPS unit 1; supply a matching
|
||
// pre-decrypted unit key in the KEYDB entry.
|
||
let known_uk = [0xCDu8; 16];
|
||
let keydb = SuppliedKey {
|
||
device_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
processing_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
media_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
disc_entry: Some(DiscEntry {
|
||
disc_hash: hash_hex,
|
||
title: "fixture".to_string(),
|
||
media_key: None,
|
||
disc_id: None,
|
||
vuk: None,
|
||
unit_keys: vec![(1, known_uk)],
|
||
}),
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
let vid = [0u8; 16];
|
||
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[&keydb];
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &vid,
|
||
providers,
|
||
mkb: None,
|
||
};
|
||
let resolved =
|
||
resolve_keys_v1(&ctx).expect("path 5 must succeed when KEYDB carries unit keys");
|
||
assert_eq!(resolved.vuk, None, "path 5 has no VUK to return");
|
||
assert_eq!(resolved.key_source, 5);
|
||
assert_eq!(resolved.unit_keys, vec![(1, known_uk)]);
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn resolve_keys_path5_rejects_partial_unit_key_coverage() {
|
||
// If the disc declares a CPS unit that's not in the KEYDB
|
||
// entry's unit_keys, path 5 must NOT half-decrypt the disc.
|
||
// The match function returns None and the resolver falls
|
||
// through to None overall (no other paths available in this
|
||
// setup).
|
||
let uk_ro = minimal_unit_key_ro();
|
||
let hash = disc_hash(&uk_ro);
|
||
let hash_hex = disc_hash_hex(&hash).to_lowercase();
|
||
// KEYDB has a key for CPS unit 99, but the disc declares unit 1.
|
||
let keydb = SuppliedKey {
|
||
device_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
processing_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
media_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
disc_entry: Some(DiscEntry {
|
||
disc_hash: hash_hex,
|
||
title: "fixture".to_string(),
|
||
media_key: None,
|
||
disc_id: None,
|
||
vuk: None,
|
||
unit_keys: vec![(99, [0xEEu8; 16])],
|
||
}),
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
let vid = [0u8; 16];
|
||
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[&keydb];
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &vid,
|
||
providers,
|
||
mkb: None,
|
||
};
|
||
assert!(
|
||
resolve_keys_v1(&ctx).is_none(),
|
||
"partial CPS-unit coverage must not produce a half-decrypted result"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn resolve_keys_path2_5_mk_pool_brute_resolves_unkeyed_disc() {
|
||
// The keyless-disc case: this disc's own hash/VID are NOT in keydb, but its
|
||
// Media Key IS — filed under a sibling disc that shares its MKB. Path
|
||
// 2.5 must km_verifies that MK against the MKB and resolve.
|
||
use super::super::decrypt::aes_ecb_encrypt as enc;
|
||
let km = [0x11u8; 16];
|
||
let vid = [0x22u8; 16];
|
||
// MKB: 0x10 type/version + 0x86 verify record whose mk_dv decrypts under
|
||
// km to the AACS verify magic, so km_verifies(mkb, km) == true.
|
||
let mut vd = [0u8; 16];
|
||
vd[..8].copy_from_slice(&[0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF]);
|
||
let mk_dv = enc(&km, &vd);
|
||
let mut mkb = mkb_record(0x10, &[0, 0, 0, 0x20, 0, 0, 0, 0x4D]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&mkb_record(0x86, &mk_dv));
|
||
assert!(
|
||
probe::km_verifies(&mkb, &km),
|
||
"fixture: km must verify the MKB"
|
||
);
|
||
// This disc's inf (its hash will NOT be in keydb).
|
||
let uk_ro = minimal_unit_key_ro();
|
||
// The sibling's MK is lifted directly into the MK pool: a KeyDb
|
||
// aggregated per-disc media_keys into media_keys(), but SuppliedKey
|
||
// does NOT harvest its disc_entry's media_key — it has an explicit
|
||
// media_keys field. `disc_entry: None` preserves the miss on this
|
||
// disc's own hash/VID (the sibling matches neither), so ONLY the
|
||
// MK-pool brute (km_verifies) can resolve it — exactly the path under
|
||
// test.
|
||
let keydb = SuppliedKey {
|
||
device_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
processing_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
media_keys: vec![km],
|
||
disc_entry: None,
|
||
};
|
||
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[&keydb];
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &vid,
|
||
providers,
|
||
mkb: Some(&mkb),
|
||
};
|
||
let resolved = resolve_keys_v1(&ctx)
|
||
.expect("MK-pool brute (path 2.5) must resolve a disc whose MK is in keydb");
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
resolved.key_source, 3,
|
||
"MK-pool brute is the KEYDB-derived class"
|
||
);
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
resolved.vuk,
|
||
Some(derive_vuk(&km, &vid)),
|
||
"VUK must derive from the verified Km + this disc's VID"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn test_content_cert_parse() {
|
||
// AACS 1.0 cert, bus encryption OFF. Layout matches libaacs: flag in
|
||
// BIT 7 of byte 1, cc_id at bytes 14..20.
|
||
let mut data = vec![0u8; 20];
|
||
data[0] = 0x00; // AACS 1.0
|
||
data[1] = 0x00; // bus_encryption flag (bit 7) clear
|
||
data[14..20].copy_from_slice(&[0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66]);
|
||
let cc = parse_content_cert(&data).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cc.version, AacsVersion::V10);
|
||
assert!(!cc.bus_encryption);
|
||
assert_eq!(cc.cc_id, [0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66]);
|
||
// AACS 2.0 with bus encryption: type 0x10, flag is BIT 7 (0x80) of byte 1
|
||
// — NOT bit 0. A cert with byte1=0x01 must therefore read as bus-OFF.
|
||
data[0] = 0x10; // AACS 2.0
|
||
data[1] = 0x80; // bus_encryption_enabled_flag = bit 7
|
||
let cc = parse_content_cert(&data).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cc.version, AacsVersion::V20);
|
||
assert!(cc.bus_encryption);
|
||
// Regression guard: bit 0 set, bit 7 clear -> bus OFF (the old bug read this as ON).
|
||
data[1] = 0x01;
|
||
assert!(!parse_content_cert(&data).unwrap().bus_encryption);
|
||
}
|
||
// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
// Hardening additions
|
||
// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
// ── VUK derivation: spec relation VUK = AES-D(MK, VID) XOR VID ─────────
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn derive_vuk_matches_spec_relation_explicitly() {
|
||
// Independently compute AES-ECB-D(mk, vid) XOR vid and confirm
|
||
// derive_vuk produces the same 16 bytes. A mutation that dropped the
|
||
// XOR-VID step, or used encrypt instead of decrypt, fails this.
|
||
use super::super::decrypt::aes_ecb_decrypt as dec;
|
||
let mk = [
|
||
0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D,
|
||
0x1E, 0x1F,
|
||
];
|
||
let vid = [
|
||
0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2A, 0x2B, 0x2C, 0x2D,
|
||
0x2E, 0x2F,
|
||
];
|
||
let mut expected = dec(&mk, &vid);
|
||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||
expected[i] ^= vid[i];
|
||
}
|
||
assert_eq!(derive_vuk(&mk, &vid), expected);
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn decrypt_unit_key_is_plain_aes_ecb_decrypt_under_vuk() {
|
||
// The encrypted unit key in Unit_Key_RO.inf is AES-ECB-E(VUK, uk);
|
||
// decrypt_unit_key must be the matching ECB-decrypt. Round-trip via
|
||
// encrypt to pin the relation.
|
||
use super::super::decrypt::aes_ecb_encrypt as enc;
|
||
let vuk = [0x9Eu8; 16];
|
||
let uk = [0x3Cu8; 16];
|
||
let enc_uk = enc(&vuk, &uk);
|
||
assert_eq!(decrypt_unit_key(&vuk, &enc_uk), uk);
|
||
}
|
||
// ── Unit_Key_RO stride: 48 (V10) vs 64 (V20/V21) ──────────────────────
|
||
/// Build a Unit_Key_RO.inf carrying `num_uk` keys at a given stride,
|
||
/// where key `i` is filled with byte `0x10 + i`. uk_pos = 0x60.
|
||
fn build_unit_key_ro(num_uk: usize, stride: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let uk_pos = 0x60usize;
|
||
let size = uk_pos + 48 + stride * num_uk + 64;
|
||
let mut data = vec![0u8; size];
|
||
// uk_pos BE32 at [0..4].
|
||
data[0..4].copy_from_slice(&(uk_pos as u32).to_be_bytes());
|
||
data[16] = 1; // app_type
|
||
data[17] = 1; // num_bdmv_dir
|
||
// num_unit_keys BE16 at uk_pos.
|
||
data[uk_pos..uk_pos + 2].copy_from_slice(&(num_uk as u16).to_be_bytes());
|
||
// Keys start at uk_pos + 48, stride apart.
|
||
let mut pos = uk_pos + 48;
|
||
for i in 0..num_uk {
|
||
for b in &mut data[pos..pos + 16] {
|
||
*b = 0x10 + i as u8;
|
||
}
|
||
pos += stride;
|
||
}
|
||
data
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn stride_v10_is_48_v20_is_64_and_picks_distinct_keys() {
|
||
// AACS 1.0 stride = 48, AACS 2.0/2.1 stride = 64 (keys.rs:30-35).
|
||
// Lay keys at 64-byte stride. Parsing at V20 stride must pick exactly
|
||
// those keys; parsing the SAME bytes at V10 (48) stride would read the
|
||
// wrong (intermediate) bytes for key 2 onward — proving the stride
|
||
// selector matters.
|
||
let data = build_unit_key_ro(2, 64);
|
||
let v20 = parse_unit_key_ro(&data, AacsVersion::V20).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(v20.encrypted_keys.len(), 2);
|
||
assert_eq!(v20.encrypted_keys[0].1, [0x10; 16]);
|
||
assert_eq!(v20.encrypted_keys[1].1, [0x11; 16]);
|
||
// Same buffer, V10 stride: key 1 still lands at uk_pos+48, but key 2
|
||
// is read at +48 (not +64) so it is NOT the planted 0x11 block.
|
||
let v10 = parse_unit_key_ro(&data, AacsVersion::V10).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(v10.encrypted_keys[0].1, [0x10; 16]);
|
||
assert_ne!(
|
||
v10.encrypted_keys[1].1, [0x11; 16],
|
||
"48-byte stride must read different bytes than 64-byte stride"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn v21_uses_same_64_byte_stride_as_v20() {
|
||
// V21 shares V20's 64-byte stride (the enum match groups V20|V21).
|
||
let data = build_unit_key_ro(2, 64);
|
||
let v20 = parse_unit_key_ro(&data, AacsVersion::V20).unwrap();
|
||
let v21 = parse_unit_key_ro(&data, AacsVersion::V21).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(v20.encrypted_keys, v21.encrypted_keys);
|
||
assert_eq!(v21.version, AacsVersion::V21);
|
||
}
|
||
// ── parse_unit_key_ro: early returns / boundaries ──────────────────────
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_unit_key_ro_rejects_too_short_header() {
|
||
// < 20 bytes → None (header fields at 16-18 would index OOB).
|
||
assert!(parse_unit_key_ro(&[0u8; 19], AacsVersion::V10).is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_unit_key_ro_rejects_uk_pos_past_end() {
|
||
// uk_pos points past the buffer → the `uk_pos + 2 > len` guard
|
||
// returns None rather than indexing OOB.
|
||
let mut data = vec![0u8; 64];
|
||
data[0..4].copy_from_slice(&1000u32.to_be_bytes()); // uk_pos = 1000
|
||
assert!(parse_unit_key_ro(&data, AacsVersion::V10).is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_unit_key_ro_zero_keys_returns_empty_set() {
|
||
// num_unit_keys == 0 → a valid file with no encrypted keys (early
|
||
// Some(..) branch), NOT None.
|
||
let uk_pos = 0x60usize;
|
||
let mut data = vec![0u8; uk_pos + 48];
|
||
data[0..4].copy_from_slice(&(uk_pos as u32).to_be_bytes());
|
||
data[16] = 1;
|
||
// num_uk left 0.
|
||
let parsed = parse_unit_key_ro(&data, AacsVersion::V10).unwrap();
|
||
assert!(parsed.encrypted_keys.is_empty());
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.app_type, 1);
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_unit_key_ro_truncated_key_region_returns_none() {
|
||
// keys_start + 16 > len → None (the first key can't fit).
|
||
let uk_pos = 0x60usize;
|
||
let mut data = vec![0u8; uk_pos + 48 + 8]; // only 8 of 16 key bytes
|
||
data[0..4].copy_from_slice(&(uk_pos as u32).to_be_bytes());
|
||
data[uk_pos + 1] = 1; // 1 key declared
|
||
assert!(parse_unit_key_ro(&data, AacsVersion::V10).is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_unit_key_ro_rejects_when_keys_run_off_end() {
|
||
// Finding #5: 3 keys declared but the buffer holds only 2 strides plus
|
||
// 8 trailing bytes (not a full 3rd 16-byte key). The extraction loop
|
||
// breaks at the buffer end (never reading OOB), and the post-loop
|
||
// length check rejects the short list with None — a truncated/malformed
|
||
// .inf must NOT be silently accepted with fewer keys than declared.
|
||
let uk_pos = 0x60usize;
|
||
let stride = 48usize;
|
||
// Room for keys at uk_pos+48 and uk_pos+48+48, then only 8 spare bytes
|
||
// (key 3 would start at uk_pos+48+96 and need 16, but only 8 remain).
|
||
let size = uk_pos + 48 + stride + 16 + 8;
|
||
let mut data = vec![0u8; size];
|
||
data[0..4].copy_from_slice(&(uk_pos as u32).to_be_bytes());
|
||
data[uk_pos + 1] = 3; // declare 3 keys
|
||
assert!(
|
||
parse_unit_key_ro(&data, AacsVersion::V10).is_none(),
|
||
"a buffer declaring more keys than it contains must be rejected"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_unit_key_ro_app_type_and_skb_flag() {
|
||
// app_type at [16], num_bdmv_dir at [17], use_skb_mkb = bit 7 of [18].
|
||
let mut data = build_unit_key_ro(1, 48);
|
||
data[16] = 0x02;
|
||
data[17] = 0x05;
|
||
data[18] = 0x80; // bit 7 set
|
||
let p = parse_unit_key_ro(&data, AacsVersion::V10).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(p.app_type, 0x02);
|
||
assert_eq!(p.num_bdmv_dir, 0x05);
|
||
assert!(p.use_skb_mkb, "bit 7 of byte 18 → use_skb_mkb true");
|
||
// Clearing bit 7 (other bits set) → false.
|
||
data[18] = 0x7F;
|
||
let p2 = parse_unit_key_ro(&data, AacsVersion::V10).unwrap();
|
||
assert!(!p2.use_skb_mkb);
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_unit_key_ro_cps_unit_numbers_are_1_based() {
|
||
// The disc's CPS unit numbers are emitted as (i+1) — keys.rs:162.
|
||
let data = build_unit_key_ro(3, 48);
|
||
let p = parse_unit_key_ro(&data, AacsVersion::V10).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
p.encrypted_keys.iter().map(|(n, _)| *n).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
|
||
vec![1, 2, 3]
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_unit_key_ro_title_cps_mapping_first_play_top_menu_then_titles() {
|
||
// [20..22] first_play, [22..24] top_menu, [24..26] num_titles, then
|
||
// per-title 2-byte pad + 2-byte CPS unit at 26 + i*4 + 2. Each on-disc
|
||
// 1-based CPS number in `1..=num_uk` is validated and converted to a
|
||
// 0-based key index (libaacs unit_key.c); an out-of-range number → 0.
|
||
let mut data = build_unit_key_ro(4, 64); // num_uk = 4 → CPS 1..=4 valid
|
||
data[20..22].copy_from_slice(&1u16.to_be_bytes()); // first_play CPS 1
|
||
data[22..24].copy_from_slice(&2u16.to_be_bytes()); // top_menu CPS 2
|
||
data[24..26].copy_from_slice(&3u16.to_be_bytes()); // num_titles = 3
|
||
data[28..30].copy_from_slice(&3u16.to_be_bytes()); // title 0 CPS 3
|
||
data[32..34].copy_from_slice(&4u16.to_be_bytes()); // title 1 CPS 4
|
||
data[36..38].copy_from_slice(&9u16.to_be_bytes()); // title 2 CPS 9 (> num_uk)
|
||
let p = parse_unit_key_ro(&data, AacsVersion::V20).unwrap();
|
||
// 1-based CPS {1,2,3,4} → 0-based {0,1,2,3}; out-of-range 9 → 0.
|
||
assert_eq!(p.title_cps_unit, vec![0, 1, 2, 3, 0]);
|
||
}
|
||
// ── MKB record framing: rec_len is BE24 incl. 4-byte header ────────────
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_version_uses_be24_length_and_reads_offset_8() {
|
||
// Type 0x10, BE24 length 0x0C (12). Body starts at pos+4: Type field
|
||
// u32 at body offset 0, version u32 at body offset 4 (pos+8).
|
||
// Confirm a length encoded in the high BE24 byte is honored.
|
||
let mkb = [
|
||
0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04,
|
||
];
|
||
// version = 0x01020304.
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_version(&mkb), Some(0x0102_0304));
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_type_category_c_20_is_uhd() {
|
||
// Type 0x10 record, BE24 length 0x0C (12). MKBType field (body
|
||
// offset 0 = pos+4) = MKB_20_CATEGORY_C (0x48141003).
|
||
let mkb = [
|
||
0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x14, 0x10, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
|
||
];
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_type_raw(&mkb), Some(MKB_20_CATEGORY_C));
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_type(&mkb), Some(MkbType::CategoryC20));
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_is_uhd(&mkb), Some(true));
|
||
assert!(MkbType::CategoryC20.is_uhd());
|
||
assert_eq!(MkbType::CategoryC20.generation(), AacsVersion::V20);
|
||
// Sanity on the 2.1 sibling.
|
||
assert_eq!(MkbType::from_raw(MKB_21_CATEGORY_C), MkbType::CategoryC21);
|
||
assert_eq!(MkbType::CategoryC21.generation(), AacsVersion::V21);
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_type_prerecorded_is_bluray_v10() {
|
||
// Type 0x10 record with MKB_TYPE_4_PRERECORDED (0x00041003) — a
|
||
// standard Blu-ray (AACS 1.0) block, not UHD.
|
||
let mkb = [
|
||
0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
|
||
];
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_type(&mkb), Some(MkbType::Prerecorded));
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_is_uhd(&mkb), Some(false));
|
||
assert!(!MkbType::Prerecorded.is_uhd());
|
||
assert_eq!(MkbType::Prerecorded.generation(), AacsVersion::V10);
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_type_none_when_no_0x10_record() {
|
||
// A buffer whose only record is a 0x81 (verify-media-key) record and
|
||
// no 0x10 Type-and-Version record → mkb_type_raw returns None.
|
||
let mkb = [0x81, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00];
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_type_raw(&mkb), None);
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_type(&mkb), None);
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_is_uhd(&mkb), None);
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_find_mk_dv_skips_short_verify_record() {
|
||
// A 0x81 record with rec_len < 20 carries no full mk_dv; the finder
|
||
// must skip it and keep walking (here to a valid 0x86 after it).
|
||
let mut mkb = vec![0x81, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10]; // rec_len 16 (< 20)
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x00; 12]);
|
||
let expected = [0xC1u8; 16];
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x86, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&expected);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x00; 4]);
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_find_mk_dv(&mkb), Some(expected));
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_find_mk_dv_stops_on_overrun_length() {
|
||
// A rec_len that runs past the buffer ends the walk (break), so no
|
||
// mk_dv is found and we get None rather than an OOB slice.
|
||
let mkb = [0x81, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00]; // claims 65535 bytes
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_find_mk_dv(&mkb), None);
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_find_mk_dv_stops_on_zero_length_record() {
|
||
// rec_len < 4 (here 0) breaks the walk — guards against an infinite
|
||
// loop on a malformed record (pos would never advance).
|
||
let mkb = [0x81, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x99];
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_find_mk_dv(&mkb), None);
|
||
}
|
||
// ── mkb_content_len / trim_mkb ─────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_content_len_stops_at_zero_type_padding_byte() {
|
||
// A type==0 byte marks the start of padding (records done). Two real
|
||
// records then a 0x00 type byte → content_len == sum of the two recs.
|
||
let mut mkb = vec![0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0, 0, 0, 1]; // 8-byte rec
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 9, 9, 9, 9]); // 8-byte rec
|
||
let content = mkb.len();
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08]); // padding starts (type 0)
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_content_len(&mkb), content);
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_content_len_returns_full_len_when_no_padding() {
|
||
let mut mkb = vec![0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0, 0, 0, 1];
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 9, 9, 9, 9]);
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_content_len(&mkb), mkb.len());
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn trim_mkb_leaves_exactly_sized_buffer_untouched() {
|
||
// n == mkb.len() (no padding) → the `n < mkb.len()` guard is false,
|
||
// so the buffer is returned untouched (no spurious truncate).
|
||
let mkb = vec![0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0, 0, 0, 1];
|
||
assert_eq!(trim_mkb(mkb.clone()), mkb);
|
||
}
|
||
// ── Content Certificate parsing ────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_content_cert_rejects_short_buffer() {
|
||
// < 20 bytes → None (cc_id slice [14..20] would index OOB).
|
||
assert!(parse_content_cert(&[0x00; 19]).is_none());
|
||
assert!(parse_content_cert(&[0x00; 20]).is_some());
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_content_cert_extracts_cc_id_and_nonzero_type_is_v20() {
|
||
// libaacs layout: [0]=type, [1] bit7=bus-enc, [14..20]=cc_id. Any
|
||
// non-0x00 type → V20.
|
||
let mut data = vec![0u8; 20];
|
||
data[0] = 0x10; // AACS2 type marker → V20
|
||
data[1] = 0x00;
|
||
data[14..20].copy_from_slice(&[0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF]);
|
||
let cc = parse_content_cert(&data).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cc.version, AacsVersion::V20);
|
||
assert_eq!(cc.cc_id, [0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF]);
|
||
assert!(!cc.bus_encryption);
|
||
}
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_content_cert_bus_encryption_reads_bit7() {
|
||
// bus_encryption = (data[1] >> 7) & 1 (libaacs). Low bits set with bit7
|
||
// clear → false; bit7 set → true. Pins the bit, not a truthiness of the byte.
|
||
let mut data = vec![0u8; 20];
|
||
data[1] = 0x7F; // bits 0..6 set, bit 7 clear
|
||
assert!(!parse_content_cert(&data).unwrap().bus_encryption);
|
||
data[1] = 0x80; // bit 7 set
|
||
assert!(parse_content_cert(&data).unwrap().bus_encryption);
|
||
}
|
||
// ── resolve: version → stride wiring + V21 upgrade on variant MKB ──────
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn resolve_keys_v2_upgrades_to_v21_on_variant_mkb() {
|
||
// resolve_keys_v2 parses with the V20 64-byte stride but upgrades the
|
||
// result's version to V21 if the MKB carries a 0x82/0x83 variant
|
||
// record. Path 4 (hash→VUK) supplies the actual keys.
|
||
let uk_ro = build_unit_key_ro(1, 64);
|
||
let hash = disc_hash(&uk_ro);
|
||
let hash_hex = disc_hash_hex(&hash).to_lowercase();
|
||
let keydb = SuppliedKey {
|
||
device_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
processing_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
media_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
disc_entry: Some(DiscEntry {
|
||
disc_hash: hash_hex,
|
||
title: "fixture".to_string(),
|
||
media_key: None,
|
||
disc_id: None,
|
||
vuk: Some([0x5Au8; 16]),
|
||
unit_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
}),
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
// MKB with a 0x83 variant record makes is_variant_mkb true.
|
||
let mut mkb = vec![0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0, 0, 0, 1];
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x83, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x55; 16]);
|
||
|
||
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[&keydb];
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &[0u8; 16],
|
||
providers,
|
||
mkb: Some(&mkb),
|
||
};
|
||
let resolved = resolve_keys_v2(&ctx).expect("path 4 resolves");
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
resolved.version,
|
||
AacsVersion::V21,
|
||
"variant MKB must upgrade V20 result to V21"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn resolve_keys_v2_stays_v20_on_classical_mkb() {
|
||
// No variant records → version stays V20.
|
||
let uk_ro = build_unit_key_ro(1, 64);
|
||
let hash = disc_hash(&uk_ro);
|
||
let hash_hex = disc_hash_hex(&hash).to_lowercase();
|
||
let keydb = SuppliedKey {
|
||
device_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
processing_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
media_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
disc_entry: Some(DiscEntry {
|
||
disc_hash: hash_hex,
|
||
title: "f".to_string(),
|
||
media_key: None,
|
||
disc_id: None,
|
||
vuk: Some([0x5Au8; 16]),
|
||
unit_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
}),
|
||
};
|
||
let mkb = vec![0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0, 0, 0, 1];
|
||
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[&keydb];
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &[0u8; 16],
|
||
providers,
|
||
mkb: Some(&mkb),
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(resolve_keys_v2(&ctx).unwrap().version, AacsVersion::V20);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn resolve_keys_bus_encryption_flag_flows_from_content_cert() {
|
||
// The resolved.bus_encryption must reflect the content cert's bit0.
|
||
let uk_ro = build_unit_key_ro(1, 48);
|
||
let hash = disc_hash(&uk_ro);
|
||
let hash_hex = disc_hash_hex(&hash).to_lowercase();
|
||
let keydb = SuppliedKey {
|
||
device_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
processing_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
media_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
disc_entry: Some(DiscEntry {
|
||
disc_hash: hash_hex,
|
||
title: "f".to_string(),
|
||
media_key: None,
|
||
disc_id: None,
|
||
vuk: Some([1u8; 16]),
|
||
unit_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
}),
|
||
};
|
||
// Content cert: AACS2 (type 0x10) + bus encryption enabled (bit 7 of byte 1).
|
||
let mut cc = vec![0u8; 20];
|
||
cc[0] = 0x10;
|
||
cc[1] = 0x80;
|
||
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[&keydb];
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: Some(&cc),
|
||
volume_id: &[0u8; 16],
|
||
providers,
|
||
mkb: None,
|
||
};
|
||
assert!(resolve_keys_v1(&ctx).unwrap().bus_encryption);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn resolve_keys_v21_path4_resolves_by_hash() {
|
||
// resolve_keys_v21 must hit path 4 (hash→VUK) and stamp version V21,
|
||
// deriving unit keys from the VUK.
|
||
use super::super::decrypt::aes_ecb_encrypt as enc;
|
||
let data = build_unit_key_ro(1, 64);
|
||
// The single encrypted key in build_unit_key_ro is [0x10;16].
|
||
let hash = disc_hash(&data);
|
||
let hash_hex = disc_hash_hex(&hash).to_lowercase();
|
||
let vuk = [0x77u8; 16];
|
||
let keydb = SuppliedKey {
|
||
device_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
processing_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
media_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
disc_entry: Some(DiscEntry {
|
||
disc_hash: hash_hex,
|
||
title: "f".to_string(),
|
||
media_key: None,
|
||
disc_id: None,
|
||
vuk: Some(vuk),
|
||
unit_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
}),
|
||
};
|
||
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[&keydb];
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &data,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &[0u8; 16],
|
||
providers,
|
||
mkb: None,
|
||
};
|
||
let r = resolve_keys_v21(&ctx).expect("v21 path 4");
|
||
assert_eq!(r.version, AacsVersion::V21);
|
||
assert_eq!(r.key_source, 4);
|
||
assert_eq!(r.vuk, Some(vuk));
|
||
// Unit key derived: AES-D(vuk, enc_key). enc_key here is [0x10;16].
|
||
assert_eq!(r.unit_keys[0].1, decrypt_unit_key(&vuk, &[0x10u8; 16]));
|
||
// Self-consistency: encrypting it back under VUK gives the stored block.
|
||
assert_eq!(enc(&vuk, &r.unit_keys[0].1), [0x10u8; 16]);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn resolve_keys_path3_derives_vuk_from_vid_match() {
|
||
// Path 3: an entry whose disc_id == ctx.volume_id supplies an MK;
|
||
// resolver derives VUK = derive_vuk(mk, vid). No hash match needed.
|
||
let uk_ro = minimal_unit_key_ro();
|
||
let vid = [0x42u8; 16];
|
||
let mk = [0x24u8; 16];
|
||
let keydb = SuppliedKey {
|
||
device_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
processing_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
media_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
disc_entry: Some(DiscEntry {
|
||
disc_hash: "0xnotthishash".to_string(),
|
||
title: "sibling".to_string(),
|
||
media_key: Some(mk),
|
||
disc_id: Some(vid),
|
||
vuk: None,
|
||
unit_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
}),
|
||
};
|
||
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[&keydb];
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &vid,
|
||
providers,
|
||
mkb: None, // no MKB → paths 1/2/2.5 skipped, path 3 fires
|
||
};
|
||
let r = resolve_keys_v1(&ctx).expect("path 3 by VID");
|
||
assert_eq!(r.key_source, 3);
|
||
assert_eq!(r.vuk, Some(derive_vuk(&mk, &vid)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn resolve_keys_returns_none_when_no_provider_has_anything() {
|
||
// Empty provider array + VID present + no MKB → all paths miss → None.
|
||
let uk_ro = minimal_unit_key_ro();
|
||
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[];
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &[0x42u8; 16],
|
||
providers,
|
||
mkb: None,
|
||
};
|
||
assert!(resolve_keys_v1(&ctx).is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn match_keydb_unit_keys_empty_keydb_returns_none() {
|
||
// match_keydb_unit_keys with empty keydb keys → None (so path 5 can't
|
||
// fire on an entry with no unit keys).
|
||
let uk_file = parse_unit_key_ro(&minimal_unit_key_ro(), AacsVersion::V10).unwrap();
|
||
assert!(match_keydb_unit_keys(&uk_file, &[]).is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── derive_media_key_from_dk: revoked-marker stops the uv scan ─────────
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn derive_media_key_from_dk_breaks_on_revoked_marker() {
|
||
// A subset-difference entry whose u_mask_shift has bit 0x40/0x80 set
|
||
// is a revoke marker; the scan must `break` (not derive a key from it
|
||
// and not panic). Pair it with a DK that would otherwise be tempting.
|
||
let mut mkb: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x81, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0xAB; 16]);
|
||
// 0x04 with one entry, u_mask_shift = 0xC0 (both top bits → revoked).
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0xC0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0xCD; 16]);
|
||
let dk = DeviceKey {
|
||
key: [0x11; 16],
|
||
node: 1,
|
||
uv: 1,
|
||
u_mask_shift: 0,
|
||
};
|
||
// The 0xC0 entry is filtered by the num_uvs take_while, so the scan
|
||
// sees zero usable slots and returns None — never a wrong key.
|
||
assert!(derive_media_key_from_dk(&mkb, &[dk]).is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn derive_media_key_from_dk_returns_none_when_records_missing() {
|
||
// No 0x04 / 0x05 records → the `?` short-circuits return None.
|
||
let mkb = vec![
|
||
0x81, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14, /* mk_dv */ 0u8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
|
||
0,
|
||
];
|
||
assert!(derive_media_key_from_dk(&mkb, &[]).is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn find_record_body_returns_none_for_empty_body_record() {
|
||
// find_record_body requires rec_len > 4 (non-empty body). A 4-byte
|
||
// record (header only, empty body) is treated as absent.
|
||
let mkb = [0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04]; // type 0x05, no body
|
||
assert!(probe::mkb_record_body(&mkb, 0x05).is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn derive_media_key_and_pk_from_dk_returns_intermediate_pk() {
|
||
// Regression: a classical DK boil must yield the intermediate
|
||
// Processing Key, not just the Media Key. The key service banks the
|
||
// PK lineage (DK·PK·MK·VUK·UK); before the `_and_pk_` form existed it
|
||
// recovered the MK here but lost the PK silently.
|
||
//
|
||
// Build a minimal classical MKB (no 0x82/0x83) with:
|
||
// - 0x04 Subset-Difference: u_mask_shift=3, uv=0x00000002
|
||
// - 0x05 cvalues: one cvalue C planted so AES-D(Kp, C) XOR uv == mk
|
||
// - 0x86 Verify Media Key: mk_dv = AES-E(mk, magic || pad)
|
||
// and a DK with node=4, uv=2, u_mask_shift=3 so dev_key_v_mask ==
|
||
// v_mask: the calc_pk_from_dk loop is a no-op and Kp == aesg3(dk, 1).
|
||
use super::super::decrypt::aes_ecb_encrypt as enc;
|
||
|
||
let dk_bytes: [u8; 16] = [
|
||
0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE,
|
||
0xFF, 0x00,
|
||
];
|
||
// Expected Processing Key for the no-op walk.
|
||
let expected_pk = aesg3(&dk_bytes, 1);
|
||
|
||
// Plant a known Media Key.
|
||
let mk: [u8; 16] = [
|
||
0xA0, 0xA1, 0xA2, 0xA3, 0xA4, 0xA5, 0xA6, 0xA7, 0xA8, 0xA9, 0xAA, 0xAB, 0xAC, 0xAD,
|
||
0xAE, 0xAF,
|
||
];
|
||
// uv (big-endian) = 0x00000002; validate XORs uv into mk[12..16].
|
||
let uv_bytes: [u8; 4] = [0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02];
|
||
|
||
// cvalue C = AES-E(Kp, mk_raw) where mk_raw = mk with the uv XOR
|
||
// pre-undone, so the validate step XORs uv back in and recovers mk.
|
||
let mut mk_raw = mk;
|
||
for a in 0..4 {
|
||
mk_raw[12 + a] ^= uv_bytes[a];
|
||
}
|
||
let cvalue = enc(&expected_pk, &mk_raw);
|
||
|
||
// mk_dv = AES-E(mk, magic || pad); validate decrypts it under mk and
|
||
// checks the leading 8 bytes against the verify magic.
|
||
let mut plaintext_vd = [0u8; 16];
|
||
plaintext_vd[..8].copy_from_slice(&[0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF]);
|
||
plaintext_vd[8..].copy_from_slice(&[0x11; 8]);
|
||
let mk_dv = enc(&mk, &plaintext_vd);
|
||
|
||
// Assemble the MKB. Type/Version (0x10) header first.
|
||
let mut mkb = vec![
|
||
0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x14, 0x10, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4D,
|
||
];
|
||
// 0x04 Subset-Difference: body = u_mask_shift(0x03) || uv(4 bytes).
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x03]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&uv_bytes);
|
||
// 0x05 cvalues: one 16-byte cvalue (mkb_find_cvalues prefers 0x05).
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&cvalue);
|
||
// 0x86 Verify Media Key: mk_dv.
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x86, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&mk_dv);
|
||
|
||
let dk = DeviceKey {
|
||
key: dk_bytes,
|
||
node: 4,
|
||
uv: 2,
|
||
u_mask_shift: 3,
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
// The new `_and_pk_` form returns BOTH the MK and the intermediate PK.
|
||
let dks = [dk];
|
||
let (got_mk, got_pk) = derive_media_key_and_pk_from_dk(&mkb, &dks)
|
||
.expect("classical DK boil must derive (mk, pk)");
|
||
assert_eq!(got_mk, mk, "recovered Media Key must match the planted MK");
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
got_pk, expected_pk,
|
||
"returned Processing Key must equal aesg3(dk, 1) for the no-op walk"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
// And the thin wrapper must still return just the MK.
|
||
assert_eq!(derive_media_key_from_dk(&mkb, &dks), Some(mk));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── resolve_keys_with_reason / classify_resolve_failure ────────────────
|
||
//
|
||
// The rc.6 E7017/E7022 split is also exercised end-to-end through the
|
||
// `ensure_decryptable` gate in `disc/mod.rs`. These tests pin the
|
||
// *classifier* directly at the keys.rs seam and cover the branches the
|
||
// gate test does not: VID-present (must never be VidUnavailable), the
|
||
// processing-keys-only material path, and the version dispatch / Ok path.
|
||
|
||
/// A `SuppliedKey` provider with the given derivation material and no
|
||
/// disc-keyed entry. Mirrors the construction the gate test uses, lifted to
|
||
/// a helper so each branch reads as one line.
|
||
fn material_provider(
|
||
device_keys: Vec<DeviceKey>,
|
||
processing_keys: Vec<[u8; 16]>,
|
||
) -> super::super::provider::SuppliedKey {
|
||
super::super::provider::SuppliedKey {
|
||
device_keys,
|
||
processing_keys,
|
||
media_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
disc_entry: None,
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn one_device_key() -> DeviceKey {
|
||
DeviceKey {
|
||
key: [0x11; 16],
|
||
node: 1,
|
||
uv: 1,
|
||
u_mask_shift: 0,
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Zero VID + PROCESSING keys (not device keys) is still "derivation
|
||
/// material present, VID missing" → VidUnavailable (E7017). The gate test
|
||
/// only proves the device-keys arm of `has_derivation_material`; this pins
|
||
/// the processing-keys arm of the same `||`.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn classify_processing_keys_zero_vid_is_vid_unavailable() {
|
||
let prov = material_provider(Vec::new(), vec![[0u8; 16]]);
|
||
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[&prov];
|
||
let uk_ro = minimal_unit_key_ro();
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &[0u8; 16],
|
||
providers,
|
||
mkb: None,
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
resolve_keys_with_reason(&ctx, 2).err(),
|
||
Some(ResolveFailure::VidUnavailable),
|
||
"processing keys + zero VID is still material-but-no-VID"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// A NON-zero VID present, but resolution still fails (the providers carry
|
||
/// material that doesn't resolve this disc). The VID is available, so the
|
||
/// failure is NOT "VID unavailable" — it must classify NoMaterial regardless
|
||
/// of how much derivation material is present, because re-acquiring the VID
|
||
/// is not the fix. This is the `has_vid == true` short-circuit, which no
|
||
/// existing test covers (the gate test only uses the zero-VID sentinel).
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn classify_vid_present_with_material_is_no_material_not_vid() {
|
||
let prov = material_provider(vec![one_device_key()], vec![[0u8; 16]]);
|
||
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[&prov];
|
||
let uk_ro = minimal_unit_key_ro();
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &[0x42u8; 16], // VID IS available
|
||
providers,
|
||
mkb: None,
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
resolve_keys_with_reason(&ctx, 2).err(),
|
||
Some(ResolveFailure::NoMaterial),
|
||
"VID present must never be reported as VidUnavailable, however much \
|
||
derivation material is on hand"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// VID present + NO material → NoMaterial (both conditions for
|
||
/// VidUnavailable absent). Distinct from the gate's zero-VID/no-material
|
||
/// branch.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn classify_vid_present_no_material_is_no_material() {
|
||
let prov = material_provider(Vec::new(), Vec::new());
|
||
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[&prov];
|
||
let uk_ro = minimal_unit_key_ro();
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &[0x42u8; 16],
|
||
providers,
|
||
mkb: None,
|
||
};
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
resolve_keys_with_reason(&ctx, 2).err(),
|
||
Some(ResolveFailure::NoMaterial)
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// `resolve_keys_with_reason` routes `version_u8 == 1` through the V10
|
||
/// resolver and any other value through the V20→V21 chain. Prove the
|
||
/// dispatch by resolving the SAME path-4 (disc-hash→VUK) fixture under both
|
||
/// versions: V10 stamps V10, the non-1 arm reaches V20/V21. A success must
|
||
/// come back as `Ok`, never an `Err(ResolveFailure)`.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn resolve_with_reason_dispatches_on_version_and_returns_ok() {
|
||
let uk_ro = build_unit_key_ro(1, 64);
|
||
let hash_hex = disc_hash_hex(&disc_hash(&uk_ro)).to_lowercase();
|
||
let vuk = [0x77u8; 16];
|
||
let keydb = SuppliedKey {
|
||
device_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
processing_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
media_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
disc_entry: Some(DiscEntry {
|
||
disc_hash: hash_hex,
|
||
title: "f".to_string(),
|
||
media_key: None,
|
||
disc_id: None,
|
||
vuk: Some(vuk),
|
||
unit_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
}),
|
||
};
|
||
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[&keydb];
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &[0u8; 16],
|
||
providers,
|
||
mkb: None,
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
// version 1 → V10 resolver. Path 4 succeeds → Ok, version stamped V10.
|
||
let v1 = resolve_keys_with_reason(&ctx, 1).expect("v1 dispatch must resolve path 4");
|
||
assert_eq!(v1.vuk, Some(vuk));
|
||
assert_eq!(v1.version, AacsVersion::V10);
|
||
|
||
// version 2 → V20→V21 chain. Same fixture resolves; not the V10 stamp.
|
||
let v2 = resolve_keys_with_reason(&ctx, 2).expect("non-1 dispatch must resolve path 4");
|
||
assert_eq!(v2.vuk, Some(vuk));
|
||
assert_ne!(
|
||
v2.version,
|
||
AacsVersion::V10,
|
||
"the non-1 arm must run the V20/V21 resolver, not V10"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|