MattJackson
a956c6ad94
Pure rename pass — no behavioral change: - Drive::is_libredrive_active() → Drive::is_raw_read_active() - PlatformDriver::is_libredrive_active() trait method (same rename) - Mt1959 struct field libredrive_active → raw_read_active - Error::AacsLibredriveUnsupported → Error::AacsRawReadUnsupported (numeric code E7016 unchanged) - All callers, tests, and doc comments updated to the new name. Old identifiers removed entirely; downstream consumers must update. Mirrored in bdemu, freemkv, autorip, freemkv-tools.
1425 lines
50 KiB
Rust
1425 lines
50 KiB
Rust
//! AACS key resolution — VUK derivation, MKB processing, disc hash, unit key parsing.
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use super::decrypt::aes_ecb_decrypt;
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use super::keydb::{DeviceKey, KeyDb};
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// ── AACS version ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// AACS protection generation a disc carries.
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///
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/// The content cert byte distinguishes V10 (`0x00`) from V20 (`0x01`). V21
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/// cannot be detected from the cert alone — a V21 disc carries a V20 cert
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/// and is upgraded to `V21` only after the MKB walk turns up record types
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/// `0x82` / `0x83` (Media Key Variant Data and Variant Number).
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///
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/// Key-storage stride in `Unit_Key_RO.inf` is 48 bytes for V10 and 64
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/// bytes for V20 / V21.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum AacsVersion {
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/// AACS 1.0 — original BD-ROM.
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V10,
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/// AACS 2.0 — UHD-BD, classical Media Key derivation.
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V20,
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/// AACS 2.1 — UHD-BD with Media Key Variant chain on top of V20.
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V21,
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}
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impl AacsVersion {
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/// Stride (in bytes) between successive encrypted unit keys in
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/// `Unit_Key_RO.inf`.
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fn unit_key_stride(self) -> usize {
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match self {
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AacsVersion::V10 => 48,
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AacsVersion::V20 | AacsVersion::V21 => 64,
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}
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}
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}
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// ── VUK derivation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// Derive VUK from Media Key and Volume ID.
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/// VUK = AES-128-ECB-DECRYPT(media_key, volume_id) XOR volume_id
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pub fn derive_vuk(media_key: &[u8; 16], volume_id: &[u8; 16]) -> [u8; 16] {
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let mut vuk = aes_ecb_decrypt(media_key, volume_id);
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for i in 0..16 {
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vuk[i] ^= volume_id[i];
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}
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vuk
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}
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/// Decrypt an encrypted unit key using the VUK (AES-128-ECB).
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pub fn decrypt_unit_key(vuk: &[u8; 16], encrypted_uk: &[u8; 16]) -> [u8; 16] {
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aes_ecb_decrypt(vuk, encrypted_uk)
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}
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// ── Unit_Key_RO.inf parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// Parsed Unit_Key_RO.inf file.
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#[derive(Debug)]
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pub struct UnitKeyFile {
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/// Disc hash (SHA1 of the entire file) — used as KEYDB lookup key
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pub disc_hash: [u8; 20],
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/// Application type (1 = BD-ROM)
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pub app_type: u8,
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/// Number of BDMV directories
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pub num_bdmv_dir: u8,
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/// Whether SKB MKB is used
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pub use_skb_mkb: bool,
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/// AACS generation this file's stride matches
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pub version: AacsVersion,
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/// Encrypted unit keys (CPS unit number, encrypted key)
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pub encrypted_keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])>,
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/// Title → CPS unit index mapping (title_idx → unit_key_idx)
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pub title_cps_unit: Vec<u16>,
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}
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/// Compute disc hash (SHA1 of Unit_Key_RO.inf content).
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pub fn disc_hash(data: &[u8]) -> [u8; 20] {
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use sha1::{Digest, Sha1};
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let hash = Sha1::digest(data);
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let mut out = [0u8; 20];
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out.copy_from_slice(&hash);
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out
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}
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/// Format disc hash as hex string with 0x prefix (for KEYDB lookup).
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pub fn disc_hash_hex(hash: &[u8; 20]) -> String {
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let mut s = String::with_capacity(42);
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s.push_str("0x");
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for b in hash {
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s.push_str(&format!("{b:02X}"));
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}
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s
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}
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/// Parse Unit_Key_RO.inf from raw bytes.
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///
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/// Format (from AACS spec):
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/// [0..4] BE32: offset to key storage area (uk_pos)
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/// [16] app_type (1 = BD-ROM)
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/// [17] num_bdmv_dir
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/// [18] bit 7: use_skb_mkb
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/// [20..22] BE16: first_play CPS unit
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/// [22..24] BE16: top_menu CPS unit
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/// [24..26] BE16: num_titles
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/// [26..] title entries: 2 bytes padding + 2 bytes CPS unit, × num_titles
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///
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/// Key storage at uk_pos:
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/// [uk_pos..uk_pos+2] BE16: num_unit_keys
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/// [uk_pos+48..] encrypted keys, 16 bytes each
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/// AACS 1.0: 48-byte stride
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/// AACS 2.0 / 2.1: 64-byte stride (48 + 16 extra)
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pub fn parse_unit_key_ro(data: &[u8], version: AacsVersion) -> Option<UnitKeyFile> {
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if data.len() < 20 {
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return None;
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}
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let hash = disc_hash(data);
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// Header
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let app_type = data[16];
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let num_bdmv_dir = data[17];
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let use_skb_mkb = (data[18] >> 7) & 1 == 1;
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// Key storage offset
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let uk_pos = u32::from_be_bytes([data[0], data[1], data[2], data[3]]) as usize;
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if uk_pos + 2 > data.len() {
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return None;
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}
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// Number of unit keys
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let num_uk = u16::from_be_bytes([data[uk_pos], data[uk_pos + 1]]) as usize;
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if num_uk == 0 {
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return Some(UnitKeyFile {
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disc_hash: hash,
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app_type,
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num_bdmv_dir,
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use_skb_mkb,
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version,
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encrypted_keys: Vec::new(),
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title_cps_unit: Vec::new(),
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});
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}
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// Stride between keys
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let stride = version.unit_key_stride();
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// Validate size
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let keys_start = uk_pos + 48; // first key at uk_pos + 48
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if keys_start + 16 > data.len() {
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return None;
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}
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// Extract encrypted keys
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let mut encrypted_keys = Vec::with_capacity(num_uk);
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let mut pos = keys_start;
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for i in 0..num_uk {
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if pos + 16 > data.len() {
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break;
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}
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let mut key = [0u8; 16];
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key.copy_from_slice(&data[pos..pos + 16]);
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encrypted_keys.push(((i + 1) as u32, key));
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pos += stride;
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}
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// Title → CPS unit mapping
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let mut title_cps_unit = Vec::new();
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if data.len() >= 26 {
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let first_play = u16::from_be_bytes([data[20], data[21]]);
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let top_menu = u16::from_be_bytes([data[22], data[23]]);
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let num_titles = u16::from_be_bytes([data[24], data[25]]) as usize;
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title_cps_unit.push(first_play);
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title_cps_unit.push(top_menu);
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for i in 0..num_titles {
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let off = 26 + i * 4 + 2; // 2 bytes padding + 2 bytes CPS unit
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if off + 2 <= data.len() {
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let cps = u16::from_be_bytes([data[off], data[off + 1]]);
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title_cps_unit.push(cps);
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}
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}
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}
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Some(UnitKeyFile {
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disc_hash: hash,
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app_type,
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num_bdmv_dir,
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use_skb_mkb,
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version,
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encrypted_keys,
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title_cps_unit,
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})
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}
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// ── MKB processing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// Derive Media Key from MKB data using processing keys.
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///
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/// Processing keys are pre-computed keys that work for specific MKB versions.
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/// This is the fast path — no subset-difference tree traversal needed.
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///
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/// MKB format:
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/// Record type 0x10 = Type and Version Record (has MKB version)
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/// Record type 0x81 = Verify Media Key Record, AACS 1.0 (has mk_dv)
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/// Record type 0x86 = Verify Media Key Record, AACS 2.0/2.1 (has mk_dv)
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/// Record type 0x04 = Subset-Difference Index (has UVS entries)
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/// Record type 0x07 = Explicit Subset-Difference Record (has cvalues)
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pub fn derive_media_key_from_pk(mkb: &[u8], processing_keys: &[[u8; 16]]) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
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// Parse MKB records
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let mk_dv = mkb_find_mk_dv(mkb)?;
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let uvs = mkb_find_subdiff_records(mkb)?;
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let cvalues = mkb_find_cvalues(mkb)?;
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// Count UV entries (each 5 bytes, stop when high bits set)
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let num_uvs = uvs
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.chunks(5)
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.take_while(|c| c.len() == 5 && (c[0] & 0xC0) == 0)
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.count();
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// Try each processing key against each UV/cvalue pair
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for pk in processing_keys {
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for i in 0..num_uvs {
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if (i + 1) * 16 > cvalues.len() {
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continue;
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}
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let record_start = i * 5;
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if record_start + 5 > uvs.len() {
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continue;
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}
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let _u_mask_shift = uvs[record_start];
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let uv = &uvs[record_start + 1..record_start + 5];
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let cv = &cvalues[i * 16..(i + 1) * 16];
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if let Some(mk) = validate_processing_key(pk, cv, uv, &mk_dv) {
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return Some(mk);
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}
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}
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}
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None
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}
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/// Validate a processing key against a cvalue/UV pair.
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/// Returns the Media Key if valid.
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///
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/// Steps:
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/// 1. `mk = AES-128D(pk, cvalue)`
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/// 2. `mk[12..16] ^= uv` (4 bytes XOR into the last 4 bytes only)
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/// 3. `dec_vd = AES-128D(mk, mk_dv)`
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/// 4. If `dec_vd[0..8] == 01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF` → valid.
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fn validate_processing_key(
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pk: &[u8; 16],
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cvalue: &[u8],
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uv: &[u8],
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mk_dv: &[u8; 16],
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) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
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if cvalue.len() < 16 || uv.len() < 4 {
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return None;
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}
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// Step 1: mk = AES-128D(pk, cvalue)
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let mut cv = [0u8; 16];
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cv.copy_from_slice(&cvalue[..16]);
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let mut mk = aes_ecb_decrypt(pk, &cv);
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// Step 2: XOR uv into the last 4 bytes of mk (mk[12..16]).
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for a in 0..4 {
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mk[12 + a] ^= uv[a];
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}
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// Step 3 + 4: dec_vd = AES-128D(mk, mk_dv); verify magic.
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let dec_vd = aes_ecb_decrypt(&mk, mk_dv);
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const VERIFY_MAGIC: [u8; 8] = [0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF];
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if dec_vd[..8] == VERIFY_MAGIC {
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return Some(mk);
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}
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None
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}
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/// Find Verify Media Key Record (type 0x81 for AACS 1.0, 0x86 for AACS 2.0/2.1) in MKB.
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fn mkb_find_mk_dv(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
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let mut pos = 0;
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let mut verify_rec_seen: Vec<(u8, usize, usize)> = Vec::new();
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while pos + 4 <= mkb.len() {
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let rec_type = mkb[pos];
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let rec_len = u32::from_be_bytes([0, mkb[pos + 1], mkb[pos + 2], mkb[pos + 3]]) as usize;
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if rec_len < 4 || pos + rec_len > mkb.len() {
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break;
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}
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if rec_type == 0x81 || rec_type == 0x86 {
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verify_rec_seen.push((rec_type, pos, rec_len));
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}
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if (rec_type == 0x81 || rec_type == 0x86) && rec_len >= 20 {
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// mk_dv is at offset 4 of the record (after the 4-byte header)
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let mut dv = [0u8; 16];
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dv.copy_from_slice(&mkb[pos + 4..pos + 20]);
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tracing::warn!(
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target: "freemkv::disc",
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phase = "mkb_mk_dv_found",
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rec_type,
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pos,
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rec_len,
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"mk_dv extracted from MKB"
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);
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return Some(dv);
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}
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pos += rec_len;
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}
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tracing::warn!(
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target: "freemkv::disc",
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phase = "mkb_mk_dv_not_found",
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verify_rec_seen = ?verify_rec_seen,
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scanned_bytes = pos,
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"no 0x81/0x86 record with rec_len>=20 found"
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);
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None
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}
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/// Find Subset-Difference records (type 0x04) in MKB.
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fn mkb_find_subdiff_records(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
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let mut pos = 0;
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while pos + 4 <= mkb.len() {
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let rec_type = mkb[pos];
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let rec_len = u32::from_be_bytes([0, mkb[pos + 1], mkb[pos + 2], mkb[pos + 3]]) as usize;
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if rec_len < 4 || pos + rec_len > mkb.len() {
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break;
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}
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if rec_type == 0x04 && rec_len > 4 {
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return Some(mkb[pos + 4..pos + rec_len].to_vec());
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}
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pos += rec_len;
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}
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None
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}
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/// Find the Media Key Data Record (cvalues table) in an MKB.
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///
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/// libaacs hard-codes record type `0x05` (matches AACS 1.0 and BD type-3/4
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/// MKBs), but on AACS 2.x Category-C MKBs the cvalues table moved to
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/// record type `0x07` and `0x05` now carries the host-revocation
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/// signature. To stay correct on both lines we prefer `0x07` first (the
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/// AACS 2.x layout used by every modern UHD disc) and fall back to
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/// `0x05` for AACS 1.0 MKBs.
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fn mkb_find_cvalues(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
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if let Some(body) = find_record_body(mkb, 0x07) {
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return Some(body);
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}
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find_record_body(mkb, 0x05)
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}
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/// Walk an MKB and return the payload (header stripped) of the first
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/// record matching `rec_type`. Returns `None` if no such record exists or
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/// the record is empty.
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fn find_record_body(mkb: &[u8], rec_type_wanted: u8) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
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let mut pos = 0;
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while pos + 4 <= mkb.len() {
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let rec_type = mkb[pos];
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let rec_len = u32::from_be_bytes([0, mkb[pos + 1], mkb[pos + 2], mkb[pos + 3]]) as usize;
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if rec_len < 4 || pos + rec_len > mkb.len() {
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break;
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}
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if rec_type == rec_type_wanted && rec_len > 4 {
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return Some(mkb[pos + 4..pos + rec_len].to_vec());
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}
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if rec_len == 0 {
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break;
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}
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pos += rec_len;
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}
|
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None
|
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}
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|
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/// Get MKB version from Type and Version Record (type 0x10).
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/// Version is a BE u32 at offset 8 of the record body (offset 12 from `pos`).
|
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pub fn mkb_version(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<u32> {
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let mut pos = 0;
|
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while pos + 4 <= mkb.len() {
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let rec_type = mkb[pos];
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let rec_len = u32::from_be_bytes([0, mkb[pos + 1], mkb[pos + 2], mkb[pos + 3]]) as usize;
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if rec_len < 4 || pos + rec_len > mkb.len() {
|
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break;
|
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}
|
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|
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if rec_type == 0x10 && rec_len >= 12 {
|
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return Some(u32::from_be_bytes([
|
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mkb[pos + 8],
|
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mkb[pos + 9],
|
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mkb[pos + 10],
|
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mkb[pos + 11],
|
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]));
|
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}
|
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pos += rec_len;
|
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}
|
||
None
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── AACS-G3 key derivation (subset-difference tree) ─────────────────────────
|
||
|
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/// AACS-G3 seed constant.
|
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const AESG3_SEED: [u8; 16] = [
|
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0x7B, 0x10, 0x3C, 0x5D, 0xCB, 0x08, 0xC4, 0xE5, 0x1A, 0x27, 0xB0, 0x17, 0x99, 0x05, 0x3B, 0xD9,
|
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];
|
||
|
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/// AACS-G3: derive a subkey from a parent key.
|
||
/// seed[15] += inc, then AES-DEC(key, seed) XOR seed.
|
||
fn aesg3(key: &[u8; 16], inc: u8) -> [u8; 16] {
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let mut seed = AESG3_SEED;
|
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seed[15] = seed[15].wrapping_add(inc);
|
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let mut out = aes_ecb_decrypt(key, &seed);
|
||
for i in 0..16 {
|
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out[i] ^= seed[i];
|
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}
|
||
out
|
||
}
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||
|
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/// Compute v_mask from a UV value.
|
||
fn calc_v_mask(uv: u32) -> u32 {
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let mut v_mask: u32 = 0xFFFF_FFFF;
|
||
while (uv & !v_mask) == 0 && v_mask != 0 {
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||
v_mask <<= 1;
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}
|
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v_mask
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Derive processing key from device key using subset-difference tree traversal.
|
||
fn calc_pk_from_dk(dk: &[u8; 16], uv: u32, v_mask: u32, dev_key_v_mask: u32) -> [u8; 16] {
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||
// Initial derivation: left_child = aesg3(dk, 0), pk = aesg3(dk, 1), right_child = aesg3(dk, 2)
|
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let mut left_child = aesg3(dk, 0);
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let mut pk = aesg3(dk, 1);
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let mut right_child = aesg3(dk, 2);
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let mut current_v_mask = dev_key_v_mask;
|
||
|
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while current_v_mask != v_mask {
|
||
// Find the highest unset bit in current_v_mask
|
||
let mut bit_pos: i32 = -1;
|
||
for i in (0..32).rev() {
|
||
if (current_v_mask & (1u32 << i)) == 0 {
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||
bit_pos = i;
|
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break;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let curr_key = if bit_pos < 0 || (uv & (1u32 << bit_pos as u32)) == 0 {
|
||
left_child
|
||
} else {
|
||
right_child
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
left_child = aesg3(&curr_key, 0);
|
||
pk = aesg3(&curr_key, 1);
|
||
right_child = aesg3(&curr_key, 2);
|
||
|
||
current_v_mask = ((current_v_mask as i32) >> 1) as u32;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pk
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Derive Media Key from MKB using device keys (subset-difference tree).
|
||
pub fn derive_media_key_from_dk(mkb: &[u8], device_keys: &[DeviceKey]) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
|
||
let mk_dv = mkb_find_mk_dv(mkb)?;
|
||
let uvs = mkb_find_subdiff_records(mkb)?;
|
||
let cvalues = mkb_find_cvalues(mkb)?;
|
||
|
||
// Count UV entries
|
||
let num_uvs = uvs
|
||
.chunks(5)
|
||
.take_while(|c| c.len() == 5 && (c[0] & 0xC0) == 0)
|
||
.count();
|
||
|
||
for dk in device_keys {
|
||
let device_number = dk.node as u32;
|
||
|
||
// Find applying subset-difference for this device
|
||
for uvs_idx in 0..num_uvs {
|
||
let p_uv = &uvs[1 + 5 * uvs_idx..];
|
||
let u_mask_shift = uvs[5 * uvs_idx]; // byte before the UV value
|
||
|
||
if u_mask_shift & 0xC0 != 0 {
|
||
break; // device revoked
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let uv = u32::from_be_bytes([p_uv[0], p_uv[1], p_uv[2], p_uv[3]]);
|
||
if uv == 0 {
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let u_mask: u32 = 0xFFFF_FFFF << u_mask_shift;
|
||
let v_mask = calc_v_mask(uv);
|
||
|
||
if ((device_number & u_mask) == (uv & u_mask))
|
||
&& ((device_number & v_mask) != (uv & v_mask))
|
||
{
|
||
// Found matching subset-difference — find the right device key
|
||
let dev_key_v_mask = calc_v_mask(dk.uv);
|
||
let dev_key_u_mask: u32 = 0xFFFF_FFFF << dk.u_mask_shift;
|
||
|
||
if u_mask == dev_key_u_mask && (uv & dev_key_v_mask) == (dk.uv & dev_key_v_mask) {
|
||
// Derive processing key via tree traversal
|
||
let pk = calc_pk_from_dk(&dk.key, uv, v_mask, dev_key_v_mask);
|
||
|
||
// Validate and derive media key
|
||
if uvs_idx < cvalues.len() / 16 {
|
||
let cv = &cvalues[uvs_idx * 16..(uvs_idx + 1) * 16];
|
||
if let Some(mk) =
|
||
validate_processing_key(&pk, cv, &uvs[1 + uvs_idx * 5..], &mk_dv)
|
||
{
|
||
return Some(mk);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
None
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// MKB disc structure format code.
|
||
const MKB_DISC_STRUCTURE_FORMAT: u8 = 0x83;
|
||
/// MKB pack buffer size.
|
||
const MKB_PACK_SIZE: usize = 32772;
|
||
|
||
/// Read MKB from drive via SCSI (REPORT DISC STRUCTURE format 0x83).
|
||
/// Returns the concatenated MKB data from all packs.
|
||
pub fn read_mkb_from_drive(session: &mut crate::drive::Drive) -> crate::error::Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||
use crate::scsi::{DataDirection, SCSI_READ_DISC_STRUCTURE};
|
||
|
||
let cdb = [
|
||
SCSI_READ_DISC_STRUCTURE,
|
||
0x01,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
MKB_DISC_STRUCTURE_FORMAT,
|
||
(MKB_PACK_SIZE >> 8) as u8,
|
||
(MKB_PACK_SIZE & 0xFF) as u8,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
];
|
||
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 32772];
|
||
session.scsi_execute(&cdb, DataDirection::FromDevice, &mut buf, 10_000)?;
|
||
|
||
let data_len = u16::from_be_bytes([buf[0], buf[1]]) as usize;
|
||
if data_len < 2 {
|
||
return Ok(Vec::new());
|
||
}
|
||
let len = data_len - 2;
|
||
let num_packs = buf[3] as usize;
|
||
|
||
let mut mkb = Vec::with_capacity(32768 * num_packs.max(1));
|
||
if len > 0 && len <= 32768 {
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&buf[4..4 + len]);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Read remaining packs
|
||
for pack in 1..num_packs {
|
||
let mut cdb = [
|
||
SCSI_READ_DISC_STRUCTURE,
|
||
0x01,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
MKB_DISC_STRUCTURE_FORMAT,
|
||
(MKB_PACK_SIZE >> 8) as u8,
|
||
(MKB_PACK_SIZE & 0xFF) as u8,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
0x00,
|
||
];
|
||
// Pack number goes in address field
|
||
cdb[2] = ((pack >> 24) & 0xFF) as u8;
|
||
cdb[3] = ((pack >> 16) & 0xFF) as u8;
|
||
cdb[4] = ((pack >> 8) & 0xFF) as u8;
|
||
cdb[5] = (pack & 0xFF) as u8;
|
||
|
||
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 32772];
|
||
if session
|
||
.scsi_execute(&cdb, DataDirection::FromDevice, &mut buf, 10_000)
|
||
.is_ok()
|
||
{
|
||
let len = u16::from_be_bytes([buf[0], buf[1]]) as usize;
|
||
if len > 2 && len - 2 <= 32768 {
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&buf[4..4 + len - 2]);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
Ok(mkb)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Content Certificate parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
/// AACS Content Certificate — identifies disc AACS version and features.
|
||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||
pub struct ContentCert {
|
||
/// Bus encryption enabled flag
|
||
pub bus_encryption: bool,
|
||
/// Content Certificate ID (6 bytes)
|
||
pub cc_id: [u8; 6],
|
||
/// AACS generation indicated by the certificate type byte.
|
||
///
|
||
/// Cert type `0x00` → [`AacsVersion::V10`]; any other value →
|
||
/// [`AacsVersion::V20`]. The certificate alone cannot distinguish
|
||
/// V20 from V21 — Variant detection happens after the MKB walk.
|
||
pub version: AacsVersion,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Parse a Content Certificate (ContentXXX.cer) file.
|
||
pub fn parse_content_cert(data: &[u8]) -> Option<ContentCert> {
|
||
if data.len() < 8 {
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Content Certificate format:
|
||
// [0] certificate type (0x00 = AACS1, 0x01 = AACS2)
|
||
// [1] bus_encryption_enabled (bit 0)
|
||
// [2..8] cc_id (6 bytes)
|
||
let version = if data[0] == 0x00 {
|
||
AacsVersion::V10
|
||
} else {
|
||
AacsVersion::V20
|
||
};
|
||
let bus_encryption = (data[1] & 0x01) != 0;
|
||
let mut cc_id = [0u8; 6];
|
||
cc_id.copy_from_slice(&data[2..8]);
|
||
|
||
Some(ContentCert {
|
||
bus_encryption,
|
||
cc_id,
|
||
version,
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Full VUK resolution chain ───────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
/// Result of resolving a disc's VUK.
|
||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||
pub struct ResolvedKeys {
|
||
/// Disc hash (SHA1 of Unit_Key_RO.inf)
|
||
pub disc_hash: [u8; 20],
|
||
/// Volume Unique Key
|
||
pub vuk: [u8; 16],
|
||
/// Decrypted unit keys (CPS unit number, key)
|
||
pub unit_keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])>,
|
||
/// Title → CPS unit index mapping
|
||
pub title_cps_unit: Vec<u16>,
|
||
/// AACS generation that drove the resolution
|
||
pub version: AacsVersion,
|
||
/// Whether bus encryption is enabled (from Content Certificate)
|
||
pub bus_encryption: bool,
|
||
/// Which resolution path succeeded (1=KEYDB, 2=KEYDB derived, 3=PK, 4=DK)
|
||
pub key_source: u8,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Inputs shared by every classical-path resolver. References only —
|
||
/// callers retain ownership of all buffers.
|
||
pub struct ResolveContext<'a> {
|
||
/// `Unit_Key_RO.inf` raw bytes.
|
||
pub unit_key_ro: &'a [u8],
|
||
/// Content Certificate raw bytes (optional — used for bus-encryption flag).
|
||
pub content_cert: Option<&'a [u8]>,
|
||
/// 16-byte Volume ID from SCSI handshake. `[0u8; 16]` is the
|
||
/// "no VID" sentinel and disables paths 2/3/4.
|
||
pub volume_id: &'a [u8; 16],
|
||
/// Key database.
|
||
pub keydb: &'a KeyDb,
|
||
/// MKB raw bytes (optional — paths 3/4 require it).
|
||
pub mkb: Option<&'a [u8]>,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// AACS 1.0 key resolution. Parses `Unit_Key_RO.inf` with 48-byte
|
||
/// stride. Tries paths 1 → 4 in order.
|
||
pub fn resolve_keys_v1(ctx: &ResolveContext<'_>) -> Option<ResolvedKeys> {
|
||
resolve_keys_classical(ctx, AacsVersion::V10)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// AACS 2.0 key resolution. Parses `Unit_Key_RO.inf` with 64-byte
|
||
/// stride. Tries paths 1 → 4 in order. When paths 3/4 succeed against
|
||
/// an MKB carrying Variant records (`0x82` / `0x83`), the result's
|
||
/// `version` is upgraded to [`AacsVersion::V21`] — derivation still
|
||
/// runs through the classical V2 path; the V21-specific Variant chain
|
||
/// is wired separately via [`resolve_keys_v21`].
|
||
pub fn resolve_keys_v2(ctx: &ResolveContext<'_>) -> Option<ResolvedKeys> {
|
||
let mut resolved = resolve_keys_classical(ctx, AacsVersion::V20)?;
|
||
if let Some(mkb) = ctx.mkb {
|
||
let recs = super::variants::walk_mkb(mkb);
|
||
if super::variants::is_variant_mkb(&recs) {
|
||
resolved.version = AacsVersion::V21;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
Some(resolved)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// AACS 2.1 key resolution via the Media Key Variant chain.
|
||
///
|
||
/// This is wired but not reachable from the production dispatcher — the
|
||
/// Variant chain still requires an integrator-supplied Key Correction
|
||
/// Data constant (see [`super::variants::KEY_CORRECTION_DATA_PLACEHOLDER`])
|
||
/// and an empirically-validated `VARIANTS[uv]` table. Until both are
|
||
/// available, [`super::variants::derive_media_key_variant`] returns
|
||
/// errors that this wrapper logs and converts to `None`.
|
||
///
|
||
/// The chain still passes the disc hash → KEYDB path (1) and the
|
||
/// KEYDB-derived MK+VID path (2) before attempting variant derivation;
|
||
/// V21 discs already in the keydb behave identically to V20.
|
||
pub fn resolve_keys_v21(ctx: &ResolveContext<'_>) -> Option<ResolvedKeys> {
|
||
// Paths 1 and 2 are version-agnostic — try them first via the
|
||
// classical V20-stride parser.
|
||
let uk_file = parse_unit_key_ro(ctx.unit_key_ro, AacsVersion::V20)?;
|
||
let hash_hex = disc_hash_hex(&uk_file.disc_hash);
|
||
let bus_encryption = ctx
|
||
.content_cert
|
||
.and_then(parse_content_cert)
|
||
.map(|cc| cc.bus_encryption)
|
||
.unwrap_or(false);
|
||
|
||
let build = |vuk: [u8; 16], key_source: u8| -> ResolvedKeys {
|
||
let unit_keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])> = uk_file
|
||
.encrypted_keys
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.map(|(num, enc_key)| (*num, decrypt_unit_key(&vuk, enc_key)))
|
||
.collect();
|
||
ResolvedKeys {
|
||
disc_hash: uk_file.disc_hash,
|
||
vuk,
|
||
unit_keys,
|
||
title_cps_unit: uk_file.title_cps_unit.clone(),
|
||
version: AacsVersion::V21,
|
||
bus_encryption,
|
||
key_source,
|
||
}
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
tracing::warn!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_v21_start",
|
||
bus_encryption,
|
||
disc_hash = %hash_hex,
|
||
mkb_present = ctx.mkb.is_some(),
|
||
"resolve_keys_v21: starting"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
if let Some(entry) = ctx.keydb.find_disc(&hash_hex) {
|
||
if let Some(vuk) = entry.vuk {
|
||
return Some(build(vuk, 1));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if *ctx.volume_id == [0u8; 16] {
|
||
tracing::warn!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_v21_no_vid",
|
||
"VID unavailable; v21 derivation requires VID"
|
||
);
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
for entry in ctx.keydb.disc_entries.values() {
|
||
if let (Some(mk), Some(did)) = (entry.media_key, entry.disc_id) {
|
||
if did == *ctx.volume_id {
|
||
return Some(build(derive_vuk(&mk, ctx.volume_id), 2));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Variant chain — walk MKB, derive Km via the Media Key Variant
|
||
// chain, then derive VUK off Km and the disc's VID.
|
||
let mkb = ctx.mkb?;
|
||
let recs = super::variants::walk_mkb(mkb);
|
||
match super::variants::derive_media_key_variant(
|
||
&recs,
|
||
&ctx.keydb.device_keys,
|
||
&super::variants::KEY_CORRECTION_DATA_PLACEHOLDER,
|
||
ctx.volume_id,
|
||
) {
|
||
Ok((_km, kvu)) => {
|
||
tracing::warn!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_v21_variant_ok",
|
||
"Media Key Variant chain produced Km + Kvu"
|
||
);
|
||
Some(build(kvu, 4))
|
||
}
|
||
Err(e) => {
|
||
tracing::warn!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_v21_variant_err",
|
||
error_code = %e,
|
||
"Media Key Variant chain failed"
|
||
);
|
||
None
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Resolve all AACS keys for a disc using the classical (single-stage
|
||
/// Media Key derivation) paths. Used by both V10 and V20.
|
||
///
|
||
/// Tries in order:
|
||
/// 1. Disc hash → KEYDB → VUK (fast path, no VID required)
|
||
/// 2. KEYDB media key + volume ID → VUK
|
||
/// 3. MKB + processing keys → media key → VUK
|
||
/// 4. MKB + device keys → processing key → media key → VUK
|
||
fn resolve_keys_classical(ctx: &ResolveContext<'_>, version: AacsVersion) -> Option<ResolvedKeys> {
|
||
let bus_encryption = ctx
|
||
.content_cert
|
||
.and_then(parse_content_cert)
|
||
.map(|cc| cc.bus_encryption)
|
||
.unwrap_or(false);
|
||
|
||
// Parse Unit_Key_RO.inf at the version-appropriate stride.
|
||
let uk_file = parse_unit_key_ro(ctx.unit_key_ro, version)?;
|
||
|
||
let hash_hex = disc_hash_hex(&uk_file.disc_hash);
|
||
|
||
// Helper to build result
|
||
let build = |vuk: [u8; 16], key_source: u8| -> ResolvedKeys {
|
||
let unit_keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])> = uk_file
|
||
.encrypted_keys
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.map(|(num, enc_key)| (*num, decrypt_unit_key(&vuk, enc_key)))
|
||
.collect();
|
||
ResolvedKeys {
|
||
disc_hash: uk_file.disc_hash,
|
||
vuk,
|
||
unit_keys,
|
||
title_cps_unit: uk_file.title_cps_unit.clone(),
|
||
version,
|
||
bus_encryption,
|
||
key_source,
|
||
}
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
tracing::warn!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_start",
|
||
version = ?version,
|
||
bus_encryption,
|
||
disc_hash = %hash_hex,
|
||
mkb_present = ctx.mkb.is_some(),
|
||
"resolve_keys: starting"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
// Path 1: Look up VUK by disc hash in KEYDB
|
||
if let Some(entry) = ctx.keydb.find_disc(&hash_hex) {
|
||
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path1_hit_entry", "disc hash found in keydb");
|
||
if let Some(vuk) = entry.vuk {
|
||
return Some(build(vuk, 1));
|
||
}
|
||
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path1_no_vuk", "disc hash entry has no VUK");
|
||
} else {
|
||
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path1_miss", "disc hash NOT in keydb");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Paths 2-4 all consume the Volume ID. Without it (handshake
|
||
// skipped, raw-read bypass failed, etc.) every downstream
|
||
// derivation produces garbage. Caller stamps `[0u8; 16]` as the
|
||
// sentinel "no VID" — short-circuit here so we don't surface a
|
||
// misleading "all paths failed" log when really the math is
|
||
// structurally impossible.
|
||
if *ctx.volume_id == [0u8; 16] {
|
||
tracing::warn!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_no_vid",
|
||
"VID unavailable; paths 2/3/4 require VID and are skipped"
|
||
);
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Path 2: Find entry with matching VID → derive VUK from MK + VID
|
||
let mut path2_mk_did_count = 0usize;
|
||
for entry in ctx.keydb.disc_entries.values() {
|
||
if let (Some(mk), Some(did)) = (entry.media_key, entry.disc_id) {
|
||
path2_mk_did_count += 1;
|
||
if did == *ctx.volume_id {
|
||
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path2_hit", "MK+VID entry matched volume_id");
|
||
return Some(build(derive_vuk(&mk, ctx.volume_id), 2));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path2_miss", mk_did_entries = path2_mk_did_count, "no MK+VID entry matched volume_id");
|
||
|
||
// Path 3: MKB + processing keys → media key → VUK
|
||
if let Some(mkb) = ctx.mkb {
|
||
let mk_dv = mkb_find_mk_dv(mkb);
|
||
let subdiff = mkb_find_subdiff_records(mkb);
|
||
let cvalues = mkb_find_cvalues(mkb);
|
||
tracing::warn!(
|
||
target: "freemkv::disc",
|
||
phase = "resolve_keys_mkb_records",
|
||
mk_dv_found = mk_dv.is_some(),
|
||
subdiff_found = subdiff.is_some(),
|
||
subdiff_len = subdiff.as_ref().map(|s| s.len()).unwrap_or(0),
|
||
cvalues_found = cvalues.is_some(),
|
||
cvalues_len = cvalues.as_ref().map(|c| c.len()).unwrap_or(0),
|
||
"MKB record scan results"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
if let Some(mk) = derive_media_key_from_pk(mkb, &ctx.keydb.processing_keys) {
|
||
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path3_hit", "media key derived from processing key");
|
||
return Some(build(derive_vuk(&mk, ctx.volume_id), 3));
|
||
}
|
||
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path3_miss", pk_count = ctx.keydb.processing_keys.len(), "PK derivation failed");
|
||
|
||
// Path 4: MKB + device keys → processing key → media key → VUK
|
||
if let Some(mk) = derive_media_key_from_dk(mkb, &ctx.keydb.device_keys) {
|
||
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path4_hit", "media key derived from device key");
|
||
return Some(build(derive_vuk(&mk, ctx.volume_id), 4));
|
||
}
|
||
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path4_miss", dk_count = ctx.keydb.device_keys.len(), "DK derivation failed");
|
||
} else {
|
||
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_no_mkb", "no MKB data available; paths 3/4 skipped");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
None
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||
mod tests {
|
||
use super::super::decrypt::{ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN, aes_ecb_encrypt};
|
||
use super::super::keydb::{DiscEntry, KeyDb};
|
||
use super::*;
|
||
|
||
/// Get KEYDB path from KEYDB_PATH environment variable. Returns None if not set or not found.
|
||
fn keydb_path() -> Option<std::path::PathBuf> {
|
||
let path = std::path::PathBuf::from(std::env::var("KEYDB_PATH").ok()?);
|
||
if path.exists() { Some(path) } else { None }
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn test_vuk_derivation() {
|
||
// Civil War UHD: known MK, VID, VUK from KEYDB
|
||
// MK = 15665F98..., VID (disc_id) = from entry, VUK = F96D7908...
|
||
// VUK = AES-DEC(MK, VID) XOR VID
|
||
let path = match keydb_path() {
|
||
Some(p) => p,
|
||
None => return,
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
let db = KeyDb::load(&path).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Find a disc with both MK, disc_id, and VUK so we can verify derivation
|
||
let entry = db
|
||
.disc_entries
|
||
.values()
|
||
.find(|e| e.media_key.is_some() && e.disc_id.is_some() && e.vuk.is_some())
|
||
.expect("No disc with MK + VID + VUK");
|
||
|
||
let mk = entry.media_key.unwrap();
|
||
let vid = entry.disc_id.unwrap();
|
||
let expected_vuk = entry.vuk.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let derived = derive_vuk(&mk, &vid);
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
derived, expected_vuk,
|
||
"VUK derivation failed for disc: {} (hash {})",
|
||
entry.title, entry.disc_hash
|
||
);
|
||
eprintln!("VUK derivation verified for: {}", entry.title);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn test_decrypt_unit_key_from_vuk() {
|
||
// Test the full chain: VUK → decrypt encrypted unit key → unit key
|
||
// Use a known disc from KEYDB that has both VUK and unit keys
|
||
let path = match keydb_path() {
|
||
Some(p) => p,
|
||
None => return,
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
let db = KeyDb::load(&path).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Find a disc with VUK and unit keys
|
||
let entry = db
|
||
.disc_entries
|
||
.values()
|
||
.find(|e| e.vuk.is_some() && !e.unit_keys.is_empty())
|
||
.expect("No disc with VUK + unit keys");
|
||
|
||
eprintln!(
|
||
"Testing unit key decrypt for: {} ({})",
|
||
entry.title, entry.disc_hash
|
||
);
|
||
eprintln!(" VUK: {:02X?}", entry.vuk.unwrap());
|
||
for (num, key) in &entry.unit_keys {
|
||
eprintln!(" Unit key {}: {:02X?}", num, key);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// The unit keys in KEYDB are already decrypted — we can verify the chain
|
||
// by encrypting with VUK and then decrypting
|
||
let vuk = entry.vuk.unwrap();
|
||
for (num, expected_uk) in &entry.unit_keys {
|
||
let encrypted = aes_ecb_encrypt(&vuk, expected_uk);
|
||
let decrypted = decrypt_unit_key(&vuk, &encrypted);
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
&decrypted, expected_uk,
|
||
"Unit key {} roundtrip failed for {}",
|
||
num, entry.title
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
eprintln!(" All {} unit key roundtrips passed", entry.unit_keys.len());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn test_decrypt_real_unit() {
|
||
// Try decrypting a real encrypted aligned unit from Civil War UHD
|
||
// This disc is AACS 2.0 (BEE) so unit key alone won't work —
|
||
// we need bus decryption first. But this verifies the pipeline.
|
||
let unit_path = std::path::Path::new("/tmp/encrypted_unit.bin");
|
||
if !unit_path.exists() {
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let original = std::fs::read(unit_path).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(original.len(), ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
super::super::decrypt::is_unit_encrypted(&original),
|
||
"Unit should be encrypted"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
let kp = match keydb_path() {
|
||
Some(p) => p,
|
||
None => return,
|
||
};
|
||
let db = KeyDb::load(&kp).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Civil War UHD entries
|
||
let civil_war_entries: Vec<&DiscEntry> = db
|
||
.disc_entries
|
||
.values()
|
||
.filter(|e| e.title.contains("CIVIL WAR") && !e.unit_keys.is_empty())
|
||
.collect();
|
||
|
||
eprintln!(
|
||
"Found {} Civil War entries with unit keys",
|
||
civil_war_entries.len()
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
// Try each entry's unit keys
|
||
for entry in &civil_war_entries {
|
||
let keys: Vec<[u8; 16]> = entry.unit_keys.iter().map(|(_, k)| *k).collect();
|
||
let mut unit = original.clone();
|
||
|
||
if let Some(idx) = super::super::decrypt::decrypt_unit_try_keys(&mut unit, &keys) {
|
||
eprintln!(
|
||
"SUCCESS: Decrypted with entry {} key {}",
|
||
entry.disc_hash, idx
|
||
);
|
||
// Count TS sync bytes
|
||
let ts = (0..32).filter(|&i| unit[4 + i * 192] == 0x47).count();
|
||
eprintln!(" TS sync bytes: {}/32", ts);
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Expected: none work because this is AACS 2.0 and needs bus decryption first
|
||
eprintln!("No unit key worked (expected for AACS 2.0 BEE disc — needs read_data_key)");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn test_disc_hash() {
|
||
// SHA1 of a known byte sequence
|
||
let data = b"test unit key ro inf data";
|
||
let hash = disc_hash(data);
|
||
assert_ne!(hash, [0u8; 20]);
|
||
// Same input → same hash
|
||
assert_eq!(hash, disc_hash(data));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn test_disc_hash_hex() {
|
||
let hash = [
|
||
***REMOVED***,
|
||
];
|
||
let hex = disc_hash_hex(&hash);
|
||
assert_eq!(hex, "***REMOVED***");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn test_parse_unit_key_ro_synthetic() {
|
||
// Build a synthetic Unit_Key_RO.inf
|
||
// Header: uk_pos at offset 0 (BE32), points to key storage
|
||
// Keys at uk_pos + 48 (16 bytes each, 48-byte stride for AACS 1.0)
|
||
let mut data = vec![0u8; 256];
|
||
|
||
// uk_pos = 0x60 (96)
|
||
data[0] = 0x00;
|
||
data[1] = 0x00;
|
||
data[2] = 0x00;
|
||
data[3] = 0x60;
|
||
|
||
// Header fields at 16-18
|
||
data[16] = 1; // app_type = BD-ROM
|
||
data[17] = 1; // num_bdmv_dir
|
||
data[18] = 0; // no SKB
|
||
|
||
// Title mapping at 20-25
|
||
data[20] = 0;
|
||
data[21] = 1; // first_play = CPS unit 1
|
||
data[22] = 0;
|
||
data[23] = 1; // top_menu = CPS unit 1
|
||
data[24] = 0;
|
||
data[25] = 1; // num_titles = 1
|
||
// Title 0 entry: 2 bytes pad + CPS unit
|
||
data[28] = 0;
|
||
data[29] = 1; // CPS unit 1
|
||
|
||
// Key storage at offset 0x60
|
||
let uk_pos = 0x60usize;
|
||
data[uk_pos] = 0;
|
||
data[uk_pos + 1] = 2; // 2 unit keys
|
||
|
||
// Key 1 at uk_pos + 48
|
||
let key1_pos = uk_pos + 48;
|
||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||
data[key1_pos + i] = 0xAA;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Key 2 at uk_pos + 48 + 48
|
||
let key2_pos = key1_pos + 48;
|
||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||
data[key2_pos + i] = 0xBB;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let parsed = parse_unit_key_ro(&data, AacsVersion::V10).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.app_type, 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.num_bdmv_dir, 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.version, AacsVersion::V10);
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.encrypted_keys.len(), 2);
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.encrypted_keys[0].0, 1); // CPS unit 1
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.encrypted_keys[0].1, [0xAA; 16]);
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.encrypted_keys[1].0, 2); // CPS unit 2
|
||
assert_eq!(parsed.encrypted_keys[1].1, [0xBB; 16]);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_version_recognizes_type_0x10() {
|
||
// Type-and-Version record: type=0x10, rec_len=12 (BE24).
|
||
// Body is 8 bytes; the version u32 sits at offset 8 of the record.
|
||
let mkb = [
|
||
0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x14, 0x10, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4D,
|
||
];
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_version(&mkb), Some(77));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_version_returns_none_on_empty() {
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_version(&[]), None);
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_version(&[0x10, 0x00]), None);
|
||
// Type 0x10 record but rec_len < 12 → no version available.
|
||
let short = [0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01];
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_version(&short), None);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_find_mk_dv_recognizes_type_0x81() {
|
||
// First: type-0x10 type/version record (12 bytes), then type-0x81 verify record.
|
||
// Verify record carries a known 16-byte mk_dv at offset 4 of the record body.
|
||
let expected: [u8; 16] = [
|
||
0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE,
|
||
0xFF, 0x00,
|
||
];
|
||
let mut mkb = vec![
|
||
0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
|
||
];
|
||
// type=0x81, rec_len=24 (4-byte header + 16-byte mk_dv + 4-byte trailing zeros)
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x81, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&expected);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]);
|
||
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_find_mk_dv(&mkb), Some(expected));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn validate_processing_key_round_trip_with_nonzero_uv() {
|
||
// Synthesise a (pk, uv, mk, cvalue, mk_dv) tuple that satisfies the
|
||
// libaacs _validate_pk relation, then confirm validate_processing_key
|
||
// recovers mk. Catches the bugs that landed pre-fix:
|
||
// * uv XOR step was missing → mk wrong whenever uv != 0
|
||
// * AES-128E + 12-zero check instead of AES-128D + magic
|
||
use super::super::decrypt::{aes_ecb_decrypt as dec, aes_ecb_encrypt as enc};
|
||
|
||
let pk: [u8; 16] = [
|
||
0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE,
|
||
0xFF, 0x00,
|
||
];
|
||
let mk: [u8; 16] = [
|
||
0xA0, 0xA1, 0xA2, 0xA3, 0xA4, 0xA5, 0xA6, 0xA7, 0xA8, 0xA9, 0xAA, 0xAB, 0xAC, 0xAD,
|
||
0xAE, 0xAF,
|
||
];
|
||
let uv: [u8; 4] = [0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00];
|
||
|
||
// cvalue is what AES-128E(pk, mk') gives, where mk' = mk with the
|
||
// last-4-bytes-uv XOR pre-undone:
|
||
// mk_raw[12..16] = mk[12..16] XOR uv (so the validate step XORs
|
||
// uv back in and recovers mk).
|
||
let mut mk_raw = mk;
|
||
for a in 0..4 {
|
||
mk_raw[12 + a] ^= uv[a];
|
||
}
|
||
let cvalue = enc(&pk, &mk_raw);
|
||
|
||
// mk_dv is the encryption (under the correct mk) of the verify
|
||
// magic, padded with arbitrary bytes — when decrypted with mk we
|
||
// recover the magic.
|
||
let mut plaintext_vd = [0u8; 16];
|
||
plaintext_vd[..8].copy_from_slice(&[0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF]);
|
||
// Trailing 8 bytes are don't-cares in the magic check.
|
||
plaintext_vd[8..].copy_from_slice(&[0x11; 8]);
|
||
let mk_dv = enc(&mk, &plaintext_vd);
|
||
// Sanity: decrypting mk_dv with mk yields the magic.
|
||
let _check = dec(&mk, &mk_dv);
|
||
|
||
let recovered = validate_processing_key(&pk, &cvalue, &uv, &mk_dv)
|
||
.expect("validate_processing_key must accept a correct pk + uv pair");
|
||
assert_eq!(recovered, mk, "recovered mk must match the planted mk");
|
||
|
||
// And a wrong pk must be rejected.
|
||
let mut wrong_pk = pk;
|
||
wrong_pk[0] ^= 0xFF;
|
||
assert!(validate_processing_key(&wrong_pk, &cvalue, &uv, &mk_dv).is_none());
|
||
|
||
// And a uv mismatch must be rejected.
|
||
let wrong_uv = [0x00u8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00];
|
||
assert!(validate_processing_key(&pk, &cvalue, &wrong_uv, &mk_dv).is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_find_cvalues_prefers_0x07_then_falls_back_to_0x05() {
|
||
// AACS 2.x: type 0x07 carries cvalues; 0x05 is the host-revocation
|
||
// signature. Mixed-record MKB → 0x07 wins.
|
||
let mut mkb = vec![
|
||
0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4D,
|
||
];
|
||
// type=0x05, body = [0xAA; 4]
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA]);
|
||
// type=0x07, body = [0xBB; 4]
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0xBB, 0xBB, 0xBB, 0xBB]);
|
||
let body = mkb_find_cvalues(&mkb).expect("cvalues record must be found");
|
||
assert_eq!(body, vec![0xBB, 0xBB, 0xBB, 0xBB], "0x07 must be preferred");
|
||
|
||
// AACS 1.0: only 0x05 present → fall back to it.
|
||
let mut mkb1 = vec![
|
||
0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
|
||
];
|
||
mkb1.extend_from_slice(&[0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC]);
|
||
let body = mkb_find_cvalues(&mkb1).expect("0x05 fallback must work for AACS 1.0");
|
||
assert_eq!(body, vec![0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC]);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mkb_find_mk_dv_recognizes_type_0x86() {
|
||
// AACS 2.0 form uses type 0x86 for the verify record.
|
||
let expected: [u8; 16] = [
|
||
0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A,
|
||
0x0B, 0x0C,
|
||
];
|
||
let mut mkb = vec![
|
||
0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4D,
|
||
];
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x86, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18]);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&expected);
|
||
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]);
|
||
|
||
assert_eq!(mkb_find_mk_dv(&mkb), Some(expected));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn test_resolve_keys_vuk_path() {
|
||
// Test the full resolve chain using VUK path
|
||
let path = match keydb_path() {
|
||
Some(p) => p,
|
||
None => return,
|
||
};
|
||
let db = KeyDb::load(&path).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Find V for Vendetta BD — has VUK and unit keys
|
||
// hash: ***REMOVED***
|
||
let entry = db.find_disc("***REMOVED***");
|
||
if entry.is_none() {
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
let entry = entry.unwrap();
|
||
let vuk = entry.vuk.unwrap();
|
||
let vid = entry.disc_id.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// We need the actual Unit_Key_RO.inf from the disc to compute disc hash.
|
||
// Since we don't have it, we can at least test that the KEYDB lookup
|
||
// works with a known hash.
|
||
let hash_hex = "***REMOVED***";
|
||
let found = db.find_disc(hash_hex);
|
||
assert!(found.is_some());
|
||
assert_eq!(found.unwrap().vuk, Some(vuk));
|
||
|
||
// Verify VUK derivation if we have MK + VID
|
||
if let Some(mk) = entry.media_key {
|
||
let derived = derive_vuk(&mk, &vid);
|
||
assert_eq!(derived, vuk, "VUK derivation mismatch for V for Vendetta");
|
||
eprintln!("V for Vendetta VUK derivation verified");
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Build a minimal Unit_Key_RO.inf with `num_unit_keys = 1`. The
|
||
/// disc hash won't be in any synthetic keydb so path 1 misses,
|
||
/// which lets us isolate the path-2/3/4 short-circuit behavior.
|
||
fn minimal_unit_key_ro() -> Vec<u8> {
|
||
let mut data = vec![0u8; 256];
|
||
// uk_pos = 0x60
|
||
data[3] = 0x60;
|
||
data[16] = 1; // app_type = BD-ROM
|
||
data[17] = 1; // num_bdmv_dir
|
||
let uk_pos = 0x60usize;
|
||
data[uk_pos + 1] = 1; // 1 unit key
|
||
// Key at uk_pos + 48 — value doesn't matter, just needs to fit.
|
||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||
data[uk_pos + 48 + i] = 0xCC;
|
||
}
|
||
data
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn resolve_keys_skips_paths_2_through_4_when_vid_is_zero() {
|
||
// No VID -> paths 2/3/4 cannot succeed. The function must
|
||
// return None WITHOUT touching the MKB / device keys, so we
|
||
// can pass an MKB that would otherwise cause expensive
|
||
// derivation work — it must not be consumed.
|
||
let uk_ro = minimal_unit_key_ro();
|
||
let zero_vid = [0u8; 16];
|
||
|
||
// Populate keydb with a non-matching VID entry (path 2 would
|
||
// miss anyway) plus dummy processing/device keys (paths 3/4
|
||
// would also miss, but the short-circuit means they're never
|
||
// attempted).
|
||
let mut keydb = KeyDb::empty();
|
||
keydb.disc_entries.insert(
|
||
"0xDEADBEEF".to_string(),
|
||
DiscEntry {
|
||
disc_hash: "0xDEADBEEF".to_string(),
|
||
title: "fixture".to_string(),
|
||
media_key: Some([0x11u8; 16]),
|
||
disc_id: Some([0x22u8; 16]),
|
||
vuk: None,
|
||
unit_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
keydb.processing_keys.push([0u8; 16]);
|
||
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &zero_vid,
|
||
keydb: &keydb,
|
||
mkb: None,
|
||
};
|
||
let result = resolve_keys_v1(&ctx);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
result.is_none(),
|
||
"resolve_keys with VID=0 and no matching disc-hash entry must return None"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn resolve_keys_path1_still_runs_when_vid_is_zero() {
|
||
// Path 1 (disc-hash → VUK) doesn't need VID. Confirm the
|
||
// short-circuit doesn't block it: install a keydb entry whose
|
||
// disc_hash matches the fixture's hash, with a known VUK, and
|
||
// verify resolve_keys returns it with key_source = 1.
|
||
let uk_ro = minimal_unit_key_ro();
|
||
let hash = disc_hash(&uk_ro);
|
||
// `find_disc` lowercases the incoming hash; the entry map is
|
||
// keyed lowercase too, so we have to lowercase here.
|
||
let hash_hex = disc_hash_hex(&hash).to_lowercase();
|
||
|
||
let mut keydb = KeyDb::empty();
|
||
let known_vuk = [0xABu8; 16];
|
||
keydb.disc_entries.insert(
|
||
hash_hex.clone(),
|
||
DiscEntry {
|
||
disc_hash: hash_hex,
|
||
title: "fixture".to_string(),
|
||
media_key: None,
|
||
disc_id: None,
|
||
vuk: Some(known_vuk),
|
||
unit_keys: Vec::new(),
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
let vid = [0u8; 16];
|
||
let ctx = ResolveContext {
|
||
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
|
||
content_cert: None,
|
||
volume_id: &vid,
|
||
keydb: &keydb,
|
||
mkb: None,
|
||
};
|
||
let resolved =
|
||
resolve_keys_v1(&ctx).expect("path 1 must run regardless of VID availability");
|
||
assert_eq!(resolved.vuk, known_vuk);
|
||
assert_eq!(resolved.key_source, 1);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn test_content_cert_parse() {
|
||
// AACS 1.0 cert
|
||
let mut data = vec![0u8; 16];
|
||
data[0] = 0x00; // AACS 1.0
|
||
data[1] = 0x00; // no bus encryption
|
||
let cc = parse_content_cert(&data).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cc.version, AacsVersion::V10);
|
||
assert!(!cc.bus_encryption);
|
||
|
||
// AACS 2.0 with bus encryption
|
||
data[0] = 0x01; // AACS 2.0
|
||
data[1] = 0x01; // bus encryption enabled
|
||
let cc = parse_content_cert(&data).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cc.version, AacsVersion::V20);
|
||
assert!(cc.bus_encryption);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|