CI/lint hardening since v1.6.14: clippy on stable with the MSRV single-sourced from Cargo.toml, cargo-deny dependency-audit gate with first-party git sources allowed (#15), and audience-based comment-guard (#17). No library code changes.
21 KiB
keydb.rs design notes
Long-form rationale moved out of src/keydb.rs doc comments to satisfy the
repo's comment-guard line caps. Each section is pointed to from the file by a
one-line // See docs/keydb.md#<anchor> comment.
candidate-order
Full derivation path this source walks, cheapest-first:
- per-disc Unit Keys (hash hit) → returned terminal, no derivation.
- per-disc VUK (hash hit) →
uks_from_vukover the disc's encrypted title keys. - a Media Key, then
derive_vuk→uks_from_vuk. The MK comes from, in order: the disc's stored MK (hash hit); the keydb's Processing Key pool walked against THIS disc's MKB viaderive_media_key_from_pk; or the device-key pool viaderive_media_key_from_dk. The PK and DK pools resolve the Media Key WITHOUT a VID; the finalderive_vukstill needs one. The VID is the unlocker's physical VID (ResolveCtx::vid) when present, else the keydb entry's OWN stored VID (theIfield,vid) for the non-physical / ISO path. With no VID from either source the MK path cannot complete — return nothing.
The cross-disc MK-pool brute (trying OTHER discs' stored media keys against this disc) stays RETIRED: every MK path here is anchored to the matched disc's own MKB or stored material.
The library still OWNS the crypto; this source owns only which primitive to
call with which material. Returning an empty Vec is a genuine "no key for
this disc here".
file-identity
(len, modified) ALONE IS NOT AN IDENTITY. mtime is stored at whole-second
resolution on HFS+, on many container overlays and on most network
filesystems, so a writer that replaces keydb.cfg within the same second
with a file of the same byte length leaves (len, modified) bit-identical —
and the cache then serves the superseded parse for the rest of the process's
life. For a key database that is not a stale page: it is serving retired or
since-corrected keys while reporting success. The writers that hit this are
real and named in this crate's own docs: the daily-refresh job, a second
freemkv process, an operator's editor, a sync tool.
Two independent discriminators close it:
dev+ino. Every writer that publishes ATOMICALLY (temp file, fsync, rename — whatKeydbSource::savedoes, and what any correct publisher does) creates a NEW inode, so the stamp differs immediately and unconditionally, whatever the clock or the mtime resolution did. Zero on platforms without them (seeFileStamp::of), which costs nothing: rule 2 stands alone.- A freshness rule on the cache entry —
CacheEntry::is_settled— which covers the residual in-place rewrite that reuses the inode.
What this still does NOT catch: a writer that FORGES the timestamp, i.e.
restores an mtime equal to the cached one (touch -t, rsync --times, a
tar/backup restore) into the SAME inode with the SAME length. Nothing short
of hashing the content can see that, and hashing 62 MiB per lookup is
precisely the cost the cache exists to remove (~141 ms × ≥3 loads per rip).
KeydbSource::save therefore keeps invalidating the cache directly, so the
one write path this crate owns never depends on any of the above.
settle-proof
Whether a cache entry's stamp can be TRUSTED to change if the file changes.
The proof, for a filesystem storing mtime at granularity G: suppose this
entry was stamped at stamped_at with stamped_at - modified >= G, and some
writer later rewrites the file in place at wall time T > stamped_at. The
recorded mtime m' of that write is within one granule of T, so
m' >= T - G > stamped_at - G >= modified. Hence m' != modified and the
stamp DOES change. The ambiguous window is therefore exactly the one where
the cached entry was stamped less than G after the file's own mtime — i.e.
we looked at the file while it was still "hot" — and in that window the
entry is refused and the file is re-read. Once the file has been quiet for
G, its entry settles and the cache is fully effective again.
Cost: after every keydb write, lookups re-parse for up to G (2 s). The
published keydb is rewritten daily, so that is ~2 s of re-parsing per day
against a cache that saves ~420 ms per rip.
modified: None (a filesystem that reports no mtime) never settles: the only
two discriminators left would be size and inode, so the entry is re-read
every time rather than being trusted on a weaker basis.
CLOCK CAVEAT: stamped_at is the local clock and modified is the
filesystem's. On a network share whose server clock runs AHEAD of the
client's by more than G, entries never settle (safe: more re-parsing). A
server clock BEHIND the client's makes an entry settle early, which re-opens
the same-second window it closes — the inode rule (1) is what covers the
realistic writers there.
keydbsource-cache
KeydbSource caches the parsed database behind the file's identity stamp.
The published keydb is ~62 MiB / ~181k entries and a single AACS-cert rip
parses it repeatedly — host_certs() for the drive handshake (freemkv's
pipe.rs/engine.rs, autorip's keysource.rs each build their own source),
then the trait host_certs(mkb) during resolution, then get_unit_keys —
and every one of those calls used to re-read all 62 MiB from disk and
re-parse it from scratch, because the struct held nothing but a PathBuf.
A keydb replaced underneath this source is picked up on the next call, with
ONE stated exception: a writer that rewrites the file in place, into the
same inode, at the same byte length, having restored the previous mtime
exactly (touch -t / rsync --times / a backup restore). Everything else —
any atomic rename, any length change, any real clock advance — changes the
stamp. FileStamp and CacheEntry::is_settled carry the full argument and
the clock caveats; do not weaken either without re-reading them. (The
earlier wording here — "an externally replaced keydb is still picked up" —
was simply false for a same-second, same-length replacement, which is the
common shape of a daily-refresh job on a whole-second-mtime filesystem.)
MEMORY RESIDENCY (accepted, and deliberately recorded rather than fixed
here): a hit keeps the entire parsed keydb — every disc's Media Key / VID /
VUK / Unit Keys, the processing- and device-key pools, and the host-cert
PRIVATE keys — resident for the process's life, where the pre-cache code
held one parse transiently. Nothing in this crate zeroizes on drop, so that
material was always exposed to a core dump or a swapped page; the cache
widens the WINDOW, it does not create the class. Closing it properly means
zeroize-on-drop across KeyDb, DiscEntry and libfreemkv's aacs::types
(which owns most of the buffers) — a cross-crate change, tracked separately,
NOT smuggled in behind a cache fix.
cached-db-one-open
Errors are the same ones KeyDb::load produces, unchanged: a missing file
is NotFound (the documented benign case), an over-cap or non-UTF-8 file is
InvalidData. The stamp costs an fstat, not a 62 MiB read.
ONE OPEN, ONE IDENTITY. The file is opened once and both the stamp (fstat
on that handle) and, on a miss, the bytes come from it. The previous shape —
std::fs::metadata(path) and then a separate KeyDb::load(path) — resolved
the path TWICE with no atomicity between them, so a rename landing in the
gap cached the new file's stamp beside the old file's contents (or the
reverse); the pairing was then served, looking perfectly valid, until the
stamp changed again. The stamp is read BEFORE the bytes on purpose: a write
racing the read then leaves the OLD stamp cached, which the next call
detects, whereas stamping afterwards would file torn content under a
fresh-looking identity and pin it.
cached-db-reemit
Re-emit the parser's rejection summary on EVERY hit, not just on the parse
that produced it. KeyDb::parse is what logs it, and a hit skips parse
entirely — so a daemon that cached a corrupt keydb logged its rejected-row
counts exactly once, at whatever moment it first read the file, and then
served that same damaged database to every later rip in silence. Repetition
is the correct failure mode here: the line is emitted only when the file
really does have rejected or duplicate rows, and a warning an operator can
still see on the tenth rip is worth more than one they had to catch on the
first.
load-failure
A MISSING keydb is the documented benign case: the app may simply not have
one, another source may hold the key, and "no keydb" is genuinely "no key
here". Everything else is NOT that: InvalidData is a keydb over the
128 MiB cap or one that is not valid UTF-8 — i.e. corrupt, truncated, or a
half-finished download — and a permission/IO failure means the file could
not be read at all. Reporting either as an empty result made a broken keydb
indistinguishable from "this disc has no key" (the same conflation as the
seven-hour 502), with no log to notice it by. Both are now logged AND
surfaced as errors so the resolver reports a source failure instead of
E7022.
save-mirror-parse
Mirror KeyDb::parse's disc-entry rule EXACTLY by CALLING it
(is_disc_entry_line), so save() never validates + persists content that
parses to zero usable entries (e.g. a stray "0xDEADBEEF" comment line) and
the two can no longer drift — they did drift once already, on the 0X case
rule.
unit-keys-from
CPS-unit numbering: a returned UnitKey::idx is the POSITIONAL index
libfreemkv's resolve_and_apply turns into the canonical CPS-unit number
idx + 1. For the terminal per-disc unit-key path we therefore map the
keydb's stored CPS number num to idx = num - 1, so the committed number
is byte-identical to the keydb's num (and to what the OLD
Key::Unit(entry.unit_keys) path committed). For the VUK / MK paths the
boil primitive already yields 0-based positional indices, matching
parse_unit_key_ro's (i + 1) after the resolver's + 1.
unit-keys-per-disc-hit
Per-disc hit (most specific). find_disc normalizes the hash form. Without
a matched entry this keydb has no per-disc material (Unit Keys / VUK / Media
Key / stored VID) to anchor a derivation for the disc, so it resolves
nothing. (The PK and DK pools are global, but the cross-disc MK-pool brute —
trying OTHER discs' media keys against this disc — stays retired; a PK/DK
pool only ever resolves a disc reached through its own matched entry below.)
unit-keys-union
UNION every source of terminal keys, then dedup — never first-hit. A stored
unit_keys list can be PARTIAL (the key-import tool only ever sampled the
CPS units reachable from a playlist, so an orphan unit's key may be
missing), while the per-disc VUK boils EVERY declared CPS unit. Taking the
stored list alone (the old return-at-first-path) would shadow the VUK and
silently drop the orphan unit's key. So gather both and keep a unique-by-key
list: the read path tries every key per unit, so an extra or stale key is
harmless — only a MISSING key hurts.
unit-keys-vuk-or-mk
- Per-disc VUK — one step, no VID needed; boils ALL declared units.
- Else a Media Key path (stored MK / PK pool / DK pool) → VUK → all
declared units. The MK itself carries no VID, but the final
vuk_from_mkneeds one: physical (unlocker) VID first, else the entry's stored VID (Ifield), else cannot derive. Either branch yields the COMPLETE declared set, so we take the first that resolves (VUK preferred — cheapest).
write-atomic
keydb.cfg is the single source of AACS truth, and save/update run
unattended (first-boot download + daily-refresh thread, with a container
restart on every release). A bare in-place fs::write truncates the file
before writing, so a SIGKILL (docker stop's grace window), OOM-kill, power
loss, or ENOSPC mid-write would leave the keydb half-written — the prior
good copy already gone. A truncated keydb doesn't error at write time; it
silently breaks key resolution on every later AACS rip. Writing to a temp
file then renaming (POSIX rename is atomic within a filesystem) means an
interrupted update leaves the previous keydb fully intact.
The fsync MUST succeed before the rename: a sync_all failure (ENOSPC,
ESTALE on the bind-mounted volume) means the kernel never guaranteed the
bytes reached stable storage, so publishing them via rename would defeat
crash-safety. The temp name is unique per call (pid + monotonic counter) so
a concurrent update can't share a fixed temp path and rename a mangled file
over the keydb.
get-unit-keys-trait
A MISSING keydb is not an error — it simply yields no keys (another source
may have them), the same as the library's own loader. A keydb that exists
but cannot be USED (over the size cap, not UTF-8, unreadable) is a source
failure and returns Err: it says nothing about whether this disc has a
key, and reporting it as an empty result is the same looks-like-success
failure as a 502 reported as E7022.
The keydb carries no AACS 2.1 forensic index keys today, so it does not
override get_fmts_indexes — the default (empty) opts it out, and an FMTS
disc's forensic set comes from the online source.
host-certs-trait
Expose the keydb's host certs through the trait — the OEM/AACS cert-auth
route collects them across every source via this method. Wires the disc's
MKB generation through for revocation filtering (the keydb parser's
; Revoked in MKBv<N> annotation): a cert revoked at generation R is
withheld once the disc's generation reaches R.
test-pinned-mtime
Force a file's mtime to PINNED_MTIME, so two different files can be made
bit-identical to a (len, mtime) stamp on purpose. The cache tests that
matter all depend on FORCING the indistinguishable case rather than hoping
the filesystem produces it: on APFS (nanosecond mtimes) a same-second
replacement is otherwise detected by mtime alone, and a test that relies on
that passes with the fix reverted — which is worth nothing.
test-committed
The committed (cps, key) pairs libfreemkv's resolve_and_apply derives
from a source's Unit Keys: positional idx → canonical CPS number
idx + 1. The KATs compare against THIS to prove byte-identical parity with
the OLD Key::Unit / resolver-derived commit.
test-mock-ctx-stub
MockCtx implements the full ResolveCtx trait so it can stand in for a
real disc, but KeydbSource itself never calls title()/samples() (those
matter to the online source, not the local keydb). Exercise them directly
so the mock's trait surface is proven correct too.
test-kat-a
Here enc_title_keys is empty, so the VUK can't derive anything — only the
stored list contributes, and it commits byte-identically to the stored
(cps, key) pairs.
test-orphan-union
Orphan-unit completeness (the real keydb bug): an entry stores only uk1
(the key-import tool sampled one reachable CPS unit) but ALSO carries the
VUK, which boils BOTH declared units. The old return-at-first-path handed
back just [uk1], shadowing the VUK and silently dropping the orphan unit.
The union must return BOTH — the stored uk1 AND the VUK-derived second unit.
test-kat-c
A hash hit with a Media Key and a physical VID (from the unlocker) derives
MK → VUK → UK. The PHYSICAL VID must be used in preference to the keydb's
stored VID — proven by giving the entry a DIFFERENT stored VID and showing
the result tracks the physical one.
test-kat-f
Owner decision #1 (AACS): a keydb Processing Key must be walked against the
matched disc's own MKB to recover the Media Key, then driven down the full
chain PK → MK → VUK → UK. The disc entry carries NO stored MK/VUK/UK — the
only key material is a global PK row — and the result must be the real
Unit Keys, byte-identical to deriving from the recovered MK.
The MKB + PK use a known-answer construction (a planted PK whose derived MK
satisfies the synthetic verify record); the constants are precomputed AES
vectors so this crate needs no AES primitive of its own. They mirror
libfreemkv's boil::mk_from_pk_drives_full_chain_to_uks KAT.
test-repeated-lookups
A single AACS-cert rip drives this source at least three times — the
scan-options builder's inherent host_certs(), the trait host_certs(mkb)
during the handshake, then get_unit_keys — and each call used to re-read
and re-parse the WHOLE file, because KeydbSource held nothing but a
PathBuf. Measured on the real 62 MiB / 184,860-entry keydb: ~140 ms per
parse in --release, i.e. ~420 ms and ~186 MiB of file reads per rip,
against ~1 µs for a cache hit.
Catches the mutation that drops the cache (every call re-parses: count 3) and the mutation that makes the cache unconditional (see the invalidation tests below).
The mtime is pinned into the PAST first, because a cache entry is only
trusted once the file has been quiet for the mtime granularity
(CacheEntry::is_settled) — a keydb written microseconds ago is
deliberately re-read. Unix-only: pinning an mtime needs touch -t (no
filetime dependency for a test).
test-changed-keydb
The cache must not go stale: a keydb replaced UNDERNEATH the source (the
daily-refresh thread writing through a different KeydbSource, or an
operator dropping in a new file) has a different size/mtime stamp and must
be re-read. Catches the mutation that caches on first load and never
re-stats — which would pin a rip to a keydb deleted hours earlier.
test-two-discriminators
The defect both of the inode/settle tests below pin: (len, mtime) is not a
file identity. An external writer — the daily-refresh job, a second freemkv
process, an editor, a sync tool — that replaces keydb.cfg inside one mtime
granule with a file of the SAME length leaves that pair bit-identical, and
the source then serves the superseded parse for the rest of the process's
life: retired or since-corrected keys, reported as success.
Each test disables the OTHER discriminator through mtime_granularity, so
neither can pass on the strength of the one it is not testing, and neither
depends on the host filesystem's real mtime resolution (on APFS the naive
scenario is not reproducible at all).
test-inode-rename
A keydb replaced by ATOMIC RENAME — how every correct publisher, including
this crate's own save(), installs a new file — must be re-read even when
length and mtime are identical. mtime_granularity: 0 makes every entry
settle, so ONLY dev+ino can distinguish the two files here.
Catches the mutation that drops dev/ino from FileStamp (the original
(len, modified) stamp): the source then keeps answering with the previous
keydb's keys.
test-inplace-rewrite
A keydb rewritten IN PLACE — same inode, same length, mtime forced back to
the same value — must still be re-read while the cached entry is too young
to trust. mtime_granularity is set to a decade so nothing ever settles,
which is the same condition a real same-second, whole-second-mtime
replacement creates and the only way to reproduce it deterministically on a
nanosecond-mtime filesystem.
Catches the mutation that deletes the is_settled check from cached_db
(every stamp match trusted unconditionally, which is what the original code
did): dev, ino, len and mtime are ALL identical here, so without the
freshness rule the source serves the old keys forever.
test-corrupt-warns
ParseStats::log runs inside KeyDb::parse, and a cache hit skips parse
— so once the cache landed, the rejected-row summary for a given file was
emitted exactly ONCE for the entire life of the process, while that same
damaged file went on being served to every subsequent rip. A long-running
daemon (autorip) logs it at startup, the operator misses it in the startup
noise or loses it to log rotation, and there is no second chance for as long
as the process runs.
Catches the mutation that deletes the emit_parse_stats call from the
cache-HIT arm of cached_db: warnings would drop to 1 while the file is
still served three times.
test-healthy-silent
Catches the mutation that makes emit_parse_stats unconditional (drops
ParseStats::log's empty-counts early return).
test-fresh-not-trusted
Catches the mutation that widens the window to something unbounded (a
granularity of hours would re-parse 62 MiB on every lookup all day) by
pairing with repeated_lookups_parse_the_keydb_once, which proves the entry
DOES settle once the mtime is in the past.
test-save-invalidates
save() replaces the very file this source reads, so it drops the cached
parse ITSELF rather than trusting the (size, mtime) stamp: a same-size
rewrite that lands inside the filesystem's timestamp granularity is the one
change the stamp cannot see — and it is exactly the change this crate
performs (the daily-refresh thread re-saving a keydb through the source it
then reads from).
The test forces that indistinguishable case rather than hoping for it: the
file is written, stamped to a FIXED mtime, cached, re-saved with different
keys of the SAME length, and stamped back to the same mtime. To the stamp
the two files are identical, so only the explicit invalidation can produce
the new key. Unix-only because pinning an mtime needs touch -t (no
filetime dependency for one test).
test-corrupt-is-error
KeyDb::load fails distinguishably for a keydb that is over the 128 MiB cap
or not valid UTF-8 — a truncated download, a half-written file, a binary
blob dropped in by mistake. Both used to collapse into Ok(Vec::new()) with
ZERO tracing, i.e. into the benign "no key for this disc" the resolver
reports as E7022 — the same looks-like-success failure as the seven-hour
502. Only a MISSING file is genuinely benign.
Catches the mutation that restores Err(_) => Ok(Vec::new()).