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Author SHA1 Message Date
Matthew Jackson d6607ba963 v1.7.5: bump version (unified release) 2026-09-23 04:40:48 +00:00
Matthew Jackson 89f202edbc style: trim three comment blocks under the central guard caps 2026-09-22 20:39:41 -07:00
Matthew Jackson e107c699d1 firmware: retire Ake+Bus into one Encryption lever (fw 0.9.0 ABI)
Firmware 0.9.0 consolidates the Ake (0x06) and Bus (0x07) features into a
single Encryption (0x06) lever; wire id 0x07 no longer exists. The separate
Bus lever was proven inert on BU40N/MT1959 — the one Encryption lever
de-busses on its own — so the unlock recipe now sets one flag where it used
to set two, and the trailing best-effort Set(Bus, off) is gone.

Set(Encryption, STATE_OFF) is the load-bearing step: the drive acts
pre-authenticated, so a bare 0xAD returns the VID with no cert and no AKE,
and content comes back de-bussed. Failure still maps to VidUnavailable.

Hardware-validated against fw 0.9.0 on BU40N 1.00 with a UHD disc: every
sampled unit returns de-bussed and opens with the AACS unit key resolved
from the live keyserver.
2026-09-22 20:32:22 -07:00
Matthew Jackson d257d40de9 v1.7.4: bump version (unified release) 2026-09-21 23:03:29 +00:00
Matthew Jackson 56c69e8877 docs: mark 1.7.4 changelog heading UNRELEASED (release workflow dates it) 2026-09-21 15:07:05 -07:00
Matthew Jackson 2c9d76235d docs: 1.7.4 changelog + consumer release notes 2026-09-21 11:47:20 -07:00
6 changed files with 282 additions and 164 deletions
+12
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@@ -1,5 +1,17 @@
# Changelog
## [1.7.5] — 2026-09-23
### Changed
- firmware: mirror the fw 0.9.0 ABI — `Ake` (`0x06`) and `Bus` (`0x07`) are retired into a single `Encryption` (`0x06`) lever, so the unlock recipe now sets one flag instead of two and wire id `0x07` is gone. Required to talk to firmware 0.9.0.
## [1.7.4] — 2026-09-21
### Maintenance
- CI consolidated to the central reusable workflows; no functional changes.
## [1.7.3] — 2026-09-19
### Changed
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "freemkv-unlock"
version = "1.7.4"
version = "1.7.5"
edition = "2024"
rust-version = "1.88"
license = "MIT"
+13 -9
View File
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ mod tests {
};
// A minimal freemkv drive: IDENTITY→magic, SET updates state, GET reads it.
struct FwDrive {
ake: u8,
encryption: u8,
hrl: u8,
cdbs: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
}
@@ -380,17 +380,18 @@ mod tests {
resp.extend(std::iter::repeat_n(STATE_PASSTHROUGH, ALL_FEATURES.len()));
n = resp.len().min(data.len());
data[..n].copy_from_slice(&resp[..n]);
} else if cdb[CDB_VERB] == Verb::Set as u8 && cdb[CDB_FEATURE] == Feature::Ake as u8
} else if cdb[CDB_VERB] == Verb::Set as u8
&& cdb[CDB_FEATURE] == Feature::Encryption as u8
{
self.ake = cdb[CDB_STATE];
self.encryption = cdb[CDB_STATE];
} else if cdb[CDB_VERB] == Verb::Set as u8 && cdb[CDB_FEATURE] == Feature::Hrl as u8
{
self.hrl = cdb[CDB_STATE];
} else if cdb[CDB_VERB] == Verb::Get as u8
&& cdb[CDB_FEATURE] == Feature::Ake as u8
&& cdb[CDB_FEATURE] == Feature::Encryption as u8
&& !data.is_empty()
{
data[0] = self.ake;
data[0] = self.encryption;
n = 1;
} else if cdb[CDB_VERB] == Verb::Get as u8
&& cdb[CDB_FEATURE] == Feature::Hrl as u8
@@ -407,19 +408,22 @@ mod tests {
}
}
let mut t = FwDrive {
ake: STATE_PASSTHROUGH,
encryption: STATE_PASSTHROUGH,
hrl: STATE_PASSTHROUGH,
cdbs: Vec::new(),
};
let u = AacsUnlocker::new(vec![host_cert()]).arm_before_unlock(ArmRecipe::BypassBd);
u.maybe_arm(&mut t).expect("armed");
assert_eq!(t.hrl, STATE_OFF, "the recipe skipped revocation (Hrl=off)");
assert_eq!(t.ake, STATE_OFF, "the recipe nulled the AKE (Ake=off)");
// IDENTITY, then Set(Hrl,off)+verify, then Set(Ake,off)+verify.
assert_eq!(
t.encryption, STATE_OFF,
"the recipe disabled encryption (Encryption=off)"
);
// IDENTITY, then Set(Hrl,off)+verify, then Set(Encryption,off)+verify.
assert_eq!(t.cdbs[0][CDB_VERB], Verb::Identity as u8);
assert_eq!(t.cdbs[1], build_set_cdb(Feature::Hrl, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(t.cdbs[2][CDB_VERB], Verb::Get as u8);
assert_eq!(t.cdbs[3], build_set_cdb(Feature::Ake, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(t.cdbs[3], build_set_cdb(Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(t.cdbs[4][CDB_VERB], Verb::Get as u8);
}
+126 -47
View File
@@ -44,8 +44,13 @@ use crate::scsi::{DataDirection, ScsiTransport};
pub const READ_BUFFER_OPCODE: u8 = 0x3C;
/// The freemkv sub-command mode at `cdb[1]`; OEM rejects modes `>= 0x0E`.
pub const KNOCK_MODE: u8 = 0x0E;
/// Two-byte knock at `cdb[2..4]` ("C0DE").
/// Two-byte knock at `cdb[2..4]` ("C0DE") — the *safe* knock carried by every
/// durable verb (Identity/Set/Get/Reset/DumpAll/Save/FlashWrite).
pub const KNOCK: [u8; 2] = [0xC0, 0xDE];
/// Two-byte knock at `cdb[2..4]` — the *debug* knock, distinct from [`KNOCK`]
/// by construction. The only frame the fw honours for the debug-only verbs
/// ([`Verb::Call`], [`Verb::Poke`], [`Verb::Reboot`]).
pub const DEBUG_KNOCK: [u8; 2] = [0xDE, 0xB9];
/// Response-framing magic leading the [`Verb::Identity`] reply (`b"freemkv"`).
pub const RESP_MAGIC: &[u8] = b"freemkv";
@@ -153,12 +158,39 @@ pub enum Verb {
/// Diagnostic RAM peek: [`MEMREAD_LEN`] bytes at the 32-bit address in
/// `cdb[5..9]` (big-endian).
DumpAll = 0x09,
/// **TEMPORARY** diagnostic probe: program a single byte to an allowlisted
/// flash offset via the OEM PROGRAM routine. `CDB[5..9]` = 32-bit flash offset
/// (big-endian); `CDB[9]` = value byte. The firmware refuses any offset outside
/// the compile-time allowlist window (`0x1EA000..0x1EB000` — the corpus-proven-
/// unlocked NV/SAVE block) with a distinct `"REFU"` status word (PROGRAM not
/// called). Reply: 4-byte offset echo (BE) + 4-byte PROGRAM/REFU status (BE).
/// Not part of the durable feature grammar; subsumed by [`Verb::Save`].
FlashWrite = 0x0A,
/// Persist the whole RAM feature-state table to the flash config block. This is
/// the ONLY verb that writes the config to flash: [`Verb::Set`] and
/// [`Verb::Reset`] touch RAM only, so a host's changes stay volatile until a
/// `Save` commits them (and survive a power cycle only once saved). Ignores
/// feature/state.
Save = 0x0B,
/// **Debug-knock only.** Interactive fw-exploration `blx target` primitive.
/// `CDB[5..9]` = 32-bit target VA (big-endian); `CDB[9]` = single u8 that
/// is loaded into r0 as the sole register argument. Refused under the safe
/// [`KNOCK`]; only executed under [`DEBUG_KNOCK`]. See [`build_call_cdb`].
Call = 0x0C,
/// **Debug-knock only.** Poke a single byte to an arbitrary address.
/// `CDB[5..9]` = 32-bit target address (big-endian, RAM or MMIO);
/// `CDB[9]` = byte value to store. Refused under the safe [`KNOCK`]; only
/// executed under [`DEBUG_KNOCK`]. See [`build_poke_cdb`].
Poke = 0x0D,
/// **Debug-knock only.** Invokes the firmware's boot function entry with
/// r0=4 to force the cold path (BSS clear + C-runtime data init + full
/// post-init), recovering a wedged drive without a power cycle. The target
/// briefly returns Aborted Command mid-reboot, then comes back ~5s later
/// with the safe-knock verb chain re-armed to its power-on defaults. The
/// target VA is baked into the handler at build time, so no CDB arguments
/// are carried beyond the verb byte. Refused under the safe [`KNOCK`];
/// only executed under [`DEBUG_KNOCK`]. See [`build_reboot_cdb`].
Reboot = 0x0F,
}
/// The feature selector in `cdb[5]` for [`Verb::Set`] / [`Verb::Get`]. These
@@ -195,27 +227,25 @@ pub enum Feature {
/// revoked certs accepted, non-destructive, the unlock direction); [`STATE_ON`]
/// (`0x01`) = on (enforce the HRL).
Hrl = 0x05,
/// Drive-host AKE. [`STATE_PASSTHROUGH`] (`0xFF`) = OEM real handshake;
/// [`STATE_OFF`] (`0x00`) = off (null/bypass — the drive acts pre-authenticated,
/// the unlock direction); [`STATE_ON`] (`0x01`) = on (require the real handshake).
Ake = 0x06,
/// In-transit AACS bus encryption. [`STATE_PASSTHROUGH`] (`0xFF`) = OEM (bus
/// encryption on); [`STATE_OFF`] (`0x00`) = off (de-bussed — content returned
/// with no bus encryption, the unlock direction); [`STATE_ON`] (`0x01`) = on
/// (bus encryption).
Bus = 0x07,
/// The one master encryption/cert bypass. [`STATE_OFF`] (`0x00`) = every
/// drive-side encryption/cert requirement gone (cert-AKE relaxed, bus-wrap
/// off — what used to need a cert now doesn't). [`STATE_PASSTHROUGH`] (`0xFF`)
/// = OEM behavior (real handshake, bus-encrypted content). [`STATE_ON`]
/// (`0x01`) = on (require the real handshake). Wire id `0x07` is retired
/// (was `Bus`, empirically proved inert as a separate datapath lever on
/// BU40N/MT1959 — the single Encryption lever de-busses on its own).
Encryption = 0x06,
}
/// The set of all features, in the canonical order the IDENTITY feature-state
/// table serialises them (and the order [`FirmwareControl::states`] probes).
pub const ALL_FEATURES: [Feature; 7] = [
pub const ALL_FEATURES: [Feature; 6] = [
Feature::Speed,
Feature::Region,
Feature::Uhd,
Feature::Bd,
Feature::Hrl,
Feature::Ake,
Feature::Bus,
Feature::Encryption,
];
/// A Blu-ray region for [`FirmwareControl::force_region_bd`].
@@ -316,6 +346,63 @@ pub fn build_memread_cdb(addr: u32) -> [u8; CDB_LEN] {
cdb
}
/// Build a 10-byte CDB for [`Verb::Call`]: `blx target(r0)` where `target` is
/// packed big-endian in `cdb[5..9]` and the u8 `r0` register argument rides in
/// `cdb[9]`. Carries the [`DEBUG_KNOCK`] at `cdb[2..4]` — the ONLY frame the
/// fw honours for Call. The handler ORs the thumb bit into the address at
/// runtime. r1..r3 are undefined at callee entry.
pub fn build_call_cdb(target: u32, r0: u8) -> [u8; CDB_LEN] {
let mut cdb = [0u8; CDB_LEN];
cdb[CDB_OPCODE] = READ_BUFFER_OPCODE;
cdb[CDB_MODE] = KNOCK_MODE;
cdb[CDB_KNOCK..CDB_KNOCK + 2].copy_from_slice(&DEBUG_KNOCK);
cdb[CDB_VERB] = Verb::Call as u8;
cdb[5] = (target >> 24) as u8;
cdb[6] = (target >> 16) as u8;
cdb[7] = (target >> 8) as u8;
cdb[8] = target as u8;
cdb[9] = r0;
cdb
}
/// Build a 10-byte CDB for [`Verb::Poke`]: write a single byte `val` to the
/// arbitrary 32-bit address `target` (RAM or MMIO). Target is packed
/// big-endian in `cdb[5..9]` and `val` rides in `cdb[9]`. Carries the
/// [`DEBUG_KNOCK`] at `cdb[2..4]`. NO bounds check on the address — this is a
/// diagnostic primitive for on-drive state discovery, not a durable verb.
pub fn build_poke_cdb(target: u32, val: u8) -> [u8; CDB_LEN] {
let mut cdb = [0u8; CDB_LEN];
cdb[CDB_OPCODE] = READ_BUFFER_OPCODE;
cdb[CDB_MODE] = KNOCK_MODE;
cdb[CDB_KNOCK..CDB_KNOCK + 2].copy_from_slice(&DEBUG_KNOCK);
cdb[CDB_VERB] = Verb::Poke as u8;
cdb[5] = (target >> 24) as u8;
cdb[6] = (target >> 16) as u8;
cdb[7] = (target >> 8) as u8;
cdb[8] = target as u8;
cdb[9] = val;
cdb
}
/// Build a 10-byte CDB for [`Verb::Reboot`]: force the firmware boot function's
/// cold path (soft-reboot the controller). Carries the [`DEBUG_KNOCK`] at
/// `cdb[2..4]`. NO arguments are transmitted on the wire — the target VA is
/// baked into the emitted handler at build time (per-image, resolved from the
/// boot-init signature). Requests a [`MIN_ALLOC_LEN`]-byte data-in like every
/// other durable-shape verb: the drive returns Aborted Command mid-reboot
/// anyway, so callers should tolerate a rejection on this send and re-probe
/// identity after a short delay.
pub fn build_reboot_cdb() -> [u8; CDB_LEN] {
let mut cdb = [0u8; CDB_LEN];
cdb[CDB_OPCODE] = READ_BUFFER_OPCODE;
cdb[CDB_MODE] = KNOCK_MODE;
cdb[CDB_KNOCK..CDB_KNOCK + 2].copy_from_slice(&DEBUG_KNOCK);
cdb[CDB_VERB] = Verb::Reboot as u8;
cdb[CDB_ALLOC_LEN] = (MIN_ALLOC_LEN >> 8) as u8;
cdb[CDB_ALLOC_LEN + 1] = MIN_ALLOC_LEN as u8;
cdb
}
/// Whether a device data response leads with [`RESP_MAGIC`].
pub fn verify_response(bytes: &[u8]) -> bool {
bytes.starts_with(RESP_MAGIC)
@@ -365,10 +452,8 @@ pub struct FeatureStates {
pub bd: u8,
/// [`Feature::Hrl`] state.
pub hrl: u8,
/// [`Feature::Ake`] state.
pub ake: u8,
/// [`Feature::Bus`] state.
pub bus: u8,
/// [`Feature::Encryption`] state (the consolidated cert/bus bypass).
pub encryption: u8,
}
impl FeatureStates {
@@ -380,8 +465,7 @@ impl FeatureStates {
uhd: STATE_PASSTHROUGH,
bd: STATE_PASSTHROUGH,
hrl: STATE_PASSTHROUGH,
ake: STATE_PASSTHROUGH,
bus: STATE_PASSTHROUGH,
encryption: STATE_PASSTHROUGH,
}
}
@@ -393,8 +477,7 @@ impl FeatureStates {
Feature::Uhd => self.uhd,
Feature::Bd => self.bd,
Feature::Hrl => self.hrl,
Feature::Ake => self.ake,
Feature::Bus => self.bus,
Feature::Encryption => self.encryption,
}
}
@@ -405,8 +488,7 @@ impl FeatureStates {
Feature::Uhd => self.uhd = state,
Feature::Bd => self.bd = state,
Feature::Hrl => self.hrl = state,
Feature::Ake => self.ake = state,
Feature::Bus => self.bus = state,
Feature::Encryption => self.encryption = state,
}
}
}
@@ -468,7 +550,7 @@ const CMD_TIMEOUT_MS: u32 = 5_000;
/// # fn demo(scsi: &mut dyn freemkv_unlock::scsi::ScsiTransport) {
/// let mut fw = FirmwareControl::new(scsi);
/// if fw.is_freemkv().unwrap_or(false) {
/// // Real AKE on a UHD disc, revocation ignored, bus de-encrypted:
/// // Encryption off on a UHD disc, revocation ignored:
/// let _ = fw.arm_oem_uhd();
/// }
/// # }
@@ -639,15 +721,13 @@ impl<'a> FirmwareControl<'a> {
pub fn skip_hrl(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
self.set(Feature::Hrl, STATE_OFF)
}
/// Null the drive-host AKE (drive acts pre-authenticated). The unlock direction
/// is now [`STATE_OFF`] (`0x00` = handshake off/bypassed).
pub fn null_ake(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
self.set(Feature::Ake, STATE_OFF)
}
/// Turn AACS in-transit bus encryption off (content returned de-bussed). The
/// unlock direction is now [`STATE_OFF`] (`0x00` = bus encryption off).
pub fn bus_off(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
self.set(Feature::Bus, STATE_OFF)
/// Disable every drive-side encryption/cert requirement in one shot: the
/// drive acts pre-authenticated (no handshake) AND content returns de-bussed
/// (no in-transit bus encryption). The consolidated `Encryption` lever
/// replaces the old separate `Ake`/`Bus` levers — wire id `0x07` (`Bus`) is
/// retired. The unlock direction is [`STATE_OFF`] (`0x00`).
pub fn disable_encryption(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
self.set(Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF)
}
/// Region-free (RPC-1). Sends [`REGION_FREE`] (`0x0F`) — under the migrated
/// region scheme `0x01` now means "force DVD region 1", not region-free.
@@ -684,38 +764,37 @@ impl<'a> FirmwareControl<'a> {
self.set_verify(Feature::Hrl, STATE_OFF)
}
/// **arm_oem_uhd** — OEM-style UHD (AACS 2.0) rip with a REAL AKE.
/// **arm_oem_uhd** — OEM-style UHD (AACS 2.0) rip.
///
/// Sets: `Uhd = on` (mode-gate neutralized so the drive engages the UHD
/// disc), `Hrl = skip` (revocation off), `Bus = off` (content de-bussed).
/// The host still runs the real AKE. Rips: UHD via the OEM cert path.
/// disc), `Hrl = skip` (revocation off), `Encryption = off` (content
/// de-bussed — the consolidated cert/bus bypass). Rips: UHD via the OEM
/// path.
pub fn arm_oem_uhd(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
self.set_verify(Feature::Uhd, STATE_ON)?;
self.set_verify(Feature::Hrl, STATE_OFF)?;
self.set_verify(Feature::Bus, STATE_OFF)
self.set_verify(Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF)
}
/// **arm_bypass_bd** — full-bypass Blu-ray rip (NO host cert needed).
///
/// Sets: `Ake = null` (drive acts pre-authenticated, so a bare VID read
/// returns the volume ID with no cert and no AKE) and `Hrl = skip`
/// (revocation off, so a revoked/absent cert never trips the HRL check).
/// Rips: BD with no cert.
/// Sets: `Encryption = off` (the consolidated cert/bus bypass — drive acts
/// pre-authenticated, no handshake, content de-bussed) and `Hrl = skip`
/// (revocation off). Rips: BD with no cert.
pub fn arm_bypass_bd(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
self.set_verify(Feature::Hrl, STATE_OFF)?;
self.set_verify(Feature::Ake, STATE_OFF)
self.set_verify(Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF)
}
/// **arm_bypass_uhd** — full-bypass UHD rip (NO host cert needed).
///
/// Sets: `Uhd = on` (engage the UHD disc), `Ake = null` (skip the
/// handshake), `Bus = off` (content de-bussed), and `Hrl = skip`
/// (revocation off). Rips: UHD with no cert.
/// Sets: `Uhd = on` (engage the UHD disc), `Encryption = off` (the
/// consolidated cert/bus bypass), and `Hrl = skip` (revocation off).
/// Rips: UHD with no cert.
pub fn arm_bypass_uhd(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
self.set_verify(Feature::Uhd, STATE_ON)?;
self.set_verify(Feature::Hrl, STATE_OFF)?;
self.set_verify(Feature::Ake, STATE_OFF)?;
self.set_verify(Feature::Bus, STATE_OFF)
self.set_verify(Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF)
}
/// **arm_stealth_oem** — return the drive to byte-for-byte OEM behaviour.
+87 -52
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,11 @@ fn verb_values_match_abi() {
assert_eq!(Verb::Get as u8, 0x03);
assert_eq!(Verb::Reset as u8, 0x04);
assert_eq!(Verb::DumpAll as u8, 0x09);
assert_eq!(Verb::FlashWrite as u8, 0x0A);
assert_eq!(Verb::Save as u8, 0x0B);
assert_eq!(Verb::Call as u8, 0x0C);
assert_eq!(Verb::Poke as u8, 0x0D);
assert_eq!(Verb::Reboot as u8, 0x0F);
}
#[test]
@@ -23,8 +27,17 @@ fn feature_values_match_abi() {
assert_eq!(Feature::Uhd as u8, 0x03);
assert_eq!(Feature::Bd as u8, 0x04);
assert_eq!(Feature::Hrl as u8, 0x05);
assert_eq!(Feature::Ake as u8, 0x06);
assert_eq!(Feature::Bus as u8, 0x07);
assert_eq!(Feature::Encryption as u8, 0x06);
// Wire id 0x07 (was `Bus`) is retired — proven inert on BU40N/MT1959.
assert_eq!(ALL_FEATURES.len(), 6);
}
#[test]
fn debug_knock_distinct_from_safe_knock() {
// The fw dispatches Call/Poke ONLY under DEBUG_KNOCK; a typo of a safe verb
// vs a debug verb under the wrong knock never crosses the line.
assert_ne!(KNOCK, DEBUG_KNOCK);
assert_eq!(DEBUG_KNOCK, [0xDE, 0xB9]);
}
#[test]
@@ -52,21 +65,22 @@ fn state_and_frame_constants_match_abi() {
#[test]
fn build_set_cdb_exact_bytes() {
// SET Ake = ON: verb 02, feature 06, state 01, alloc MIN_ALLOC_LEN (0x0040)
// at cdb[7..9] big-endian — the drive aborts a sub-16-byte data-in.
// SET Encryption = ON: verb 02, feature 06, state 01, alloc MIN_ALLOC_LEN
// (0x0040) at cdb[7..9] big-endian — the drive aborts a sub-16-byte data-in.
assert_eq!(
build_set_cdb(Feature::Ake, STATE_ON),
build_set_cdb(Feature::Encryption, STATE_ON),
[0x3C, 0x0E, 0xC0, 0xDE, 0x02, 0x06, 0x01, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00]
);
}
#[test]
fn build_get_cdb_exact_bytes() {
// GET Bus: verb 03, feature 07, alloc MIN_ALLOC_LEN (0x0040) at cdb[7..9]
// big-endian — the drive aborts a 1-byte data-in; state read from offset 0.
// GET Encryption: verb 03, feature 06, alloc MIN_ALLOC_LEN (0x0040) at
// cdb[7..9] big-endian — the drive aborts a 1-byte data-in; state read
// from offset 0.
assert_eq!(
build_get_cdb(Feature::Bus),
[0x3C, 0x0E, 0xC0, 0xDE, 0x03, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00]
build_get_cdb(Feature::Encryption),
[0x3C, 0x0E, 0xC0, 0xDE, 0x03, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00]
);
}
@@ -78,12 +92,38 @@ fn vendor_commands_floor_alloc_len_at_min_for_hw() {
assert_eq!(MIN_ALLOC_LEN, 64);
let alloc =
|cdb: &[u8; CDB_LEN]| u16::from_be_bytes([cdb[CDB_ALLOC_LEN], cdb[CDB_ALLOC_LEN + 1]]);
assert_eq!(alloc(&build_set_cdb(Feature::Ake, STATE_ON)), MIN_ALLOC_LEN);
assert_eq!(alloc(&build_get_cdb(Feature::Ake)), MIN_ALLOC_LEN);
assert_eq!(
alloc(&build_set_cdb(Feature::Encryption, STATE_ON)),
MIN_ALLOC_LEN
);
assert_eq!(alloc(&build_get_cdb(Feature::Encryption)), MIN_ALLOC_LEN);
assert_eq!(alloc(&build_reset_cdb(RESET_TO_OEM)), MIN_ALLOC_LEN);
assert_eq!(alloc(&build_save_cdb()), MIN_ALLOC_LEN);
}
#[test]
fn build_call_and_poke_cdb_exact_bytes() {
// Call: verb 0x0C at cdb[4], DEBUG_KNOCK at cdb[2..4], target big-endian
// in cdb[5..9], r0 in cdb[9].
assert_eq!(
build_call_cdb(0x0102_0304, 0xAB),
[0x3C, 0x0E, 0xDE, 0xB9, 0x0C, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0xAB]
);
// Poke: verb 0x0D at cdb[4], DEBUG_KNOCK at cdb[2..4], target big-endian
// in cdb[5..9], value in cdb[9].
assert_eq!(
build_poke_cdb(0x0200_0E40, 0xAA),
[0x3C, 0x0E, 0xDE, 0xB9, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0E, 0x40, 0xAA]
);
// Reboot: verb 0x0F at cdb[4], DEBUG_KNOCK at cdb[2..4], no on-wire target
// (the boot-entry VA is baked into the handler at build time). Alloc floors
// at MIN_ALLOC_LEN (0x0040 at cdb[7..9]) so the data-in is not aborted.
assert_eq!(
build_reboot_cdb(),
[0x3C, 0x0E, 0xDE, 0xB9, 0x0F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00]
);
}
#[test]
fn build_reset_and_identity_cdb_exact_bytes() {
// RESET carries its mode in the state slot (cdb[6]) and floors its data-in at
@@ -271,13 +311,13 @@ impl ScsiTransport for FwMock {
#[test]
fn identity_detects_freemkv_and_issues_identity_cdb() {
let mut m = FwMock::new();
m.states.ake = STATE_ON;
m.states.encryption = STATE_ON;
{
let mut fw = FirmwareControl::new(&mut m);
let id = fw.identity().expect("no fault").expect("is freemkv");
assert_eq!(id.version, "0.6.6");
// States no longer ride in IDENTITY — read them via GET.
assert_eq!(fw.get(Feature::Ake).expect("get"), STATE_ON);
assert_eq!(fw.get(Feature::Encryption).expect("get"), STATE_ON);
assert!(fw.is_freemkv().expect("no fault"));
}
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[0], build_identity_cdb(MEMREAD_LEN as u16));
@@ -311,20 +351,19 @@ fn get_and_set_roundtrip_issue_the_right_cdbs() {
let mut m = FwMock::new();
{
let mut fw = FirmwareControl::new(&mut m);
assert_eq!(fw.get(Feature::Bus).expect("get"), STATE_PASSTHROUGH);
fw.set(Feature::Bus, STATE_ON).expect("set");
assert_eq!(fw.get(Feature::Bus).expect("get"), STATE_ON);
assert_eq!(fw.get(Feature::Encryption).expect("get"), STATE_PASSTHROUGH);
fw.set(Feature::Encryption, STATE_ON).expect("set");
assert_eq!(fw.get(Feature::Encryption).expect("get"), STATE_ON);
}
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[0], build_get_cdb(Feature::Bus));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[1], build_set_cdb(Feature::Bus, STATE_ON));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[2], build_get_cdb(Feature::Bus));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[0], build_get_cdb(Feature::Encryption));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[1], build_set_cdb(Feature::Encryption, STATE_ON));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[2], build_get_cdb(Feature::Encryption));
}
#[test]
fn reset_sends_reset_cdb_and_clears_state() {
let mut m = FwMock::new();
m.states.ake = STATE_ON;
m.states.bus = STATE_ON;
m.states.encryption = STATE_ON;
{
let mut fw = FirmwareControl::new(&mut m);
fw.reset().expect("reset");
@@ -350,12 +389,12 @@ fn save_then_reset_to_flash_restores_the_saved_value() {
let mut m = FwMock::new();
{
let mut fw = FirmwareControl::new(&mut m);
fw.set(Feature::Bus, STATE_OFF).expect("set");
fw.set(Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF).expect("set");
fw.save().expect("save");
fw.reset().expect("reset to OEM");
assert_eq!(fw.get(Feature::Bus).expect("get"), STATE_PASSTHROUGH);
assert_eq!(fw.get(Feature::Encryption).expect("get"), STATE_PASSTHROUGH);
fw.reset_to_flash().expect("reset to flash");
assert_eq!(fw.get(Feature::Bus).expect("get"), STATE_OFF);
assert_eq!(fw.get(Feature::Encryption).expect("get"), STATE_OFF);
}
// The verbs issued, in order: SET, SAVE, RESET, GET, RESET, GET.
assert_eq!(
@@ -386,10 +425,10 @@ fn states_probes_every_feature_in_order() {
}
assert_eq!(states.speed, SPEED_MAX);
assert_eq!(states.hrl, STATE_ON);
// Seven GETs, one per feature, in ALL_FEATURES order.
assert_eq!(m.cdbs.len(), 7);
// Six GETs, one per feature, in ALL_FEATURES order (Bus id 0x07 retired).
assert_eq!(m.cdbs.len(), 6);
let features: Vec<u8> = m.cdbs.iter().map(|c| c[CDB_FEATURE]).collect();
assert_eq!(features, vec![0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07]);
assert_eq!(features, vec![0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06]);
assert!(m.verbs().iter().all(|&v| v == Verb::Get as u8));
}
@@ -416,8 +455,7 @@ fn typed_setters_issue_expected_set_cdbs() {
fw.enable_uhd().unwrap();
fw.disable_bd().unwrap();
fw.skip_hrl().unwrap();
fw.null_ake().unwrap();
fw.bus_off().unwrap();
fw.disable_encryption().unwrap();
fw.region_free().unwrap();
fw.force_region_bd(BdRegion::B).unwrap();
fw.force_region_dvd(2).unwrap();
@@ -425,16 +463,15 @@ fn typed_setters_issue_expected_set_cdbs() {
}
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[0], build_set_cdb(Feature::Uhd, STATE_ON));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[1], build_set_cdb(Feature::Bd, STATE_OFF));
// The HRL/AKE/BUS unlock direction is now STATE_OFF (0x00), not STATE_ON.
// The HRL/Encryption unlock direction is STATE_OFF (0x00), not STATE_ON.
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[2], build_set_cdb(Feature::Hrl, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[3], build_set_cdb(Feature::Ake, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[4], build_set_cdb(Feature::Bus, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[3], build_set_cdb(Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF));
// Region-free is REGION_FREE (0x0F) — 0x01 now forces DVD region 1.
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[5], build_set_cdb(Feature::Region, REGION_FREE));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[6], build_set_cdb(Feature::Region, REGION_BD_B));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[4], build_set_cdb(Feature::Region, REGION_FREE));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[5], build_set_cdb(Feature::Region, REGION_BD_B));
// force_region_dvd(2) = REGION_DVD_BASE + 2 = 0x02 under the new base.
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[7], build_set_cdb(Feature::Region, 0x02));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[8], build_set_cdb(Feature::Speed, SPEED_MAX));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[6], build_set_cdb(Feature::Region, 0x02));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[7], build_set_cdb(Feature::Speed, SPEED_MAX));
}
#[test]
@@ -461,7 +498,7 @@ fn arm_oem_bd_sets_and_verifies_hrl_skip() {
}
#[test]
fn arm_oem_uhd_sets_uhd_hrl_bus_each_verified() {
fn arm_oem_uhd_sets_uhd_hrl_encryption_each_verified() {
let mut m = FwMock::new();
{
let mut fw = FirmwareControl::new(&mut m);
@@ -476,50 +513,48 @@ fn arm_oem_uhd_sets_uhd_hrl_bus_each_verified() {
);
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[0], build_set_cdb(Feature::Uhd, STATE_ON));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[2], build_set_cdb(Feature::Hrl, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[4], build_set_cdb(Feature::Bus, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[4], build_set_cdb(Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(m.states.uhd, STATE_ON);
assert_eq!(m.states.hrl, STATE_OFF);
assert_eq!(m.states.bus, STATE_OFF);
assert_eq!(m.states.encryption, STATE_OFF);
}
#[test]
fn arm_bypass_bd_nulls_ake() {
fn arm_bypass_bd_disables_encryption() {
let mut m = FwMock::new();
{
let mut fw = FirmwareControl::new(&mut m);
fw.arm_bypass_bd().expect("armed");
}
// Hrl=off (revocation skip) is set+verified FIRST, then Ake=null.
// Hrl=off (revocation skip) is set+verified FIRST, then Encryption=off.
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[0], build_set_cdb(Feature::Hrl, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[1], build_get_cdb(Feature::Hrl));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[2], build_set_cdb(Feature::Ake, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[3], build_get_cdb(Feature::Ake));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[2], build_set_cdb(Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[3], build_get_cdb(Feature::Encryption));
assert_eq!(m.states.hrl, STATE_OFF);
assert_eq!(m.states.ake, STATE_OFF);
assert_eq!(m.states.encryption, STATE_OFF);
}
#[test]
fn arm_bypass_uhd_sets_uhd_ake_bus() {
fn arm_bypass_uhd_sets_uhd_hrl_encryption() {
let mut m = FwMock::new();
{
let mut fw = FirmwareControl::new(&mut m);
fw.arm_bypass_uhd().expect("armed");
}
// Recipe order: Uhd=on, Hrl=off, Ake=null, Bus=off (each SET then verifying GET).
// Recipe order: Uhd=on, Hrl=off, Encryption=off (each SET then verifying GET).
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[0], build_set_cdb(Feature::Uhd, STATE_ON));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[2], build_set_cdb(Feature::Hrl, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[4], build_set_cdb(Feature::Ake, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[6], build_set_cdb(Feature::Bus, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(m.cdbs[4], build_set_cdb(Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(m.states.uhd, STATE_ON);
assert_eq!(m.states.hrl, STATE_OFF);
assert_eq!(m.states.ake, STATE_OFF);
assert_eq!(m.states.bus, STATE_OFF);
assert_eq!(m.states.encryption, STATE_OFF);
}
#[test]
fn arm_stealth_oem_resets_then_verifies_all_passthrough() {
let mut m = FwMock::new();
m.states.ake = STATE_ON;
m.states.encryption = STATE_ON;
m.states.uhd = STATE_ON;
{
let mut fw = FirmwareControl::new(&mut m);
@@ -539,7 +574,7 @@ fn arm_by_recipe_enum_dispatches() {
let mut fw = FirmwareControl::new(&mut m);
fw.arm(ArmRecipe::BypassBd).expect("armed");
}
assert_eq!(m.states.ake, STATE_OFF);
assert_eq!(m.states.encryption, STATE_OFF);
}
#[test]
+43 -55
View File
@@ -11,11 +11,14 @@
//! module's CDB builders so the wire framing never drifts.
//!
//! Unlock mapping onto the grammar: region-free = `Set(Region, free)`
//! (`REGION_FREE`), riplock lift = `Set(Speed, max)` (`SPEED_MAX`), the
//! load-bearing transport unlock = `Set(Ake, off)` (`STATE_OFF` — drive acts
//! pre-authenticated → a bare `0xAD` returns the VID with no cert and no AKE), and
//! the trailing bus-off = `Set(Bus, off)` (`STATE_OFF`, content de-bussed). Under
//! the migrated spec the HRL/AKE/BUS unlock direction is `STATE_OFF`, not `0x01`.
//! (`REGION_FREE`), riplock lift = `Set(Speed, max)` (`SPEED_MAX`), and the
//! load-bearing transport unlock = `Set(Encryption, off)` (`STATE_OFF` — the
//! consolidated cert/bus bypass: drive acts pre-authenticated → a bare `0xAD`
//! returns the VID with no cert and no AKE, and content returns de-bussed).
//! The old separate `Bus` lever (wire id `0x07`) is retired — it was proven
//! inert on BU40N/MT1959, and the single `Encryption` lever de-busses on its
//! own. Under the migrated spec the HRL/Encryption unlock direction is
//! `STATE_OFF`, not `0x01`.
use crate::firmware::{
Feature, MEMREAD_LEN, MIN_ALLOC_LEN, REGION_FREE, RESP_MAGIC, SPEED_MAX, STATE_OFF,
@@ -162,8 +165,8 @@ impl FreemkvUnlocker {
}
// Full freemkv unlock: IDENTITY (hard gate) → Set(Region,free) →
// Set(Speed,max) (best-effort) → Set(Ake,off) (LOAD-BEARING) → bare 0xAD VID
// (best-effort) → Set(Bus,off) (trailing, best-effort).
// Set(Speed,max) (best-effort) → Set(Encryption,off) (LOAD-BEARING —
// consolidated cert/bus bypass) → bare 0xAD VID (best-effort).
fn full_unlock(
&self,
scsi: &mut dyn ScsiTransport,
@@ -193,41 +196,30 @@ impl FreemkvUnlocker {
// Region-free + riplock lift (best-effort features).
best_effort(self.set(scsi, Feature::Region, REGION_FREE), "region")?;
best_effort(self.set(scsi, Feature::Speed, SPEED_MAX), "speed")?;
// Ake = off/null (LOAD-BEARING): drive acts pre-authenticated, so a bare
// 0xAD returns the VID with no cert/AKE. No fallback. The migrated spec
// puts the null/bypass direction on STATE_OFF (0x00), not 0x01.
match self.set(scsi, Feature::Ake, STATE_OFF) {
// Encryption = off (LOAD-BEARING): the consolidated cert/bus bypass —
// drive acts pre-authenticated (bare 0xAD returns the VID with no
// cert/AKE) AND content returns de-bussed. No fallback.
match self.set(scsi, Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF) {
Ok(()) => {}
Err(UnlockError::Transport) => return Err(UnlockError::Transport),
Err(_) => {
tracing::debug!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "freemkv_null_ake_rejected",
"Set(Ake, null) rejected — cannot unlock this drive"
phase = "freemkv_disable_encryption_rejected",
"Set(Encryption, off) rejected — cannot unlock this drive"
);
return Err(UnlockError::VidUnavailable);
}
}
// Bare 0xAD VID read — the shared BEST-EFFORT reader (identical to the
// LD/Renesas routes). The null AKE already unlocked the drive, so a VID
// miss must not discard it: only a dead bus propagates (`?`), else `None`.
// LD/Renesas routes). Encryption=off already unlocked the drive, so a
// VID miss must not discard it: only a dead bus propagates (`?`), else `None`.
let vid = crate::vid::read_aacs_vid(scsi)?;
// Trailing Set(Bus, off): remove in-transit bus encryption (STATE_OFF is
// the de-bussed direction). FULLY best-effort — inert without the lever,
// and a failure here never discards an already-obtained unlock.
if let Err(e) = self.set(scsi, Feature::Bus, STATE_OFF) {
tracing::debug!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "freemkv_bus_off_unavailable",
?e,
"bus-off (Set Bus) not applied; continuing"
);
}
tracing::debug!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "freemkv_unlocked",
has_vid = vid.is_some(),
"freemkv drive unlocked (null AKE — Ake=off)"
"freemkv drive unlocked (Encryption=off — consolidated cert/bus bypass)"
);
Ok(Unlocked { vid, bus_key: None })
}
@@ -370,15 +362,12 @@ mod tests {
build_set_cdb(Feature::Speed, SPEED_MAX),
[0x3C, 0x0E, 0xC0, 0xDE, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00]
);
// Ake/Bus unlock direction is now STATE_OFF (0x00) at cdb[6], not 0x01.
// Encryption unlock direction is STATE_OFF (0x00) at cdb[6]; wire id
// 0x07 (was `Bus`) is retired.
assert_eq!(
build_set_cdb(Feature::Ake, STATE_OFF),
build_set_cdb(Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF),
[0x3C, 0x0E, 0xC0, 0xDE, 0x02, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00]
);
assert_eq!(
build_set_cdb(Feature::Bus, STATE_OFF),
[0x3C, 0x0E, 0xC0, 0xDE, 0x02, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00]
);
}
// ── Detection ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -437,19 +426,19 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
fn set_ake_null_issues_the_set_ake_on_cdb() {
fn set_encryption_off_issues_the_set_encryption_cdb() {
let mut t = MockTransport::always(Reply::good(vec![]));
FreemkvUnlocker::new()
.set(&mut t, Feature::Ake, STATE_OFF)
.set(&mut t, Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF)
.expect("ok");
assert_eq!(t.cdbs[0], build_set_cdb(Feature::Ake, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(t.cdbs[0], build_set_cdb(Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF));
}
#[test]
fn set_drive_rejection_is_not_applicable() {
let mut t = MockTransport::always(Reply::illegal_request());
let err = FreemkvUnlocker::new()
.set(&mut t, Feature::Ake, STATE_OFF)
.set(&mut t, Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF)
.unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err, UnlockError::NotApplicable);
}
@@ -465,19 +454,18 @@ mod tests {
// ── full_unlock / unlock ─────────────────────────────────────────────
/// The full unlock runs IDENTITY → Set(Region) → Set(Speed) → Set(Ake) →
/// bare VID → Set(Bus) in order.
/// The full unlock runs IDENTITY → Set(Region) → Set(Speed) →
/// Set(Encryption) → bare VID in order.
#[test]
fn full_unlock_issues_identity_region_speed_ake_then_bare_vid_then_bus() {
fn full_unlock_issues_identity_region_speed_encryption_then_bare_vid() {
let vid = [0x7Cu8; 16];
let mut t = MockTransport::scripted(
vec![
Reply::good(freemkv_identity_payload()), // IDENTITY
Reply::good(vec![]), // Set Region
Reply::good(vec![]), // Set Speed
Reply::good(vec![]), // Set Ake (load-bearing)
Reply::good(vec![]), // Set Encryption (load-bearing)
Reply::good(vid_ds_response(vid)), // 0xAD bare VID
Reply::good(vec![]), // Set Bus (trailing)
],
Reply::TransportFault,
);
@@ -485,16 +473,15 @@ mod tests {
let out = FreemkvUnlocker::new()
.unlock(&mut t, &ctx(&id))
.expect("no fault")
.expect("null AKE ⇒ unlocked");
.expect("encryption off ⇒ unlocked");
assert_eq!(out.vid, Some(vid));
assert_eq!(t.cdbs.len(), 6);
// The four vendor SETs land on the right features, in order.
assert_eq!(t.cdbs.len(), 5);
// The three vendor SETs land on the right features, in order.
assert_eq!(t.cdbs[0], build_identity_cdb(RESP_LEN as u16));
assert_eq!(t.cdbs[1], build_set_cdb(Feature::Region, REGION_FREE));
assert_eq!(t.cdbs[2], build_set_cdb(Feature::Speed, SPEED_MAX));
assert_eq!(t.cdbs[3], build_set_cdb(Feature::Ake, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(t.cdbs[3], build_set_cdb(Feature::Encryption, STATE_OFF));
assert_eq!(t.cdbs[4][0], crate::scsi::SCSI_READ_DISC_STRUCTURE);
assert_eq!(t.cdbs[5], build_set_cdb(Feature::Bus, STATE_OFF));
}
/// A missing region/speed feature does not fail the unlock (best-effort).
@@ -519,17 +506,17 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(out.vid, Some(vid));
}
/// The null AKE is LOAD-BEARING: if the drive rejects it, this isn't an
/// unlockable freemkv drive, so `unlock()` declines (`None`) and falls
/// through — never a hard error.
/// Set(Encryption, off) is LOAD-BEARING: if the drive rejects it, this
/// isn't an unlockable freemkv drive, so `unlock()` declines (`None`) and
/// falls through — never a hard error.
#[test]
fn declines_when_null_ake_rejected() {
fn declines_when_disable_encryption_rejected() {
let mut t = MockTransport::scripted(
vec![
Reply::good(freemkv_identity_payload()), // identity
Reply::good(vec![]), // region
Reply::good(vec![]), // speed
Reply::illegal_request(), // null ake REJECTED
Reply::illegal_request(), // Set(Encryption,off) REJECTED
],
Reply::TransportFault,
);
@@ -542,8 +529,9 @@ mod tests {
);
}
/// Best-effort VID: the null AKE succeeded (drive unlocked), but the bare
/// VID read was rejected — `unlock()` still returns `Some`, with `vid: None`.
/// Best-effort VID: Set(Encryption,off) succeeded (drive unlocked), but the
/// bare VID read was rejected — `unlock()` still returns `Some`, with
/// `vid: None`.
#[test]
fn unlocks_without_vid_when_bare_read_fails() {
let mut t = MockTransport::scripted(
@@ -551,7 +539,7 @@ mod tests {
Reply::good(freemkv_identity_payload()), // identity
Reply::good(vec![]), // region
Reply::good(vec![]), // speed
Reply::good(vec![]), // null ake
Reply::good(vec![]), // Set(Encryption,off)
Reply::illegal_request(), // bare VID: no medium
],
Reply::TransportFault,