Files
libfreemkv/src/css/mod.rs
T
Matthew Jackson 98000869b2 css: redact CssState Debug (test-guarded)
CssState is reachable via the public Disc.css field; #[derive(Debug)] leaked the
raw CSS title key on any {:?} of a Disc. Manual Debug prints crack_span only.
2026-07-17 21:00:34 -07:00

963 lines
42 KiB
Rust

//! CSS (Content Scramble System) — DVD disc encryption.
//!
//! CSS uses a weak 40-bit LFSR stream cipher (broken since 1999).
//!
//! The title key is recovered keylessly: [`crack_key`] runs the Stevenson
//! known-plaintext attack (see the [`stevenson`] module) on the scrambled
//! data, needing no player keys, disc-key crack, or external key file.
//! Sectors are then decrypted with [`descramble_sector`].
//!
//! Usage:
//! ```rust,ignore
//! if let Some(state) = css::crack_key(reader, extents, batch) {
//! css::descramble_sector(&state, &mut sector);
//! }
//! ```
pub mod lfsr;
pub mod stevenson;
pub(crate) mod tables;
use crate::disc::Extent;
use crate::sector::SectorSource;
/// Consecutive CSS-locked (`05/6F/03`) reads before the crack scan early-bails.
/// The bus-auth read gate is global (all-or-nothing), so a run this long means
/// it is shut and nothing here is crackable — bail instead of grinding the full
/// 50_000-sector budget (which is what made rc5 appear to hang on a wedged USB
/// bridge). The counter resets to 0 on any readable batch.
const CSS_LOCKED_BAIL: u32 = 64;
/// CSS decryption state for a DVD title.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct CssState {
/// 5-byte CSS title key (from SCSI auth or the crack fallback).
pub title_key: [u8; 5],
/// LBA half-open span `[start, end)` of the extent set this key was
/// cracked from. CSS title keys are per-VTS: a key cracked from one
/// VTS does NOT descramble a title living in a different VTS. The mux
/// path checks whether the title being opened overlaps this span; if
/// not, it re-cracks from that title's own extents. `None` for keys
/// of unknown provenance (e.g. test fixtures) — treated as "applies
/// everywhere" for backward compatibility.
pub crack_span: Option<(u32, u32)>,
}
// Redacting `Debug`: `CssState` is reachable via the public `Disc.css` field, so
// a `{:?}` on a `Disc` would otherwise print the raw CSS title key. Print only
// the (non-secret) crack span. Guarded by `css_state_debug_is_redacted`.
impl std::fmt::Debug for CssState {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("CssState")
.field("title_key", &"<redacted>")
.field("crack_span", &self.crack_span)
.finish()
}
}
/// Recover the CSS title key with no keys, by scanning scrambled sectors and
/// running the Stevenson known-plaintext attack (see the [`stevenson`] module).
///
/// The crib comes from the periodic-run detector: a scrambled sector's cleartext region
/// (bytes 0x00..0x80) often ends in a short-period repeating run (stuffing /
/// constant fill); the attack assumes that run continues across the 0x80
/// boundary into the encrypted region, giving the known plaintext the 2^16
/// LFSR recovery needs. We scan up to 50000 sectors across the
/// extents and return the first sector that yields a key — no player keys, no
/// disc-key crack. Works on a live drive (after bus-auth unlocks reads) and on
/// disc images alike.
pub fn crack_key(
reader: &mut dyn SectorSource,
extents: &[Extent],
batch_sectors: u16,
) -> Option<CssState> {
crack_key_halt(reader, extents, batch_sectors, None)
}
/// Outcome of a CSS crack scan that distinguishes the THREE cases the bare
/// `Option<CssState>` conflated (and which caused a silent-failure bug:
/// scrambled-but-uncracked content was treated as "unencrypted" and muxed as
/// plaintext garbage at exit 0):
///
/// - [`CrackOutcome::Cracked`] — a scrambled sector yielded a title key.
/// - [`CrackOutcome::Unencrypted`] — NO scrambled sector was seen across the
/// scanned extents (`is_scrambled` never true): the content is genuinely
/// plaintext, so proceeding without a key is correct.
/// - [`CrackOutcome::ScrambledUncracked`] — scrambled sectors WERE seen but no
/// key could be recovered (the Stevenson attack found no crackable crib, or
/// the scrambled region was unreadable). The content is encrypted; muxing it
/// as plaintext would emit garbage, so callers MUST surface a hard error
/// ([`crate::error::Error::CssKeyMissing`]) instead of falling through to
/// "unencrypted".
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum CrackOutcome {
Cracked(CssState),
Unencrypted,
ScrambledUncracked,
}
impl CrackOutcome {
/// The cracked `CssState`, if any. `None` for `Unencrypted` /
/// `ScrambledUncracked`. Lets the `Option`-returning wrappers stay thin.
pub fn into_state(self) -> Option<CssState> {
match self {
CrackOutcome::Cracked(s) => Some(s),
_ => None,
}
}
/// True when scrambled sectors were seen but no key was recovered — the
/// case callers must surface as a hard error instead of "unencrypted".
pub fn is_scrambled_uncracked(&self) -> bool {
matches!(self, CrackOutcome::ScrambledUncracked)
}
}
/// [`crack_key`] returning the full [`CrackOutcome`] (Cracked / Unencrypted /
/// ScrambledUncracked) so callers can distinguish "genuinely unencrypted" from
/// "encrypted but uncrackable" — the latter must become a hard error, never a
/// silent fall-through to plaintext.
pub fn crack_key_outcome(
reader: &mut dyn SectorSource,
extents: &[Extent],
batch_sectors: u16,
halt: Option<&crate::halt::Halt>,
) -> CrackOutcome {
crack_key_scan(reader, extents, batch_sectors, halt, true)
}
/// [`crack_key`] with an optional cooperative-cancellation token.
///
/// "No silent hangs": the crack scans up to 50_000 sectors, which on a live
/// drive hitting bad sectors can take a long time. This variant polls `halt`
/// once per batch (the same cadence sweep/patch use) so an operator Stop or a
/// scan-level watchdog can interrupt the scan, and emits a
/// `freemkv::heartbeat` beat ("css_crack") each batch so a stuck scan is
/// visible in the log.
pub fn crack_key_halt(
reader: &mut dyn SectorSource,
extents: &[Extent],
batch_sectors: u16,
halt: Option<&crate::halt::Halt>,
) -> Option<CssState> {
crack_key_scan(reader, extents, batch_sectors, halt, false).into_state()
}
/// The crack scan, returning the full [`CrackOutcome`]. Tracks a
/// `saw_scrambled` flag so a scrambled-but-uncracked disc is distinguished
/// from a genuinely-unencrypted one (the [`crack_key`] / [`crack_key_halt`]
/// `Option` wrappers collapse both to `None`).
fn crack_key_scan(
reader: &mut dyn SectorSource,
extents: &[Extent],
batch_sectors: u16,
halt: Option<&crate::halt::Halt>,
// True only on the INITIAL scan: a fully CSS-locked (`05/6F/03`) result is a
// hard `ScrambledUncracked`. False on the per-VTS re-crack so a lapsed-AGID
// locked read returns None instead of killing a genuinely crackable title.
fail_on_locked: bool,
) -> CrackOutcome {
// Batch the reads: a live optical drive at 1 sector/read is glacial, and the
// crack only needs to FIND one scrambled sector whose 0x80 plaintext matches
// a known PES header. `batch_sectors` MUST be sized to the source — a drive
// rejects a READ(10) larger than its per-command max (DVD = 16) and
// `Drive::read` does not chunk, so an over-large batch fails every read and
// scans nothing. Callers pass `detect_max_batch_sectors(device_path)` for a
// live drive, a file-safe value for an image, or 1 to force per-sector.
let batch = (batch_sectors.max(1)) as u32;
// Record the LBA span the key is being cracked from so the per-title mux
// path can tell whether a later title lives in the same VTS (overlaps the
// span → key applies) or a different one (→ re-crack). Half-open [min,max).
let crack_span = extents
.iter()
.filter(|e| e.sector_count > 0)
.map(|e| (e.start_lba, e.start_lba.saturating_add(e.sector_count)))
.reduce(|(amin, amax), (bmin, bmax)| (amin.min(bmin), amax.max(bmax)));
let mut tried = 0u32;
let max_tries = 50_000u32;
let mut buf = vec![0u8; batch as usize * 2048];
let mut hb = crate::progress::Heartbeat::new("css_crack");
// Track whether ANY scrambled sector was observed. If we exhaust the scan
// budget having seen scrambled data but never recovered a key, the content
// is encrypted-but-uncrackable — a HARD failure the caller must surface,
// NOT silently treat as unencrypted (which would mux scrambled MPEG as
// plaintext → garbage at exit 0). See `CrackOutcome::ScrambledUncracked`.
let mut saw_scrambled = false;
// A read rejected with sense `05/6F/03` ("scrambled sector without
// authentication") is positive proof of CSS encryption — never collapse it
// to "unencrypted". A run of consecutive locked reads means the bus-auth
// gate is shut (it is global, so reads are all-or-nothing), so the scan
// early-bails. `consecutive_locked` resets on any readable batch, so a
// crackable title (gate open) never trips it.
let mut saw_locked = false;
let mut consecutive_locked = 0u32;
'outer: for (extent_idx, ext) in extents.iter().enumerate() {
let mut i = 0u32;
while i < ext.sector_count && tried < max_tries {
// Cooperative cancellation — poll once per batch, the same cadence
// sweep/patch use, so a Stop / watchdog can interrupt the scan.
if let Some(h) = halt {
if h.is_cancelled() {
break 'outer;
}
}
// Liveness beacon: a long scan over a damaged disc stays visible.
// The heartbeat is time-throttled; only when it actually beats do
// we emit the crack-specific context (tried/lba/extent_idx).
if hb.tick(tried as u64, max_tries as u64) {
tracing::debug!(
target: "freemkv::heartbeat",
phase = "css_crack",
tried,
lba = ext.start_lba + i,
extent_idx,
"scanning"
);
}
let n = (ext.sector_count - i).min(batch);
let want = n as usize * 2048;
match reader.read_sectors(ext.start_lba + i, n as u16, &mut buf[..want], true) {
Ok(_) => {
// A readable batch: the gate is open — reset the locked run.
consecutive_locked = 0;
for s in 0..n as usize {
tried += 1;
let sect = &buf[s * 2048..(s + 1) * 2048];
// Use the HARDENED pack-gated check (Fix 3): a clear stub
// sector with stray bits at 0x14 must NOT count as
// scramble evidence, or a genuinely-unencrypted title
// would falsely report ScrambledUncracked (a false E7023).
if is_scrambled_pack(sect) {
saw_scrambled = true;
if let Some(key) = stevenson::crack_title_key(sect) {
return CrackOutcome::Cracked(CssState {
title_key: key,
crack_span,
});
}
}
if tried >= max_tries {
break 'outer;
}
}
}
// A failed batch still counts toward the budget so a damaged
// region can't loop forever. A CSS-locked failure (`05/6F/03`)
// proves encryption and, in a long enough run, means the read
// gate is shut — track it and early-bail rather than grind.
Err(e) => {
tried += n;
if e.scsi_sense().is_some_and(|s| s.is_css_locked()) {
saw_locked = true;
consecutive_locked += 1;
if consecutive_locked >= CSS_LOCKED_BAIL {
break 'outer;
}
} else {
consecutive_locked = 0;
}
}
}
i += n;
}
}
// Budget exhausted / extents walked / early-bailed with no key recovered.
// The disc is ENCRYPTED-but-uncracked (a hard failure on the initial scan)
// when EITHER a scrambled sector was actually seen, OR — on the initial scan
// only (`fail_on_locked`) — every read was CSS-locked (`05/6F/03`), itself
// proof of scrambling. A re-crack (`fail_on_locked` false) stays soft: a
// lapsed-AGID locked read yields None, not a hard fail, so a crackable title
// in another VTS isn't killed. Only a scan that saw neither a scrambled
// sector nor a CSS-lock is genuinely unencrypted.
if saw_scrambled || (saw_locked && fail_on_locked) {
CrackOutcome::ScrambledUncracked
} else {
CrackOutcome::Unencrypted
}
}
/// Descramble a single CSS-encrypted sector in place.
pub fn descramble_sector(state: &CssState, sector: &mut [u8]) {
lfsr::descramble_sector(&state.title_key, sector);
}
/// Descramble a whole CSS buffer in place, re-cracking the title key on a VOB
/// region boundary. `title_key` is a CACHE of the last crack, not a fixed disc
/// key: it changes per VTS/VOB region, so it is validated on every scrambled
/// sector and re-cracked on a miss (the standard on-demand per-region rekey).
///
/// This CSS key acquisition is intrinsic to the cipher — CSS has no external key
/// source, the ONLY way to a title key is cracking the data — so it lives with
/// the CSS primitives and runs inside `decrypt::decrypt_sectors` (a public,
/// self-contained CSS decrypt), NOT at the post-decrypt recovery seam that AACS
/// key-fetch and FMTS segment-skip use (those consume external inputs).
///
/// The clear header (`<0x80`) is never scrambled, so its periodic crib predicts
/// the plaintext at `0x80`. Descramble with the cached key; if the crib fails to
/// reappear the key region changed (or the primed key was wrong) — restore the
/// ciphertext, re-crack from this very sector, and descramble again. A crib-less
/// sector (no periodic run) can be neither validated nor cracked, so it rides the
/// cached key — correct, because it lives in the same region as the nearby crib
/// sector that set the cache.
pub fn descramble_region(buf: &mut [u8], title_key: &mut [u8; 5]) {
for chunk in buf.chunks_mut(2048) {
if chunk.len() < 2048 || !is_scrambled(chunk) {
continue;
}
let crib = stevenson::attack_crib(chunk);
// Snapshot the ciphertext (chunk is exactly 2048 here) only when there is
// a crib to validate against, so the common cache-hit path costs no
// per-sector heap allocation.
let mut original = [0u8; 2048];
if crib.is_some() {
original.copy_from_slice(chunk);
}
lfsr::descramble_sector(title_key, chunk);
if let Some(crib) = crib {
if chunk[0x80..0x80 + 10] != crib[..] {
// Cached key is stale for this region — restore the ciphertext and
// crack this sector's own key.
chunk.copy_from_slice(&original);
if let Some(fresh) = stevenson::crack_title_key(chunk) {
*title_key = fresh;
}
lfsr::descramble_sector(title_key, chunk);
}
}
}
}
/// Check if a sector has the CSS scramble flag set.
///
/// This is the RAW flag test — bits 4-5 of the sub-header byte 0x14 — used by
/// the descramble loop (`decrypt::decrypt_sectors`), which has already committed
/// to descrambling a known title's VOB data and only needs to skip the clear
/// NAV packs interleaved in it. For the CRACK SCAN's "did this disc actually
/// contain scrambled content?" decision (which must not false-positive on a
/// clear stub), use [`is_scrambled_pack`] instead.
pub fn is_scrambled(sector: &[u8]) -> bool {
sector.len() >= 2048 && (sector[0x14] >> 4) & 0x03 != 0
}
/// The 4-byte MPEG-2 Program Stream pack-start code (`00 00 01 BA`) every DVD
/// video sector opens with. CSS leaves the clear header (`0x00..0x80`)
/// untouched, so this signature survives scrambling.
pub(crate) const PACK_START: [u8; 4] = [0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xBA];
/// Check if a sector is a CSS-scrambled DVD **video pack** — the HARDENED test
/// the crack scan uses to set its `saw_scrambled` evidence flag (Fix 3).
///
/// [`is_scrambled`] keys solely on bits 4-5 of byte 0x14. That single byte is
/// only meaningful inside a real DVD sector — an MPEG-2 Program Stream pack,
/// which ALWAYS begins with the 32-bit pack-start code `00 00 01 BA` at offset
/// 0x00. A tiny clear / nav-only stub (a 0.5 s menu loop, an FBI-warning title)
/// can carry arbitrary bytes that happen to set bits 4-5 of byte 0x14; trusting
/// byte 0x14 alone there would flip the scan's `saw_scrambled` gate and make a
/// genuinely-UNENCRYPTED title report `ScrambledUncracked` — a false E7023.
///
/// Requiring the pack-start signature FIRST means only a sector that is
/// structurally a DVD video pack can be counted as scramble evidence. This does
/// NOT weaken the genuine "encrypted but uncrackable" hard-fail: a real
/// scrambled feature is made of valid PS packs, so its scrambled sectors still
/// pass this check and still drive `ScrambledUncracked` when no key cracks. (The
/// descramble loop keeps the looser [`is_scrambled`]: by the time it runs we
/// already know the title is CSS, and it only needs to skip interleaved clear
/// NAV packs — a wrongly-skipped or wrongly-included sector there is recoverable
/// per-sector, whereas a false scramble verdict in the scan poisons the whole
/// title's outcome.)
pub fn is_scrambled_pack(sector: &[u8]) -> bool {
sector.len() >= 2048 && sector[0x00..0x04] == PACK_START && (sector[0x14] >> 4) & 0x03 != 0
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
/// `CssState` is reachable via the public `Disc.css` field, so a `{:?}` on a
/// `Disc` must not print the raw CSS title key. Sentinel byte 213 (0xD5);
/// `crack_span` is non-secret and none of its values are 213.
#[test]
fn css_state_debug_is_redacted() {
let s = CssState {
title_key: [0xD5; 5],
crack_span: Some((10, 20)),
};
let dbg = format!("{s:?}");
assert!(
!dbg.contains("213"),
"CssState Debug leaked the title key: {dbg}"
);
assert!(dbg.contains("redacted"), "CssState Debug missing marker: {dbg}");
}
// ── is_scrambled ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// is_scrambled returns false for any buffer shorter than one sector,
/// WITHOUT indexing byte 0x14 (which would panic on a tiny buffer). The
/// length guard is short-circuited before the flag read.
///
/// Grounding: `sector.len() >= 2048 && (sector[0x14] >> 4) & 0x03 != 0` —
/// `&&` short-circuits so a 20-byte buffer never reads index 0x14.
/// Mutation: swap the operands so the flag is read first
/// (`(sector[0x14]...) && sector.len() >= 2048`) -> panics indexing a
/// 20-byte slice; this test catches it.
#[test]
fn is_scrambled_short_buffer_is_false_no_panic() {
assert!(!is_scrambled(&[]));
assert!(!is_scrambled(&[0u8; 20])); // shorter than 0x14+1 even
assert!(!is_scrambled(&[0xFFu8; 2047])); // one byte short of a sector
}
/// is_scrambled keys on bits 4-5 of byte 0x14 (the CSS scramble field).
/// A full sector flagged 0x10/0x20/0x30 is scrambled; 0x00 and the
/// high-bit-only values 0x40/0x80 are clear.
///
/// Grounding: `(sector[0x14] >> 4) & 0x03`.
/// Mutation: widen mask to `& 0x0F` -> 0x40 reports scrambled, the 0x40
/// assert fails.
#[test]
fn is_scrambled_uses_bits_4_5_only() {
let mut s = vec![0u8; 2048];
for (flag, expected) in [
(0x00u8, false),
(0x10, true),
(0x20, true),
(0x30, true),
(0x40, false),
(0x80, false),
(0xC0, false),
(0xFF, true), // bits 4-5 set within 0xFF
] {
s[0x14] = flag;
assert_eq!(
is_scrambled(&s),
expected,
"flag byte {flag:#04x} scramble detection"
);
}
}
/// is_scrambled accepts exactly 2048 bytes as the minimum (boundary at the
/// inclusive value 2048).
///
/// Grounding: `sector.len() >= 2048`.
/// Mutation: change `>= 2048` to `> 2048` -> an exact 2048-byte scrambled
/// sector reports false; this fails.
#[test]
fn is_scrambled_exact_sector_length_accepted() {
let mut s = vec![0u8; 2048];
s[0x14] = 0x30;
assert!(is_scrambled(&s), "exactly 2048 bytes must be eligible");
}
/// Fix 3 hardening: `is_scrambled_pack` (the crack-scan evidence gate)
/// requires BOTH the MPEG-PS pack-start code at 0x00 AND the 0x14 scramble
/// bits. A clear / nav-only stub whose bytes happen to set bits 4-5 of 0x14
/// but lacks the pack-start is NOT counted as scramble evidence — without
/// this the scan flips `saw_scrambled` and a genuinely unencrypted title
/// reports `ScrambledUncracked` (the false E7023). The looser `is_scrambled`
/// (descramble gate) still reads the same sector as flagged.
///
/// Grounding: `sector[0x00..0x04] == 00 00 01 BA && (sector[0x14] >> 4)...`.
/// Mutation: drop the pack-start clause -> the 0x14-only sector counts as a
/// scrambled pack; the first assert fails.
#[test]
fn is_scrambled_pack_requires_pack_start_signature() {
let mut s = vec![0u8; 2048];
s[0x14] = 0x30; // scramble bits set, but no pack-start at 0x00
assert!(
!is_scrambled_pack(&s),
"0x14 bits without the MPEG-PS pack-start must NOT count as a scrambled pack"
);
// The looser descramble-gate check still sees the raw flag.
assert!(is_scrambled(&s), "is_scrambled keys on the 0x14 flag alone");
// A near-miss pack-start (wrong final byte) is still rejected.
s[0x00..0x04].copy_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xBB]);
assert!(
!is_scrambled_pack(&s),
"a wrong pack-start byte must not qualify"
);
// The real signature flips it to a scrambled pack.
s[0x00..0x04].copy_from_slice(&PACK_START);
assert!(
is_scrambled_pack(&s),
"valid pack-start + 0x14 bits → scrambled pack"
);
}
// ── crack_key scanning over a mock SectorSource ────────────────────────
/// Records every (lba, count) read; returns a caller-supplied flag byte at
/// 0x14 so we can drive scrambled/clear sectors, or an injected error.
struct MockSource {
reads: std::cell::RefCell<Vec<u32>>,
flag_byte: u8,
fail_all: bool,
/// Every read fails with CSS-locked sense `05/6F/03` (drive refusing
/// scrambled reads because the bus-auth gate isn't open).
lock_all: bool,
/// When set, the sector at `crackable.0` is served as a full
/// Stevenson-crackable scrambled sector (`crackable.1`, 2048 bytes)
/// instead of the uniform `flag_byte` fill. Lets the scan actually
/// reach `CrackOutcome::Cracked` from a synthetic ISO.
crackable: Option<(u32, Vec<u8>)>,
}
impl MockSource {
fn new(flag_byte: u8) -> Self {
Self {
reads: std::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new()),
flag_byte,
fail_all: false,
lock_all: false,
crackable: None,
}
}
}
/// Build a Stevenson-crackable scrambled sector for `(title_key, seed)`:
/// the cleartext header (0x59..0x80) carries a periodic run that continues
/// across the 0x80 boundary into the encrypted region — the crib
/// `stevenson::crack_title_key` recovers a key from. Mirrors the
/// `synth_periodic_sector` fixture in the stevenson tests but built here
/// from the crate-internal `scramble_sector`.
fn crackable_sector(title_key: &[u8; 5], seed: &[u8; 5], period: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
const RUN_START: usize = 0x59;
const SEED_OFFSET: usize = 0x54;
let mut plaintext = vec![0u8; 2048];
plaintext[0x00..0x04].copy_from_slice(&PACK_START); // valid DVD pack header
plaintext[0x14] = 0x10; // scramble flag
let pat: Vec<u8> = (0..period)
.map(|k| (0xA0u8.wrapping_add(k as u8)) ^ 0x5A)
.collect();
for (i, b) in plaintext.iter_mut().enumerate().skip(RUN_START) {
*b = pat[i % period];
}
plaintext[SEED_OFFSET..SEED_OFFSET + 5].copy_from_slice(seed);
lfsr::scramble_sector(title_key, &mut plaintext);
plaintext
}
impl SectorSource for MockSource {
fn read_sectors(
&mut self,
lba: u32,
count: u16,
buf: &mut [u8],
_recovery: bool,
) -> Result<usize> {
self.reads.borrow_mut().push(lba);
if self.lock_all {
return Err(Error::DiscRead {
sector: lba as u64,
status: Some(2),
sense: Some(crate::scsi::ScsiSense {
sense_key: 0x05,
asc: 0x6F,
ascq: 0x03,
}),
});
}
if self.fail_all {
return Err(Error::DecryptFailed);
}
let n = count as usize * 2048;
let end = n.min(buf.len());
for b in buf[..end].iter_mut() {
*b = 0;
}
// Fill each sector in the batch with the uniform flag byte, EXCEPT a
// designated crackable LBA which gets the full synthetic sector.
for s in 0..count as u32 {
let sect_lba = lba + s;
let base = s as usize * 2048;
if base + 2048 > end {
break;
}
match &self.crackable {
Some((clba, sector)) if *clba == sect_lba => {
buf[base..base + 2048].copy_from_slice(sector);
}
_ => {
// Real DVD video sectors always open with the MPEG-PS
// pack-start code; `is_scrambled` (Fix 3) requires it
// before trusting the 0x14 scramble bits, so the fixture
// must include it for a `flag_byte` of 0x30 to register
// as scrambled.
buf[base..base + 4].copy_from_slice(&PACK_START);
buf[base + 0x14] = self.flag_byte;
}
}
}
Ok(n)
}
}
/// crack_key caps total scanned sectors at 50_000 even when extents are
/// far larger, and counts EVERY scanned sector (clear ones included)
/// toward the budget. With one 200_000-sector extent of clear sectors, it
/// must read exactly 50_000 sectors and return None — never run away.
///
/// Grounding: `let max_tries = 50_000; ... tried += 1` before the read,
/// loop guard `tried < max_tries`.
/// Mutation: change `50_000` to `500_000` -> read count exceeds 50_000;
/// the exact-count assert fails. Removing the `tried += 1` increment ->
/// would read all 200_000; also fails.
#[test]
fn crack_key_caps_total_tries_at_50000() {
let mut src = MockSource::new(0x00); // clear sectors, never a hit
let extents = [Extent {
start_lba: 0,
sector_count: 200_000,
}];
let res = crack_key(&mut src, &extents, 1);
assert!(res.is_none(), "clear sectors yield no key");
assert_eq!(
src.reads.borrow().len(),
50_000,
"scan must stop at the 50_000-sector budget"
);
}
// ── CrackOutcome: scrambled-but-uncracked vs genuinely unencrypted (Fix 6) ─
/// A scan over CLEAR sectors (scramble flag never set) returns
/// `Unencrypted` — the content is genuinely plaintext, so proceeding
/// without a key is correct.
#[test]
fn crack_outcome_clear_sectors_is_unencrypted() {
let mut src = MockSource::new(0x00); // never scrambled
let extents = [Extent {
start_lba: 0,
sector_count: 100,
}];
let outcome = crack_key_outcome(&mut src, &extents, 1, None);
assert!(
matches!(outcome, CrackOutcome::Unencrypted),
"no scrambled sector seen → Unencrypted, got {outcome:?}"
);
// The Option wrapper collapses Unencrypted → None.
assert!(crack_key(&mut MockSource::new(0x00), &extents, 1).is_none());
}
/// THE Fix 6 regression: a scan that SEES scrambled sectors (flag set) but
/// recovers no key (the mock's zeroed data has no Stevenson crib) must
/// return `ScrambledUncracked` — a HARD failure — NOT `Unencrypted`. The
/// old code conflated this with "unencrypted" and muxed scrambled MPEG as
/// plaintext (garbage at exit 0).
#[test]
fn crack_outcome_scrambled_uncracked_is_hard_failure() {
let mut src = MockSource::new(0x30); // scrambled flag set, no crackable crib
let extents = [Extent {
start_lba: 0,
sector_count: 100,
}];
let outcome = crack_key_outcome(&mut src, &extents, 1, None);
assert!(
outcome.is_scrambled_uncracked(),
"scrambled sectors seen but no key → ScrambledUncracked, got {outcome:?}"
);
// The legacy Option wrapper still collapses this to None (the callers
// that need the distinction now use crack_key_outcome instead).
assert!(crack_key(&mut MockSource::new(0x30), &extents, 1).is_none());
}
/// Even when every read FAILS, a scan that never managed to observe a
/// scrambled sector reports `Unencrypted` (we cannot prove encryption from
/// unreadable data alone — the AACS/keydb paths and the disc-level
/// `css_error` plumbing cover genuinely unreadable encrypted discs).
#[test]
fn crack_outcome_all_reads_fail_is_unencrypted() {
let mut src = MockSource::new(0x30);
src.fail_all = true; // no sector is ever inspected
let extents = [Extent {
start_lba: 0,
sector_count: 10,
}];
let outcome = crack_key_outcome(&mut src, &extents, 1, None);
assert!(
matches!(outcome, CrackOutcome::Unencrypted),
"no readable scrambled sector → Unencrypted, got {outcome:?}"
);
}
/// Fix C (rc.5.1): on the INITIAL scan, a drive that refuses every read with
/// CSS-locked sense (`05/6F/03`) is encrypted-but-locked →
/// `ScrambledUncracked` (a hard failure), NOT `Unencrypted`. This is the
/// rc4.3 bug: every VOB read came back `6F/03`, so the scan saw no scrambled
/// sector and wrongly declared the disc unencrypted → 19 KB garbage.
#[test]
fn crack_outcome_css_locked_initial_is_scrambled_uncracked() {
let mut src = MockSource::new(0x30);
src.lock_all = true; // every read → 05/6F/03
let extents = [Extent {
start_lba: 0,
sector_count: 100,
}];
let outcome = crack_key_outcome(&mut src, &extents, 1, None);
assert!(
outcome.is_scrambled_uncracked(),
"every read 6F/03 on the initial scan → ScrambledUncracked, got {outcome:?}"
);
}
/// MISSING #1 guard: the re-crack path (the `Option`-returning `crack_key`,
/// `fail_on_locked == false`) must NOT hard-fail on a CSS-locked read — it
/// returns `None`. A lapsed-AGID re-crack of another VTS stays soft so a
/// genuinely crackable title isn't killed by a transient locked read.
#[test]
fn crack_key_recrack_locked_is_none_not_hard_fail() {
let mut src = MockSource::new(0x30);
src.lock_all = true;
let extents = [Extent {
start_lba: 0,
sector_count: 100,
}];
assert!(crack_key(&mut src, &extents, 1).is_none());
}
/// Fix F: a fully CSS-locked scan early-bails near `CSS_LOCKED_BAIL`
/// consecutive locked reads instead of grinding the whole 50_000-sector
/// budget (the rc5 "stuck Scanning…" hang on a wedged bridge).
#[test]
fn crack_css_locked_scan_early_bails() {
let mut src = MockSource::new(0x30);
src.lock_all = true;
let extents = [Extent {
start_lba: 0,
sector_count: 10_000,
}];
let _ = crack_key_outcome(&mut src, &extents, 1, None);
let n = src.reads.borrow().len();
assert!(
n <= (CSS_LOCKED_BAIL as usize) + 1,
"locked scan early-bails near {CSS_LOCKED_BAIL}, not 10000; read {n}"
);
}
/// The budget spans ALL extents, not per-extent: two extents summing past
/// the cap must still stop at 50_000 total reads.
///
/// Grounding: `tried` is declared outside the `for ext in extents` loop;
/// `if tried >= max_tries { break }` after each extent.
/// Mutation: move `let mut tried = 0` inside the extent loop -> each extent
/// gets its own 50_000 budget; total reads would be 80_000, this fails.
#[test]
fn crack_key_budget_is_shared_across_extents() {
let mut src = MockSource::new(0x00);
let extents = [
Extent {
start_lba: 0,
sector_count: 40_000,
},
Extent {
start_lba: 100_000,
sector_count: 40_000,
},
];
let res = crack_key(&mut src, &extents, 1);
assert!(res.is_none());
assert_eq!(
src.reads.borrow().len(),
50_000,
"the 50_000 budget is shared across all extents"
);
}
/// crack_key scans sequentially from each extent's start_lba. The first
/// reads must be at the extent's start_lba, start_lba+1, ... pinning the
/// LBA arithmetic `ext.start_lba + i`.
///
/// Grounding: `reader.read_sectors(ext.start_lba + i, 1, ...)`.
/// Mutation: change `ext.start_lba + i` to just `i` -> the recorded LBAs
/// would start at 0, not 5000; this fails.
#[test]
fn crack_key_scans_from_extent_start_lba() {
let mut src = MockSource::new(0x00);
let extents = [Extent {
start_lba: 5_000,
sector_count: 4,
}];
let _ = crack_key(&mut src, &extents, 1);
let reads = src.reads.borrow();
assert_eq!(
&reads[..],
&[5_000, 5_001, 5_002, 5_003],
"sequential scan from start_lba"
);
}
/// A read error on a sector does NOT abort the scan: crack_key keeps
/// scanning subsequent sectors (the error sector still counts toward the
/// budget). With a small failing extent, every sector is attempted and the
/// function returns None.
///
/// Grounding: `if reader.read_sectors(...).is_ok() && is_scrambled(...)` —
/// an Err simply falls through to `i += 1`.
/// Mutation: change the read-error handling to `reader.read_sectors(...)?`
/// (propagate) -> crack_key would stop after the first error and read only
/// 1 sector; this asserts all 10 were attempted.
#[test]
fn crack_key_continues_past_read_errors() {
let mut src = MockSource::new(0x30);
src.fail_all = true;
let extents = [Extent {
start_lba: 0,
sector_count: 10,
}];
let res = crack_key(&mut src, &extents, 1);
assert!(res.is_none());
assert_eq!(
src.reads.borrow().len(),
10,
"read errors must not abort the scan"
);
}
/// Empty extents (no sectors) -> crack_key reads nothing and returns None.
/// A zero-sector extent must not read its start_lba.
///
/// Grounding: `while i < ext.sector_count` with sector_count == 0 never
/// enters.
/// Mutation: change `i < ext.sector_count` to `i <= ext.sector_count` ->
/// one spurious read at start_lba; this asserts zero reads.
#[test]
fn crack_key_empty_extent_reads_nothing() {
let mut src = MockSource::new(0x30);
let extents = [Extent {
start_lba: 42,
sector_count: 0,
}];
let res = crack_key(&mut src, &extents, 1);
assert!(res.is_none());
assert_eq!(
src.reads.borrow().len(),
0,
"zero-sector extent reads nothing"
);
}
/// No extents at all -> immediate None, zero reads.
///
/// Grounding: `for ext in extents` over an empty slice is a no-op.
/// Mutation: any change that reads before the loop would break this.
#[test]
fn crack_key_no_extents_is_none() {
let mut src = MockSource::new(0x30);
let res = crack_key(&mut src, &[], 1);
assert!(res.is_none());
assert_eq!(src.reads.borrow().len(), 0);
}
// ── Scan-level Cracked branch + per-VTS re-crack success (audit §2 / §5 #8) ─
/// SCAN-LEVEL CRACKED (audit gap "MockSource never yields a crackable
/// sector"): drive the full `crack_key_scan` over a synthetic ISO whose
/// scan hits a Stevenson-crackable scrambled sector. The outcome must be
/// `CrackOutcome::Cracked` with a key that round-trips the sector, AND the
/// `crack_span` must be recorded as the half-open extent span (the per-VTS
/// routing key the mux path needs). Previously only the leaf crack and the
/// Uncracked/Unencrypted branches were tested — the Cracked branch and
/// `crack_span` recording were never exercised end-to-end.
#[test]
fn crack_outcome_reaches_cracked_with_span() {
let title_key = [0x42, 0x13, 0x37, 0xBE, 0xEF];
let seed = [0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55];
let crackable = crackable_sector(&title_key, &seed, 8);
// The crackable sector sits a few sectors into the extent.
let mut src = MockSource::new(0x00); // surrounding sectors: clear
src.crackable = Some((1003, crackable.clone()));
let extents = [Extent {
start_lba: 1000,
sector_count: 50,
}];
let outcome = crack_key_outcome(&mut src, &extents, 4, None);
let state = match outcome {
CrackOutcome::Cracked(s) => s,
other => panic!("expected Cracked, got {other:?}"),
};
// The recovered key descrambles the crackable sector body.
let mut test = crackable.clone();
descramble_sector(&state, &mut test);
let mut plain = crackable;
lfsr::descramble_sector(&title_key, &mut plain);
assert_eq!(
&test[0x80..],
&plain[0x80..],
"recovered key must round-trip the scrambled sector body"
);
// crack_span = half-open [start, start+count) of the scanned extent.
assert_eq!(
state.crack_span,
Some((1000, 1050)),
"crack_span must record the extent LBA span for per-VTS routing"
);
}
/// CSS_ERROR WIRING (audit §2 / §5 #7): an all-locked synthetic ISO (every
/// VOB read returns CSS-locked sense `05/6F/03` across MULTIPLE extents, as a
/// real encrypted-but-unauthenticated disc image does) must produce the exact
/// outcome the scan converts into `disc.css_error = Some(Error::CssKeyMissing)`
/// — i.e. `CrackOutcome::ScrambledUncracked` / `is_scrambled_uncracked()`,
/// NOT `Unencrypted`. disc/mod.rs's `crack_key_outcome → ScrambledUncracked`
/// arm (where it stamps css_error) is driven by exactly this signal, so this
/// pins the css-layer contract that arm depends on without touching the
/// scan plumbing.
#[test]
fn all_locked_synthetic_iso_yields_css_key_missing_signal() {
let mut src = MockSource::new(0x30);
src.lock_all = true; // every read → 05/6F/03 across the whole "ISO"
let extents = [
Extent {
start_lba: 0,
sector_count: 30,
},
Extent {
start_lba: 5_000,
sector_count: 30,
},
];
let outcome = crack_key_outcome(&mut src, &extents, 16, None);
assert!(
outcome.is_scrambled_uncracked(),
"all-locked ISO → ScrambledUncracked (the css_error=CssKeyMissing \
signal), got {outcome:?}"
);
// The legacy Option wrapper still collapses it to None — callers that
// surface the hard error must use crack_key_outcome, which this proves.
let mut src2 = MockSource::new(0x30);
src2.lock_all = true;
assert!(crack_key(&mut src2, &extents, 16).is_none());
}
/// PER-VTS RE-CRACK SUCCESS (audit gap "success path missing"): the prior
/// re-crack test only covered the locked→None path. Here a re-crack
/// (`crack_key`, `fail_on_locked == false`) over a DIFFERENT VTS's extents
/// finds that VTS's own crackable sector and returns a `CssState` whose
/// `crack_span` matches the new extents — proving a key cracked for one VTS
/// is genuinely re-derived (not reused) for another.
#[test]
fn recrack_succeeds_on_other_vts_extents() {
let title_key = [0xFE, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x98, 0x76];
let seed = [0x00, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x7F, 0x01];
let crackable = crackable_sector(&title_key, &seed, 5);
let mut src = MockSource::new(0x00);
// The second VTS lives at a disjoint LBA range; its crackable sector is
// the first one in the extent.
src.crackable = Some((9000, crackable));
let other_vts = [Extent {
start_lba: 9000,
sector_count: 20,
}];
let state = crack_key(&mut src, &other_vts, 4).expect("re-crack must recover a key");
assert_eq!(
state.crack_span,
Some((9000, 9020)),
"re-crack span must reflect the OTHER VTS extents, not a reused span"
);
}
}