AACS 2.0 full pipeline: handshake, bus key, decrypt, transparent API
- aacs.rs: content decryption (AES-CBC aligned units, bus decrypt, VUK derivation, unit key decrypt). 11 tests including synthetic roundtrip. - aacs_handshake.rs: SCSI authentication (ECDH on AACS 160-bit curve, ECDSA sign/verify, AES-CMAC, bus key derivation, read_data_key). 14 tests including EC order, ECDH shared secret, cert verification. - disc.rs: transparent API — Disc::scan() detects AACS, authenticates, derives keys internally. ContentReader decrypts on the fly. App never sees AACS details. - error.rs: AacsError (E7000) variant BF v12 complete: 284 unique matches from 8 AWS instances.
This commit is contained in:
MattJackson
@@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ sha1 = "0.10"
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aes = "0.8"
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cbc = "0.1"
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flate2 = "1"
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num-bigint = "0.4"
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num-traits = "0.2"
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num-integer = "0.1"
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rand = "0.8"
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cmac = "0.7"
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zip = { version = "2", default-features = false, features = ["deflate"] }
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[target.'cfg(target_os = "linux")'.dependencies]
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+436
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
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//! Title keys decrypt m2ts stream content (AES-128-CBC).
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use aes::Aes128;
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use aes::cipher::{BlockEncrypt, BlockDecrypt, KeyInit, generic_array::GenericArray};
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/// Parsed AACS key database.
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#[derive(Debug)]
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@@ -279,6 +281,235 @@ impl KeyDb {
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}
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}
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// ── AACS constants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// Fixed IV used by AACS for all AES-CBC operations.
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const AACS_IV: [u8; 16] = [
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0x0B, 0xA0, 0xF8, 0xDD, 0xFE, 0xA6, 0x1F, 0xB3,
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0xD8, 0xDF, 0x9F, 0x56, 0x6A, 0x05, 0x0F, 0x78,
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];
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/// Size of an AACS aligned unit (3 × 2048-byte sectors).
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pub const ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN: usize = 6144;
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/// Size of one sector.
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const SECTOR_LEN: usize = 2048;
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/// Transport stream packet spacing in Blu-ray m2ts (192 bytes = 4 TP_extra + 188 TS).
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const TS_PACKET_LEN: usize = 192;
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/// TS sync byte.
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const TS_SYNC: u8 = 0x47;
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// ── AES primitives ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// AES-128-ECB encrypt a single 16-byte block.
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fn aes_ecb_encrypt(key: &[u8; 16], data: &[u8; 16]) -> [u8; 16] {
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let cipher = Aes128::new(GenericArray::from_slice(key));
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let mut block = GenericArray::clone_from_slice(data);
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cipher.encrypt_block(&mut block);
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let mut out = [0u8; 16];
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out.copy_from_slice(&block);
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out
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}
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/// AES-128-ECB decrypt a single 16-byte block.
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pub fn aes_ecb_decrypt(key: &[u8; 16], data: &[u8; 16]) -> [u8; 16] {
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let cipher = Aes128::new(GenericArray::from_slice(key));
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let mut block = GenericArray::clone_from_slice(data);
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cipher.decrypt_block(&mut block);
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let mut out = [0u8; 16];
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out.copy_from_slice(&block);
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out
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}
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/// AES-128-CBC decrypt in-place with the fixed AACS IV.
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/// AES-128-CBC decrypt in-place with the fixed AACS IV.
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fn aes_cbc_decrypt(key: &[u8; 16], data: &mut [u8]) {
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let cipher = Aes128::new(GenericArray::from_slice(key));
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let num_blocks = data.len() / 16;
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// Process blocks in reverse to avoid clobbering ciphertext needed for XOR
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for i in (0..num_blocks).rev() {
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let offset = i * 16;
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let prev = if i == 0 {
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AACS_IV
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} else {
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let mut p = [0u8; 16];
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p.copy_from_slice(&data[(i - 1) * 16..i * 16]);
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p
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};
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let mut block = GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&data[offset..offset + 16]);
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cipher.decrypt_block(&mut block);
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for j in 0..16 {
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data[offset + j] = block[j] ^ prev[j];
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}
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}
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}
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// ── VUK derivation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// Derive VUK from Media Key and Volume ID.
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/// VUK = AES-128-ECB-DECRYPT(media_key, volume_id) XOR volume_id
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pub fn derive_vuk(media_key: &[u8; 16], volume_id: &[u8; 16]) -> [u8; 16] {
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let mut vuk = aes_ecb_decrypt(media_key, volume_id);
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for i in 0..16 {
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vuk[i] ^= volume_id[i];
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}
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vuk
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}
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/// Decrypt an encrypted unit key using the VUK (AES-128-ECB).
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pub fn decrypt_unit_key(vuk: &[u8; 16], encrypted_uk: &[u8; 16]) -> [u8; 16] {
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aes_ecb_decrypt(vuk, encrypted_uk)
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}
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// ── Unit_Key_RO.inf parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// Extract encrypted unit keys from Unit_Key_RO.inf data.
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/// Returns vec of (cps_unit_number, encrypted_key).
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pub fn parse_unit_key_ro(data: &[u8]) -> Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])> {
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// Minimum size check
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if data.len() < 0xA0 {
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return Vec::new();
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}
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// Number of unit keys at offset 0x10 (big-endian u16)
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// But the first key is always at offset 0x90
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let mut keys = Vec::new();
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// Read number of keys from offset 0x20 (varies by format)
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// Simple approach: key table starts at 0x90, each key is 16 bytes
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// First key is CPS unit 1
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let mut offset = 0x90;
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let mut unit_num = 1u32;
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while offset + 16 <= data.len() {
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let mut key = [0u8; 16];
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key.copy_from_slice(&data[offset..offset + 16]);
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// Stop if we hit all zeros (no more keys)
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if key == [0u8; 16] {
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break;
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}
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keys.push((unit_num, key));
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unit_num += 1;
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offset += 16;
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}
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keys
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}
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// ── Content decryption ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// Check if a 6144-byte aligned unit is encrypted (copy_permission_indicator bits).
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pub fn is_unit_encrypted(unit: &[u8]) -> bool {
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unit.len() >= ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN && (unit[0] & 0xC0) != 0
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}
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/// Verify decrypted unit by checking TS sync bytes at expected offsets.
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fn verify_ts(unit: &[u8]) -> bool {
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// In a 6144-byte unit, TS packets start at byte 0 with 4-byte TP_extra_header
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// then 188-byte TS packet, repeating every 192 bytes.
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// Sync byte 0x47 should appear at offset 4, 196, 388, ...
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let mut count = 0;
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let mut offset = 4;
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while offset < unit.len() {
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if unit[offset] == TS_SYNC {
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count += 1;
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}
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offset += TS_PACKET_LEN;
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}
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// Expect at least most packets to have sync bytes
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let total = (unit.len() - 4) / TS_PACKET_LEN + 1;
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count > total / 2
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}
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/// Decrypt one AACS aligned unit (6144 bytes) in-place.
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/// Returns true if decryption succeeded (verified by TS sync bytes).
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///
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/// Algorithm:
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/// 1. AES-128-ECB encrypt first 16 bytes with unit_key → derived
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/// 2. XOR derived with original 16 bytes → unit_decrypt_key
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/// 3. AES-128-CBC decrypt bytes 16..6143 with unit_decrypt_key and AACS IV
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/// 4. Clear encryption flag bits
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pub fn decrypt_unit(unit: &mut [u8], unit_key: &[u8; 16]) -> bool {
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if unit.len() < ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN {
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return false;
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}
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if !is_unit_encrypted(unit) {
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return true; // not encrypted
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}
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// Save original first 16 bytes (they're plaintext TP_extra_header)
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let mut header = [0u8; 16];
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header.copy_from_slice(&unit[..16]);
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// Step 1: Encrypt header with unit key to derive per-unit key
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let derived = aes_ecb_encrypt(unit_key, &header);
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// Step 2: XOR to get the actual decryption key
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let mut decrypt_key = [0u8; 16];
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for i in 0..16 {
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decrypt_key[i] = derived[i] ^ header[i];
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}
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// Step 3: Decrypt bytes 16..6143 with AES-CBC
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aes_cbc_decrypt(&decrypt_key, &mut unit[16..ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN]);
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// Step 4: Clear encryption flag
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unit[0] &= !0xC0;
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// Verify
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verify_ts(unit)
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}
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/// Decrypt one aligned unit trying multiple unit keys. Returns the key index that worked.
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pub fn decrypt_unit_try_keys(unit: &mut [u8], unit_keys: &[[u8; 16]]) -> Option<usize> {
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if !is_unit_encrypted(unit) {
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return Some(0);
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}
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// Save original for retry
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let original = unit[..ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN].to_vec();
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for (i, key) in unit_keys.iter().enumerate() {
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unit[..ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&original);
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if decrypt_unit(unit, key) {
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return Some(i);
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}
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}
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// Restore original on failure
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unit[..ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&original);
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None
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}
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/// Remove bus encryption from an aligned unit (AACS 2.0 / UHD).
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/// Bus encryption uses read_data_key, decrypting bytes 16..2047 of each 2048-byte sector.
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pub fn decrypt_bus(unit: &mut [u8], read_data_key: &[u8; 16]) {
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for sector_start in (0..ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN).step_by(SECTOR_LEN) {
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if sector_start + SECTOR_LEN > unit.len() {
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break;
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}
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// First 16 bytes of each sector are plaintext
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aes_cbc_decrypt(read_data_key, &mut unit[sector_start + 16..sector_start + SECTOR_LEN]);
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}
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}
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/// Full decrypt of an aligned unit: bus decrypt (if needed) then AACS decrypt.
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pub fn decrypt_unit_full(
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unit: &mut [u8],
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unit_key: &[u8; 16],
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read_data_key: Option<&[u8; 16]>,
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) -> bool {
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if !is_unit_encrypted(unit) {
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return true;
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}
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if let Some(rdk) = read_data_key {
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decrypt_bus(unit, rdk);
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}
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decrypt_unit(unit, unit_key)
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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@@ -310,6 +541,211 @@ mod tests {
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assert_eq!(hc.certificate.len(), 92);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_vuk_derivation() {
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// Civil War UHD: known MK, VID, VUK from KEYDB
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// MK = 15665F98..., VID (disc_id) = from entry, VUK = F96D7908...
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// VUK = AES-DEC(MK, VID) XOR VID
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let path = std::path::Path::new("");
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if !path.exists() { return; }
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let db = KeyDb::load(path).unwrap();
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// Find a disc with both MK, disc_id, and VUK so we can verify derivation
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let entry = db.disc_entries.values()
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.find(|e| e.media_key.is_some() && e.disc_id.is_some() && e.vuk.is_some())
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.expect("No disc with MK + VID + VUK");
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let mk = entry.media_key.unwrap();
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let vid = entry.disc_id.unwrap();
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let expected_vuk = entry.vuk.unwrap();
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let derived = derive_vuk(&mk, &vid);
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assert_eq!(derived, expected_vuk,
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"VUK derivation failed for disc: {} (hash {})", entry.title, entry.disc_hash);
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eprintln!("VUK derivation verified for: {}", entry.title);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_aes_ecb_roundtrip() {
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let key = [0x15u8, 0x66, 0x5F, 0x98, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04,
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0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C];
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let plain = [0x41u8; 16];
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let enc = aes_ecb_encrypt(&key, &plain);
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let dec = aes_ecb_decrypt(&key, &enc);
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assert_eq!(dec, plain);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_decrypt_unit_unencrypted() {
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// Unit with 0xC0 bits clear should pass through unchanged
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let mut unit = vec![0u8; ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN];
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unit[0] = 0x00; // not encrypted
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let key = [0u8; 16];
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assert!(decrypt_unit(&mut unit, &key));
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_aes_cbc_roundtrip() {
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let key = [0x11u8, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88,
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0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0x00];
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let original = vec![0x42u8; 128]; // 8 blocks
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let mut data = original.clone();
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// Encrypt with CBC manually (forward direction)
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fn aes_cbc_encrypt(key: &[u8; 16], data: &mut [u8]) {
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let cipher = Aes128::new(GenericArray::from_slice(key));
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let mut prev = super::AACS_IV;
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let num_blocks = data.len() / 16;
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for i in 0..num_blocks {
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let offset = i * 16;
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for j in 0..16 {
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data[offset + j] ^= prev[j];
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}
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let mut block = GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&data[offset..offset + 16]);
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cipher.encrypt_block(&mut block);
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data[offset..offset + 16].copy_from_slice(&block);
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prev.copy_from_slice(&data[offset..offset + 16]);
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}
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}
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aes_cbc_encrypt(&key, &mut data);
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assert_ne!(data, original); // should be different after encrypt
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super::aes_cbc_decrypt(&key, &mut data);
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assert_eq!(data, original); // should match after roundtrip
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_decrypt_unit_synthetic() {
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// Build a fake 6144-byte aligned unit with known TS sync pattern,
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// encrypt it with the AACS algorithm, then decrypt and verify.
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let unit_key = [0xAAu8; 16];
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// Build plaintext unit with TS sync bytes every 192 bytes starting at offset 4
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let mut plain = vec![0u8; ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN];
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let mut offset = 4;
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while offset < ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN {
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plain[offset] = TS_SYNC;
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offset += TS_PACKET_LEN;
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}
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// Set encryption flag
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plain[0] |= 0xC0;
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// Now encrypt bytes 16..6143 using the AACS algorithm (reverse of decrypt)
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let header: [u8; 16] = plain[..16].try_into().unwrap();
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let derived = super::aes_ecb_encrypt(&unit_key, &header);
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let mut encrypt_key = [0u8; 16];
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for i in 0..16 {
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encrypt_key[i] = derived[i] ^ header[i];
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}
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// CBC encrypt bytes 16..6143
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let cipher = Aes128::new(GenericArray::from_slice(&encrypt_key));
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let mut prev = super::AACS_IV;
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let num_blocks = (ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN - 16) / 16;
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for i in 0..num_blocks {
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let off = 16 + i * 16;
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for j in 0..16 {
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plain[off + j] ^= prev[j];
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}
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let mut block = GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&plain[off..off + 16]);
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cipher.encrypt_block(&mut block);
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plain[off..off + 16].copy_from_slice(&block);
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prev.copy_from_slice(&plain[off..off + 16]);
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}
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// Now plain contains encrypted data. Decrypt it.
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let mut unit = plain;
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assert!(is_unit_encrypted(&unit));
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assert!(decrypt_unit(&mut unit, &unit_key));
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assert!(!is_unit_encrypted(&unit)); // flag should be cleared
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// Verify TS sync bytes
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let mut count = 0;
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let mut off = 4;
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while off < ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN {
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if unit[off] == TS_SYNC {
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count += 1;
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}
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off += TS_PACKET_LEN;
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}
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assert_eq!(count, (ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN - 4) / TS_PACKET_LEN + 1);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_decrypt_unit_key_from_vuk() {
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// Test the full chain: VUK → decrypt encrypted unit key → unit key
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// Use a known disc from KEYDB that has both VUK and unit keys
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let path = std::path::Path::new("");
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if !path.exists() { return; }
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let db = KeyDb::load(path).unwrap();
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// Find a disc with VUK and unit keys
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let entry = db.disc_entries.values()
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.find(|e| e.vuk.is_some() && !e.unit_keys.is_empty())
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.expect("No disc with VUK + unit keys");
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eprintln!("Testing unit key decrypt for: {} ({})", entry.title, entry.disc_hash);
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eprintln!(" VUK: {:02X?}", entry.vuk.unwrap());
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for (num, key) in &entry.unit_keys {
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eprintln!(" Unit key {}: {:02X?}", num, key);
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}
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// The unit keys in KEYDB are already decrypted — we can verify the chain
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// by encrypting with VUK and then decrypting
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let vuk = entry.vuk.unwrap();
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for (num, expected_uk) in &entry.unit_keys {
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let encrypted = aes_ecb_encrypt(&vuk, expected_uk);
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let decrypted = decrypt_unit_key(&vuk, &encrypted);
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assert_eq!(&decrypted, expected_uk,
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"Unit key {} roundtrip failed for {}", num, entry.title);
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||||
}
|
||||
eprintln!(" All {} unit key roundtrips passed", entry.unit_keys.len());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_decrypt_real_unit() {
|
||||
// Try decrypting a real encrypted aligned unit from Civil War UHD
|
||||
// This disc is AACS 2.0 (BEE) so unit key alone won't work —
|
||||
// we need bus decryption first. But this verifies the pipeline.
|
||||
let unit_path = std::path::Path::new("/tmp/encrypted_unit.bin");
|
||||
if !unit_path.exists() { return; }
|
||||
|
||||
let original = std::fs::read(unit_path).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(original.len(), ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN);
|
||||
assert!(is_unit_encrypted(&original), "Unit should be encrypted");
|
||||
|
||||
let keydb_path = std::path::Path::new("");
|
||||
if !keydb_path.exists() { return; }
|
||||
let db = KeyDb::load(keydb_path).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
// Civil War UHD entries
|
||||
let civil_war_entries: Vec<&DiscEntry> = db.disc_entries.values()
|
||||
.filter(|e| e.title.contains("CIVIL WAR") && !e.unit_keys.is_empty())
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
|
||||
eprintln!("Found {} Civil War entries with unit keys", civil_war_entries.len());
|
||||
|
||||
// Try each entry's unit keys
|
||||
for entry in &civil_war_entries {
|
||||
let keys: Vec<[u8; 16]> = entry.unit_keys.iter().map(|(_, k)| *k).collect();
|
||||
let mut unit = original.clone();
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(idx) = decrypt_unit_try_keys(&mut unit, &keys) {
|
||||
eprintln!("SUCCESS: Decrypted with entry {} key {}", entry.disc_hash, idx);
|
||||
// Count TS sync bytes
|
||||
let ts = (0..32).filter(|&i| unit[4 + i * 192] == 0x47).count();
|
||||
eprintln!(" TS sync bytes: {}/32", ts);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Expected: none work because this is AACS 2.0 and needs bus decryption first
|
||||
eprintln!("No unit key worked (expected for AACS 2.0 BEE disc — needs read_data_key)");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_parse_full_keydb() {
|
||||
let path = std::path::Path::new("");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
|
||||
//! AACS bus authentication handshake — ECDH key agreement + bus key derivation.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Implements the AACS SCSI authentication protocol to obtain:
|
||||
//! - Volume ID (VID) — needed for VUK derivation
|
||||
//! - Read Data Key — needed for AACS 2.0 (UHD) bus decryption
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Flow:
|
||||
//! 1. Invalidate AGIDs → allocate fresh AGID
|
||||
//! 2. Send host certificate + nonce
|
||||
//! 3. Receive drive certificate + nonce
|
||||
//! 4. Receive drive key point + signature, verify
|
||||
//! 5. Sign host key point, send
|
||||
//! 6. ECDH: host_priv × drive_key_point → bus key (low 128 bits of x)
|
||||
//! 7. Read VID or Read Data Keys (encrypted with bus key)
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Uses the AACS 1.0 custom 160-bit elliptic curve.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
|
||||
use crate::drive::DriveSession;
|
||||
use crate::scsi::DataDirection;
|
||||
use num_bigint::BigUint;
|
||||
use num_traits::{One, Zero};
|
||||
use num_integer::Integer;
|
||||
use sha1::{Sha1, Digest};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Execute a SCSI command that reads data from the device.
|
||||
fn scsi_read(session: &mut DriveSession, cdb: &[u8], len: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
let mut buf = vec![0u8; len];
|
||||
session.scsi_execute(cdb, DataDirection::FromDevice, &mut buf, 5_000)?;
|
||||
Ok(buf)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Execute a SCSI command that writes data to the device.
|
||||
fn scsi_write(session: &mut DriveSession, cdb: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let mut buf = data.to_vec();
|
||||
session.scsi_execute(cdb, DataDirection::ToDevice, &mut buf, 5_000)?;
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── AACS 1.0 elliptic curve parameters (160-bit) ───────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
const EC_P: [u8; 20] = [
|
||||
0x9D, 0xC9, 0xD8, 0x13, 0x55, 0xEC, 0xCE, 0xB5, 0x60, 0xBD,
|
||||
0xB0, 0x9E, 0xF9, 0xEA, 0xE7, 0xC4, 0x79, 0xA7, 0xD7, 0xDF,
|
||||
];
|
||||
const EC_A: [u8; 20] = [
|
||||
0x9D, 0xC9, 0xD8, 0x13, 0x55, 0xEC, 0xCE, 0xB5, 0x60, 0xBD,
|
||||
0xB0, 0x9E, 0xF9, 0xEA, 0xE7, 0xC4, 0x79, 0xA7, 0xD7, 0xDC,
|
||||
];
|
||||
const EC_B: [u8; 20] = [
|
||||
0x40, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x3E, 0xC1, 0xCB, 0xCD, 0x16, 0x52, 0x48,
|
||||
0xD6, 0x8E, 0x12, 0x45, 0xE0, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xAC, 0xB1, 0xD8,
|
||||
];
|
||||
const EC_N: [u8; 20] = [
|
||||
0x9D, 0xC9, 0xD8, 0x13, 0x55, 0xEC, 0xCE, 0xB5, 0x60, 0xBD,
|
||||
0xC4, 0x4F, 0x54, 0x81, 0x7B, 0x2C, 0x7F, 0x5A, 0xB0, 0x17,
|
||||
];
|
||||
const EC_GX: [u8; 20] = [
|
||||
0x2E, 0x64, 0xFC, 0x22, 0x57, 0x83, 0x51, 0xE6, 0xF4, 0xCC,
|
||||
0xA7, 0xEB, 0x81, 0xD0, 0xA4, 0xBD, 0xC5, 0x4C, 0xCE, 0xC6,
|
||||
];
|
||||
const EC_GY: [u8; 20] = [
|
||||
0x09, 0x14, 0xA2, 0x5D, 0xD0, 0x54, 0x42, 0x88, 0x9D, 0xB4,
|
||||
0x55, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x3C, 0x9A, 0x07, 0x07, 0xF5, 0xCB, 0xB9,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
// ── AACS LA (Licensing Administrator) public key for cert verification ──────
|
||||
|
||||
const AACS_LA_PUB_X: [u8; 20] = [
|
||||
0x01, 0xF3, 0x5D, 0xAB, 0xD8, 0xAE, 0x5F, 0x40, 0x56, 0x5E,
|
||||
0x30, 0xC8, 0x8A, 0x60, 0x42, 0x82, 0x07, 0x61, 0xDF, 0x93,
|
||||
];
|
||||
const AACS_LA_PUB_Y: [u8; 20] = [
|
||||
0x44, 0x87, 0xB5, 0xAC, 0x07, 0x10, 0x8D, 0x10, 0x5B, 0xA5,
|
||||
0xB9, 0xE3, 0x2F, 0x3B, 0xBB, 0xFC, 0x0C, 0x2C, 0xBC, 0xD1,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Elliptic curve arithmetic over GF(p) ───────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
|
||||
struct EcPoint {
|
||||
x: BigUint,
|
||||
y: BigUint,
|
||||
infinity: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl EcPoint {
|
||||
fn infinity() -> Self {
|
||||
EcPoint { x: BigUint::zero(), y: BigUint::zero(), infinity: true }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn new(x: BigUint, y: BigUint) -> Self {
|
||||
EcPoint { x, y, infinity: false }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn from_bytes(x_bytes: &[u8], y_bytes: &[u8]) -> Self {
|
||||
EcPoint::new(BigUint::from_bytes_be(x_bytes), BigUint::from_bytes_be(y_bytes))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Modular inverse using extended Euclidean algorithm.
|
||||
fn mod_inv(a: &BigUint, m: &BigUint) -> Option<BigUint> {
|
||||
use num_bigint::BigInt;
|
||||
use num_traits::Signed;
|
||||
|
||||
let a = BigInt::from(a.clone());
|
||||
let m = BigInt::from(m.clone());
|
||||
|
||||
let (mut old_r, mut r) = (a, m.clone());
|
||||
let (mut old_s, mut s) = (BigInt::one(), BigInt::zero());
|
||||
|
||||
while !r.is_zero() {
|
||||
let q = &old_r / &r;
|
||||
let temp_r = r.clone();
|
||||
r = old_r - &q * &r;
|
||||
old_r = temp_r;
|
||||
let temp_s = s.clone();
|
||||
s = old_s - &q * &s;
|
||||
old_s = temp_s;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if old_r != BigInt::one() {
|
||||
return None;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if old_s.is_negative() {
|
||||
old_s += &m;
|
||||
}
|
||||
Some(old_s.to_biguint().unwrap())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// EC point addition on curve y² = x³ + ax + b (mod p).
|
||||
fn ec_add(p1: &EcPoint, p2: &EcPoint, a: &BigUint, p: &BigUint) -> EcPoint {
|
||||
if p1.infinity { return p2.clone(); }
|
||||
if p2.infinity { return p1.clone(); }
|
||||
|
||||
if p1.x == p2.x {
|
||||
if p1.y == p2.y && !p1.y.is_zero() {
|
||||
return ec_double(p1, a, p);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return EcPoint::infinity();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// λ = (y2 - y1) / (x2 - x1) mod p
|
||||
let dy = if p2.y >= p1.y {
|
||||
(&p2.y - &p1.y) % p
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
(p - (&p1.y - &p2.y) % p) % p
|
||||
};
|
||||
let dx = if p2.x >= p1.x {
|
||||
(&p2.x - &p1.x) % p
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
(p - (&p1.x - &p2.x) % p) % p
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let dx_inv = mod_inv(&dx, p).unwrap();
|
||||
let lam = (&dy * &dx_inv) % p;
|
||||
|
||||
// x3 = λ² - x1 - x2 mod p
|
||||
let x3 = {
|
||||
let lam2 = (&lam * &lam) % p;
|
||||
let sum = (&p1.x + &p2.x) % p;
|
||||
if lam2 >= sum {
|
||||
(lam2 - sum) % p
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
(p - (sum - lam2) % p) % p
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// y3 = λ(x1 - x3) - y1 mod p
|
||||
let y3 = {
|
||||
let diff = if p1.x >= x3 {
|
||||
(&p1.x - &x3) % p
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
(p - (&x3 - &p1.x) % p) % p
|
||||
};
|
||||
let prod = (&lam * &diff) % p;
|
||||
if prod >= p1.y {
|
||||
(prod - &p1.y) % p
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
(p - (&p1.y - prod) % p) % p
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
EcPoint::new(x3, y3)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// EC point doubling.
|
||||
fn ec_double(pt: &EcPoint, a: &BigUint, p: &BigUint) -> EcPoint {
|
||||
if pt.infinity || pt.y.is_zero() {
|
||||
return EcPoint::infinity();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// λ = (3x² + a) / (2y) mod p
|
||||
let three = BigUint::from(3u32);
|
||||
let two = BigUint::from(2u32);
|
||||
|
||||
let numerator = (&three * &pt.x * &pt.x + a) % p;
|
||||
let denominator = (&two * &pt.y) % p;
|
||||
let denom_inv = mod_inv(&denominator, p).unwrap();
|
||||
let lam = (&numerator * &denom_inv) % p;
|
||||
|
||||
// x3 = λ² - 2x mod p
|
||||
let x3 = {
|
||||
let lam2 = (&lam * &lam) % p;
|
||||
let two_x = (&two * &pt.x) % p;
|
||||
if lam2 >= two_x {
|
||||
(lam2 - two_x) % p
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
(p - (two_x - lam2) % p) % p
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// y3 = λ(x - x3) - y mod p
|
||||
let y3 = {
|
||||
let diff = if pt.x >= x3 {
|
||||
(&pt.x - &x3) % p
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
(p - (&x3 - &pt.x) % p) % p
|
||||
};
|
||||
let prod = (&lam * &diff) % p;
|
||||
if prod >= pt.y {
|
||||
(prod - &pt.y) % p
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
(p - (&pt.y - prod) % p) % p
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
EcPoint::new(x3, y3)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Scalar multiplication using double-and-add.
|
||||
fn ec_mul(k: &BigUint, pt: &EcPoint, a: &BigUint, p: &BigUint) -> EcPoint {
|
||||
if k.is_zero() {
|
||||
return EcPoint::infinity();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let mut result = EcPoint::infinity();
|
||||
let mut base = pt.clone();
|
||||
let mut scalar = k.clone();
|
||||
|
||||
while !scalar.is_zero() {
|
||||
if scalar.bit(0) {
|
||||
result = ec_add(&result, &base, a, p);
|
||||
}
|
||||
base = ec_double(&base, a, p);
|
||||
scalar >>= 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
result
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Convert BigUint to fixed-size big-endian bytes, zero-padded.
|
||||
fn to_bytes_be_padded(n: &BigUint, len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let bytes = n.to_bytes_be();
|
||||
if bytes.len() >= len {
|
||||
bytes[bytes.len() - len..].to_vec()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let mut padded = vec![0u8; len - bytes.len()];
|
||||
padded.extend_from_slice(&bytes);
|
||||
padded
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── ECDSA ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// ECDSA sign: sign SHA-1(data) with private key on AACS curve.
|
||||
/// Returns (r, s) each 20 bytes.
|
||||
fn ecdsa_sign(priv_key: &[u8; 20], data: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 20], [u8; 20]) {
|
||||
let p = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_P);
|
||||
let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_A);
|
||||
let n = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_N);
|
||||
let g = EcPoint::from_bytes(&EC_GX, &EC_GY);
|
||||
let d = BigUint::from_bytes_be(priv_key);
|
||||
|
||||
// Hash the data
|
||||
let hash = Sha1::digest(data);
|
||||
let z = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&hash);
|
||||
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
// Generate random k
|
||||
let mut k_bytes = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
use rand::RngCore;
|
||||
rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut k_bytes);
|
||||
let k = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&k_bytes) % &n;
|
||||
if k.is_zero() { continue; }
|
||||
|
||||
// R = k × G
|
||||
let r_point = ec_mul(&k, &g, &a, &p);
|
||||
let r = &r_point.x % &n;
|
||||
if r.is_zero() { continue; }
|
||||
|
||||
// s = k⁻¹(z + r·d) mod n
|
||||
let k_inv = match mod_inv(&k, &n) {
|
||||
Some(v) => v,
|
||||
None => continue,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let s = (&k_inv * ((&z + &r * &d) % &n)) % &n;
|
||||
if s.is_zero() { continue; }
|
||||
|
||||
let r_bytes = to_bytes_be_padded(&r, 20);
|
||||
let s_bytes = to_bytes_be_padded(&s, 20);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut r_out = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
let mut s_out = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
r_out.copy_from_slice(&r_bytes);
|
||||
s_out.copy_from_slice(&s_bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
return (r_out, s_out);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// ECDSA verify: verify signature (r, s) against SHA-1(data) using public key.
|
||||
fn ecdsa_verify(pub_x: &[u8; 20], pub_y: &[u8; 20], sig_r: &[u8; 20], sig_s: &[u8; 20], data: &[u8]) -> bool {
|
||||
let p = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_P);
|
||||
let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_A);
|
||||
let n = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_N);
|
||||
let g = EcPoint::from_bytes(&EC_GX, &EC_GY);
|
||||
let q = EcPoint::from_bytes(pub_x, pub_y);
|
||||
|
||||
let r = BigUint::from_bytes_be(sig_r);
|
||||
let s = BigUint::from_bytes_be(sig_s);
|
||||
|
||||
if r.is_zero() || r >= n || s.is_zero() || s >= n {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let hash = Sha1::digest(data);
|
||||
let z = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&hash);
|
||||
|
||||
let s_inv = match mod_inv(&s, &n) {
|
||||
Some(v) => v,
|
||||
None => return false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let u1 = (&z * &s_inv) % &n;
|
||||
let u2 = (&r * &s_inv) % &n;
|
||||
|
||||
let p1 = ec_mul(&u1, &g, &a, &p);
|
||||
let p2 = ec_mul(&u2, &q, &a, &p);
|
||||
let r_point = ec_add(&p1, &p2, &a, &p);
|
||||
|
||||
if r_point.infinity {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
&r_point.x % &n == r
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── AACS certificate handling ───────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Verify an AACS certificate (92 bytes) against the AACS LA public key.
|
||||
fn verify_cert(cert: &[u8]) -> bool {
|
||||
if cert.len() < 92 { return false; }
|
||||
// Certificate format: type(1) + flags(1) + padding(2) + serial(6) + pub_x(20) + pub_y(20) + sig_r(20) + sig_s(20)
|
||||
// Signature is over the first 52 bytes
|
||||
let mut sig_r = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
let mut sig_s = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
sig_r.copy_from_slice(&cert[52..72]);
|
||||
sig_s.copy_from_slice(&cert[72..92]);
|
||||
|
||||
ecdsa_verify(&AACS_LA_PUB_X, &AACS_LA_PUB_Y, &sig_r, &sig_s, &cert[..52])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extract public key from certificate.
|
||||
fn cert_pub_key(cert: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 20], [u8; 20]) {
|
||||
let mut x = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
let mut y = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
x.copy_from_slice(&cert[12..32]);
|
||||
y.copy_from_slice(&cert[32..52]);
|
||||
(x, y)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Bus key derivation (ECDH) ───────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Compute bus key via ECDH: bus_key = low 128 bits of (host_priv × drive_key_point).x
|
||||
fn compute_bus_key(host_priv: &[u8; 20], drive_key_point_x: &[u8; 20], drive_key_point_y: &[u8; 20]) -> [u8; 16] {
|
||||
let p = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_P);
|
||||
let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_A);
|
||||
|
||||
let d = BigUint::from_bytes_be(host_priv);
|
||||
let dkp = EcPoint::from_bytes(drive_key_point_x, drive_key_point_y);
|
||||
|
||||
let shared = ec_mul(&d, &dkp, &a, &p);
|
||||
|
||||
// Bus key = lowest 128 bits (last 16 bytes) of x-coordinate
|
||||
let x_bytes = to_bytes_be_padded(&shared.x, 20);
|
||||
let mut bus_key = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
bus_key.copy_from_slice(&x_bytes[4..20]); // last 16 of 20
|
||||
bus_key
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Generate ephemeral host key pair: (private_key, public_point_x, public_point_y).
|
||||
fn generate_host_key_pair() -> ([u8; 20], [u8; 20], [u8; 20]) {
|
||||
let p_mod = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_P);
|
||||
let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_A);
|
||||
let g = EcPoint::from_bytes(&EC_GX, &EC_GY);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut priv_bytes = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
use rand::RngCore;
|
||||
rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut priv_bytes);
|
||||
let d = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&priv_bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
let q = ec_mul(&d, &g, &a, &p_mod);
|
||||
|
||||
let qx = to_bytes_be_padded(&q.x, 20);
|
||||
let qy = to_bytes_be_padded(&q.y, 20);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut pub_x = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
let mut pub_y = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
pub_x.copy_from_slice(&qx);
|
||||
pub_y.copy_from_slice(&qy);
|
||||
|
||||
(priv_bytes, pub_x, pub_y)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── AES-CMAC (for MAC verification) ────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// AES-128-CMAC over 16 bytes of data.
|
||||
fn aes_cmac_16(data: &[u8; 16], key: &[u8; 16]) -> [u8; 16] {
|
||||
use aes::Aes128;
|
||||
use aes::cipher::{BlockEncrypt, KeyInit, generic_array::GenericArray};
|
||||
|
||||
let cipher = Aes128::new(GenericArray::from_slice(key));
|
||||
|
||||
// For single-block CMAC:
|
||||
// 1. Generate subkey K1
|
||||
let mut l = GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&[0u8; 16]);
|
||||
cipher.encrypt_block(&mut l);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut k1 = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let carry = (l[0] >> 7) & 1;
|
||||
for i in 0..15 {
|
||||
k1[i] = (l[i] << 1) | (l[i + 1] >> 7);
|
||||
}
|
||||
k1[15] = l[15] << 1;
|
||||
if carry == 1 {
|
||||
k1[15] ^= 0x87; // Rb for AES-128
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. XOR data with K1, encrypt
|
||||
let mut block = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||||
block[i] = data[i] ^ k1[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
let mut ga = GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&block);
|
||||
cipher.encrypt_block(&mut ga);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut mac = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
mac.copy_from_slice(&ga);
|
||||
mac
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── SCSI command builders ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Build REPORT KEY CDB (0xA4).
|
||||
fn cdb_report_key(agid: u8, format: u8, len: u16) -> [u8; 12] {
|
||||
let mut cdb = [0u8; 12];
|
||||
cdb[0] = 0xA4;
|
||||
cdb[7] = 0x02; // key class = AACS
|
||||
cdb[8] = (len >> 8) as u8;
|
||||
cdb[9] = (len & 0xFF) as u8;
|
||||
cdb[10] = (agid << 6) | (format & 0x3F);
|
||||
cdb
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Build SEND KEY CDB (0xA3).
|
||||
fn cdb_send_key(agid: u8, format: u8, len: u16) -> [u8; 12] {
|
||||
let mut cdb = [0u8; 12];
|
||||
cdb[0] = 0xA3;
|
||||
cdb[7] = 0x02; // key class = AACS
|
||||
cdb[8] = (len >> 8) as u8;
|
||||
cdb[9] = (len & 0xFF) as u8;
|
||||
cdb[10] = (agid << 6) | (format & 0x3F);
|
||||
cdb
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Build REPORT DISC STRUCTURE CDB (0xAD).
|
||||
fn cdb_report_disc_structure(agid: u8, format: u8, len: u16) -> [u8; 12] {
|
||||
let mut cdb = [0u8; 12];
|
||||
cdb[0] = 0xAD;
|
||||
cdb[1] = 0x01; // Blu-ray
|
||||
cdb[7] = format;
|
||||
cdb[8] = (len >> 8) as u8;
|
||||
cdb[9] = (len & 0xFF) as u8;
|
||||
cdb[10] = agid << 6;
|
||||
cdb
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── High-level handshake ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Result of a successful AACS authentication handshake.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||||
pub struct AacsAuth {
|
||||
/// Bus key (16 bytes) — derived from ECDH
|
||||
pub bus_key: [u8; 16],
|
||||
/// AGID used for this session
|
||||
pub agid: u8,
|
||||
/// Volume ID (16 bytes) — read after auth
|
||||
pub volume_id: Option<[u8; 16]>,
|
||||
/// Read data key (16 bytes) — for AACS 2.0 bus decryption
|
||||
pub read_data_key: Option<[u8; 16]>,
|
||||
/// Drive certificate (92 bytes)
|
||||
pub drive_cert: [u8; 92],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Perform the full AACS authentication handshake.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Requires a host private key (20 bytes) and host certificate (92 bytes)
|
||||
/// from the KEYDB.cfg HC entry.
|
||||
pub fn aacs_authenticate(
|
||||
session: &mut DriveSession,
|
||||
host_priv_key: &[u8; 20],
|
||||
host_cert: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> Result<AacsAuth> {
|
||||
if host_cert.len() < 92 {
|
||||
return Err(Error::AacsError { detail: "host certificate too short".into() });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 1: Invalidate all AGIDs
|
||||
for agid in 0..4u8 {
|
||||
let cdb = cdb_report_key(agid, 0x3F, 2);
|
||||
let _ = scsi_read(session, &cdb, 2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 2: Allocate AGID
|
||||
let cdb = cdb_report_key(0, 0x00, 8);
|
||||
let response = scsi_read(session, &cdb, 8)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| Error::AacsError { detail: "failed to allocate AGID".into() })?;
|
||||
let agid = (response[7] >> 6) & 0x03;
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 3: Generate host nonce and ephemeral key pair
|
||||
let mut host_nonce = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
use rand::RngCore;
|
||||
rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut host_nonce);
|
||||
let (host_key, host_key_point_x, host_key_point_y) = generate_host_key_pair();
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 4: Send host certificate + nonce (SEND KEY format 0x01)
|
||||
let mut send_buf = [0u8; 116];
|
||||
send_buf[1] = 0x72; // data length
|
||||
send_buf[4..24].copy_from_slice(&host_nonce);
|
||||
send_buf[24..116].copy_from_slice(&host_cert[..92]);
|
||||
|
||||
let cdb = cdb_send_key(agid, 0x01, 116);
|
||||
scsi_write(session, &cdb, &send_buf)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| Error::AacsError { detail: "drive rejected host certificate".into() })?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 5: Read drive certificate + nonce (REPORT KEY format 0x01)
|
||||
let cdb = cdb_report_key(agid, 0x01, 116);
|
||||
let response = scsi_read(session, &cdb, 116)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| Error::AacsError { detail: "failed to read drive certificate".into() })?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut drive_nonce = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
let mut drive_cert = [0u8; 92];
|
||||
drive_nonce.copy_from_slice(&response[4..24]);
|
||||
drive_cert.copy_from_slice(&response[24..116]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify drive certificate
|
||||
if !verify_cert(&drive_cert) {
|
||||
return Err(Error::AacsError { detail: "drive certificate verification failed".into() });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 6: Read drive key point + signature (REPORT KEY format 0x02)
|
||||
let cdb = cdb_report_key(agid, 0x02, 84);
|
||||
let response = scsi_read(session, &cdb, 84)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| Error::AacsError { detail: "failed to read drive key".into() })?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut drive_key_point = [0u8; 40]; // x(20) + y(20)
|
||||
let mut drive_key_sig = [0u8; 40]; // r(20) + s(20)
|
||||
drive_key_point.copy_from_slice(&response[4..44]);
|
||||
drive_key_sig.copy_from_slice(&response[44..84]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify drive key signature: sign(drive_nonce=host_nonce || drive_key_point)
|
||||
let (drive_pub_x, drive_pub_y) = cert_pub_key(&drive_cert);
|
||||
let mut verify_data = [0u8; 60];
|
||||
verify_data[..20].copy_from_slice(&host_nonce);
|
||||
verify_data[20..60].copy_from_slice(&drive_key_point);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut sig_r = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
let mut sig_s = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
sig_r.copy_from_slice(&drive_key_sig[..20]);
|
||||
sig_s.copy_from_slice(&drive_key_sig[20..40]);
|
||||
|
||||
if !ecdsa_verify(&drive_pub_x, &drive_pub_y, &sig_r, &sig_s, &verify_data) {
|
||||
return Err(Error::AacsError { detail: "drive key signature verification failed".into() });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 7: Sign host key point (ECDSA over drive_nonce || host_key_point)
|
||||
let mut sign_data = [0u8; 60];
|
||||
sign_data[..20].copy_from_slice(&drive_nonce);
|
||||
sign_data[20..40].copy_from_slice(&host_key_point_x);
|
||||
sign_data[40..60].copy_from_slice(&host_key_point_y);
|
||||
|
||||
let (host_sig_r, host_sig_s) = ecdsa_sign(host_priv_key, &sign_data);
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 8: Send host key point + signature (SEND KEY format 0x02)
|
||||
let mut send_buf = [0u8; 84];
|
||||
send_buf[1] = 0x52;
|
||||
send_buf[4..24].copy_from_slice(&host_key_point_x);
|
||||
send_buf[24..44].copy_from_slice(&host_key_point_y);
|
||||
send_buf[44..64].copy_from_slice(&host_sig_r);
|
||||
send_buf[64..84].copy_from_slice(&host_sig_s);
|
||||
|
||||
let cdb = cdb_send_key(agid, 0x02, 84);
|
||||
scsi_write(session, &cdb, &send_buf)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| Error::AacsError { detail: "drive rejected host key".into() })?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 9: Compute bus key via ECDH
|
||||
let mut dkp_x = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
let mut dkp_y = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
dkp_x.copy_from_slice(&drive_key_point[..20]);
|
||||
dkp_y.copy_from_slice(&drive_key_point[20..40]);
|
||||
|
||||
let bus_key = compute_bus_key(&host_key, &dkp_x, &dkp_y);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(AacsAuth {
|
||||
bus_key,
|
||||
agid,
|
||||
volume_id: None,
|
||||
read_data_key: None,
|
||||
drive_cert,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Read Volume ID after successful authentication.
|
||||
pub fn read_volume_id(session: &mut DriveSession, auth: &mut AacsAuth) -> Result<[u8; 16]> {
|
||||
// REPORT DISC STRUCTURE format 0x80
|
||||
let cdb = cdb_report_disc_structure(auth.agid, 0x80, 36);
|
||||
let response = scsi_read(session, &cdb, 36)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| Error::AacsError { detail: "failed to read Volume ID".into() })?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut vid = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let mut mac = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
vid.copy_from_slice(&response[4..20]);
|
||||
mac.copy_from_slice(&response[20..36]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify MAC: AES-CMAC(VID, bus_key) should equal mac
|
||||
let calc_mac = aes_cmac_16(&vid, &auth.bus_key);
|
||||
if calc_mac != mac {
|
||||
return Err(Error::AacsError { detail: "VID MAC verification failed".into() });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
auth.volume_id = Some(vid);
|
||||
Ok(vid)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Read data keys after successful authentication (for AACS 2.0 bus encryption).
|
||||
pub fn read_data_keys(session: &mut DriveSession, auth: &mut AacsAuth) -> Result<([u8; 16], [u8; 16])> {
|
||||
// REPORT DISC STRUCTURE format 0x84
|
||||
let cdb = cdb_report_disc_structure(auth.agid, 0x84, 36);
|
||||
let response = scsi_read(session, &cdb, 36)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| Error::AacsError { detail: "failed to read data keys".into() })?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut enc_rdk = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let mut enc_wdk = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
enc_rdk.copy_from_slice(&response[4..20]);
|
||||
enc_wdk.copy_from_slice(&response[20..36]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Decrypt with bus key (AES-ECB)
|
||||
let read_data_key = crate::aacs::aes_ecb_decrypt(&auth.bus_key, &enc_rdk);
|
||||
let write_data_key = crate::aacs::aes_ecb_decrypt(&auth.bus_key, &enc_wdk);
|
||||
|
||||
auth.read_data_key = Some(read_data_key);
|
||||
Ok((read_data_key, write_data_key))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Tests ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_ec_curve_generator_on_curve() {
|
||||
// Verify G is on the curve: y² = x³ + ax + b (mod p)
|
||||
let p = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_P);
|
||||
let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_A);
|
||||
let b = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_B);
|
||||
let gx = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_GX);
|
||||
let gy = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_GY);
|
||||
|
||||
let lhs = (&gy * &gy) % &p;
|
||||
let rhs = (&gx * &gx * &gx + &a * &gx + &b) % &p;
|
||||
assert_eq!(lhs, rhs, "Generator point is not on the curve");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_ec_mul_identity() {
|
||||
let p = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_P);
|
||||
let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_A);
|
||||
let g = EcPoint::from_bytes(&EC_GX, &EC_GY);
|
||||
|
||||
// 1 × G = G
|
||||
let result = ec_mul(&BigUint::one(), &g, &a, &p);
|
||||
assert_eq!(result.x, g.x);
|
||||
assert_eq!(result.y, g.y);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_ec_mul_order() {
|
||||
// n × G = O (point at infinity)
|
||||
let p = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_P);
|
||||
let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_A);
|
||||
let n = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_N);
|
||||
let g = EcPoint::from_bytes(&EC_GX, &EC_GY);
|
||||
|
||||
let result = ec_mul(&n, &g, &a, &p);
|
||||
assert!(result.infinity, "n × G should be point at infinity");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_ecdsa_sign_verify() {
|
||||
// Generate a key pair and test sign/verify
|
||||
let (priv_key, pub_x, pub_y) = generate_host_key_pair();
|
||||
let data = b"test data for AACS ECDSA";
|
||||
|
||||
let (sig_r, sig_s) = ecdsa_sign(&priv_key, data);
|
||||
assert!(ecdsa_verify(&pub_x, &pub_y, &sig_r, &sig_s, data),
|
||||
"ECDSA signature should verify");
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify with wrong data fails
|
||||
assert!(!ecdsa_verify(&pub_x, &pub_y, &sig_r, &sig_s, b"wrong data"),
|
||||
"ECDSA should fail with wrong data");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_ecdh_shared_secret() {
|
||||
// Two parties should derive the same shared point
|
||||
let p = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_P);
|
||||
let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(&EC_A);
|
||||
let g = EcPoint::from_bytes(&EC_GX, &EC_GY);
|
||||
|
||||
let (priv_a, pub_ax, pub_ay) = generate_host_key_pair();
|
||||
let (priv_b, pub_bx, pub_by) = generate_host_key_pair();
|
||||
|
||||
// A computes: priv_a × pub_B
|
||||
let shared_a = compute_bus_key(&priv_a, &pub_bx, &pub_by);
|
||||
// B computes: priv_b × pub_A
|
||||
let shared_b = compute_bus_key(&priv_b, &pub_ax, &pub_ay);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(shared_a, shared_b, "ECDH shared secrets should match");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_aes_cmac() {
|
||||
// Basic CMAC test — at minimum verify it produces consistent output
|
||||
let key = [0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
|
||||
0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c];
|
||||
let data = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let mac1 = aes_cmac_16(&data, &key);
|
||||
let mac2 = aes_cmac_16(&data, &key);
|
||||
assert_eq!(mac1, mac2);
|
||||
assert_ne!(mac1, [0u8; 16]); // shouldn't be all zeros
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_verify_host_cert_from_keydb() {
|
||||
// Verify the host cert from our KEYDB
|
||||
let keydb_path = std::path::Path::new("");
|
||||
if !keydb_path.exists() { return; }
|
||||
|
||||
let db = crate::aacs::KeyDb::load(keydb_path).unwrap();
|
||||
if let Some(hc) = &db.host_cert {
|
||||
let valid = verify_cert(&hc.certificate);
|
||||
eprintln!("Host cert verification: {}", if valid { "PASS" } else { "FAIL" });
|
||||
// Note: our cert is revoked but should still have valid LA signature
|
||||
// If it doesn't verify, the LA public key might be wrong
|
||||
if !valid {
|
||||
eprintln!(" (cert may use different LA key or format)");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+430
-3
@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ pub struct Disc {
|
||||
pub capacity_sectors: u32,
|
||||
/// Titles sorted by duration (longest first), then playlist name
|
||||
pub titles: Vec<Title>,
|
||||
/// AACS state — None if disc is unencrypted or keys unavailable
|
||||
pub aacs: Option<AacsState>,
|
||||
/// Whether this disc requires AACS decryption
|
||||
pub encrypted: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A title (one MPLS playlist).
|
||||
@@ -247,15 +251,438 @@ impl Stream {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── AACS state ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// AACS decryption state for a disc.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||||
pub struct AacsState {
|
||||
/// Volume Unique Key
|
||||
pub vuk: [u8; 16],
|
||||
/// Decrypted unit keys indexed by CPS unit number
|
||||
pub unit_keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])>,
|
||||
/// Read data key (AACS 2.0 bus decryption) — None for AACS 1.0
|
||||
pub read_data_key: Option<[u8; 16]>,
|
||||
/// Whether bus encryption is enabled
|
||||
pub bus_encryption: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Disc scanning ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
// Placeholder — the actual implementation will be wired in
|
||||
// when the CLI's disc_info.rs parsing is migrated here.
|
||||
// For now, the CLI does its own parsing.
|
||||
/// Options for disc scanning.
|
||||
pub struct ScanOptions {
|
||||
/// Path to KEYDB.cfg for AACS key lookup.
|
||||
/// If None, tries ~/.config/aacs/KEYDB.cfg and /etc/aacs/KEYDB.cfg.
|
||||
pub keydb_path: Option<std::path::PathBuf>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for ScanOptions {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
ScanOptions { keydb_path: None }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl ScanOptions {
|
||||
/// Create options with a specific KEYDB path.
|
||||
pub fn with_keydb(path: impl Into<std::path::PathBuf>) -> Self {
|
||||
ScanOptions { keydb_path: Some(path.into()) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Resolve KEYDB path: explicit, then standard locations.
|
||||
fn resolve_keydb(&self) -> Option<std::path::PathBuf> {
|
||||
if let Some(p) = &self.keydb_path {
|
||||
if p.exists() { return Some(p.clone()); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Standard locations
|
||||
if let Some(home) = std::env::var_os("HOME") {
|
||||
let p = std::path::PathBuf::from(home).join(".config/aacs/KEYDB.cfg");
|
||||
if p.exists() { return Some(p); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
let p = std::path::PathBuf::from("/etc/aacs/KEYDB.cfg");
|
||||
if p.exists() { return Some(p); }
|
||||
None
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Disc {
|
||||
/// Disc capacity in GB
|
||||
pub fn capacity_gb(&self) -> f64 {
|
||||
self.capacity_sectors as f64 * 2048.0 / (1024.0 * 1024.0 * 1024.0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Scan a disc — parse filesystem, playlists, streams, and set up AACS decryption.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This is the main entry point. After scan(), the Disc is ready:
|
||||
/// - titles are populated with streams
|
||||
/// - AACS keys are derived (if KEYDB available)
|
||||
/// - content can be read and decrypted transparently
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// ```no_run
|
||||
/// use libfreemkv::{DriveSession, Disc};
|
||||
/// use libfreemkv::disc::ScanOptions;
|
||||
/// use std::path::Path;
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// let mut session = DriveSession::open(Path::new("/dev/sr0")).unwrap();
|
||||
/// let disc = Disc::scan(&mut session, &ScanOptions::default()).unwrap();
|
||||
/// for title in &disc.titles {
|
||||
/// println!("{} — {} streams", title.duration_display(), title.streams.len());
|
||||
/// }
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
pub fn scan(session: &mut DriveSession, opts: &ScanOptions) -> Result<Self> {
|
||||
// Step 1: Read capacity
|
||||
let capacity = Self::read_capacity(session)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 2: Parse UDF filesystem
|
||||
let udf_fs = udf::read_filesystem(session)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 3: Find and parse MPLS playlists
|
||||
let mut titles = Vec::new();
|
||||
if let Some(playlist_dir) = udf_fs.find_dir("/BDMV/PLAYLIST") {
|
||||
for entry in &playlist_dir.entries {
|
||||
if !entry.is_dir && entry.name.to_lowercase().ends_with(".mpls") {
|
||||
let path = format!("/BDMV/PLAYLIST/{}", entry.name);
|
||||
if let Ok(mpls_data) = udf_fs.read_file(session, &path) {
|
||||
if let Some(title) = Self::parse_playlist(session, &udf_fs, &entry.name, &mpls_data) {
|
||||
titles.push(title);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Sort: longest first
|
||||
titles.sort_by(|a, b| b.duration_secs.partial_cmp(&a.duration_secs).unwrap_or(std::cmp::Ordering::Equal));
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 4: Detect AACS encryption
|
||||
let encrypted = udf_fs.find_dir("/AACS").is_some()
|
||||
|| udf_fs.find_dir("/BDMV/AACS").is_some();
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 5: If encrypted and KEYDB available, authenticate and derive keys
|
||||
let aacs = if encrypted {
|
||||
if let Some(keydb_path) = opts.resolve_keydb() {
|
||||
match Self::setup_aacs(session, &keydb_path) {
|
||||
Ok(state) => Some(state),
|
||||
Err(_) => None, // keys not found, continue without decryption
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
None
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
None
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Disc {
|
||||
capacity_sectors: capacity,
|
||||
titles,
|
||||
aacs,
|
||||
encrypted,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Set up AACS decryption for this disc.
|
||||
/// Call after scan() to enable transparent content decryption.
|
||||
pub fn setup_aacs(
|
||||
session: &mut DriveSession,
|
||||
keydb_path: &std::path::Path,
|
||||
) -> Result<AacsState> {
|
||||
use crate::aacs::{KeyDb, derive_vuk, decrypt_unit_key};
|
||||
use crate::aacs_handshake;
|
||||
|
||||
// Load KEYDB
|
||||
let keydb = KeyDb::load(keydb_path).map_err(|e| Error::AacsError {
|
||||
detail: format!("failed to load KEYDB: {}", e),
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
|
||||
let host_cert = keydb.host_cert.as_ref().ok_or_else(|| Error::AacsError {
|
||||
detail: "no host certificate in KEYDB".into(),
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Authenticate with drive
|
||||
let mut auth = aacs_handshake::aacs_authenticate(
|
||||
session,
|
||||
&host_cert.private_key,
|
||||
&host_cert.certificate,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Read Volume ID
|
||||
let vid = aacs_handshake::read_volume_id(session, &mut auth)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Try to read data keys (AACS 2.0)
|
||||
let (read_data_key, bus_encryption) = match aacs_handshake::read_data_keys(session, &mut auth) {
|
||||
Ok((rdk, _wdk)) => (Some(rdk), true),
|
||||
Err(_) => (None, false),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute disc hash (SHA1 of Unit_Key_RO.inf) for KEYDB lookup
|
||||
// First try: look up by VID-derived entries
|
||||
// The KEYDB has entries indexed by disc_hash, but we can also
|
||||
// find entries that match our MK+VID combination
|
||||
|
||||
// Try all entries — find one whose MK+VID produces a VUK that decrypts unit keys
|
||||
let mut found_vuk = None;
|
||||
|
||||
// First: try entries that have a disc_id matching our VID
|
||||
for entry in keydb.disc_entries.values() {
|
||||
if let (Some(mk), Some(did)) = (entry.media_key, entry.disc_id) {
|
||||
if did == vid {
|
||||
let vuk = derive_vuk(&mk, &vid);
|
||||
found_vuk = Some((vuk, entry.unit_keys.clone()));
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Fallback: if we have a VUK that works, use it
|
||||
if found_vuk.is_none() {
|
||||
for entry in keydb.disc_entries.values() {
|
||||
if let Some(vuk) = entry.vuk {
|
||||
if let (Some(mk), Some(did)) = (entry.media_key, entry.disc_id) {
|
||||
if did == vid {
|
||||
found_vuk = Some((vuk, entry.unit_keys.clone()));
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let (vuk, keydb_unit_keys) = found_vuk.ok_or_else(|| Error::AacsError {
|
||||
detail: format!("no matching disc found in KEYDB for VID {:02x?}", &vid[..4]),
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
|
||||
// If KEYDB has pre-decrypted unit keys, use them directly
|
||||
// Otherwise we'd need to read Unit_Key_RO.inf and decrypt with VUK
|
||||
let unit_keys = if !keydb_unit_keys.is_empty() {
|
||||
keydb_unit_keys
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Would need to read AACS/Unit_Key_RO.inf from disc and decrypt
|
||||
// For now, require KEYDB to have unit keys
|
||||
return Err(Error::AacsError {
|
||||
detail: "no unit keys in KEYDB entry — Unit_Key_RO.inf parsing not yet implemented".into(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(AacsState {
|
||||
vuk,
|
||||
unit_keys,
|
||||
read_data_key,
|
||||
bus_encryption,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Internal helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
fn read_capacity(session: &mut DriveSession) -> Result<u32> {
|
||||
let cdb = [0x25, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00];
|
||||
let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
|
||||
session.scsi_execute(&cdb, crate::scsi::DataDirection::FromDevice, &mut buf, 5_000)?;
|
||||
let lba = u32::from_be_bytes([buf[0], buf[1], buf[2], buf[3]]);
|
||||
Ok(lba + 1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn parse_playlist(
|
||||
session: &mut DriveSession,
|
||||
udf_fs: &udf::UdfFs,
|
||||
filename: &str,
|
||||
data: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> Option<Title> {
|
||||
let parsed = mpls::parse(data).ok()?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Calculate duration from play items
|
||||
let duration_ticks: u64 = parsed.play_items.iter()
|
||||
.map(|pi| (pi.out_time.saturating_sub(pi.in_time)) as u64)
|
||||
.sum();
|
||||
let duration_secs = duration_ticks as f64 / 45000.0;
|
||||
|
||||
// Skip very short playlists (< 30 seconds)
|
||||
if duration_secs < 30.0 {
|
||||
return None;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Parse each clip for EP map → sector extents
|
||||
let mut extents = Vec::new();
|
||||
let mut total_size: u64 = 0;
|
||||
let clip_count = parsed.play_items.len();
|
||||
|
||||
for play_item in &parsed.play_items {
|
||||
let clpi_path = format!("/BDMV/CLIPINF/{}.clpi", play_item.clip_id);
|
||||
if let Ok(clpi_data) = udf_fs.read_file(session, &clpi_path) {
|
||||
if let Ok(clip_info) = clpi::parse(&clpi_data) {
|
||||
// Use EP map to get sector extents for this clip's time range
|
||||
let clip_extents = clip_info.get_extents(play_item.in_time, play_item.out_time);
|
||||
for ext in &clip_extents {
|
||||
total_size += ext.sector_count as u64 * 2048;
|
||||
}
|
||||
extents.extend(clip_extents);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Streams: for now, we know the count but not details
|
||||
// (STN table parsing will be added to mpls module)
|
||||
let streams = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
let playlist_num = filename.trim_end_matches(".mpls").trim_end_matches(".MPLS");
|
||||
let playlist_id = playlist_num.parse::<u16>().unwrap_or(0);
|
||||
|
||||
Some(Title {
|
||||
playlist: filename.to_string(),
|
||||
playlist_id,
|
||||
duration_secs,
|
||||
size_bytes: total_size,
|
||||
clip_count,
|
||||
streams,
|
||||
extents,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Decrypted reader ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// A reader that reads m2ts content, decrypting transparently if needed.
|
||||
pub struct ContentReader<'a> {
|
||||
session: &'a mut DriveSession,
|
||||
aacs: Option<&'a AacsState>,
|
||||
extents: Vec<Extent>,
|
||||
current_extent: usize,
|
||||
current_offset: u32, // sectors into current extent
|
||||
unit_key_idx: usize,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Disc {
|
||||
/// Open a title for reading. Decryption is automatic — if the disc
|
||||
/// is encrypted and keys were found during scan(), content is decrypted
|
||||
/// on the fly. Unencrypted discs pass through unchanged.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// ```no_run
|
||||
/// # use libfreemkv::{DriveSession, Disc};
|
||||
/// # use libfreemkv::disc::ScanOptions;
|
||||
/// # use std::path::Path;
|
||||
/// # let mut session = DriveSession::open(Path::new("/dev/sr0")).unwrap();
|
||||
/// let disc = Disc::scan(&mut session, &ScanOptions::default()).unwrap();
|
||||
/// let mut reader = disc.open_title(&mut session, 0).unwrap();
|
||||
/// while let Some(unit) = reader.read_unit().unwrap() {
|
||||
/// // unit is 6144 bytes of decrypted content
|
||||
/// }
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
pub fn open_title<'a>(&'a self, session: &'a mut DriveSession, title_idx: usize) -> Result<ContentReader<'a>> {
|
||||
let title = self.titles.get(title_idx).ok_or_else(|| Error::DiscError {
|
||||
detail: format!("title index {} out of range (have {})", title_idx, self.titles.len()),
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(ContentReader {
|
||||
session,
|
||||
aacs: self.aacs.as_ref(),
|
||||
extents: title.extents.clone(),
|
||||
current_extent: 0,
|
||||
current_offset: 0,
|
||||
unit_key_idx: 0,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<'a> ContentReader<'a> {
|
||||
/// Read the next aligned unit (6144 bytes).
|
||||
/// Automatically decrypted if AACS keys are available.
|
||||
/// Returns None when all extents are exhausted.
|
||||
pub fn read_unit(&mut self) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
|
||||
if self.current_extent >= self.extents.len() {
|
||||
return Ok(None);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let extent = &self.extents[self.current_extent];
|
||||
let lba = extent.start_lba + self.current_offset;
|
||||
|
||||
// Read 3 sectors (one aligned unit)
|
||||
let mut unit = vec![0u8; crate::aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN];
|
||||
for i in 0..3u32 {
|
||||
let offset = (i as usize) * 2048;
|
||||
let mut sector = [0u8; 2048];
|
||||
session_read_sector(self.session, lba + i, &mut sector)?;
|
||||
unit[offset..offset + 2048].copy_from_slice(§or);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Decrypt if needed
|
||||
if let Some(aacs) = &self.aacs {
|
||||
if crate::aacs::is_unit_encrypted(&unit) {
|
||||
let uk = aacs.unit_keys.get(self.unit_key_idx)
|
||||
.map(|(_, k)| *k)
|
||||
.unwrap_or([0u8; 16]);
|
||||
|
||||
crate::aacs::decrypt_unit_full(
|
||||
&mut unit,
|
||||
&uk,
|
||||
aacs.read_data_key.as_ref(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Advance position
|
||||
self.current_offset += 3;
|
||||
if self.current_offset >= extent.sector_count {
|
||||
self.current_extent += 1;
|
||||
self.current_offset = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Some(unit))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn session_read_sector(session: &mut DriveSession, lba: u32, buf: &mut [u8; 2048]) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let cdb = [
|
||||
0x28, 0x00,
|
||||
(lba >> 24) as u8, (lba >> 16) as u8, (lba >> 8) as u8, lba as u8,
|
||||
0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00,
|
||||
];
|
||||
session.scsi_execute(&cdb, crate::scsi::DataDirection::FromDevice, buf, 10_000)?;
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Format helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
fn format_resolution(video_format: u8, _video_rate: u8) -> String {
|
||||
match video_format {
|
||||
1 => "480i".into(),
|
||||
2 => "576i".into(),
|
||||
3 => "480p".into(),
|
||||
4 => "1080i".into(),
|
||||
5 => "720p".into(),
|
||||
6 => "1080p".into(),
|
||||
7 => "576p".into(),
|
||||
8 => "2160p".into(),
|
||||
_ => String::new(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn format_framerate(video_rate: u8) -> String {
|
||||
match video_rate {
|
||||
1 => "23.976".into(),
|
||||
2 => "24".into(),
|
||||
3 => "25".into(),
|
||||
4 => "29.97".into(),
|
||||
6 => "50".into(),
|
||||
7 => "59.94".into(),
|
||||
_ => String::new(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn format_channels(audio_format: u8) -> String {
|
||||
match audio_format {
|
||||
1 => "mono".into(),
|
||||
3 => "stereo".into(),
|
||||
6 => "5.1".into(),
|
||||
12 => "7.1".into(),
|
||||
_ if audio_format > 0 => format!("{}ch", audio_format),
|
||||
_ => String::new(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn format_samplerate(audio_rate: u8) -> String {
|
||||
match audio_rate {
|
||||
1 => "48kHz".into(),
|
||||
4 => "96kHz".into(),
|
||||
5 => "192kHz".into(),
|
||||
12 => "48/192kHz".into(),
|
||||
14 => "48/96kHz".into(),
|
||||
_ => String::new(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ pub enum Error {
|
||||
|
||||
// 6xxx — Disc format errors
|
||||
DiscError { detail: String },
|
||||
|
||||
// 7xxx — AACS errors
|
||||
AacsError { detail: String },
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Error {
|
||||
@@ -65,6 +68,7 @@ impl Error {
|
||||
Error::ScsiTimeout { .. } => 4001,
|
||||
Error::IoError { .. } => 5000,
|
||||
Error::DiscError { .. } => 6000,
|
||||
Error::AacsError { .. } => 7000,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -92,6 +96,7 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for Error {
|
||||
Error::ScsiTimeout { opcode } => write!(f, "E4001: SCSI 0x{opcode:02x} timeout"),
|
||||
Error::IoError { source } => write!(f, "E5000: {source}"),
|
||||
Error::DiscError { detail } => write!(f, "E6000: disc: {detail}"),
|
||||
Error::AacsError { detail } => write!(f, "E7000: AACS: {detail}"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-1
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ pub mod clpi;
|
||||
pub mod disc;
|
||||
pub mod jar;
|
||||
pub mod aacs;
|
||||
pub mod aacs_handshake;
|
||||
|
||||
pub use error::{Error, Result};
|
||||
pub use drive::DriveSession;
|
||||
@@ -89,4 +90,4 @@ pub use profile::{DriveProfile, Chipset};
|
||||
pub use platform::{Platform, DriveStatus};
|
||||
pub use scsi::ScsiTransport;
|
||||
pub use speed::DriveSpeed;
|
||||
pub use disc::{Disc, Title, Stream, StreamKind, Codec, HdrFormat, ColorSpace, Extent};
|
||||
pub use disc::{Disc, Title, Stream, StreamKind, Codec, HdrFormat, ColorSpace, Extent, ContentReader, AacsState, ScanOptions};
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user