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Author SHA1 Message Date
MattJackson 7d58ba7b08 v0.30.0: DiscInputs carries the disc's volume label (title)
Add `DiscInputs.volume_label: Option<String>` — the disc's human title (UDF/ISO
volume identifier, else BDMV <di:name>), populated by Disc::inputs() from the
scan. Identity only, no secret, not used in any AACS derivation; lets a key
source forward the title so a key service can catalog disc_hash → title.
2026-06-06 09:05:15 -07:00
MattJackson 4f1dbfd042 v0.29.0: bump version 2026-06-05 20:36:19 -07:00
MattJackson 5b702a76a7 mux: write PTS (presentation), not DTS, as the MKV block timecode
The video codec parsers (HEVC, H.264, VC-1, MPEG-2) used
pes.dts.or(pes.pts) as each frame's timestamp. MKV block timecodes
are presentation timestamps; frames are stored in decode order and
the player reorders for display by timecode. Using DTS makes the
timecode monotonic in storage order, presenting B-frames in decode
order — visible motion judder / wrong frames on playback, and
PTS-based seeking lands on the wrong frame.

The compressed video was always byte-correct (verified by NAL-level
diff against a known-good demux); this was purely a timestamp defect
affecting every B-frame title. Fix: prefer PTS (pes.pts.or(pes.dts)).
Verified on a real UHD iso->mkv: emitted PTS now reorders for
B-frames identically to a reference muxer.

Update the two tests that asserted the old DTS-preferred behavior and
add an HEVC regression test pinning PTS as the block timecode.
2026-06-05 20:01:13 -07:00
MattJackson 6be5198886 libfreemkv: v1.0 hardening — codec/EBML/TS robustness + DTS parser fixes
Audit-driven fixes (rounds 1–3):
- hevc: correct hvcC profile/level SPS offsets (HEVC has a 2-byte NAL header)
- mkv: map all DTS variants to the registered A_DTS codec id; force a new
  cluster before the i16 cluster-relative timestamp can overflow
- ebml/mkvstream: bound untrusted EBML sizes (no multi-GB allocs); reject
  uint>8 (was an OOB panic) and non-{0,4,8} float widths (were a desync)
- ts: skip PES-header bytes that span a TS packet boundary; add the PMT
  section_len/prog_info_len bounds the PAT parser already had
- ac3: preserve a 0x0B77 syncword split across a PES boundary; cap buffer
- dts: validate each next-core boundary by decoded core size (a 0x7FFE8001
  pattern inside XLL payload no longer false-splits/drops the lossless
  extension); reject sub-minimum core frames; fix forced-emit PTS base
- lpcm: DVD program-stream PCM no longer double-strips the BD LPCM header
- vc1/mpeg2: do not emit a parameter-set-only PES as a standalone frame
- pgs/truehd: cap the pending reassembly buffer (parity with ac3/dts)
- aacs: ts_syncs_intact uses the exact packet count
- prefetched: capacity-guard the recycled-buffer set_len
- Cargo.toml: exclude project docs from the published crate

Convergence: a third independent audit pass found no remaining material
(CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM) issues. Full precommit (fmt + clippy -D + tests,
Rust 1.86) green.
2026-06-05 16:23:39 -07:00
MattJackson e2aa9abd6d aacs: validate a resolved key against content before applying it
decrypt_with now takes the disc's encrypted content samples and, after
deriving the candidate unit keys, confirms at least one de-scrambles a real
aligned unit before committing them. A wrong key (a keydb VK that doesn't
match the disc, a stale UK) is rejected with AacsKeyRejected instead of
silently applying garbage unit keys. Conservative by design: with no samples
(resume / mapfile cache) it accepts as before, leaving those paths unchanged.

The KeySource trait becomes a stateful provider — next_key hands one candidate
at a time (the source owns the order) and reports exhaustion, replacing the
all-at-once resolve; errored() distinguishes a failed source from a clean
no-key.
2026-06-05 09:23:08 -07:00
MattJackson 3b7bee9ed4 Fix DTS-HD MA muxing as lossy core only (#10)
DTS-HD MA/HRA access units on Blu-ray are a DTS core frame (sync
0x7FFE8001) followed by one or more DTS extension substreams (sync
0x64582025) carrying the lossless audio. Ground-truthing the Dunkirk
ISO showed the m2ts demuxer hands these out as SEPARATE PES packets on
the same PID: one core PES (exactly core-sized, nothing trailing), then
the extension substreams in following PES packets with their own later
PTS.

The old DtsParser emitted one frame per PES the moment a core frame was
complete, and dropped any PES with no core sync. So every core became a
core-only (lossy) frame and the extension PES packets were discarded as
junk -- silently downgrading the track to lossy DTS core (1557 kb/s CBR,
16-bit) instead of DTS-HD MA (VBR, 24-bit lossless).

Rewrite the parser to assemble across PES boundaries: an access unit
runs from its core sync up to (but not including) the NEXT core sync, so
the core plus every following extension substream stays together. Add a
CodecParser::flush() (default empty) called at end-of-stream by both the
pipelined and inline DiscStream mux paths to drain the final buffered
unit. A 64 KiB cap guarantees forward progress and never stalls if a
boundary can't be found.

Validated on the rip1 testbed: Dunkirk eng+ger and Fight Club eng main
audio now ffprobe as profile=DTS-HD MA (Fight Club eng at 24-bit), with
VBR packet sizes (~2716-2788 B) well above the old fixed 2012 B lossy
core. Genuinely-lossy DTS dub tracks are left untouched.
2026-06-05 06:40:27 -07:00
MattJackson b7405e2d27 mux: fail iso:// with no usable AACS key instead of muxing garbage
When an AACS-encrypted ISO is muxed with decryption requested (not --raw)
but key resolution yielded no usable key, input() proceeded to mux the
still-encrypted stream — emitting ~100 MB of garbage (no TS syncs, demuxer
emits nothing) and sometimes spinning for tens of minutes.

Add a cheap result-check in resolve::input()'s Iso branch via the pure
predicate aacs_key_missing(raw, has_aacs, keys): when decryption is
requested AND the disc carries AACS state AND decrypt_keys() is None,
return new Error::NoDiscKey { disc_hash } (E7022) before muxing. The
40-hex disc hash is sourced from AacsState::disc_hash. --raw and
non-AACS (unencrypted / CSS) discs are unaffected. Unit-tested.
2026-06-05 05:06:15 -07:00
MattJackson e04d79c593 v0.28.1: bump version 2026-06-04 21:46:41 -07:00
MattJackson b34af1fa74 mux: wire TrueHD channel probe into iso:// mux setup
correct_truehd_channels() probes the first DECRYPTED access units of the
chosen title (TrueHD PIDs, bounded 8 MiB read of the first extent) and
sets AudioStream.channels from the MLP major sync — fixing the MPLS
audio_format understatement (5.1 declared on a 7.1/Atmos TrueHD track).
Regenerates the basic codec label for the corrected count; richer
editorial labels are left untouched. Wired in resolve.rs input() for
iso:// after decrypt_with (the m2ts is only decryptable post-key), using
a fresh reader so the mux reader is undisturbed. generate_audio_label
made pub(crate).
2026-06-04 20:28:37 -07:00
MattJackson a7317f8885 mux/truehd: decode true channel count from MLP major-sync format_info
Adds truehd_channels(format_info) + truehd_channels_from_stream(): the
real presentation channel count (8ch/7.1 when present, else 6ch/5.1)
from the TrueHD major sync, which the MPLS audio_format base field
understates (declares 5.1 even on a 7.1/Atmos track — the Dune case).
Per the MLP spec presentation channel-assignment masks. 3 unit tests.

This is the decoder; wiring it to correct AudioStream.channels requires
a mux-time probe of the DECRYPTED audio payload (the channel truth isn't
readable at scan — the m2ts is AACS-encrypted until the key is applied
at mux), to be added + validated on a real rip.
2026-06-04 19:51:46 -07:00
MattJackson 474273afc0 mux/mkv: signal Dolby Vision via dvcC BlockAdditionMapping
With the EL now carried (mpls PID fix), the MKV writer tags the Dolby
Vision layer so players/mediainfo recognise it: a BlockAdditionMapping
(0x41E4) with BlockAddIDType 'dvcC' and a DOVIDecoderConfigurationRecord
(profile 7, bl+el+rpu present) on the DV-layer video track. Disc
Profile 7 dual-layer is preserved losslessly as a second video track
(archival-correct, MakeMKV-equivalent); M2TS carries the EL as a native
second video PID with no extra signaling needed.

Adds dolby_vision_config() + a profile-7 dvcC unit test. End-to-end DV
recognition (mediainfo / playback) to be confirmed on a full rip.
2026-06-04 19:42:14 -07:00
MattJackson 0a2bab5789 mpls: resolve PID for sub-path / DV-EL stream entries (types 2/3/4)
parse_stream_entry only read the PID for stream-entry type 1 (a stream
in the PlayItem's own clip), returning PID 0 for every other type. The
Dolby Vision enhancement layer uses type 4 (verified on Wicked + Dune:
se_len=9 type=0x04 [00 10 15] -> PID 0x1015), so the EL fell through to
PID 0x0000 and was silently dropped by the demux/mux — Dolby Vision lost.

Now the PID offset is keyed off the entry type per the BD stream_entry()
layout: type 1 -> +2, type 2 -> +4, type 3/4 -> +3. The DV EL now
resolves to its real PID (0x1015) so it is demuxed and carried as a
stream through the PES layer to every writer (M2TS carries dual-PID DV
natively; the MKV writer's DV signaling is the format-specific piece).
2026-06-04 19:28:34 -07:00
MattJackson fa4d7ef871 mux/dts: keep DTS-HD extension substream across PES boundaries
The DTS parser emitted a core-only frame and discarded the trailing
DTS-HD extension substream whenever the extension straddled a PES
boundary (it advanced past only the core, then re-synced on the core
syncword, skipping the leftover extension bytes). That silently
downgrades DTS-HD MA / HRA to lossy DTS core.

Now: when an extension sync is visible after the core — full, or a
partial prefix at the buffer edge — wait for the full extension instead
of splitting it off; only 'nothing after the core' (final unit / EOF,
no parser flush) is taken as a genuine lossy core-only unit. Adds a
boundary-split regression test asserting core+extension is preserved.
2026-06-04 19:16:26 -07:00
MattJackson 36d1af1b7f labels+disc: codec from stream, audio-richness title tiebreak
Two validated audio-correctness fixes (proven on real discs Wicked/
Paddington/Dune/Fight Club via head-captures):

labels: apply_labels now derives the codec/channel descriptor from the
stream's OWN codec/channels unless the parser's codec_hint is BOTH
consistent with it AND richer (e.g. "Dolby Atmos" on a TrueHD stream).
A mis-bound hint ("AC-3 2.0" on a TrueHD track) is rejected and the
stream's own codec used — killing the cross-labeled shuffle (Wicked) and
the compat-core mislabel (Paddington), while keeping rich hints and
normalizing plain ones to uniform marketing names. (codec_hint_consistent
+ codec_hint_adds_detail, 5 tests.)

disc: canonical_title_order gains an audio-richness tiebreak
(lossless > channels > track-count) for titles that tie on
duration+clips — so a movie authored as a full-audio playlist plus a
stereo-only twin (Fight Club 00800 vs 00004) picks the full-audio one
instead of falling to array order.
2026-06-04 19:10:11 -07:00
MattJackson b96f6206fe 0.28.0: version bump (keydb decoupling) 2026-06-04 16:41:04 -07:00
MattJackson bb32fb993b 0.28.0 review fixes: propagate mux key-apply error; scrub key-shaped fixtures
- mux input(): propagate a failed decrypt_with rather than muxing an
  undecryptable stream silently (review M6).
- Scrub synthetic but key-SHAPED hex (HOST_PRIV_KEY/DEVICE_KEY/disc-entry) from
  the keydb parser tests to obvious zero/repeated-byte placeholders. No real or
  real-looking key material in code.
2026-06-04 16:38:58 -07:00
MattJackson c1eb74dfa5 AACS: cutover — lookup-free lib; DriveCredentials for the handshake
The library no longer loads a keydb anywhere. The scan path always captures the
disc's AACS inputs (MKB, VID, Unit_Key_RO.inf) and resolves NO key; a caller
resolves a Key from a key source and applies it via Disc::decrypt_with.

- ScanOptions loses keydb_path / unit_key / disable_keydb (and the path search);
  it now carries only optional DriveCredentials (host certs) for the live-drive
  AACS handshake. do_handshake_cert uses those instead of loading the keydb.
  An unlocked / LibreDrive drive takes the OEM Volume-ID path and needs none.
- The mux input() path takes caller-resolved unit_keys instead of a keydb_path,
  and applies them via decrypt_with.
- Deleted the now-dead inline resolve_encryption / resolve_encryption_static.

All 700+ lib tests pass.
2026-06-04 16:04:06 -07:00
MattJackson 46838c63ca AACS: trim the MKB captured at keyless scan to its record length
The VID-only scan path stashed MKB_RO/RW raw — those files are allocated to a
fixed ~128 MiB and zero-padded, so the MKB on AacsState (consumed by
Disc::inputs() and the device/processing-key decrypt_with derivation) was the
full pad, not the ~few-MB record stream. Trim to mkb_content_len, matching
read_aacs_inputs.
2026-06-04 15:32:12 -07:00
MattJackson 1e60220ff6 AACS: KeySource::needs_samples() gates the content-sample read
A source that validates server-side against ciphertext (an online key service)
needs encrypted content samples; one that keys on disc identity (keydb, mapfile)
does not. needs_samples() lets the caller skip the extra disc read unless a
configured source actually needs it. Defaults false.
2026-06-04 14:45:40 -07:00
MattJackson 080f03e8ed AACS: DiscInputs gains app-populated samples for ciphertext-validating sources
An online key service validates a candidate against real ciphertext, so it
needs a few encrypted content sample units. Add a samples field to DiscInputs;
Disc::inputs() leaves it empty (reading content needs the disc reader, which
scan does not retain) for the application to fill.
2026-06-04 14:42:11 -07:00
MattJackson 35de6101d4 AACS: add KeySource trait + DiscInputs; Media key carries a candidate pool
The library now describes the key-source abstraction it consumes, while the
concrete sources live in a companion crate. A KeySource looks a disc up from
its DiscInputs (disc hash, volume id, MKB, Unit_Key_RO.inf) and returns a Key;
the library derives down and decrypts. Sources do no derivation.

Disc::inputs() exposes those inputs from a scanned disc.

Key::Media now carries a Vec of candidate media keys rather than one: a media
key is MKB-scoped, so a source hands its whole pool and the library picks the
one that verifies against the disc's MKB. That mirrors Device/Processing and
keeps key selection (a derivation step) inside the library.
2026-06-04 14:29:32 -07:00
MattJackson 9012101573 AACS: decrypt_with accepts higher-level keys and derives down
Disc::decrypt_with now takes Device / Processing / Media / Volume keys in
addition to Unit. A caller hands in whatever level it resolved and the
library derives down the AACS chain to the per-CPS-unit keys, then
decrypts:

  Device   -> MKB walk         -> media key -> VUK -> per-CPS unit keys
  Processing -> MKB            -> media key -> VUK -> per-CPS unit keys
  Media      -> Volume ID      -> VUK              -> per-CPS unit keys
  Volume     -> Unit_Key_RO.inf, one unit key per CPS unit
  Unit       -> used directly (terminal)

Derivation stays centralized in the version-dispatched resolver
(1.0 / 2.0 / 2.1), fed by a single-key provider built from the supplied
key — no new crypto. Volume notably does NOT stop at the volume key: it
decrypts every CPS unit's key.

Scan stashes the AACS inputs (Unit_Key_RO.inf and MKB) on AacsState so an
out-of-band decrypt_with can derive without re-reading the disc.

Non-breaking: Key is #[non_exhaustive] and the existing Unit path is
unchanged. New tests cover the Volume -> per-CPS derive-down, the
missing-inputs error, and the no-units rejection.
2026-06-04 14:20:16 -07:00
MattJackson 8bc1de6c9b 0.27.5 (step 2, Phase 1): expose AACS inputs (uk_ro, mkb) on AacsState
scan now stashes the raw Unit_Key_RO.inf + MKB bytes on AacsState (via
resolve_vid_only, the disable_keydb path), so an external key-resolver can
derive unit keys from a resolved VUK without re-reading the disc — the
foundation for moving lookup/derivation out of libfreemkv. Additive: the keydb
path is untouched, all existing constructors default the new fields empty.
584 lib tests green. Builds on the KeyOrigin rename + the Key/decrypt_with API.
2026-06-04 13:20:27 -07:00
MattJackson d94a4d3444 0.27.5 (step 2, item 2): rename provenance enum KeySource -> KeyOrigin
Disambiguates the key vocabulary: Key (the input handed to decrypt_with),
key sources (the resolver's lookup list), and KeyOrigin (how a key was
resolved). Internal-only rename — no dependents import it.
2026-06-04 11:42:21 -07:00
MattJackson 1bd7e1de2a 0.27.4: lookup-free Key API (Disc::decrypt_with) + E8005 deferred-mux fix
Add libfreemkv::Key (non_exhaustive; Unit wired) + Disc::decrypt_with(Key) — the
caller resolves a key from any source and hands it in; the library decrypts with
no keydb/network of its own. inject_unit_keys now synthesizes a minimal
ExternalUk AACS state when a scan built none (no keydb at scan time), so a disc
keyed at sweep but scanned without a keydb still decrypts from its mapfile UK
instead of reporting E8005 and deferring the mux forever. Tests cover the
synthesize, replace, empty->None, and decrypt_with paths.
2026-06-04 11:08:33 -07:00
MattJackson da62ee7cf2 v0.27.3: bump version 2026-06-03 21:47:43 -07:00
MattJackson 575c76156f mapfile: persist resolved unit keys (keys XOR VID)
A keyed disc now writes its decrypted AACS unit keys to the mapfile header
(# freemkv-uk: <cps>:<hex>); an unresolved disc writes only the VID. The two are
mutually exclusive (set_unit_keys clears the VID) — unit keys are the final
answer, so deferred-mux / resume decrypts directly with no key lookup, while the
VID alone is the 'still unresolved, retry' marker. CopyOptions/SweepOptions carry
the keys (written when present, else the VID); Disc::inject_unit_keys applies
mapfile-recovered keys to a scanned disc. Round-trip test added.
2026-06-03 21:45:37 -07:00
MattJackson b518860d9c v0.27.0: detect AACS-scrambled units by raw TS sync, not flag bits
Rename is_unit_encrypted -> is_aacs_scrambled and decide encryption from the unit's MPEG-TS sync bytes (destroyed by the encrypted body) instead of the TP_extra copy-control (byte 0) or TS scrambling-control (byte 7) flags, which discs do not set reliably. One shared predicate now backs the decrypt gate and out-of-band key validation, so callers agree on what 'encrypted' means. Decryption restores the syncs, so a decrypted unit reads as clear and there is no flag to clear.
2026-06-03 07:35:50 -07:00
MattJackson c8eb42b490 v0.26.11: detect AACS unit encryption via TS scrambling-control bits
is_unit_encrypted read the TP_extra copy-control bits (byte 0), which are a
copy-permission flag, not an encryption flag. On discs whose sampled units are
clear navigation packets (PAT/PMT) those bits can be set while the unit is not
scrambled, so a correct Unit Key was used to 'decrypt' already-plaintext data,
produced garbage, and the key was wrongly treated as failing.

Read the actual flag instead: the TS transport_scrambling_control bits (top two
of TS-header byte 3 = byte 7 of the aligned unit, inside the clear seed). AACS
encrypts whole aligned units, so this one packet's TSC reflects the unit.
decrypt_unit now clears the TSC bits of every packet on the way out so the
result is valid unscrambled TS. Tests updated to the TSC flag.
2026-06-02 20:37:56 -07:00
MattJackson 48570ac065 Local resolve: MK-pool brute via km_verifies (path 2.5)
keydb stores Media Keys per-disc, but an MK is MKB-scoped (shared across a
pressing/MKB-family). A disc whose own hash/VID isn't keyed can still resolve
if any stored MK verifies against its MKB. New path 2.5 (between PK and the
VID lookup) collects the distinct MK pool from the providers, km_verifies each
against the disc MKB, and on a UNIQUE pass derives VUK (with the disc VID) then
the UK — matching the online resolver's behavior so local keydb mode resolves
the same discs (e.g. an MK present in keydb under a sibling pressing).
km_verifies is one AES-D + magic check per candidate (cheap). Adds
KeyProvider::media_keys() + a path-2.5 unit test.
2026-06-02 16:14:09 -07:00
MattJackson 08e46640fd v0.26.8: bump version 2026-06-02 15:41:38 -07:00
MattJackson a9195824ff Trim MKB to real record length; empty unit-keys means no keys
- mkb_content_len walks the MKB record stream and returns where it ends,
  so callers can drop the trailing zero padding. MKB files are allocated
  to a fixed size (~128 MiB) with records at the front; both MKB_RO and
  MKB_RW can be padded. read_aacs_inputs* now trim to the real records
  (~few MB) instead of shipping ~128 MiB of zeros.
- decrypt_keys() returns None when unit_keys is empty: an AACS state that
  carries only a VID (out-of-band resolution, pre-key) is 'encrypted, no
  keys', not a usable empty key set.
2026-06-02 15:41:27 -07:00
MattJackson 401fe23988 v0.26.7: bump version 2026-06-02 15:15:58 -07:00
MattJackson f89bce5851 Read MKB_RO not the padded MKB_RW; keep VID when keydb is disabled
- read_aacs_inputs / read_aacs_inputs_from_drive now read MKB_RO.inf first.
  MKB_RW.inf is a fixed ~128 MiB rewritable region that is mostly zero
  padding; reading it shipped 124 MiB of nothing. MKB_RO is the real,
  correctly-sized MKB (a few MB). Fall back to RW only if RO is absent.
- disable_keydb no longer drops the Volume ID. A caller resolving Unit Keys
  out-of-band needs the VID (on-disc content read during the handshake).
  New resolve_vid_only builds a keys-free AacsState carrying just the VID +
  version metadata, so the disc reports 'encrypted, no keys' (resolved
  out-of-band) instead of discarding the VID.
2026-06-02 15:15:45 -07:00
37 changed files with 3432 additions and 704 deletions
+55
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@@ -1,5 +1,60 @@
# Changelog
## 0.29.0 (2026-06-06)
### Fixed
- **Video frames now carry their presentation timestamp (PTS), not the decode
timestamp (DTS), as the MKV block timecode.** The HEVC, H.264, VC-1 and
MPEG-2 parsers stamped each frame with `dts.or(pts)`, so B-frame titles were
muxed with monotonic decode-order timecodes: players presented frames in
decode order (visible judder / apparent "corruption") and PTS-based seeking
landed on the wrong frame. The compressed video was always byte-correct —
this was purely a timestamp defect, and it affected every B-frame title. The
parsers now use `pts.or(dts)`. Verified against a reference muxer on a real
UHD title: the emitted frame sequence is now identical.
- **DTS-HD MA tracks no longer downgrade to the lossy DTS core** — the access
unit is delimited by the next *validated* core sync, so a `0x7FFE8001` byte
pattern inside the XLL extension can no longer truncate the unit. (#10)
- **A resolved AACS key is verified against the content before it is applied**,
so a stale or wrong VUK can no longer silently produce garbage output.
- **`iso://` mux fails fast when no usable AACS key is available** instead of
writing a garbage MKV.
### Changed
- Codec / EBML / TS hardening: bounds-checked PMT and PES-header parsing, EBML
length validation, and bounded codec buffers (DTS, TrueHD, PGS).
## 0.27.3 (2026-06-04)
### Added
- **The mapfile now persists resolved AACS unit keys, not just the Volume ID.**
A keyed disc writes its decrypted unit keys as `# freemkv-uk: <cps>:<hex>`
comment headers; an unresolved disc writes only the `# freemkv-vid:` marker.
The two are **mutually exclusive** (`Mapfile::set_unit_keys` clears the VID):
unit keys are the final answer, so a deferred-mux / resume decrypts directly
with no key-service round-trip, while the VID alone means "still unresolved —
retry the key service." `CopyOptions`/`SweepOptions` gain a `unit_keys` field
(written when non-empty, else the VID), and `Disc::inject_unit_keys` applies
mapfile-recovered keys to a scanned disc (marking the source `ExternalUk`).
## 0.27.0 (2026-06-03)
### Changed
- **AACS unit-encryption detection now reads the raw MPEG-TS sync bytes
instead of header flag bits.** `is_unit_encrypted` is renamed
`is_aacs_scrambled`: a unit is encrypted iff its body TS packet sync bytes
(`0x47` at offset 4 and every 192 bytes) are not intact — the encrypted
body destroys them. The previous check read the TP_extra copy-control bits
(byte 0) or TS transport_scrambling_control bits (byte 7), which discs and
players do not set reliably. A single predicate now backs both the decrypt
gate and out-of-band key validation, so all callers agree on what
"encrypted" means. Decryption restores the syncs, so a decrypted unit reads
as clear and there is no encryption flag to clear.
## 0.26.1 (2026-05-22)
### Added
+3 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "libfreemkv"
version = "0.26.6"
version = "0.30.0"
edition = "2024"
rust-version = "1.86"
license = "AGPL-3.0-only"
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ description = "Open source raw disc access library for optical drives"
repository = "https://github.com/freemkv/libfreemkv"
keywords = ["bluray", "uhd", "optical", "scsi", "disc"]
categories = ["hardware-support", "multimedia"]
# Keep internal AI-instruction / private notes out of the published crate.
exclude = []
[dependencies]
serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
+50 -24
View File
@@ -69,16 +69,29 @@ pub(crate) fn aes_cbc_decrypt(key: &[u8; 16], data: &mut [u8]) {
// ── Content decryption ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Check if a 6144-byte aligned unit is encrypted (copy_permission_indicator bits).
pub fn is_unit_encrypted(unit: &[u8]) -> bool {
unit.len() >= ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN && (unit[0] & 0xC0) != 0
/// True if a 6144-byte aligned unit is AACS-scrambled on disc.
///
/// AACS encrypts the unit body, which destroys the MPEG-TS sync bytes (`0x47`)
/// a clear unit carries at offsets 4, 196, 388, … (one per 192-byte source
/// packet). So "scrambled" = "the TS syncs are NOT intact". This is
/// flag-independent: it does NOT read the TP_extra copy-control bits (byte 0)
/// or the TS scrambling-control bits (byte 7) — AACS sets neither reliably
/// across discs/players.
///
/// This is the single shared definition of "encrypted" for the whole ecosystem
/// — libfreemkv's decrypt gate, autorip's sample selection, and the online key
/// service's validation gate all call THIS, so they always agree on what is
/// encrypted. A correctly-decrypted (or natively-clear) unit reports `false`,
/// so the decrypt path never double-decrypts and there is no flag to clear.
pub fn is_aacs_scrambled(unit: &[u8]) -> bool {
unit.len() >= ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN && !ts_syncs_intact(unit)
}
/// Verify decrypted unit by checking TS sync bytes at expected offsets.
fn verify_ts(unit: &[u8]) -> bool {
// In a 6144-byte unit, TS packets start at byte 0 with 4-byte TP_extra_header
// then 188-byte TS packet, repeating every 192 bytes.
// Sync byte 0x47 should appear at offset 4, 196, 388, ...
/// Most TS packet positions in `unit` carry the `0x47` sync byte — i.e. the
/// unit looks like clear MPEG-TS. Syncs sit at offset 4 and every 192 bytes
/// after (4-byte TP_extra_header + 188-byte TS packet). An encrypted body
/// scrambles all but the first (which lives in the clear 16-byte seed).
fn ts_syncs_intact(unit: &[u8]) -> bool {
let mut count = 0;
let mut offset = 4;
while offset < unit.len() {
@@ -87,11 +100,20 @@ fn verify_ts(unit: &[u8]) -> bool {
}
offset += TS_PACKET_LEN;
}
// Expect at least most packets to have sync bytes
let total = (unit.len() - 4) / TS_PACKET_LEN + 1;
// One sync byte is checked per 192-byte BD-TS packet (at offset 4 of
// each). `total` is exactly that packet count; the old
// `(len - 4) / TS_PACKET_LEN + 1` over-counted by one for lengths of
// the form `4 + k·192` (harmless for the always-6144 aligned unit, but
// wrong in general and it biased the majority threshold).
let total = unit.len() / TS_PACKET_LEN;
count > total / 2
}
/// Verify a decrypted unit looks like clear MPEG-TS (sync bytes intact).
fn verify_ts(unit: &[u8]) -> bool {
ts_syncs_intact(unit)
}
/// Decrypt one AACS aligned unit (6144 bytes) in-place.
/// Returns true if decryption succeeded (verified by TS sync bytes).
///
@@ -99,12 +121,14 @@ fn verify_ts(unit: &[u8]) -> bool {
/// 1. AES-128-ECB encrypt first 16 bytes with unit_key → derived
/// 2. XOR derived with original 16 bytes → unit_decrypt_key
/// 3. AES-128-CBC decrypt bytes 16..6143 with unit_decrypt_key and AACS IV
/// 4. Clear encryption flag bits
///
/// Decryption restores the TS sync bytes, so the unit reads as clear afterward;
/// there is no flag to clear.
pub fn decrypt_unit(unit: &mut [u8], unit_key: &[u8; 16]) -> bool {
if unit.len() < ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN {
return false;
}
if !is_unit_encrypted(unit) {
if !is_aacs_scrambled(unit) {
return true; // not encrypted
}
@@ -124,16 +148,13 @@ pub fn decrypt_unit(unit: &mut [u8], unit_key: &[u8; 16]) -> bool {
// Step 3: Decrypt bytes 16..6143 with AES-CBC
aes_cbc_decrypt(&decrypt_key, &mut unit[16..ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN]);
// Step 4: Clear encryption flag
unit[0] &= !0xC0;
// Verify
// Decryption restored the TS syncs; verify the unit now looks like clear TS.
verify_ts(unit)
}
/// Decrypt one aligned unit trying multiple unit keys. Returns the key index that worked.
pub fn decrypt_unit_try_keys(unit: &mut [u8], unit_keys: &[[u8; 16]]) -> Option<usize> {
if !is_unit_encrypted(unit) {
if !is_aacs_scrambled(unit) {
return Some(0);
}
@@ -173,7 +194,7 @@ pub fn decrypt_unit_full(
unit_key: &[u8; 16],
read_data_key: Option<&[u8; 16]>,
) -> bool {
if !is_unit_encrypted(unit) {
if !is_aacs_scrambled(unit) {
return true;
}
if let Some(rdk) = read_data_key {
@@ -200,10 +221,15 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_decrypt_unit_unencrypted() {
// Unit with 0xC0 bits clear should pass through unchanged
// A clear unit (TS syncs intact) is not scrambled → passes through.
let mut unit = vec![0u8; ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN];
unit[0] = 0x00; // not encrypted
let mut off = 4;
while off < ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN {
unit[off] = TS_SYNC;
off += TS_PACKET_LEN;
}
let key = [0u8; 16];
assert!(!is_aacs_scrambled(&unit));
assert!(decrypt_unit(&mut unit, &key));
}
@@ -253,8 +279,8 @@ mod tests {
plain[offset] = TS_SYNC;
offset += TS_PACKET_LEN;
}
// Set encryption flag
plain[0] |= 0xC0;
// No flag set: CBC-encrypting the body below scrambles packets 1..31's
// TS syncs, which is exactly what `is_aacs_scrambled` (raw-sync) detects.
// Now encrypt bytes 16..6143 using the AACS algorithm (reverse of decrypt)
let header: [u8; 16] = plain[..16].try_into().unwrap();
@@ -281,9 +307,9 @@ mod tests {
// Now plain contains encrypted data. Decrypt it.
let mut unit = plain;
assert!(is_unit_encrypted(&unit));
assert!(is_aacs_scrambled(&unit));
assert!(decrypt_unit(&mut unit, &unit_key));
assert!(!is_unit_encrypted(&unit)); // flag should be cleared
assert!(!is_aacs_scrambled(&unit)); // decrypted: TS syncs restored
// Verify TS sync bytes
let mut count = 0;
+36 -14
View File
@@ -223,6 +223,13 @@ impl super::provider::KeyProvider for KeyDb {
fn processing_keys(&self) -> Vec<[u8; 16]> {
self.processing_keys.clone()
}
fn media_keys(&self) -> Vec<[u8; 16]> {
// Every per-disc Media Key in the db. The resolver dedups; MKs are
// MKB-scoped so the same value recurs across a pressing's discs.
self.iter_disc_entries()
.filter_map(|e| e.media_key)
.collect()
}
fn host_certs(&self) -> Vec<HostCert> {
self.host_certs.clone()
}
@@ -448,8 +455,13 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_parse_disc_entry() {
let line = r#"0x000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F10111213 = SAMPLE_FILM (Sample Film) | D | 2024-01-01 | M | 0x000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F | I | 0x101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F | V | 0x202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F | U | 1-0x303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F ; MKBv77"#;
let entry = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(line).unwrap();
// All-zero placeholders — synthetic; no real key material in code.
let z40 = "00".repeat(20);
let z32 = "00".repeat(16);
let line = format!(
"0x{z40} = SAMPLE_FILM (Sample Film) | D | 2024-01-01 | M | 0x{z32} | I | 0x{z32} | V | 0x{z32} | U | 1-0x{z32} ; MKBv77"
);
let entry = KeyDb::parse_disc_entry(&line).unwrap();
assert_eq!(entry.title, "Sample Film");
assert!(entry.media_key.is_some());
assert!(entry.vuk.is_some());
@@ -457,9 +469,14 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(entry.unit_keys[0].0, 1);
}
// NOTE: key fields below use obvious repeated-byte / zero placeholders
// (0x01.., 0x02.., 0x03.., 0x00..). NEVER put real — or real-looking — host,
// device, or processing key material in code; these tests exercise the
// parser's field-splitting only, not any genuine key.
#[test]
fn test_parse_device_key() {
let line = "| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F | DEVICE_NODE 0x0800 | KEY_UV 0x00000400 | KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT 0x17 ; MKBv01-MKBv48";
let line = "| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x00000000000000000000000000000000 | DEVICE_NODE 0x0800 | KEY_UV 0x00000400 | KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT 0x17 ; MKBv01-MKBv48";
let dk = KeyDb::parse_device_key(line).unwrap();
assert_eq!(dk.node, 0x0800);
assert_eq!(dk.u_mask_shift, 0x17);
@@ -472,9 +489,9 @@ mod tests {
// candidate: it lands in `processing_keys` and the brute walker
// handles it.
let cfg = r#"
| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0xDEADBEEF0001020304050607080900AA ; orphan, no position fields
| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F | DEVICE_NODE 0x0800 | KEY_UV 0x00000400 | KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT 0x17 ; positioned MKBv01-MKBv48
| PK | 0xCAFEBABE0001020304050607080900BB ; legacy PK row still works
| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x01010101010101010101010101010101 ; orphan, no position fields
| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x02020202020202020202020202020202 | DEVICE_NODE 0x0800 | KEY_UV 0x00000400 | KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT 0x17 ; positioned MKBv01-MKBv48
| PK | 0x03030303030303030303030303030303 ; legacy PK row still works
"#;
let db = KeyDb::parse(cfg);
assert_eq!(
@@ -488,29 +505,34 @@ mod tests {
2,
"orphan DK row + legacy PK row both belong in processing_keys"
);
assert_eq!(db.processing_keys[0][..4], [0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF]);
assert_eq!(db.processing_keys[1][..4], [0xCA, 0xFE, 0xBA, 0xBE]);
assert_eq!(db.processing_keys[0][..4], [0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01]);
assert_eq!(db.processing_keys[1][..4], [0x03, 0x03, 0x03, 0x03]);
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_orphan_dk_rejects_lines_with_position_fields() {
// The parser must NOT pick up a positioned DK row as an orphan
// (that would double-count). parse_orphan_dk explicitly checks.
let positioned = "| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F | DEVICE_NODE 0x0800 | KEY_UV 0x00000400 | KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT 0x17";
let positioned = "| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x02020202020202020202020202020202 | DEVICE_NODE 0x0800 | KEY_UV 0x00000400 | KEY_U_MASK_SHIFT 0x17";
assert!(
KeyDb::parse_orphan_dk(positioned).is_none(),
"positioned DK must not match orphan parser"
);
let orphan = "| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0xDEADBEEF0001020304050607080900AA";
let orphan = "| DK | DEVICE_KEY 0x01010101010101010101010101010101";
let key = KeyDb::parse_orphan_dk(orphan).expect("orphan should parse");
assert_eq!(key[..4], [0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF]);
assert_eq!(key[..4], [0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01]);
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_host_cert() {
let line = "| HC | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0xDEADBEEF000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F | HOST_CERT 0x000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B ; Revoked";
let hc = KeyDb::parse_host_cert(line).unwrap();
assert_eq!(hc.private_key[0], 0xDE);
// 20-byte priv + 92-byte cert, all zeros — placeholders, not a key.
let line = format!(
"| HC | HOST_PRIV_KEY 0x{} | HOST_CERT 0x{} ; Revoked",
"00".repeat(20),
"00".repeat(92)
);
let hc = KeyDb::parse_host_cert(&line).unwrap();
assert_eq!(hc.private_key, [0u8; 20]);
assert_eq!(hc.certificate.len(), 92);
}
+128 -1
View File
@@ -532,6 +532,27 @@ fn find_record_body(mkb: &[u8], rec_type_wanted: u8) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
None
}
/// Real content length of an MKB: the byte offset where the record stream
/// ends. MKB files (especially `MKB_RW.inf`, but `MKB_RO.inf` too on some
/// discs) are allocated to a fixed size — often ~128 MiB — with the records at
/// the front and the rest zero padding. Walking records (type+len) and stopping
/// at the first padding byte (`type == 0` / zero-length / overrun) gives the
/// actual size so callers can trim off megabytes of zeros before sending or
/// archiving. Returns `mkb.len()` only if the whole buffer parsed as records.
pub fn mkb_content_len(mkb: &[u8]) -> usize {
let mut pos = 0;
while pos + 4 <= mkb.len() {
let rec_type = mkb[pos];
let rec_len = u32::from_be_bytes([0, mkb[pos + 1], mkb[pos + 2], mkb[pos + 3]]) as usize;
// A zero type, a zero/short length, or an overrun = records done, padding begun.
if rec_type == 0x00 || rec_len < 4 || pos + rec_len > mkb.len() {
break;
}
pos += rec_len;
}
pos
}
/// Get MKB version from Type and Version Record (type 0x10).
/// Version is a BE u32 at offset 8 of the record body (offset 12 from `pos`).
pub fn mkb_version(mkb: &[u8]) -> Option<u32> {
@@ -1082,6 +1103,30 @@ fn resolve_keys_classical(ctx: &ResolveContext<'_>, version: AacsVersion) -> Opt
return Some(build(Some(vuk), derive_uks(&vuk), 2));
}
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path2_miss", pk_count = all_pks.len(), "PK derivation failed");
// Path 2.5: MK-pool brute. keydb stores Media Keys per-disc, but an
// MK is MKB-scoped (shared across a pressing/MKB-family). A disc
// whose own hash/VID isn't keyed can still resolve if ANY stored MK
// verifies against its MKB. Try every distinct MK via km_verifies;
// a UNIQUE pass is this disc's Km → derive VUK (needs VID) → UK.
// km_verifies is one AES-D + magic check per candidate (cheap).
let mks = providers.media_keys();
let mut mk_hits: Vec<[u8; 16]> = Vec::new();
for mk in &mks {
if probe::km_verifies(mkb, mk) && !mk_hits.contains(mk) {
mk_hits.push(*mk);
if mk_hits.len() > 1 {
break; // ambiguous — bail to avoid a wrong key
}
}
}
if mk_hits.len() == 1 {
let vuk = derive_vuk(&mk_hits[0], ctx.volume_id);
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path2_5_hit", mk_pool = mks.len(), "media key from keydb MK-pool brute (km_verifies)");
// Same class as path 3 (KEYDB MK → derived VUK).
return Some(build(Some(vuk), derive_uks(&vuk), 3));
}
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_path2_5_miss", mk_pool = mks.len(), mk_hits = mk_hits.len(), "MK-pool brute: no unique verifying MK");
} else {
tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::disc", phase = "resolve_keys_no_mkb", "no MKB; paths 1/2 skipped");
}
@@ -1247,7 +1292,7 @@ mod tests {
let original = std::fs::read(unit_path).unwrap();
assert_eq!(original.len(), ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN);
assert!(
super::super::decrypt::is_unit_encrypted(&original),
super::super::decrypt::is_aacs_scrambled(&original),
"Unit should be encrypted"
);
@@ -1374,6 +1419,26 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(mkb_version(&mkb), Some(77));
}
#[test]
fn mkb_content_len_trims_trailing_padding() {
// Two real records (0x10 type/version + 0x86 verify), then 128 KiB of
// zero padding (the fixed-region tail). Content length must stop at the
// end of the records, not include the padding.
let mut mkb = vec![
0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4D,
];
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x86, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18]);
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0xAB; 16]);
mkb.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]);
let records_len = mkb.len();
mkb.extend(std::iter::repeat(0u8).take(128 * 1024)); // padding
assert_eq!(mkb_content_len(&mkb), records_len);
// No padding → returns the full length.
assert_eq!(mkb_content_len(&mkb[..records_len]), records_len);
// Empty → 0.
assert_eq!(mkb_content_len(&[]), 0);
}
#[test]
fn mkb_version_returns_none_on_empty() {
assert_eq!(mkb_version(&[]), None);
@@ -1913,6 +1978,68 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[test]
fn resolve_keys_path2_5_mk_pool_brute_resolves_unkeyed_disc() {
// The Dunkirk case: this disc's own hash/VID are NOT in keydb, but its
// Media Key IS — filed under a sibling disc that shares its MKB. Path
// 2.5 must km_verifies that MK against the MKB and resolve.
use super::super::decrypt::aes_ecb_encrypt as enc;
let km = [0x11u8; 16];
let vid = [0x22u8; 16];
// MKB: 0x10 type/version + 0x86 verify record whose mk_dv decrypts under
// km to the AACS verify magic, so km_verifies(mkb, km) == true.
let mut vd = [0u8; 16];
vd[..8].copy_from_slice(&[0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF]);
let mk_dv = enc(&km, &vd);
let mut mkb = mkb_record(0x10, &[0, 0, 0, 0x20, 0, 0, 0, 0x4D]);
mkb.extend_from_slice(&mkb_record(0x86, &mk_dv));
assert!(
probe::km_verifies(&mkb, &km),
"fixture: km must verify the MKB"
);
// This disc's inf (its hash will NOT be in keydb).
let uk_ro = minimal_unit_key_ro();
// keydb: a SIBLING disc carries our km, keyed by the sibling's own
// hash + VID (neither matches THIS disc) — so only the MK-pool brute
// (km_verifies) can find it.
let mut keydb = KeyDb::empty();
keydb.disc_entries.insert(
"0xsibling".to_string(),
DiscEntry {
disc_hash: "0xsibling".to_string(),
title: "sibling".to_string(),
media_key: Some(km),
disc_id: Some([0x99u8; 16]),
vuk: None,
unit_keys: Vec::new(),
},
);
let providers: &[&dyn super::super::KeyProvider] = &[&keydb];
let ctx = ResolveContext {
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro,
content_cert: None,
volume_id: &vid,
providers,
mkb: Some(&mkb),
};
let resolved = resolve_keys_v1(&ctx)
.expect("MK-pool brute (path 2.5) must resolve a disc whose MK is in keydb");
assert_eq!(
resolved.key_source, 3,
"MK-pool brute is the KEYDB-derived class"
);
assert_eq!(
resolved.vuk,
Some(derive_vuk(&km, &vid)),
"VUK must derive from the verified Km + this disc's VID"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_content_cert_parse() {
// AACS 1.0 cert
+3 -3
View File
@@ -24,15 +24,15 @@ pub mod variants;
// AES primitives (aes_ecb_encrypt, aes_ecb_decrypt, aes_cbc_decrypt) are pub(crate) in decrypt.rs.
pub use decrypt::{
ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN, decrypt_bus, decrypt_unit, decrypt_unit_full, decrypt_unit_try_keys,
is_unit_encrypted,
is_aacs_scrambled,
};
pub use keydb::{DeviceKey, DiscEntry, HostCert, KeyDb};
pub use keys::probe;
pub use keys::{
AacsVersion, ContentCert, ResolveContext, ResolvedKeys, UnitKeyFile, decrypt_unit_key,
derive_media_key_from_dk, derive_media_key_from_pk, derive_vuk, disc_hash, disc_hash_hex,
mkb_version, parse_content_cert, parse_unit_key_ro, read_mkb_from_drive, resolve_keys_v1,
resolve_keys_v2, resolve_keys_v21,
mkb_content_len, mkb_version, parse_content_cert, parse_unit_key_ro, read_mkb_from_drive,
resolve_keys_v1, resolve_keys_v2, resolve_keys_v21,
};
pub use provider::KeyProvider;
pub use variants::{
+56
View File
@@ -48,6 +48,14 @@ pub trait KeyProvider: Send + Sync {
Vec::new()
}
/// Every Media Key this provider holds, regardless of which disc it was
/// filed under. An MK is MKB-scoped (shared across a pressing/MKB-family),
/// so the resolver can verify each against the disc's MKB (`km_verifies`)
/// and resolve a disc whose own hash/VID isn't directly keyed.
fn media_keys(&self) -> Vec<[u8; 16]> {
Vec::new()
}
/// AACS host certificates (with their private keys) for drive
/// authentication. Multiple in case some are revoked.
fn host_certs(&self) -> Vec<HostCert> {
@@ -85,6 +93,15 @@ impl Providers<'_> {
self.0.iter().flat_map(|p| p.processing_keys()).collect()
}
/// Union of distinct Media Keys across every provider, for the MK-pool
/// brute (`km_verifies` against the disc's MKB).
pub fn media_keys(&self) -> Vec<[u8; 16]> {
let mut v: Vec<[u8; 16]> = self.0.iter().flat_map(|p| p.media_keys()).collect();
v.sort_unstable();
v.dedup();
v
}
/// Union — gather host certs from every provider. Not yet wired into
/// the SCSI handshake (which still reads `KeyDb.host_certs` directly);
/// kept here so a provider-aware handshake refactor is a drop-in.
@@ -103,3 +120,42 @@ impl Providers<'_> {
self.0.iter().find_map(|p| p.lookup_disc_by_vid(volume_id))
}
}
/// A [`KeyProvider`] backed by a single caller-supplied key's raw material —
/// the bridge for [`crate::disc::Disc::decrypt_with`].
///
/// The application's key source did the lookup and handed in material at one
/// level (DK / PK / MK / VUK). This exposes exactly that material to the
/// version-dispatched resolver, which owns ALL derivation — so a source never
/// derives, and the lib remains the single home for the AACS chain across
/// 1.0 / 2.0 / 2.1 / 2.x.
///
/// Each level fills only its own field; the rest stay empty, so the resolver
/// naturally runs the matching path (DK→…, PK→…, MK-pool brute, or a
/// disc-keyed VUK hit). `decrypt_with` already knows the disc, so the
/// `lookup_disc_by_*` hash/VID arguments are irrelevant — a present
/// `disc_entry` is returned for any query.
pub(crate) struct SuppliedKey {
pub device_keys: Vec<DeviceKey>,
pub processing_keys: Vec<[u8; 16]>,
pub media_keys: Vec<[u8; 16]>,
pub disc_entry: Option<DiscEntry>,
}
impl KeyProvider for SuppliedKey {
fn device_keys(&self) -> Vec<DeviceKey> {
self.device_keys.clone()
}
fn processing_keys(&self) -> Vec<[u8; 16]> {
self.processing_keys.clone()
}
fn media_keys(&self) -> Vec<[u8; 16]> {
self.media_keys.clone()
}
fn lookup_disc_by_hash(&self, _disc_hash: &[u8; 20]) -> Option<DiscEntry> {
self.disc_entry.clone()
}
fn lookup_disc_by_vid(&self, _volume_id: &[u8; 16]) -> Option<DiscEntry> {
self.disc_entry.clone()
}
}
+11 -10
View File
@@ -185,12 +185,13 @@ pub fn decrypt_sectors(
let chunks: Vec<&mut [u8]> = buf.chunks_mut(unit_len).collect();
let nunits = chunks.len();
// Per-unit decrypt closure. The is_unit_encrypted check is
// a byte-0 heuristic; on a misfire we snapshot+restore via
// the original bytes so non-m2ts (e.g. MPLS/CLPI nav files)
// survive. See test `nav_file_unit_survives_decrypt_attempt`.
// Per-unit decrypt closure. The is_aacs_scrambled check reads the
// raw TS syncs; a non-m2ts unit (e.g. MPLS/CLPI nav file) can look
// scrambled and trigger a decrypt attempt, so on a verify miss we
// snapshot+restore the original bytes so it survives. See test
// `nav_file_unit_survives_decrypt_attempt`.
let decrypt_one = |chunk: &mut [u8]| {
if chunk.len() == unit_len && aacs::is_unit_encrypted(chunk) {
if chunk.len() == unit_len && aacs::is_aacs_scrambled(chunk) {
let original: Vec<u8> = chunk.to_vec();
if !aacs::decrypt_unit_full(chunk, &uk, rdk.as_ref()) {
chunk.copy_from_slice(&original);
@@ -232,11 +233,11 @@ pub fn decrypt_sectors(
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// Regression for the 0.18.1 nav-file scramble bug. A non-m2ts unit whose
/// first byte has the top 2 bits set (here: the ASCII letter 'M' that
/// MPLS files start with, 0x4D = 0b01001101) trips `is_unit_encrypted`,
/// gets AES-decrypted with the unit key, fails the TS-sync verification,
/// and must be restored to its original bytes — not left scrambled.
/// Regression for the 0.18.1 nav-file scramble bug. A non-m2ts unit (here
/// an MPLS file: starts "MPLS", carries no TS syncs) reads as scrambled
/// under `is_aacs_scrambled`, gets AES-decrypted with the unit key, fails
/// the TS-sync verification, and must be restored to its original bytes —
/// not left scrambled.
#[test]
fn nav_file_unit_survives_decrypt_attempt() {
let mut unit = vec![0u8; aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN];
+42 -202
View File
@@ -179,54 +179,33 @@ impl Disc {
session: &mut crate::drive::Drive,
opts: &ScanOptions,
) -> (Option<HandshakeResult>, Option<Error>) {
use crate::aacs::{self, KeyDb};
use crate::aacs;
let keydb_path = match opts.resolve_keydb() {
Some(p) => p,
None => {
// Host certs come from the caller's DriveCredentials (e.g. the keydb's
// host_certs(), sourced app-side) — the library does not load a keydb.
// Absent ⇒ no cert auth: an unlocked / LibreDrive drive already returned
// a Volume ID via the OEM path before reaching here, so this is the
// locked-drive-without-credentials case.
let host_certs: &[aacs::HostCert] = match &opts.credentials {
Some(c) if !c.host_certs.is_empty() => &c.host_certs,
_ => {
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_no_keydb",
"no KEYDB found in search paths; handshake skipped"
phase = "handshake_no_credentials",
"no drive credentials supplied; cert handshake skipped"
);
return (None, None);
}
};
let keydb = match KeyDb::load(&keydb_path) {
Ok(db) => db,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_keydb_load_failed",
io_error_kind = ?e.kind(),
keydb = %keydb_path.display(),
"KEYDB load failed; handshake skipped"
);
return (
None,
Some(Error::KeydbLoad {
path: keydb_path.display().to_string(),
}),
);
}
};
let host_cert_count = keydb.host_certs.len();
let host_cert_count = host_certs.len();
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_start",
host_cert_count,
keydb = %keydb_path.display(),
"handshake starting"
);
if host_cert_count == 0 {
// No host certs in keydb -> cert auth cannot proceed.
// Surface as RawReadUnsupported so the caller knows
// neither path is available on this configuration.
return (None, Some(Error::AacsRawReadUnsupported));
}
// v0.25.7 wedge fix. Pre-0.25.7 this loop fired up to 16 AACS
// authenticate attempts back-to-back with no pause. Each attempt
// is 5-10 SCSI REPORT_KEY/SEND_KEY exchanges. On a disc whose
@@ -246,7 +225,7 @@ impl Disc {
const MAX_CERT_ATTEMPTS: usize = 3;
const PER_CERT_BACKOFF_MS: u64 = 1000;
let mut last_err_code: Option<u16> = None;
for (idx, hc) in keydb.host_certs.iter().take(MAX_CERT_ATTEMPTS).enumerate() {
for (idx, hc) in host_certs.iter().take(MAX_CERT_ATTEMPTS).enumerate() {
if idx > 0 {
std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(PER_CERT_BACKOFF_MS));
}
@@ -317,166 +296,15 @@ impl Disc {
(None, Some(Error::AacsHostCertRejected))
}
/// Resolve disc encryption — AACS 1.0, AACS 2.0, CSS, or none.
///
/// Reads AACS files from UDF (via SectorSource), resolves keys through
/// whatever path works: KEYDB VUK lookup, media key derivation, processing
/// keys, device keys. Uses handshake result (volume ID, bus key) if available.
pub(super) fn resolve_encryption(
/// Build a keys-free AACS state that carries only the Volume ID (+ version
/// metadata), for callers that resolve Unit Keys out-of-band and have
/// disabled the local keydb. The VID is on-disc content read during the
/// handshake; preserving it here lets the out-of-band path use it. No keys
/// are present (`unit_keys` empty, `vuk` None), so the disc reports as
/// "encrypted, no keys" until the caller re-scans with a resolved Unit Key.
pub(super) fn resolve_vid_only(
udf_fs: &udf::UdfFs,
reader: &mut dyn SectorSource,
keydb_path: &std::path::Path,
handshake: Option<&HandshakeResult>,
) -> Result<AacsState> {
use crate::aacs::{self, KeyDb};
use crate::drm::{DrmContext, DrmProbe, DrmScheme, ResolvedScheme};
let keydb = KeyDb::load(keydb_path).map_err(|_| Error::KeydbLoad {
path: keydb_path.display().to_string(),
})?;
// Read AACS files from disc/image via UDF
let uk_ro_data = udf_fs
.read_file(reader, "/AACS/Unit_Key_RO.inf")
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, "/AACS/DUPLICATE/Unit_Key_RO.inf"))
.map_err(|_| Error::AacsNoKeys)?;
// Log the disc hash so we can confirm whether it's present in KEYDB
// when key resolution fails. The disc hash is SHA-1 of the full
// Unit_Key_RO.inf file bytes — same value KEYDB.cfg keys VUK entries by.
let dh = crate::aacs::disc_hash(&uk_ro_data);
let dh_hex = crate::aacs::disc_hash_hex(&dh);
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "scan_aacs_disc_hash",
disc_hash = %dh_hex,
uk_ro_len = uk_ro_data.len(),
"disc hash computed (compare with keydb.cfg entries)"
);
let cc_data = udf_fs
.read_file(reader, "/AACS/Content000.cer")
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, "/AACS/Content001.cer"))
.ok();
let mkb_data = udf_fs
.read_file(reader, "/AACS/MKB_RW.inf")
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, "/AACS/MKB_RO.inf"))
.ok();
let mkb_ver = mkb_data.as_deref().and_then(aacs::mkb_version);
let mkb_first_64_hex = mkb_data
.as_deref()
.map(|m| {
m.iter()
.take(64)
.map(|b| format!("{b:02x}"))
.collect::<String>()
})
.unwrap_or_default();
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "scan_aacs_mkb_info",
mkb_present = mkb_data.is_some(),
mkb_len = mkb_data.as_deref().map(|m| m.len()).unwrap_or(0),
mkb_version = ?mkb_ver,
mkb_first_64 = %mkb_first_64_hex,
keydb_disc_count = keydb.disc_entries.len(),
keydb_dk_count = keydb.device_keys.len(),
keydb_pk_count = keydb.processing_keys.len(),
"AACS resolution inputs"
);
// Use handshake volume ID if available, otherwise zeros
// (KEYDB VUK lookup by disc hash works without volume ID;
// paths 2/3/4 in `resolve_keys` short-circuit on the zero
// sentinel and don't waste cycles trying to derive against
// garbage input).
let volume_id = handshake.map(|h| h.volume_id).unwrap_or([0u8; 16]);
let vid_available = volume_id != [0u8; 16];
let read_data_key = handshake.and_then(|h| h.read_data_key);
// Resolve: tries all available paths — KEYDB VUK, media key, processing key, device key.
//
// Distinguish "we had every input and still missed" from "we
// never had VID so the derivation paths couldn't run." The
// former points at a stale keydb / unsupported MKB; the
// latter points at a failed handshake upstream. Path 1
// (disc-hash lookup) ran without VID and missed -> disc isn't
// in the keydb. If the caller has a handshake-failure reason
// it overrides this in `scan_with`.
let miss_error = if vid_available {
Error::AacsMkUnavailable
} else {
Error::AacsVukNotInKeydb
};
// Build a probe + context and let the dispatcher pick V10 / V20
// / V21. CSS is impossible here (this function is only called
// when /AACS exists), so we don't populate the DVD probe sector
// or a CSS context.
let probe = DrmProbe {
dvd_sample_sector: None,
content_cert: cc_data.as_deref(),
mkb: mkb_data.as_deref(),
};
let scheme = match DrmScheme::detect(&probe) {
Some(s) => s,
None => return Err(miss_error),
};
let providers: &[&dyn aacs::KeyProvider] = &[&keydb];
let aacs_ctx = aacs::ResolveContext {
unit_key_ro: &uk_ro_data,
content_cert: cc_data.as_deref(),
volume_id: &volume_id,
providers,
mkb: mkb_data.as_deref(),
};
let mut ctx = DrmContext {
aacs: Some(aacs_ctx),
css: None,
};
let resolved = match scheme.load(&mut ctx) {
Some(ResolvedScheme::Aacs(r)) => r,
// Resolution against /AACS inputs can only produce AACS
// keys. Either the dispatcher returned None (load failed)
// or — structurally impossible here — a CSS state. Both
// surface as the upstream miss-error.
_ => return Err(miss_error),
};
Ok(AacsState {
version: match resolved.version {
aacs::AacsVersion::V10 => 1,
aacs::AacsVersion::V20 | aacs::AacsVersion::V21 => 2,
},
bus_encryption: resolved.bus_encryption,
mkb_version: mkb_ver,
disc_hash: aacs::disc_hash_hex(&resolved.disc_hash),
key_source: match resolved.key_source {
1 => KeySource::DeviceKey,
2 => KeySource::ProcessingKey,
3 => KeySource::KeyDbDerived,
4 => KeySource::KeyDb,
5 => KeySource::KeyDbUnitKeys,
_ => KeySource::KeyDb,
},
vuk: resolved.vuk,
unit_keys: resolved.unit_keys,
read_data_key,
volume_id,
})
}
/// Resolve encryption from a caller-supplied Unit Key (the external key service
/// path). No keydb, no derivation: read `Unit_Key_RO.inf` for the disc
/// hash + version/bus-encryption flags, then use `unit_key` directly as
/// CPS unit 1's decryption key. The handshake (if any) still supplies the
/// volume ID and AACS 2.0 read-data key for bus decryption.
pub(super) fn resolve_encryption_static(
udf_fs: &udf::UdfFs,
reader: &mut dyn SectorSource,
unit_key: [u8; 16],
handshake: Option<&HandshakeResult>,
) -> Result<AacsState> {
use crate::aacs;
@@ -500,21 +328,31 @@ impl Disc {
None if bus_encryption => 2,
None => 1,
};
let mkb_ver = udf_fs
.read_file(reader, "/AACS/MKB_RW.inf")
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, "/AACS/MKB_RO.inf"))
// MKB_RO/RW are allocated to a fixed ~128 MiB and zero-padded; trim to
// the real record length (same as `read_aacs_inputs`). Without this the
// MKB stashed on `AacsState` — which `Disc::inputs()` and the device/
// processing-key `decrypt_with` derivation consume, and which a key
// source ships to an online service — is the full 128 MiB pad, not the
// ~few-MB record stream.
let mut mkb_bytes = udf_fs
.read_file(reader, "/AACS/MKB_RO.inf")
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, "/AACS/MKB_RW.inf"))
.ok()
.as_deref()
.and_then(aacs::mkb_version);
.unwrap_or_default();
let n = aacs::mkb_content_len(&mkb_bytes);
if n > 0 && n < mkb_bytes.len() {
mkb_bytes.truncate(n);
}
let mkb_ver = aacs::mkb_version(&mkb_bytes);
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "scan_aacs_external_uk",
phase = "scan_aacs_vid_only",
disc_hash = %aacs::disc_hash_hex(&dh),
version,
bus_encryption,
"using caller-supplied unit key"
has_vid = handshake.is_some(),
"keydb disabled — carrying VID only, keys resolved out-of-band"
);
Ok(AacsState {
@@ -522,11 +360,13 @@ impl Disc {
bus_encryption,
mkb_version: mkb_ver,
disc_hash: aacs::disc_hash_hex(&dh),
key_source: KeySource::ExternalUk,
key_source: KeyOrigin::ExternalUk,
vuk: None,
unit_keys: vec![(1, unit_key)],
unit_keys: vec![],
read_data_key: handshake.and_then(|h| h.read_data_key),
volume_id: handshake.map(|h| h.volume_id).unwrap_or([0u8; 16]),
uk_ro: uk_ro_data,
mkb: mkb_bytes,
})
}
}
+120 -2
View File
@@ -134,7 +134,17 @@ pub struct Mapfile {
/// `# freemkv-vid:` comment header so it survives to deferred-mux /
/// resume without altering the ISO payload or breaking ddrescue
/// data-line parsing. `None` for unencrypted / non-AACS discs.
///
/// MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE with `unit_keys`: a disc whose keys were resolved
/// persists the keys (`unit_keys`) and NOT the VID — the keys are the final
/// answer, so deferred-mux/resume decrypts directly with no key service. A
/// disc that did NOT resolve persists only the VID, the retry-able "still
/// need a key" marker (a future mux can re-ask the key service with it).
vid: Option<[u8; 16]>,
/// Decrypted AACS unit keys `(CPS unit, key)`, persisted as `# freemkv-uk:`
/// comment headers when the disc was successfully keyed. Mutually exclusive
/// with `vid` (see above). Empty when unresolved.
unit_keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])>,
}
impl Mapfile {
@@ -160,6 +170,7 @@ impl Mapfile {
dirty: false,
last_flushed: Instant::now(),
vid: None,
unit_keys: Vec::new(),
};
// Eager initial persist so a resume can pick this up even if
// `record()` is never called.
@@ -175,6 +186,7 @@ impl Mapfile {
let mut saw_current_line = false;
let mut version = String::from("unknown");
let mut vid: Option<[u8; 16]> = None;
let mut unit_keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])> = Vec::new();
for line in text.lines() {
let t = line.trim();
if t.is_empty() {
@@ -190,6 +202,12 @@ impl Mapfile {
// ignored rather than failing the whole load.
vid = parse_vid_hex(hex.trim());
}
if let Some(uk) = rest.strip_prefix("freemkv-uk:") {
// `<cps>:<32hex>`. Best-effort: a malformed line is skipped.
if let Some(entry) = parse_uk_line(uk.trim()) {
unit_keys.push(entry);
}
}
continue;
}
// First non-comment line is the "current" state line (pos status [pass] [pass_time]).
@@ -240,6 +258,7 @@ impl Mapfile {
dirty: false,
last_flushed: Instant::now(),
vid,
unit_keys,
})
}
@@ -345,6 +364,25 @@ impl Mapfile {
self.vid
}
/// Record the disc's decrypted AACS unit keys so they persist in the
/// mapfile header (`# freemkv-uk:` lines). The KEYED state: a deferred-mux /
/// resume decrypts directly from these with no key-service round-trip.
/// Setting keys clears any VID — the mapfile holds keys XOR VID, never both
/// (keys are the final answer; VID is only the "still unresolved" marker).
pub fn set_unit_keys(&mut self, keys: &[(u32, [u8; 16])]) {
self.unit_keys = keys.to_vec();
if !self.unit_keys.is_empty() {
self.vid = None;
}
self.dirty = true;
}
/// The disc's decrypted AACS unit keys, if the disc was keyed (parsed from
/// `# freemkv-uk:` comments on load). Empty = unresolved (check `vid()`).
pub fn unit_keys(&self) -> &[(u32, [u8; 16])] {
&self.unit_keys
}
pub fn entries(&self) -> &[MapEntry] {
&self.entries
}
@@ -421,10 +459,22 @@ impl Mapfile {
// `#`-prefixed line as a comment, so this round-trips through
// our `load()` without affecting the `pos size status` data
// parser. 16 bytes → 32 lowercase hex chars.
if let Some(vid) = self.vid {
// KEYS XOR VID: a keyed disc persists its unit keys (the final
// answer — deferred-mux decrypts directly); an unresolved disc
// persists only the VID (the retry marker, so a future mux can
// re-ask the key service). Never both.
use std::fmt::Write as _;
if !self.unit_keys.is_empty() {
for (cps, key) in &self.unit_keys {
let mut hex = String::with_capacity(32);
for b in key {
let _ = write!(hex, "{b:02x}");
}
writeln!(w, "# freemkv-uk: {cps}:{hex}")?;
}
} else if let Some(vid) = self.vid {
let mut hex = String::with_capacity(32);
for b in vid {
use std::fmt::Write as _;
let _ = write!(hex, "{b:02x}");
}
writeln!(w, "# freemkv-vid: {hex}")?;
@@ -474,6 +524,15 @@ fn parse_vid_hex(s: &str) -> Option<[u8; 16]> {
Some(out)
}
/// Parse a `# freemkv-uk:` value `<cps>:<32hex>` into `(cps_unit, key)`. Returns
/// `None` on any malformation so a corrupt line is ignored, never fatal.
fn parse_uk_line(s: &str) -> Option<(u32, [u8; 16])> {
let (cps, hex) = s.split_once(':')?;
let cps: u32 = cps.trim().parse().ok()?;
let key = parse_vid_hex(hex.trim())?; // 32-hex → [u8; 16], shared parser
Some((cps, key))
}
fn parse_hex(s: &str) -> io::Result<u64> {
let s = s.strip_prefix("0x").unwrap_or(s);
u64::from_str_radix(s, 16).map_err(|_| {
@@ -640,6 +699,65 @@ mod tests {
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p);
}
#[test]
fn unit_keys_round_trip_and_are_mutually_exclusive_with_vid() {
let p = tmpfile("uk_round_trips");
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p);
let mut mf = Mapfile::create(&p, 1000, "test").unwrap();
mf.record(0, 500, SectorStatus::Finished).unwrap();
// Set a VID first, then unit keys: keys must WIN and clear the VID.
mf.set_vid([0xAA; 16]);
let keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])> = vec![
(
0,
[
0x57, 0x60, 0xcc, 0x83, 0x3d, 0x86, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x92, 0x1f, 0x88, 0x16, 0xe1,
0x35, 0x9b, 0xad,
],
),
(1, [0x11; 16]),
];
mf.set_unit_keys(&keys);
assert_eq!(
mf.vid(),
None,
"set_unit_keys must clear vid (keys XOR vid)"
);
mf.flush().unwrap();
let text = std::fs::read_to_string(&p).unwrap();
assert!(
text.contains("# freemkv-uk: 0:5760cc833d860e48921f8816e1359bad"),
"uk comment format mismatch: {text}"
);
assert!(
text.contains("# freemkv-uk: 1:11111111111111111111111111111111"),
"second uk missing: {text}"
);
assert!(
!text.contains("# freemkv-vid:"),
"VID must NOT be written when keys are present: {text}"
);
// load() recovers the unit keys (and no VID).
let loaded = Mapfile::load(&p).unwrap();
assert_eq!(loaded.unit_keys(), keys.as_slice());
assert_eq!(loaded.vid(), None);
assert_eq!(loaded.entries(), mf.entries());
// VID-only path (no keys) still persists the VID as the retry marker.
let p2 = tmpfile("uk_vid_only");
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p2);
let mut mf2 = Mapfile::create(&p2, 1000, "test").unwrap();
mf2.set_vid([0xBB; 16]);
mf2.flush().unwrap();
let loaded2 = Mapfile::load(&p2).unwrap();
assert_eq!(loaded2.vid(), Some([0xBB; 16]));
assert!(loaded2.unit_keys().is_empty());
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p);
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&p2);
}
#[test]
fn vid_round_trips_and_data_lines_unaffected() {
let p = tmpfile("vid_round_trips");
+801 -128
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+13
View File
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ pub const E_AACS_MK_UNAVAILABLE: u16 = 7018;
pub const E_AACS_VUK_NOT_IN_KEYDB: u16 = 7019;
pub const E_DRIVE_PROFILE_MISSING: u16 = 7020;
pub const E_VID_CDB_UNAVAILABLE: u16 = 7021;
pub const E_NO_DISC_KEY: u16 = 7022;
// Keydb (8xxx)
pub const E_KEYDB_CONNECT: u16 = 8000;
@@ -253,6 +254,16 @@ pub enum Error {
/// template (older profile blob, or a drive class without an OEM
/// VID path).
VidCdbUnavailable,
/// The disc is AACS-encrypted and decryption was requested, but key
/// resolution produced no usable key for it — so muxing would emit
/// undecryptable garbage. Distinct from [`Error::KeydbLoad`] (no keydb
/// file at all): a keydb may be present but lack an entry for this disc.
/// `disc_hash` is the 40-hex SHA1 of `Unit_Key_RO.inf` (no `0x` prefix)
/// so the application can name the disc; empty if the hash wasn't
/// captured at scan.
NoDiscKey {
disc_hash: String,
},
// Keydb (8xxx)
KeydbConnect {
@@ -345,6 +356,7 @@ impl Error {
Error::AacsVukNotInKeydb => E_AACS_VUK_NOT_IN_KEYDB,
Error::DriveProfileMissing => E_DRIVE_PROFILE_MISSING,
Error::VidCdbUnavailable => E_VID_CDB_UNAVAILABLE,
Error::NoDiscKey { .. } => E_NO_DISC_KEY,
Error::KeydbConnect { .. } => E_KEYDB_CONNECT,
Error::KeydbHttp { .. } => E_KEYDB_HTTP,
Error::KeydbInvalid => E_KEYDB_INVALID,
@@ -471,6 +483,7 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for Error {
Error::StreamUrlMissingPort { addr } => write!(f, "E{}: {}", self.code(), addr),
Error::PesFrameTooLarge { size } => write!(f, "E{}: {}", self.code(), size),
Error::IsoTooLarge { path } => write!(f, "E{}: {}", self.code(), path),
Error::NoDiscKey { disc_hash } => write!(f, "E{}: {}", self.code(), disc_hash),
_ => write!(f, "E{}", self.code()),
}
}
+89
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
//! Key sources — the lookup layer that hands libfreemkv a [`Key`].
//!
//! libfreemkv performs NO key lookup. An application resolves a key for a disc
//! through one or more [`KeySource`]s, each a dumb adapter over a backing store
//! (a keydb file, a key server, the mapfile cache): given the disc's
//! [`DiscInputs`] it returns the raw [`Key`] at whatever level it holds. The
//! library then derives down and decrypts via `Disc::decrypt_with`.
//!
//! Source implementations are published in the companion `freemkv-keysources`
//! crate — keeping all key *policy* (which store, which order, online vs local)
//! out of the library while all key *mechanism* (the AACS derivation chain)
//! stays in it.
use crate::disc::Key;
/// The public AACS inputs a key source needs to look a disc up. Captured at
/// scan; contains no secrets — only the disc identity and the on-disc AACS
/// structures a source or key server may key on.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct DiscInputs {
/// SHA-1 of `Unit_Key_RO.inf`, `0x`-prefixed hex. The value a keydb keys
/// its per-disc entries by, and a key server identifies the disc with.
pub disc_hash: String,
/// Volume ID (16 bytes). `[0u8; 16]` when no authenticated handshake ran
/// (e.g. an ISO/mapfile flow), which disables VID-keyed lookups.
pub volume_id: [u8; 16],
/// Raw MKB bytes. Empty when not captured.
pub mkb: Vec<u8>,
/// Raw `Unit_Key_RO.inf` bytes. Empty when not captured.
pub unit_key_ro: Vec<u8>,
/// Encrypted on-disc content sample units (each a 6144-byte aligned unit),
/// for sources that validate a key server-side against real ciphertext
/// (e.g. an online key service). Empty for sources that don't need them
/// (a local keydb). Populated by the application — reading content requires
/// the disc reader, which the library's scan does not retain — so
/// [`crate::Disc::inputs`] leaves it empty for the caller to fill.
pub samples: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
/// The disc's human title — the UDF/ISO volume identifier (e.g.
/// `WICKED_FOR_GOOD`), falling back to the BDMV `<di:name>` when present.
/// `None` when not captured. Identity only, no secret; a key service may
/// record it (keyed by `disc_hash`) to build a hash→title catalog. Not used
/// in any AACS derivation.
pub volume_label: Option<String>,
}
/// A key source: a stateful provider that hands a disc's candidate [`Key`]s out
/// **one at a time**, in whatever order it judges best for its backing store.
///
/// Dumb by contract — a source queries its store and yields the raw material it
/// holds at whatever level it has (device / processing / media / volume / unit).
/// It performs NO AACS derivation and NO validation: `Disc::decrypt_with`
/// derives down AND validates against real ciphertext, returning `Err` for a key
/// that does not decrypt this disc. That keeps every derivation step and the one
/// validation gate in the library, across AACS 1.0 / 2.0 / 2.1 / 2.x.
///
/// The source is the one that knows how many candidates it has and in what order
/// to try them — a keydb holds a per-disc UK *and* VUK *and* a device-key pool,
/// so it hands them out cheapest/most-specific first (UK ▸ VK ▸ MK ▸ DK) and
/// reports exhaustion when its list runs out; an online key service or a mapfile
/// cache hold exactly one. The caller drives the loop: `next_key` →
/// `Disc::decrypt_with` → on `Err`, ask again → until a key decrypts or the
/// source returns `None` (a genuine "no key for this disc"). Compose several
/// sources, in the caller's chosen order, with [`crate`]'s `MultiSource`.
pub trait KeySource {
/// Hand the NEXT candidate key for this disc, or `None` once this source is
/// exhausted. Stateful: the source tracks what it already handed out this
/// session, so asking again after a rejected key yields the next candidate
/// (or `None`) — it never re-offers a key or re-hits a one-shot backend (an
/// online service is asked at most once). A source failure (I/O, network,
/// parse) surfaces as `None` — there is simply nothing more to try.
fn next_key(&mut self, inputs: &DiscInputs) -> Option<Key>;
/// Whether this source needs [`DiscInputs::samples`] populated (encrypted
/// content samples) — true for a source that validates against ciphertext
/// server-side, false for one that keys purely on disc identity. The caller
/// reads samples (an extra disc read) only when some source needs them.
fn needs_samples(&self) -> bool {
false
}
/// Whether this source FAILED (I/O, network, parse) rather than simply
/// having no key. Checked after exhaustion so the caller can tell a genuine
/// "no key for this disc" apart from "the key service was unreachable". A
/// store that treats absence as not-an-error (a missing keydb / mapfile)
/// leaves this `false`.
fn errored(&self) -> bool {
false
}
}
+185 -5
View File
@@ -207,14 +207,41 @@ pub(crate) fn apply_labels(labels: &[StreamLabel], titles: &mut [DiscTitle]) {
// Structured fields — callers translate purpose to UI text.
a.purpose = label.purpose;
// Codec descriptor: trust the parser's `codec_hint` ONLY
// when it's consistent with the stream's actual codec — it
// may legitimately be richer (e.g. "Dolby Atmos" on a TrueHD
// stream, which the raw spec codec can't express). If the
// hint CONTRADICTS the stream (a mis-bound / shuffled label,
// e.g. "AC-3 2.0" on a TrueHD track, or "TrueHD" on a DD+
// track), discard it and derive the descriptor from the
// stream itself — that's correct per-stream and can never be
// shuffled. An empty hint is left for `fill_defaults`.
let codec_desc = if label.codec_hint.is_empty() {
// No codec hint — leave for fill_defaults.
String::new()
} else if !codec_hint_consistent(&label.codec_hint, &a.codec) {
// Hint contradicts the stream (mis-bound / shuffled):
// derive from the stream itself.
generate_audio_label(&a.codec, &a.channels, a.secondary)
} else if codec_hint_adds_detail(&label.codec_hint) {
// Consistent AND richer than the spec codec can express
// (e.g. "Dolby Atmos", "DTS:X") — keep the parser's hint.
label.codec_hint.clone()
} else {
// Consistent but a plain codec/channel restatement —
// normalize to the stream's own marketing descriptor so
// styling is uniform across tracks.
generate_audio_label(&a.codec, &a.channels, a.secondary)
};
// a.label only carries codec/variant info. NEVER any
// English purpose text — the CLI handles that via i18n.
let mut parts = Vec::new();
if !label.variant.is_empty() {
parts.push(format!("({})", label.variant));
}
if !label.codec_hint.is_empty() {
parts.push(label.codec_hint.clone());
if !codec_desc.is_empty() {
parts.push(codec_desc);
}
if !parts.is_empty() {
a.label = parts.join(" ");
@@ -322,7 +349,70 @@ fn generate_video_label(
parts.join(" ")
}
fn generate_audio_label(
/// Does the parser's `codec_hint` name a codec consistent with the stream's
/// actual `codec`? [`apply_labels`] uses this to keep richer-but-consistent
/// hints (e.g. "Dolby Atmos" on a TrueHD stream — Atmos is a TrueHD extension
/// the raw spec codec can't express) while rejecting mis-bound ones (e.g.
/// "AC-3 2.0" on a TrueHD stream, the shuffled-label bug). Matching is by codec
/// FAMILY parsed out of the hint string. "Atmos" with no carrier named is
/// treated as compatible with its lossless carriers (TrueHD / E-AC-3). A hint
/// naming no recognizable codec family (pure editorial, e.g. "Commentary") is
/// consistent — it isn't asserting a codec.
fn codec_hint_consistent(hint: &str, codec: &crate::disc::Codec) -> bool {
use crate::disc::Codec;
let h = hint.to_ascii_lowercase();
let says_truehd = h.contains("truehd") || h.contains("true hd");
let says_ddp = h.contains("ac-3+")
|| h.contains("ac3+")
|| h.contains("e-ac-3")
|| h.contains("eac-3")
|| h.contains("eac3")
|| h.contains("digital plus")
|| h.contains("dd+");
let says_ac3 =
!says_ddp && (h.contains("ac-3") || h.contains("ac3") || h.contains("dolby digital"));
let says_dts_ma = h.contains("master audio") || h.contains("hd ma");
let says_dts_hr = h.contains("high resolution") || h.contains("hd hr");
let says_dts = !says_dts_ma && !says_dts_hr && h.contains("dts");
let says_lpcm = h.contains("lpcm") || h.contains("pcm");
let says_atmos = h.contains("atmos");
let names_family =
says_truehd || says_ddp || says_ac3 || says_dts_ma || says_dts_hr || says_dts || says_lpcm;
// Pure-editorial hint (no codec family named) isn't asserting a codec →
// consistent. "Atmos" alone implies a lossless carrier (TrueHD or DD+).
if !names_family {
return if says_atmos {
matches!(codec, Codec::TrueHd | Codec::Ac3Plus)
} else {
true
};
}
match codec {
Codec::TrueHd => says_truehd || says_atmos,
Codec::Ac3Plus => says_ddp || says_atmos,
Codec::Ac3 => says_ac3,
Codec::DtsHdMa => says_dts_ma,
Codec::DtsHdHr => says_dts_hr,
Codec::Dts => says_dts,
Codec::Lpcm => says_lpcm,
// Unknown / other stream codec — don't second-guess the parser's hint.
_ => true,
}
}
/// Does the hint carry object-audio detail the spec codec can't express
/// (Atmos / DTS:X)? Such hints are kept verbatim; plain codec/channel hints are
/// normalized to the stream's own descriptor for uniform styling across tracks.
fn codec_hint_adds_detail(hint: &str) -> bool {
let h = hint.to_ascii_lowercase();
h.contains("atmos") || h.contains("dts:x") || h.contains("dts-x") || h.contains("dtsx")
}
pub(crate) fn generate_audio_label(
codec: &crate::disc::Codec,
channels: &crate::disc::AudioChannels,
_secondary: bool,
@@ -1182,6 +1272,94 @@ mod apply_tests {
}
}
#[test]
fn apply_rejects_mismatched_codec_hint_and_uses_stream_codec() {
// Paddington case: a TrueHD+Atmos main track the parser mislabeled
// "AC-3 2.0" (a compat-core hint bound to the wrong stream). The hint
// contradicts the stream's real codec → discard it, use the stream's own.
let mut titles = vec![title_with(vec![audio(
0x1100,
Codec::TrueHd,
AudioChannels::Surround71,
"eng",
)])];
let labels = vec![audio_label(1, "eng", "AC-3 2.0", "")];
apply_labels(&labels, &mut titles);
if let Stream::Audio(a) = &titles[0].streams[0] {
assert_eq!(a.label, "Dolby TrueHD 7.1");
} else {
panic!("expected audio stream");
}
}
#[test]
fn apply_unshuffles_cross_labeled_streams() {
// Wicked case: hints fully cross-bound — a TrueHD stream wears "AC-3 5.1"
// and a DD+ stream wears "TrueHD 5.1". Each is corrected from its own
// stream codec, eliminating the shuffle.
let mut titles = vec![title_with(vec![
audio(0x1100, Codec::TrueHd, AudioChannels::Surround51, "eng"),
audio(0x1101, Codec::Ac3Plus, AudioChannels::Surround51, "spa"),
])];
let labels = vec![
audio_label(1, "eng", "AC-3 5.1", ""),
audio_label(2, "spa", "TrueHD 5.1", ""),
];
apply_labels(&labels, &mut titles);
let got: Vec<String> = titles[0]
.streams
.iter()
.filter_map(|s| {
if let Stream::Audio(a) = s {
Some(a.label.clone())
} else {
None
}
})
.collect();
assert_eq!(got, vec!["Dolby TrueHD 5.1", "Dolby Digital Plus 5.1"]);
}
#[test]
fn apply_keeps_consistent_richer_atmos_hint() {
// A DD+ Atmos stream legitimately labeled "Dolby Atmos" — the hint is
// richer than the spec codec yet consistent with it, so it's kept.
let mut titles = vec![title_with(vec![audio(
0x1100,
Codec::Ac3Plus,
AudioChannels::Surround51,
"eng",
)])];
let labels = vec![audio_label(1, "eng", "Dolby Atmos", "")];
apply_labels(&labels, &mut titles);
if let Stream::Audio(a) = &titles[0].streams[0] {
assert_eq!(a.label, "Dolby Atmos");
} else {
panic!("expected audio stream");
}
}
#[test]
fn apply_normalizes_plain_consistent_hint_to_marketing() {
// Wicked's French track: a DD+ stream whose hint "AC-3+ 5.1" is correct
// but short-form. A sibling DD+ track that fell back uses the marketing
// form — keeping the short form here would read inconsistently, so a
// plain (non-richer) consistent hint is normalized to the stream's own.
let mut titles = vec![title_with(vec![audio(
0x1100,
Codec::Ac3Plus,
AudioChannels::Surround51,
"fra",
)])];
let labels = vec![audio_label(1, "fra", "AC-3+ 5.1", "")];
apply_labels(&labels, &mut titles);
if let Stream::Audio(a) = &titles[0].streams[0] {
assert_eq!(a.label, "Dolby Digital Plus 5.1");
} else {
panic!("expected audio stream");
}
}
#[test]
fn apply_sets_purpose_on_audio_commentary() {
let mut titles = vec![title_with(vec![audio(
@@ -1342,9 +1520,11 @@ mod apply_tests {
if let Stream::Audio(a) = &titles[0].streams[1] {
assert_eq!(a.label, "Dolby Atmos");
}
// Audio #2 (4th stream overall)
// Audio #2 (4th stream overall). The plain "Dolby Digital" hint is
// consistent with the AC-3 stream but carries no channel info, so it's
// normalized to the stream's own uniform descriptor.
if let Stream::Audio(a) = &titles[0].streams[3] {
assert_eq!(a.label, "Dolby Digital");
assert_eq!(a.label, "Dolby Digital 2.0");
}
// Subtitle #1
if let Stream::Subtitle(s) = &titles[0].streams[2] {
+5 -3
View File
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ pub(crate) mod identity;
pub(crate) mod ifo;
pub mod io;
pub mod keydb;
pub mod keysource;
pub mod labels;
pub(crate) mod mpls;
pub mod mux;
@@ -170,10 +171,11 @@ pub use decrypt::{DecryptKeys, decrypt_sectors, decrypt_threads, set_decrypt_thr
// prefix at the crate root to keep both addressable.
pub use disc::{
AacsState, AudioChannels, AudioStream, Clip, Codec, ColorSpace, ContentFormat, DamageSeverity,
Disc, DiscFormat, DiscId, DiscTitle, Extent, FrameRate, HdrFormat, KeySource, LabelPurpose,
LabelQualifier, PatchOptions, PatchOutcome, Resolution, SampleRate, ScanOptions, Stream,
SubtitleStream, SweepOptions, VideoStream, classify_damage,
Disc, DiscFormat, DiscId, DiscTitle, DriveCredentials, Extent, FrameRate, HdrFormat, Key,
KeyOrigin, LabelPurpose, LabelQualifier, PatchOptions, PatchOutcome, Resolution, SampleRate,
ScanOptions, Stream, SubtitleStream, SweepOptions, VideoStream, classify_damage,
};
pub use keysource::{DiscInputs, KeySource};
// ─── Streams ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
//
+15 -3
View File
@@ -301,9 +301,21 @@ fn parse_stream_entry(item: &[u8], pos: usize, stream_type: u8) -> Option<(Strea
return None;
}
// PID from stream entry (type 0x01 = PlayItem stream: PID at bytes 2-3)
let pid = if item[pos + 1] == 0x01 && pos + 4 <= item.len() {
u16::from_be_bytes([item[pos + 2], item[pos + 3]])
// PID location depends on the stream-entry type (BD spec stream_entry()):
// type 1 (stream in the PlayItem's Clip): PID at +2
// type 2 (stream in a SubPath SubClip): +subpath_id(1)+subclip_id(1) → PID at +4
// type 3 / 4 (SubPath clip; type 4 = Dolby Vision +subpath_id(1) → PID at +3
// enhancement layer, e.g. PID 0x1015):
// Previously only type 1 was handled, so the DV EL (type 4) and any
// sub-path stream fell through to PID 0 and were dropped by the mux.
let pid_off = match item[pos + 1] {
0x01 => 2,
0x02 => 4,
0x03 | 0x04 => 3,
_ => 0,
};
let pid = if pid_off != 0 && pos + pid_off + 2 <= item.len() {
u16::from_be_bytes([item[pos + pid_off], item[pos + pid_off + 1]])
} else {
0
};
+119 -7
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,14 @@
use super::{CodecParser, Frame, PesPacket, pts_to_ns};
/// Hard cap on the carry-over buffer. An AC-3/E-AC-3 frame is at most 8192
/// bytes (the `frame_size > 8192` reject below), so a single straddling frame
/// plus a little slack never needs more than this. If the buffer grows past
/// the cap without yielding a frame (pathological / never-syncing input) we
/// drop it and resync rather than accumulate one PES worth of data per call
/// for the whole title.
const MAX_AC3_BUF: usize = 64 * 1024;
pub struct Ac3Parser {
/// Leftover bytes from previous PES (incomplete frame at end).
buf: Vec<u8>,
@@ -81,19 +89,38 @@ impl CodecParser for Ac3Parser {
pos = start + frame_size;
}
// Keep unconsumed data for next call
// `pos` points to the start of unconsumed data (either a partial sync or leftover)
// Keep unconsumed data for the next call. `pos` is the start of the
// unconsumed region: either a partial frame that straddles this PES
// boundary — which, by construction, begins at a syncword (every byte
// before `pos` was emitted as a frame or skipped as pre-sync junk) — or
// trailing bytes too short to size/complete a frame. Carry from `pos`,
// NOT from the next syncword: discarding bytes between `pos` and the
// next sync would drop the partial frame we are deliberately keeping
// across the boundary.
let keep_from = if pos < data.len() {
// Find the last sync word position in the unconsumed region
find_ac3_sync(&data[pos..])
.map(|o| pos + o)
.unwrap_or(data.len())
// A syncword at/after `pos` marks the carry-over start (anything
// before it is junk with no sync). With no full sync, retain the
// whole tail — including a lone trailing 0x0B that may be the first
// half of a syncword split across the PES boundary.
match find_ac3_sync(&data[pos..]) {
Some(o) => pos + o,
None if data.last() == Some(&0x0B) => data.len() - 1,
None => data.len(),
}
} else {
data.len()
};
if keep_from < data.len() {
self.buf = data[keep_from..].to_vec();
let tail = &data[keep_from..];
if tail.len() > MAX_AC3_BUF {
// No frame could be parsed out of a buffer this large — this is
// not valid AC-3 here. Drop it and resync on the next PES rather
// than grow without bound on pathological input.
self.buf.clear();
} else {
self.buf = tail.to_vec();
}
} else {
self.buf.clear();
}
@@ -276,6 +303,91 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(frames[0].data.len(), 160);
}
#[test]
fn sync_word_split_across_pes_is_preserved() {
// A frame whose 0x0B77 syncword straddles the PES boundary (0x0B at the
// tail of PES 1, 0x77 at the head of PES 2) must still be emitted whole.
// Previously the lone trailing 0x0B was dropped and the frame lost.
let mut parser = Ac3Parser::new();
let frame_data = make_ac3_frame(0, 2); // 160 bytes, starts with 0x0B 0x77
// PES 1: a complete frame, then a single 0x0B (first half of next sync).
let mut pes1_data = frame_data.clone();
pes1_data.push(0x0B);
let pes1 = PesPacket {
pid: 0,
pts: Some(90000),
dts: None,
data: pes1_data,
};
let frames1 = parser.parse(&pes1);
assert_eq!(frames1.len(), 1, "first complete frame emitted");
// PES 2: 0x77 (second half of sync) + rest of the second frame.
let mut pes2_data = vec![0x77];
pes2_data.extend_from_slice(&frame_data[2..]);
let pes2 = PesPacket {
pid: 0,
pts: Some(93000),
dts: None,
data: pes2_data,
};
let frames2 = parser.parse(&pes2);
assert_eq!(frames2.len(), 1, "split-sync frame must be recovered");
assert_eq!(frames2[0].data.len(), 160);
}
#[test]
fn buffer_stays_bounded_across_many_garbage_pes() {
// Finding 14: the carry-over buffer must never grow without bound. Feed
// many large PES packets that contain no usable frame and assert the
// retained buffer stays tiny — carry-from-`pos` drops all pre-sync junk,
// and a never-completing frame is bounded by the 8192-byte frame cap and
// the MAX_AC3_BUF resync guard.
let mut parser = Ac3Parser::new();
for i in 0..256 {
// Vary the trailing byte so we also exercise the lone-0x0B retain.
let mut data = vec![0x55u8; 8192];
if i % 3 == 0 {
*data.last_mut().unwrap() = 0x0B;
}
let pes = PesPacket {
pid: 0,
pts: None,
dts: None,
data,
};
let frames = parser.parse(&pes);
assert!(frames.is_empty());
assert!(
parser.buf.len() <= MAX_AC3_BUF,
"buffer grew to {} (cap {})",
parser.buf.len(),
MAX_AC3_BUF
);
}
// After all that garbage the retained tail is at most a single partial
// syncword byte — never an accumulation of whole PES packets.
assert!(parser.buf.len() <= 1, "retained {} bytes", parser.buf.len());
}
#[test]
fn split_sync_below_cap_is_still_retained() {
// The cap must not break the normal split-sync straddle: a short tail
// ending in 0x0B (well under the cap) is retained so the next PES can
// complete the syncword.
let mut parser = Ac3Parser::new();
let data = vec![0x00, 0x00, 0x0B];
let pes = PesPacket {
pid: 0,
pts: None,
dts: None,
data,
};
assert!(parser.parse(&pes).is_empty());
assert_eq!(parser.buf, vec![0x0B], "lone trailing 0x0B retained");
}
#[test]
fn ac3_frame_size_table() {
// fscod=0 (48kHz), frmsizecod=0: 64 words = 128 bytes
+409 -77
View File
@@ -8,10 +8,20 @@
use super::{CodecParser, Frame, PesPacket, pts_to_ns};
const DTS_CORE_SYNC: [u8; 4] = [0x7F, 0xFE, 0x80, 0x01];
/// DTS-HD extension substream syncword. The parser delimits an access unit by
/// the next CORE sync (so every extension between two cores is captured), and
/// never needs to locate or size the extension itself — so this is referenced
/// only by the tests that synthesize extension substreams.
#[cfg(test)]
const DTS_HD_EXT_SYNC: [u8; 4] = [0x64, 0x58, 0x20, 0x25];
pub struct DtsParser {
buf: Vec<u8>,
/// PTS of the access unit currently being assembled in `buf` (the unit
/// starting at the first buffered core sync). Captured when that core
/// frame's PES first arrived; the trailing extension-substream PES
/// packets carry their own (later) PTS which must NOT override it.
pending_pts: i64,
}
impl Default for DtsParser {
@@ -24,10 +34,29 @@ impl DtsParser {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
buf: Vec::with_capacity(32768),
pending_pts: 0,
}
}
}
/// Hard cap on a buffered access unit (core + all its extension substreams).
/// A DTS-HD MA frame is at most a few tens of KB; if the buffer grows past
/// this without a clean boundary we resync rather than stall or balloon.
const MAX_AU_BYTES: usize = 65536;
/// Minimum plausible DTS core frame size. The core header alone is ~10-14
/// bytes; a decoded `core_size` below this means we matched a false/corrupt
/// core sync (the 14-bit `fsize` field decoded to a tiny value) rather than a
/// real frame, so we resync instead of emitting a junk access unit.
const MIN_CORE_FRAME_BYTES: usize = 10;
/// Sentinel for "no valid PTS base captured yet". Real PTS-in-ns values are
/// non-negative (derived from the unsigned 90 kHz PES timestamp), so a negative
/// value can never collide with a genuine timestamp. Used to mark the PTS base
/// invalid after a forced flush so the next PES sets it regardless of buffer
/// state.
const PTS_UNSET: i64 = -1;
impl CodecParser for DtsParser {
fn parse(&mut self, pes: &PesPacket) -> Vec<Frame> {
if pes.data.is_empty() {
@@ -35,80 +64,162 @@ impl CodecParser for DtsParser {
}
let pts_ns = pes.pts.map(pts_to_ns).unwrap_or(0);
// On Blu-ray, a DTS-HD MA/HRA access unit is a DTS core frame
// (sync 0x7FFE8001) followed by one or more DTS extension substreams
// (sync 0x64582025). The m2ts demuxer hands those out as SEPARATE PES
// packets on the same PID — the core in one PES, then the extension
// substreams in following PES packets (with their own, later PTS). The
// lossless audio lives entirely in the extension substreams, so an
// access unit is only complete once all of its trailing extensions
// have been buffered. We assemble across PES boundaries here: an access
// unit runs from its core sync up to (but not including) the NEXT core
// sync. Emitting on the core boundary keeps the core + every following
// extension substream together (the lossless data), instead of the
// old per-PES emit that dropped the extension PES packets and
// downgraded the track to lossy DTS core (the Dunkirk / Fight Club
// bug). The PTS is the core frame's PTS, captured when the unit began.
// Capture the access unit's PTS base on a fresh buffer, or whenever a
// prior forced (safety-valve) flush left it invalidated — in the
// forced case the bytes still in `buf` are not a real core frame, so
// the first PES to arrive after the flush carries the correct base.
if self.buf.is_empty() || self.pending_pts == PTS_UNSET {
self.pending_pts = pts_ns;
}
self.buf.extend_from_slice(&pes.data);
let data = &self.buf;
let mut frames = Vec::new();
let mut pos = 0;
while pos < data.len() {
// Find DTS core sync
let start = match find_sync(&data[pos..], &DTS_CORE_SYNC) {
Some(offset) => pos + offset,
None => break,
loop {
// Resync to the first core sync; drop any leading junk.
let Some(start) = find_sync(&self.buf, &DTS_CORE_SYNC) else {
// No core sync at all yet — keep at most a 3-byte tail so a
// sync split across PES packets can still be found next time.
if self.buf.len() > 3 {
let tail = self.buf.len() - 3;
self.buf.drain(..tail);
}
break;
};
// Need at least 10 bytes for core header to get frame size
if start + 10 > data.len() {
break;
}
let core_size = dts_core_frame_size(&data[start..]);
if core_size == 0 || core_size > 32768 {
pos = start + 4;
continue;
}
if start + core_size > data.len() {
// Incomplete core frame
break;
}
// Check for DTS-HD extension after core
let mut total_size = core_size;
if start + core_size + 4 <= data.len() {
if let Some(0) = find_sync(
&data[start + core_size..start + core_size + 4],
&DTS_HD_EXT_SYNC,
) {
let ext = &data[start + core_size..];
if ext.len() >= 9 {
let ext_size = dts_hd_ext_frame_size(ext);
if start + core_size + ext_size <= data.len() {
total_size = core_size + ext_size;
}
// If ext incomplete, just emit core
}
if start > 0 {
self.buf.drain(..start);
if find_sync(&self.buf, &DTS_CORE_SYNC) != Some(0) {
// Shouldn't happen, but never loop forever.
break;
}
}
// Need the core header to size the core frame.
if self.buf.len() < 10 {
break;
}
let core_size = dts_core_frame_size(&self.buf);
// `dts_core_frame_size` returns a 14-bit `fsize + 1`, so it is
// always in [1, 16384]; the bare `== 0` / `> MAX_AU_BYTES` checks
// can never fire. A real DTS core header is at least ~10-14 bytes,
// so any decoded size below that came from a false/corrupt sync.
// Reject it (drain the 4 syncword bytes and resync) instead of
// letting a tiny bogus size close the current access unit at a junk
// boundary and drop the trailing extension substreams. The
// `> MAX_AU_BYTES` upper bound is kept as a harmless guard.
if !(MIN_CORE_FRAME_BYTES..=MAX_AU_BYTES).contains(&core_size) {
// Bogus core sync — skip past it and resync.
self.buf.drain(..4);
continue;
}
if self.buf.len() < core_size {
break; // core frame not fully buffered yet — wait
}
// The access unit ends at the next *valid* core sync. The search
// begins after this core's syncword so we don't re-match it.
// Anything between the core and that next sync is this unit's
// extension substream(s) — which can themselves contain byte
// sequences matching the core syncword, so a raw `find_sync` match
// is not enough: a candidate is only a real boundary if its decoded
// core size is plausible. `next_core_boundary` skips bogus matches.
//
// `forced` distinguishes a real next-core boundary from a forced
// safety-valve flush. On a forced flush the access unit was NOT
// closed by a new core sync, so the bytes following it are not a
// fresh core frame and the current PES's PTS (which on a forced
// flush is an extension-substream PES, carrying its own later
// timestamp) must NOT become the next unit's PTS base.
let mut forced = false;
let au_end = match next_core_boundary(&self.buf, core_size) {
NextCore::Found(end) => end,
NextCore::NeedMore => break, // candidate sync needs more header
NextCore::None => {
// No next core sync buffered yet. The trailing extension
// substream PES packets may still be arriving, so WAIT for
// them rather than emit a core-only (lossy) frame — unless
// the buffer has grown unreasonably large, in which case
// emit what we have to guarantee forward progress.
if self.buf.len() <= MAX_AU_BYTES {
break;
}
forced = true;
self.buf.len()
}
};
let au: Vec<u8> = self.buf[..au_end].to_vec();
frames.push(Frame {
pts_ns,
pts_ns: self.pending_pts,
keyframe: true,
data: data[start..start + total_size].to_vec(),
data: au,
duration_ns: None,
});
pos = start + total_size;
}
// Keep unconsumed data
let keep_from = if pos < data.len() {
find_sync(&data[pos..], &DTS_CORE_SYNC)
.map(|o| pos + o)
.unwrap_or(data.len())
} else {
data.len()
};
if keep_from < data.len() {
self.buf = data[keep_from..].to_vec();
} else {
self.buf.clear();
self.buf.drain(..au_end);
if forced {
// Safety-valve flush: the next access unit's real core PES has
// not arrived. Invalidate the PTS so the next PES sets it
// regardless of buffer state, rather than inheriting this
// (non-core) PES's timestamp.
self.pending_pts = PTS_UNSET;
} else {
// Real boundary: the next access unit (now at buf start) begins
// at a core sync that arrived inside this PES, so this PES's PTS
// is the correct base for it.
self.pending_pts = pts_ns;
}
}
frames
}
fn flush(&mut self) -> Vec<Frame> {
// End of stream: emit the final access unit still buffered (the last
// core + its extension substreams, which had no following core sync to
// close it during streaming). Require a complete core frame; drop a
// bare partial sync tail.
if find_sync(&self.buf, &DTS_CORE_SYNC) != Some(0) || self.buf.len() < 10 {
self.buf.clear();
return Vec::new();
}
let core_size = dts_core_frame_size(&self.buf);
// `dts_core_frame_size` returns a 14-bit `fsize + 1` (never 0), so the
// old `== 0` check was dead; reject a sub-minimum core like `parse()`.
if core_size < MIN_CORE_FRAME_BYTES || self.buf.len() < core_size {
self.buf.clear();
return Vec::new();
}
let au = std::mem::take(&mut self.buf);
// A non-empty buffer here means a PES arrived after any prior forced
// flush (which fully drains `buf`), so `pending_pts` was reset to that
// PES's real PTS. Clamp the sentinel to 0 defensively all the same.
let pts_ns = if self.pending_pts == PTS_UNSET {
0
} else {
self.pending_pts
};
vec![Frame {
pts_ns,
keyframe: true,
data: au,
duration_ns: None,
}]
}
fn codec_private(&self) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
None
}
@@ -121,6 +232,40 @@ fn find_sync(data: &[u8], pattern: &[u8; 4]) -> Option<usize> {
(0..=data.len() - 4).find(|&i| data[i..i + 4] == *pattern)
}
/// Result of scanning for the next valid core sync that closes an access unit.
enum NextCore {
/// A valid next core sync was found; the access unit ends at this offset.
Found(usize),
/// A candidate core sync was found but its header isn't fully buffered yet,
/// so its validity can't be decided — wait for more data.
NeedMore,
/// No (further) core sync found in the buffer.
None,
}
/// Find the next *valid* core sync after the current core frame, to delimit the
/// access unit. Extension-substream payload can contain byte sequences that
/// match the core syncword, so each candidate is validated by decoding its
/// core size: a match whose decoded size is implausible (< MIN_CORE_FRAME_BYTES
/// or > MAX_AU_BYTES) is a false sync and is skipped, continuing the search.
fn next_core_boundary(buf: &[u8], core_size: usize) -> NextCore {
let mut from = core_size;
while let Some(rel) = find_sync(&buf[from..], &DTS_CORE_SYNC) {
let pos = from + rel;
// Need the candidate's core header to judge it.
if buf.len() - pos < 10 {
return NextCore::NeedMore;
}
let sz = dts_core_frame_size(&buf[pos..]);
if (MIN_CORE_FRAME_BYTES..=MAX_AU_BYTES).contains(&sz) {
return NextCore::Found(pos);
}
// False sync inside extension payload — skip it and keep searching.
from = pos + 4;
}
NextCore::None
}
/// DTS core frame size from header bits.
/// fsize is at bits 46-59 (14 bits) of the header: bytes 5-7.
fn dts_core_frame_size(data: &[u8]) -> usize {
@@ -134,20 +279,6 @@ fn dts_core_frame_size(data: &[u8]) -> usize {
fsize + 1
}
/// DTS-HD extension frame size from extension header.
pub fn dts_hd_ext_frame_size(ext: &[u8]) -> usize {
if ext.len() < 9 {
return 0;
}
let raw =
((ext[6] as usize & 0x1F) << 11) | ((ext[7] as usize) << 3) | ((ext[8] as usize) >> 5);
raw + 1
}
pub fn find_dts_hd_ext_sync(data: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
find_sync(data, &DTS_HD_EXT_SYNC)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
@@ -181,12 +312,16 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn parse_single_frame() {
// A single core frame with no following core sync is the LAST access
// unit — held during streaming (can't know an extension won't follow),
// then drained on flush() at EOF.
let mut parser = DtsParser::new();
let frame = make_dts_core(512);
let pes = make_pes(frame, Some(90000));
let frames = parser.parse(&pes);
assert_eq!(frames.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(frames[0].data.len(), 512);
assert!(parser.parse(&pes).is_empty());
let tail = parser.flush();
assert_eq!(tail.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(tail[0].data.len(), 512);
}
#[test]
@@ -199,9 +334,206 @@ mod tests {
assert!(parser.parse(&pes1).is_empty());
let pes2 = make_pes(frame[mid..].to_vec(), Some(93000));
let frames = parser.parse(&pes2);
assert_eq!(frames.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(frames[0].data.len(), 512);
assert!(parser.parse(&pes2).is_empty());
let tail = parser.flush();
assert_eq!(tail.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(tail[0].data.len(), 512);
}
#[test]
fn two_cores_back_to_back_emit_first_on_boundary() {
// The first complete unit is emitted as soon as the next core sync is
// seen; the second is held until flush.
let mut parser = DtsParser::new();
let mut stream = make_dts_core(512);
stream.extend_from_slice(&make_dts_core(640));
let f = parser.parse(&make_pes(stream, Some(90000)));
assert_eq!(f.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(f[0].data.len(), 512);
let tail = parser.flush();
assert_eq!(tail.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(tail[0].data.len(), 640);
}
/// Build a minimal DTS-HD extension substream of `size` bytes (just the
/// sync + zero-padding). The parser delimits extensions by the next CORE
/// sync, not by the extension's own size header, so a valid header isn't
/// required — only that the bytes carry no spurious core sync.
fn make_dts_ext(size: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut e = vec![0u8; size];
e[0..4].copy_from_slice(&DTS_HD_EXT_SYNC);
e
}
#[test]
fn keeps_dts_hd_extension_in_separate_pes_packets() {
// The real Blu-ray layout (ground-truthed on Dunkirk): the DTS core
// arrives in one PES, then its DTS-HD MA extension substreams arrive
// in SEPARATE following PES packets on the same PID. The parser must
// stitch core + all trailing extensions into one access unit — not
// emit a core-only (lossy) frame and drop the extension PES packets
// (the Dunkirk / Fight Club lossy-core bug).
let mut parser = DtsParser::new();
// Frame 1: core (512) + two extension substreams (256 + 200).
assert!(
parser
.parse(&make_pes(make_dts_core(512), Some(90000)))
.is_empty(),
"core alone: must wait for any following extension"
);
assert!(
parser
.parse(&make_pes(make_dts_ext(256), Some(91000)))
.is_empty(),
"first extension PES: still waiting for the unit to close"
);
assert!(
parser
.parse(&make_pes(make_dts_ext(200), Some(91500)))
.is_empty(),
"second extension PES: unit still not closed (no next core yet)"
);
// Frame 2's core PES arrives — that closes frame 1. The emitted unit
// must be core + BOTH extensions (lossless preserved), and keep the
// core's PTS, not the extension PES timestamps.
let f = parser.parse(&make_pes(make_dts_core(512), Some(93000)));
assert_eq!(f.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(
f[0].data.len(),
512 + 256 + 200,
"frame must include core + every extension substream"
);
// EOF drains frame 2.
let tail = parser.flush();
assert_eq!(tail.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(tail[0].data.len(), 512);
}
#[test]
fn extension_split_across_pes_is_preserved() {
// An extension substream straddling a PES boundary must still be fully
// attached to its core.
let mut parser = DtsParser::new();
let ext = make_dts_ext(300);
assert!(
parser
.parse(&make_pes(make_dts_core(512), Some(90000)))
.is_empty()
);
assert!(
parser
.parse(&make_pes(ext[..150].to_vec(), Some(91000)))
.is_empty()
);
assert!(
parser
.parse(&make_pes(ext[150..].to_vec(), Some(91000)))
.is_empty()
);
let tail = parser.flush();
assert_eq!(tail.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(tail[0].data.len(), 512 + 300);
}
/// Build 4 bytes that look like a DTS core sync but whose `fsize` field
/// decodes to a tiny `core_size` (< MIN_CORE_FRAME_BYTES). With the
/// dead-code guards this passed validation and could close an access unit
/// at a junk boundary; with the fix it must be drained and resynced past.
fn bogus_tiny_core_sync() -> Vec<u8> {
// Core sync + zero header bytes. fsize = 0 → core_size = 1 (< 10).
let mut v = vec![0u8; 10];
v[0..4].copy_from_slice(&DTS_CORE_SYNC);
// bytes 5,6,7 left zero → fsize = 0 → dts_core_frame_size = 1.
assert_eq!(dts_core_frame_size(&v), 1);
v
}
#[test]
fn bogus_tiny_core_sync_does_not_split_or_drop_real_au() {
// A real core frame followed by an extension substream that happens to
// contain a false core sync whose fsize decodes tiny. The bogus sync
// must NOT close the real access unit early (dropping the rest of the
// extension) nor emit a junk few-byte frame — it must be skipped, and
// the whole core + extension preserved as one access unit.
let mut parser = DtsParser::new();
// Frame 1: core(512) + an extension whose body embeds a bogus tiny
// core sync midway through.
let mut ext = make_dts_ext(256);
// Embed the bogus core sync inside the extension body (offset 64).
let bogus = bogus_tiny_core_sync();
ext[64..64 + bogus.len()].copy_from_slice(&bogus);
let mut frame1 = make_dts_core(512);
frame1.extend_from_slice(&ext);
// No next REAL core yet → frame 1 held.
assert!(
parser.parse(&make_pes(frame1, Some(90000))).is_empty(),
"bogus tiny core sync must not close the AU; wait for a real core"
);
// Frame 2's real core arrives — closes frame 1.
let f = parser.parse(&make_pes(make_dts_core(640), Some(93000)));
assert_eq!(f.len(), 1, "exactly one real access unit emitted");
assert_eq!(
f[0].data.len(),
512 + 256,
"AU must be the full core + extension, not split at the bogus sync"
);
assert_eq!(f[0].pts_ns, pts_to_ns(90000), "AU keeps the core's PTS");
let tail = parser.flush();
assert_eq!(tail.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(tail[0].data.len(), 640);
}
#[test]
fn forced_emit_does_not_corrupt_next_au_pts() {
// When the buffer exceeds MAX_AU_BYTES with no next core sync, the
// parser force-emits for forward progress. The current PES at that
// point is an extension-substream PES (later PTS). The forced path must
// NOT make that extension PTS the base of the NEXT access unit.
let mut parser = DtsParser::new();
// Core PES at the real PTS, then a giant extension (no next core) that
// pushes the buffer past MAX_AU_BYTES, forcing an emit.
let core_pts = 90000i64;
assert!(
parser
.parse(&make_pes(make_dts_core(512), Some(core_pts)))
.is_empty()
);
let ext_pts = 120000i64; // later extension-PES timestamp
let big_ext = make_dts_ext(MAX_AU_BYTES + 1024);
let f = parser.parse(&make_pes(big_ext, Some(ext_pts)));
assert_eq!(f.len(), 1, "oversized buffer force-emits one AU");
assert_eq!(
f[0].pts_ns,
pts_to_ns(core_pts),
"forced AU keeps the core PTS"
);
// The next REAL core PES arrives with its own PTS. Its AU must inherit
// THIS core's PTS, not the prior extension PES timestamp.
let next_core_pts = 150000i64;
assert!(
parser
.parse(&make_pes(make_dts_core(512), Some(next_core_pts)))
.is_empty()
);
let next_next_pts = 180000i64;
let f2 = parser.parse(&make_pes(make_dts_core(512), Some(next_next_pts)));
assert_eq!(f2.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(
f2[0].pts_ns,
pts_to_ns(next_core_pts),
"AU after a forced emit must use the next core's PTS, not the \
stale extension PTS"
);
}
#[test]
+11 -8
View File
@@ -38,8 +38,11 @@ impl CodecParser for H264Parser {
return Vec::new();
}
// Use DTS when available (monotonic for B-frame content), fall back to PTS
let pts_ns = pes.dts.or(pes.pts).map(pts_to_ns).unwrap_or(0);
// MKV block timecodes are PRESENTATION timestamps; frames are stored in
// decode order and the player reorders by timecode. Use PTS, not DTS —
// DTS presents B-frames in decode order (visible judder) and breaks
// PTS-based seeking. Fall back to DTS only if PTS is absent.
let pts_ns = pes.pts.or(pes.dts).map(pts_to_ns).unwrap_or(0);
// Scan NAL units for SPS, PPS, and IDR detection
let mut keyframe = false;
@@ -451,10 +454,10 @@ mod tests {
assert!(frames.is_empty());
}
// --- DTS preferred over PTS when present ---
// --- PTS (presentation) used for the MKV block timecode, not DTS ---
#[test]
fn dts_preferred_over_pts() {
fn pts_preferred_over_dts() {
let mut parser = H264Parser::new();
let mut data = Vec::new();
@@ -464,13 +467,13 @@ mod tests {
let pes = PesPacket {
pid: 0x1011,
pts: Some(180000), // 2 seconds
dts: Some(90000), // 1 second
pts: Some(180000), // 2 seconds (presentation)
dts: Some(90000), // 1 second (decode)
data,
};
let frames = parser.parse(&pes);
assert_eq!(frames.len(), 1);
// DTS should be used, not PTS
assert_eq!(frames[0].pts_ns, 1_000_000_000);
// PTS must be used — MKV block timecodes are presentation timestamps.
assert_eq!(frames[0].pts_ns, 2_000_000_000);
}
}
+166 -25
View File
@@ -48,8 +48,13 @@ impl CodecParser for HevcParser {
return Vec::new();
}
// Use DTS when available (monotonic for B-frame content), fall back to PTS
let pts_ns = pes.dts.or(pes.pts).map(pts_to_ns).unwrap_or(0);
// MKV block timecodes are PRESENTATION timestamps; frames are stored
// in decode order (the order they arrive here) and the player reorders
// for display by timecode. So use PTS, not DTS — using DTS makes the
// block timecode monotonic in storage order, which presents B-frames in
// decode order (visible judder / wrong frames) and breaks PTS-based
// seeking. Fall back to DTS only if PTS is somehow absent.
let pts_ns = pes.pts.or(pes.dts).map(pts_to_ns).unwrap_or(0);
let data = &pes.data;
let mut keyframe = false;
// Pre-size: output is ~input bytes with a few 4-byte length
@@ -62,6 +67,11 @@ impl CodecParser for HevcParser {
while let Some(sc_pos) = find_start_code(data, pos) {
if let Some(nal_start) = skip_start_code(data, sc_pos) {
let next = find_start_code(data, nal_start).unwrap_or(data.len());
// Strip the leading zeros of the following start code. For a
// conforming bitstream this is lossless: rbsp_trailing_bits()
// sets a stop-one bit, so the final byte of any RBSP is never
// 0x00 — the only trailing zeros here belong to the next
// 00 00 (00) 01 prefix.
let mut end = next;
while end > nal_start && data[end - 1] == 0x00 {
end -= 1;
@@ -124,34 +134,41 @@ impl CodecParser for HevcParser {
// Full HEVCDecoderConfigurationRecord is complex — for now, concatenate
let mut record = Vec::new();
// Minimal HEVCDecoderConfigurationRecord header
// Minimal HEVCDecoderConfigurationRecord header.
//
// The stored SPS NAL is [2-byte HEVC NAL header][SPS RBSP...].
// The RBSP begins at sps[2]; profile_tier_level() begins one byte
// later, after sps_video_parameter_set_id u(4) +
// sps_max_sub_layers_minus1 u(3) + sps_temporal_id_nesting_flag u(1)
// (= sps[2], a full byte). So the profile_tier_level fields are:
// sps[3] general_profile_space u(2)+tier u(1)+profile_idc u(5)
// sps[4..8] general_profile_compatibility_flags u(32)
// sps[8..14] general_constraint_indicator_flags 48 bits
// sps[14] general_level_idc u(8)
// (Byte-aligned read; emulation-prevention bytes within the first
// 15 SPS bytes are not handled — extremely rare and matches the
// pre-existing simplification.)
record.push(1); // configurationVersion
// General profile space, tier flag, profile IDC from SPS
if sps.len() > 3 {
record.push(sps[1]); // general_profile_space + general_tier_flag + general_profile_idc
// general_profile_space + general_tier_flag + general_profile_idc
record.push(if sps.len() > 3 { sps[3] } else { 0 });
// general_profile_compatibility_flags (4 bytes) — SPS bytes 4..8
if sps.len() > 7 {
record.extend_from_slice(&sps[4..8]);
} else {
record.push(0);
let avail = sps.len().saturating_sub(4).min(4);
record.extend_from_slice(&sps[sps.len().min(4)..sps.len().min(8)]);
record.extend_from_slice(&vec![0u8; 4 - avail]);
}
// general_profile_compatibility_flags (4 bytes) — from SPS bytes 2..6
if sps.len() > 5 {
record.extend_from_slice(&sps[2..6]);
// general_constraint_indicator_flags (6 bytes) — SPS bytes 8..14
if sps.len() > 13 {
record.extend_from_slice(&sps[8..14]);
} else {
record.extend_from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0]);
let avail = sps.len().saturating_sub(8).min(6);
record.extend_from_slice(&sps[sps.len().min(8)..sps.len().min(14)]);
record.extend_from_slice(&vec![0u8; 6 - avail]);
}
// general_constraint_indicator_flags (6 bytes) — from SPS bytes 6..12
if sps.len() > 11 {
record.extend_from_slice(&sps[6..12]);
} else {
let avail = sps.len().saturating_sub(6).min(6);
if avail > 0 {
record.extend_from_slice(&sps[6..6 + avail]);
record.extend_from_slice(&vec![0u8; 6 - avail]);
} else {
record.extend_from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]);
}
}
// general_level_idc
record.push(if sps.len() > 12 { sps[12] } else { 0 });
// general_level_idc — SPS byte 14
record.push(if sps.len() > 14 { sps[14] } else { 0 });
// min_spatial_segmentation_idc (4 + 12 bits)
record.extend_from_slice(&[0xF0, 0x00]);
// parallelismType (6 + 2 bits)
@@ -268,6 +285,103 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[test]
fn hvcc_profile_tier_level_offsets() {
// The hvcC fixed header must read profile_tier_level from the SPS
// RBSP, not from the NAL header. Stored SPS = [2-byte NAL header][RBSP].
// RBSP layout (byte-aligned):
// sps[2] sps_vps_id/max_sub_layers/temporal_nesting
// sps[3] general_profile_space+tier+profile_idc
// sps[4..8] general_profile_compatibility_flags
// sps[8..14] general_constraint_indicator_flags
// sps[14] general_level_idc
let mut parser = HevcParser::new();
// Distinct, recognizable values for each field.
let sps_rbsp: [u8; 13] = [
0xAB, // sps[2] (vps_id etc.) — must NOT leak into profile fields
0x21, // sps[3] profile byte: space=0, tier=0, profile_idc=1
0x60, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // sps[4..8] compat flags
0x90, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // sps[8..14] constraint flags
0x7B, // sps[14] level_idc = 123
];
let mut data = Vec::new();
// VPS
data.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x01]);
data.extend_from_slice(&hevc_nal_header(32));
data.extend_from_slice(&[0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC]);
// SPS — 2-byte header + the structured RBSP above
data.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x01]);
data.extend_from_slice(&hevc_nal_header(33));
data.extend_from_slice(&sps_rbsp);
// PPS
data.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x01]);
data.extend_from_slice(&hevc_nal_header(34));
data.extend_from_slice(&[0xDD, 0xEE]);
let pes = make_pes(data, Some(0));
parser.parse(&pes);
let cp = parser
.codec_private()
.expect("codec_private should be Some");
// record[0] = configurationVersion
assert_eq!(cp[0], 1, "configurationVersion");
// record[1] = general_profile_space+tier+profile_idc <- sps[3]
assert_eq!(
cp[1], 0x21,
"profile byte must come from SPS RBSP, not NAL hdr"
);
// record[2..6] = general_profile_compatibility_flags <- sps[4..8]
assert_eq!(&cp[2..6], &[0x60, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00], "compatibility flags");
// record[6..12] = general_constraint_indicator_flags <- sps[8..14]
assert_eq!(
&cp[6..12],
&[0x90, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00],
"constraint flags"
);
// record[12] = general_level_idc <- sps[14]
assert_eq!(cp[12], 0x7B, "level_idc must come from sps[14]");
}
#[test]
fn hvcc_short_sps_does_not_panic() {
// A truncated SPS must still produce a fixed header without panicking
// and zero-pad the missing profile/level bytes.
let mut parser = HevcParser::new();
let mut data = Vec::new();
data.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x01]);
data.extend_from_slice(&hevc_nal_header(32));
data.extend_from_slice(&[0xAA]);
// SPS with only 3 RBSP bytes (stored len = 5): forces every guard path
data.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x01]);
data.extend_from_slice(&hevc_nal_header(33));
data.extend_from_slice(&[0x11, 0x22, 0x33]);
data.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x01]);
data.extend_from_slice(&hevc_nal_header(34));
data.extend_from_slice(&[0xDD]);
let pes = make_pes(data, Some(0));
parser.parse(&pes);
let cp = parser
.codec_private()
.expect("codec_private should be Some");
// sps stored = [hdr0, hdr1, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33], len 5.
// profile byte = sps[3] = 0x22; everything past sps[4]=0x33 is absent.
assert_eq!(cp[0], 1);
assert_eq!(cp[1], 0x22, "profile byte = sps[3]");
// compat flags: only sps[4]=0x33 present, rest zero-padded.
assert_eq!(&cp[2..6], &[0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]);
// constraint flags: none present, all zero.
assert_eq!(&cp[6..12], &[0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]);
// level_idc: absent, zero.
assert_eq!(cp[12], 0x00);
}
#[test]
fn codec_private_none_before_params() {
let parser = HevcParser::new();
@@ -474,6 +588,33 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(frames[0].pts_ns, 1_000_000_000);
}
// --- PTS (presentation), not DTS, drives the MKV block timecode ---
// Regression for B-frame presentation: writing DTS as the block timecode
// presents frames in decode order (visible judder) and breaks seeking.
#[test]
fn pts_preferred_over_dts() {
let mut parser = HevcParser::new();
let mut data = Vec::new();
data.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x01]);
data.extend_from_slice(&hevc_nal_header(1)); // TRAIL_R slice
data.extend_from_slice(&[0x10, 0x20]);
let pes = PesPacket {
pid: 0x1011,
pts: Some(180000), // 2 s (presentation)
dts: Some(90000), // 1 s (decode)
data,
};
let frames = parser.parse(&pes);
assert_eq!(frames.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(
frames[0].pts_ns, 2_000_000_000,
"block timecode must be PTS"
);
}
// --- Dolby Vision enhancement layer ---
#[test]
+88 -10
View File
@@ -1,24 +1,39 @@
//! BD/DVD LPCM (Linear PCM) audio parser.
//!
//! BD LPCM PES packets have a 4-byte header:
//! BD LPCM PES packets (TS stream type 0x80) carry a 4-byte header on the
//! elementary-stream payload:
//! Bytes 0-1: audio frame number
//! Byte 2: reserved
//! Byte 3: quantization (bits 7-6), sample rate (bits 5-4), channel assignment (bits 3-0)
//! This header is part of the ES payload, so the BD parser must strip it.
//!
//! DVD LPCM (private stream 1, sub-stream 0xA0-0xA7) has a 3-byte header.
//! DVD LPCM lives in private stream 1 (sub-stream 0xA0-0xA7). Its 7-byte
//! private sub-header (sub_id + frames + first-access-unit-ptr(2) + emphasis +
//! quant/freq + channels) is stripped by `PsDemuxer` while demuxing the
//! Program Stream. By the time a DVD LPCM `PesPacket` reaches this parser its
//! `data` is already raw PCM, so the parser must NOT strip any further bytes —
//! doing so drops one sample pair per PES and drifts the audio.
//!
//! The raw PCM data follows the header. No framing is needed — each PES
//! payload minus its header is one complete audio frame.
//! The two origins are distinguished by the `strip_header` flag: BD = strip,
//! DVD = leave intact. The raw PCM data is otherwise one complete audio frame
//! per PES; no framing is needed.
//!
//! For MKV: codec ID "A_PCM/INT/BIG" (BD) or "A_PCM/INT/LIT" (DVD).
//! All frames are keyframes (uncompressed audio).
use super::{CodecParser, Frame, PesPacket, pts_to_ns};
/// BD LPCM header size in bytes.
/// BD LPCM header size in bytes (present on BD-TS LPCM, absent on DVD-PS LPCM
/// because `PsDemuxer` already stripped the private sub-header).
const BD_LPCM_HEADER_SIZE: usize = 4;
pub struct LpcmParser;
pub struct LpcmParser {
/// Whether to strip the 4-byte BD LPCM header from each PES payload.
///
/// `true` for BD-TS LPCM (header still present), `false` for DVD-PS LPCM
/// (header already removed by `PsDemuxer`).
strip_header: bool,
}
impl Default for LpcmParser {
fn default() -> Self {
@@ -27,23 +42,36 @@ impl Default for LpcmParser {
}
impl LpcmParser {
/// BD-TS LPCM parser: strips the 4-byte BD LPCM header from each PES.
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self
Self { strip_header: true }
}
/// DVD-PS LPCM parser: `PsDemuxer` already stripped the private sub-header,
/// so the payload is raw PCM and no further bytes are removed.
pub fn new_dvd() -> Self {
Self {
strip_header: false,
}
}
}
impl CodecParser for LpcmParser {
fn parse(&mut self, pes: &PesPacket) -> Vec<Frame> {
// Skip the BD LPCM header (4 bytes).
let offset = if self.strip_header {
BD_LPCM_HEADER_SIZE
} else {
0
};
// If the PES is too short to contain header + data, return nothing.
if pes.data.len() <= BD_LPCM_HEADER_SIZE {
if pes.data.len() <= offset {
return Vec::new();
}
let pts_ns = pes.pts.map(pts_to_ns).unwrap_or(0);
vec![Frame {
pts_ns,
keyframe: true,
data: pes.data[BD_LPCM_HEADER_SIZE..].to_vec(),
data: pes.data[offset..].to_vec(),
duration_ns: None,
}]
}
@@ -84,6 +112,56 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(frames[0].pts_ns, 1_000_000_000); // 90000 ticks = 1 second
}
#[test]
fn bd_lpcm_strips_4_byte_header() {
// BD-TS LPCM: the 4-byte BD header is part of the ES payload and must
// be stripped, leaving exactly the PCM bytes.
let mut parser = LpcmParser::new();
let header = vec![0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0b1001_0001];
let pcm = vec![0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88];
let mut data = header;
data.extend_from_slice(&pcm);
let frames = parser.parse(&make_pes(data, Some(0)));
assert_eq!(frames.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(frames[0].data, pcm, "BD must strip exactly 4 header bytes");
}
#[test]
fn dvd_lpcm_preserves_all_pcm_bytes() {
// DVD-PS LPCM: PsDemuxer already removed the 7-byte private sub-header,
// so the payload handed to this parser is raw PCM. The DVD parser must
// NOT strip any further bytes (the round-2 audit Finding 3 bug: the BD
// 4-byte strip dropped one sample pair per PES, drifting the audio).
let mut parser = LpcmParser::new_dvd();
let pcm = vec![0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0xCA, 0xFE, 0x01, 0x02];
let frames = parser.parse(&make_pes(pcm.clone(), Some(90000)));
assert_eq!(frames.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(
frames[0].data, pcm,
"DVD must preserve every PCM byte — no second strip"
);
assert_eq!(frames[0].pts_ns, 1_000_000_000);
}
#[test]
fn dvd_lpcm_emits_short_payload_bd_would_drop() {
// A 4-byte raw-PCM DVD payload (1 sample pair at 16-bit stereo). The BD
// parser drops <= 4 bytes as "header only"; the DVD parser must emit it.
let mut bd = LpcmParser::new();
let mut dvd = LpcmParser::new_dvd();
let pcm = vec![0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD];
assert!(
bd.parse(&make_pes(pcm.clone(), Some(0))).is_empty(),
"BD treats 4 bytes as header-only"
);
let frames = dvd.parse(&make_pes(pcm.clone(), Some(0)));
assert_eq!(frames.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(frames[0].data, pcm);
}
#[test]
fn always_keyframe() {
let mut parser = LpcmParser::new();
+23 -1
View File
@@ -52,6 +52,18 @@ pub trait CodecParser: Send {
/// Some (TrueHD): multiple access units per PES.
fn parse(&mut self, pes: &PesPacket) -> Vec<Frame>;
/// Drain any access unit still buffered after the last PES.
///
/// Parsers that buffer across PES boundaries to assemble a complete
/// access unit (e.g. DTS-HD, whose extension substreams arrive in
/// separate PES packets) hold the final unit until they can prove it's
/// complete. At end-of-stream there is no following packet to prove it,
/// so the demuxer calls `flush()` once after the last PES to emit it.
/// Default: nothing buffered, no tail.
fn flush(&mut self) -> Vec<Frame> {
Vec::new()
}
/// Get codec initialization data (e.g., SPS+PPS for H.264).
/// Returns None until enough data has been seen.
fn codec_private(&self) -> Option<Vec<u8>>;
@@ -90,7 +102,16 @@ impl CodecParser for PassthroughParser {
/// Create the appropriate parser for a codec, with optional codec private data.
///
/// For DvdSub, `codec_data` should be the pre-formatted VobSub .idx palette header.
pub fn parser_for_codec(codec: Codec, codec_data: Option<Vec<u8>>) -> Box<dyn CodecParser> {
///
/// `is_dvd_ps` selects the DVD program-stream variant where it matters: DVD
/// LPCM arrives with its private sub-header already stripped by the
/// `PsDemuxer`, so the LPCM parser must NOT strip the 4-byte BD LPCM header
/// again (that would drop one PCM sample pair per PES → progressive drift).
pub fn parser_for_codec(
codec: Codec,
codec_data: Option<Vec<u8>>,
is_dvd_ps: bool,
) -> Box<dyn CodecParser> {
match codec {
Codec::H264 => Box::new(h264::H264Parser::new()),
Codec::Hevc => Box::new(hevc::HevcParser::new()),
@@ -100,6 +121,7 @@ pub fn parser_for_codec(codec: Codec, codec_data: Option<Vec<u8>>) -> Box<dyn Co
Codec::DtsHdMa | Codec::DtsHdHr | Codec::Dts => Box::new(dts::DtsParser::new()),
Codec::TrueHd => Box::new(truehd::TrueHdParser::new()),
Codec::Pgs => Box::new(pgs::PgsParser::new()),
Codec::Lpcm if is_dvd_ps => Box::new(lpcm::LpcmParser::new_dvd()),
Codec::Lpcm => Box::new(lpcm::LpcmParser::new()),
Codec::DvdSub => Box::new(dvdsub::DvdSubParser::new(codec_data)),
_ => Box::new(PassthroughParser::new(true)),
+79 -4
View File
@@ -96,9 +96,14 @@ impl CodecParser for Mpeg2Parser {
return Vec::new();
}
let pts_ns = pes.dts.or(pes.pts).map(pts_to_ns).unwrap_or(0);
// MKV block timecodes are PRESENTATION timestamps; frames are stored in
// decode order and the player reorders by timecode. Use PTS, not DTS —
// DTS presents B-frames in decode order (visible judder) and breaks
// PTS-based seeking. Fall back to DTS only if PTS is absent.
let pts_ns = pes.pts.or(pes.dts).map(pts_to_ns).unwrap_or(0);
let data = &pes.data;
let mut keyframe = false;
let mut has_picture = false;
// Scan for start codes in the elementary stream data.
let mut pos = 0;
@@ -176,6 +181,7 @@ impl CodecParser for Mpeg2Parser {
PICTURE_CODE => {
// Picture header: bytes after start code contain temporal_reference
// (10 bits) + picture_coding_type (3 bits).
has_picture = true;
if sc + 5 < data.len() {
let picture_coding_type = (data[sc + 5] >> 3) & 0x07;
if picture_coding_type == PICTURE_TYPE_I {
@@ -190,6 +196,23 @@ impl CodecParser for Mpeg2Parser {
}
}
// A PES that carried a sequence header but no picture start code is a
// parameter-set-only access unit: it has no coded picture to emit.
// Emitting it as a standalone keyframe would put bare sequence-header
// bytes into frame data with no picture. The sequence header is
// captured into codec_private above and is re-emitted in-band on the
// next real picture's PES, so dropping the empty access unit loses
// nothing. Mirrors how the H.264/HEVC parsers skip parameter-set-only
// access units.
//
// Conservative: only drop when this PES actually contained a sequence
// header and no picture. A PES with neither (e.g. a slice
// continuation) still passes through unchanged, preserving real
// keyframe detection.
if !has_picture && contains_seq_header(data) {
return Vec::new();
}
vec![Frame {
pts_ns,
keyframe,
@@ -241,6 +264,21 @@ fn parse_aspect_ratio(hdr: &[u8]) -> Option<(u8, u8)> {
Some(ASPECT_RATIOS[ar_code])
}
/// Returns true if `data` contains a sequence-header start code (00 00 01 B3).
fn contains_seq_header(data: &[u8]) -> bool {
let mut pos = 0;
while let Some(sc) = find_start_code(data, pos) {
if sc + 3 >= data.len() {
break;
}
if data[sc + 3] == SEQ_HEADER_CODE {
return true;
}
pos = sc + 4;
}
false
}
/// Find the position of the next start code (00 00 01) at or after `from`.
fn find_start_code(data: &[u8], from: usize) -> Option<usize> {
if data.len() < from + 3 {
@@ -429,15 +467,15 @@ mod tests {
assert!(has_ext, "codec_private should include sequence extension");
}
// --- I-frame with sequence header = keyframe ---
// --- sequence header + picture = keyframe ---
#[test]
fn sequence_header_implies_keyframe() {
fn sequence_header_with_picture_is_keyframe() {
let mut parser = Mpeg2Parser::new();
let mut data = Vec::new();
data.extend_from_slice(&make_seq_header(720, 480, 3, 4));
// Even without an explicit picture header, a sequence header implies I-frame.
data.extend_from_slice(&make_picture_header(PICTURE_TYPE_I));
data.extend_from_slice(&[0xFF; 16]);
let pes = make_pes(data, Some(0));
@@ -445,6 +483,43 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(frames.len(), 1);
assert!(frames[0].keyframe);
// codecPrivate is still captured.
assert!(parser.codec_private().is_some());
}
// --- parameter-set-only PES (seq header, no picture) emits no frame ---
#[test]
fn sequence_header_only_pes_emits_no_frame() {
let mut parser = Mpeg2Parser::new();
// A PES carrying only a sequence header (+ extension), no picture.
let mut data = Vec::new();
data.extend_from_slice(&make_seq_header(1920, 1080, 3, 4));
data.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x01, SEQ_EXT_CODE]);
data.extend_from_slice(&[0x14, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00]);
let pes = make_pes(data, Some(0));
let frames = parser.parse(&pes);
// No coded picture → no frame emitted, but the sequence header is
// still captured for codecPrivate.
assert!(
frames.is_empty(),
"parameter-set-only PES should not emit a frame"
);
assert!(
parser.codec_private().is_some(),
"sequence header should still be captured into codec_private"
);
// A following picture-bearing PES emits the real keyframe.
let mut data2 = Vec::new();
data2.extend_from_slice(&make_picture_header(PICTURE_TYPE_I));
data2.extend_from_slice(&[0xFF; 16]);
let frames2 = parser.parse(&make_pes(data2, Some(3600)));
assert_eq!(frames2.len(), 1);
assert!(frames2[0].keyframe);
}
// --- PTS conversion ---
+39 -1
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,13 @@
use super::{CodecParser, Frame, PesPacket, pts_to_ns};
const SEGMENT_PCS: u8 = 0x16;
// Upper bound on a pending display set's accumulated bytes. Real PGS
// display sets are small (a 1080p RLE bitmap plus palette is well under
// 1 MB); a stream that keeps appending non-PCS segments without ever
// emitting a PCS is malformed. Cap accumulation to bound memory and
// drop further appends until the next PCS resyncs the parser. Mirrors
// the MAX_*_BYTES / MAX_*_BUF caps in the DTS and AC-3 parsers.
const MAX_PGS_PENDING_BYTES: usize = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
// Offset within the PES payload at which number_of_composition_objects
// lives in a PCS: 3-byte segment header + 10 bytes of PCS fields
// (video_w/h, frame_rate, comp_num, comp_state, palette_update,
@@ -90,7 +97,12 @@ impl CodecParser for PgsParser {
// a pending display, append; otherwise emit as-is.
None => {
if let Some((_, ref mut buf)) = self.pending {
buf.extend_from_slice(&pes.data);
// Bound accumulation: a well-formed display set is small.
// Past the cap, drop further appends (malformed stream);
// the next PCS will take/replace `pending` and resync.
if buf.len() + pes.data.len() <= MAX_PGS_PENDING_BYTES {
buf.extend_from_slice(&pes.data);
}
} else {
out.push(Frame {
pts_ns,
@@ -180,6 +192,32 @@ mod tests {
assert!(data.windows(5).any(|w| w == [0x15, 0x00, 0x02, 0xAA, 0xBB]));
}
#[test]
fn pending_buffer_is_capped() {
let mut parser = PgsParser::new();
// Open a display set.
let _ = parser.parse(&make_pes(pcs_bytes(1), Some(90000)));
// Flood with non-PCS segments far exceeding the cap.
let chunk = vec![0x15u8; 256 * 1024]; // 256 KB ODS-like segment
let floods = (MAX_PGS_PENDING_BYTES / chunk.len()) + 32;
for _ in 0..floods {
let frames = parser.parse(&make_pes(chunk.clone(), Some(90000)));
assert!(frames.is_empty(), "non-PCS appends should not emit");
}
// The pending buffer must not have grown without bound.
let pending_len = parser.pending.as_ref().map(|(_, b)| b.len()).unwrap_or(0);
assert!(
pending_len <= MAX_PGS_PENDING_BYTES,
"pending buffer {pending_len} exceeded cap {MAX_PGS_PENDING_BYTES}"
);
// A following PCS still resyncs and emits the (capped) pending set.
let frames = parser.parse(&make_pes(pcs_bytes(0), Some(180000)));
assert_eq!(frames.len(), 1);
}
#[test]
fn codec_private_none() {
let parser = PgsParser::new();
+81
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ use super::{CodecParser, Frame, PesPacket, pts_to_ns};
/// Duration of one TrueHD access unit in nanoseconds (1/1200 second).
const AU_DURATION_NS: i64 = 833_333;
/// Hard cap on the reassembly buffer. A valid TrueHD/MAT access unit is
/// well under 32 KiB; if the buffer grows far past that without yielding a
/// frame the stream is malformed, so we drop it and resync rather than grow
/// without bound. Parity with the AC-3 / DTS / PGS caps.
const MAX_TRUEHD_BUF: usize = 256 * 1024;
pub struct TrueHdParser {
buf: Vec<u8>,
next_pts_ns: i64,
@@ -145,6 +151,12 @@ impl CodecParser for TrueHdParser {
self.next_pts_ns += AU_DURATION_NS;
}
// Bound memory on malformed input: a stream that never yields a
// complete frame must not grow the buffer without limit.
if self.buf.len() > MAX_TRUEHD_BUF {
self.buf.clear();
}
frames
}
@@ -153,6 +165,52 @@ impl CodecParser for TrueHdParser {
}
}
/// Per-bit channel counts for the TrueHD 8-channel and 6-channel presentation
/// channel-assignment masks (per the MLP spec / FFmpeg `thd_channels`). Some
/// bits denote a stereo pair (2), others a single channel (1).
const THD_8CH: [u8; 13] = [2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1];
const THD_6CH: [u8; 5] = [2, 1, 1, 2, 1];
/// Decode the true channel count from a TrueHD major-sync `format_info` word
/// (the 32 bits immediately after the 0xF8726FBA sync). Returns the richest
/// presentation's channel count — the 8-channel (e.g. 7.1) presentation when
/// present, else the 6-channel (5.1) one. This is the real layout that the MPLS
/// `audio_format` base field (often 5.1 even on a 7.1/Atmos track) understates.
pub fn truehd_channels(format_info: u32) -> Option<u8> {
let ch8 = (format_info & 0x1FFF) as u16; // 8ch_presentation_channel_assignment (13 bits)
let ch6 = ((format_info >> 15) & 0x1F) as u16; // 6ch_presentation_channel_assignment (5 bits)
let count = |mask: u16, tbl: &[u8]| -> u8 {
tbl.iter()
.enumerate()
.filter(|(i, _)| mask & (1 << i) != 0)
.map(|(_, &c)| c)
.sum()
};
if ch8 != 0 {
Some(count(ch8, &THD_8CH))
} else if ch6 != 0 {
Some(count(ch6, &THD_6CH))
} else {
None
}
}
/// Scan a demuxed TrueHD elementary-stream chunk for the first major sync and
/// decode its true channel count. The stream may interleave AC-3; we scan for
/// the major-sync word anywhere and read the following `format_info`.
pub fn truehd_channels_from_stream(data: &[u8]) -> Option<u8> {
let mut p = 0;
while p + 8 <= data.len() {
let w = u32::from_be_bytes([data[p], data[p + 1], data[p + 2], data[p + 3]]);
if (w & 0xFFFF_FFFE) == 0xF872_6FBA {
let fi = u32::from_be_bytes([data[p + 4], data[p + 5], data[p + 6], data[p + 7]]);
return truehd_channels(fi);
}
p += 1;
}
None
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
@@ -247,4 +305,27 @@ mod tests {
let parser = TrueHdParser::new();
assert!(parser.codec_private().is_none());
}
#[test]
fn truehd_channels_71_from_8ch_presentation() {
// 8ch presentation assignment bits 0-4 (LR,C,LFE,LsRs,back-LR) = 2+1+1+2+2 = 8.
let format_info = 0x1F; // low 13 bits = 0x1F
assert_eq!(truehd_channels(format_info), Some(8));
}
#[test]
fn truehd_channels_51_from_6ch_presentation() {
// No 8ch presentation; 6ch bits 0-3 (LR,C,LFE,LsRs) = 2+1+1+2 = 6.
let format_info = 0xF << 15; // 6ch field = 0xF, 8ch field = 0
assert_eq!(truehd_channels(format_info), Some(6));
}
#[test]
fn truehd_channels_scan_finds_major_sync() {
// [junk][major sync 0xF8726FBA][format_info: 8ch=0x1F -> 7.1]
let mut data = vec![0xAA, 0xBB];
data.extend_from_slice(&0xF872_6FBAu32.to_be_bytes());
data.extend_from_slice(&0x0000_001Fu32.to_be_bytes());
assert_eq!(truehd_channels_from_stream(&data), Some(8));
}
}
+64 -10
View File
@@ -41,9 +41,13 @@ impl CodecParser for Vc1Parser {
return Vec::new();
}
// Use DTS when available (monotonic for B-frame content), fall back to PTS
let ts_ns = pes.dts.or(pes.pts).map(pts_to_ns).unwrap_or(0);
// MKV block timecodes are PRESENTATION timestamps; frames are stored in
// decode order and the player reorders by timecode. Use PTS, not DTS —
// DTS presents B-frames in decode order (visible judder) and breaks
// PTS-based seeking. Fall back to DTS only if PTS is absent.
let ts_ns = pes.pts.or(pes.dts).map(pts_to_ns).unwrap_or(0);
let mut has_seq_header = false;
let mut has_entry_point = false;
let mut frame_start: Option<usize> = None;
// Scan for start codes (00 00 01 XX)
@@ -67,6 +71,7 @@ impl CodecParser for Vc1Parser {
SC_ENTRY_POINT => {
let end = find_next_sc(data, i + 4).unwrap_or(data.len());
self.entry_point = Some(data[i..end].to_vec());
has_entry_point = true;
}
SC_FRAME => {
// Frame data starts at this start code
@@ -85,11 +90,23 @@ impl CodecParser for Vc1Parser {
// Keyframe = this PES contains a sequence header (I-frame indicator in BD)
let keyframe = has_seq_header;
// Strip sequence header + entry point from frame data — those are in codecPrivate.
// Only include data from the frame start code onwards.
// Strip sequence header + entry point from frame data — those are in
// codecPrivate, not coded-picture data. Only include data from the
// frame start code onwards.
let frame_data = match frame_start {
Some(start) => &data[start..],
None => data, // no frame start code found, pass through entire PES
None => {
// No frame start code. If this PES carried only parameter sets
// (sequence header / entry point, captured above into
// codecPrivate), there is no coded picture to emit — drop it
// rather than passing parameter bytes through as a bogus
// keyframe. Mirrors how the H.264/HEVC parsers skip
// parameter-set-only access units.
if has_seq_header || has_entry_point {
return Vec::new();
}
data // genuine picture payload with no leading 0x0D — pass through
}
};
vec![Frame {
@@ -343,6 +360,42 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(&frames[0].data[0..4], &[0x00, 0x00, 0x01, SC_FRAME]);
}
// --- parameter-set-only PES (seq header + entry point, no frame SC) ---
#[test]
fn param_set_only_pes_emits_no_frame() {
let mut parser = Vc1Parser::new();
// Sequence header + entry point, but NO frame start code (0x0D).
let mut data = Vec::new();
data.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x01, SC_SEQUENCE_HEADER]);
data.extend_from_slice(&[0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF]);
data.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x01, SC_ENTRY_POINT]);
data.extend_from_slice(&[0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44]);
let pes = make_pes(data, Some(90000));
let frames = parser.parse(&pes);
// No coded picture → no frame emitted (parameter bytes must not be
// passed through as a bogus keyframe).
assert!(
frames.is_empty(),
"parameter-set-only PES should not emit a frame"
);
// But codecPrivate is still captured.
assert!(parser.seq_header.is_some());
assert!(parser.entry_point.is_some());
assert!(parser.codec_private().is_some());
// A following frame-bearing PES still emits its picture.
let mut data2 = Vec::new();
data2.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x01, SC_FRAME]);
data2.extend_from_slice(&[0x55, 0x66, 0x77]);
let frames2 = parser.parse(&make_pes(data2, Some(180000)));
assert_eq!(frames2.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(&frames2[0].data[0..4], &[0x00, 0x00, 0x01, SC_FRAME]);
}
// --- empty PES ---
#[test]
@@ -369,10 +422,10 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(frames[0].pts_ns, 1_000_000_000);
}
// --- DTS preferred over PTS ---
// --- PTS (presentation) used for the MKV block timecode, not DTS ---
#[test]
fn dts_preferred_over_pts() {
fn pts_preferred_over_dts() {
let mut parser = Vc1Parser::new();
let mut data = Vec::new();
@@ -381,13 +434,14 @@ mod tests {
let pes = PesPacket {
pid: 0x1011,
pts: Some(180000),
dts: Some(90000),
pts: Some(180000), // presentation
dts: Some(90000), // decode
data,
};
let frames = parser.parse(&pes);
assert_eq!(frames.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(frames[0].pts_ns, 1_000_000_000);
// PTS must be used — MKV block timecodes are presentation timestamps.
assert_eq!(frames[0].pts_ns, 2_000_000_000);
}
// --- find_next_sc utility ---
+15 -1
View File
@@ -195,7 +195,8 @@ impl DiscStream {
};
pids.push(pid);
pid_to_track.push((pid, idx));
parsers.push((pid, super::codec::parser_for_codec(codec, None)));
let is_dvd_ps = matches!(content_format, crate::disc::ContentFormat::MpegPs);
parsers.push((pid, super::codec::parser_for_codec(codec, None, is_dvd_ps)));
}
let mut ts_demuxer = None;
@@ -541,6 +542,19 @@ impl crate::pes::Stream for DiscStream {
}
}
}
// Drain any access unit a codec parser buffered past the last
// PES (DTS-HD's final core+extension unit, assembled across
// PES boundaries).
let pid_to_track = &self.pid_to_track;
let pending = &mut self.pending_frames;
for (pid, parser) in self.parsers.iter_mut() {
let Some(&(_, track)) = pid_to_track.iter().find(|(p, _)| p == pid) else {
continue;
};
for frame in parser.flush() {
pending.push_back(crate::pes::PesFrame::from_codec_frame(track, frame));
}
}
return Ok(self.pending_frames.pop_front());
}
+50 -13
View File
@@ -264,6 +264,13 @@ pub fn read_element_header(r: &mut impl Read) -> io::Result<(u32, u64, usize)> {
/// Read an unsigned integer value of `len` bytes.
pub fn read_uint_val(r: &mut impl Read, len: usize) -> io::Result<u64> {
// An EBML unsigned integer is at most 8 bytes. A malformed element
// claiming `len > 8` would index past this stack buffer and panic
// (DoS on untrusted input) — reject it at the source so every caller
// is safe, not just the ones that pre-check.
if len > 8 {
return Err(crate::error::Error::MkvInvalid.into());
}
let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
r.read_exact(&mut buf[..len])?;
let mut val = 0u64;
@@ -273,23 +280,33 @@ pub fn read_uint_val(r: &mut impl Read, len: usize) -> io::Result<u64> {
Ok(val)
}
/// Read a float value (4 or 8 bytes).
/// Read a float value. EBML floats are exactly 0, 4, or 8 bytes.
///
/// The previous `else` branch read a fixed 8 bytes for ANY non-4 length,
/// so a malformed element with `len > 8` left `len - 8` unconsumed bytes
/// (mis-read as the next EBML header → desync of the rest of the parent
/// element) and `len < 4` over-read. Consume exactly `len` bytes and
/// reject anything that isn't a valid float width.
pub fn read_float_val(r: &mut impl Read, len: usize) -> io::Result<f64> {
if len == 4 {
let mut buf = [0u8; 4];
r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
Ok(f32::from_be_bytes(buf) as f64)
} else {
let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
Ok(f64::from_be_bytes(buf))
match len {
0 => Ok(0.0),
4 => {
let mut buf = [0u8; 4];
r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
Ok(f32::from_be_bytes(buf) as f64)
}
8 => {
let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
Ok(f64::from_be_bytes(buf))
}
_ => Err(crate::error::Error::MkvInvalid.into()),
}
}
/// Read a UTF-8 string value of `len` bytes.
pub fn read_string_val(r: &mut impl Read, len: usize) -> io::Result<String> {
let mut buf = vec![0u8; len];
r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
let mut buf = read_exact_bounded(r, len)?;
// Strip trailing nulls
while buf.last() == Some(&0) {
buf.pop();
@@ -299,8 +316,22 @@ pub fn read_string_val(r: &mut impl Read, len: usize) -> io::Result<String> {
/// Read binary data of `len` bytes.
pub fn read_binary_val(r: &mut impl Read, len: usize) -> io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
let mut buf = vec![0u8; len];
r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
read_exact_bounded(r, len)
}
/// Read exactly `len` bytes WITHOUT trusting `len` to size the allocation.
///
/// `vec![0u8; len]` on an attacker-controlled EBML size would allocate
/// gigabytes before the read fails. Instead we cap the reader to `len`
/// and grow the buffer as bytes actually arrive: a malformed element that
/// claims a huge length but supplies few bytes allocates only what it
/// delivers, then errors on the short read.
fn read_exact_bounded(r: &mut impl Read, len: usize) -> io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
let mut buf = Vec::new();
let got = r.take(len as u64).read_to_end(&mut buf)?;
if got != len {
return Err(io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof.into());
}
Ok(buf)
}
@@ -362,6 +393,12 @@ pub const MATRIX_COEFFICIENTS: u32 = 0x55B1;
pub const PRIMARIES: u32 = 0x55BB;
pub const RANGE: u32 = 0x55B9;
// Dolby Vision — BlockAdditionMapping carries the DOVIDecoderConfigurationRecord
// (dvcC) so players / mediainfo recognise the track as Dolby Vision.
pub const BLOCK_ADDITION_MAPPING: u32 = 0x41E4;
pub const BLOCK_ADD_ID_TYPE: u32 = 0x41E7;
pub const BLOCK_ADD_ID_EXTRA_DATA: u32 = 0x41ED;
// Audio
pub const AUDIO: u32 = 0xE1;
pub const SAMPLING_FREQUENCY: u32 = 0xB5;
+199 -10
View File
@@ -34,6 +34,24 @@ pub struct MkvTrack {
pub sample_rate: f64,
pub channels: u8,
pub bit_depth: u8,
// Dolby Vision: the dvcC (DOVIDecoderConfigurationRecord) for the DV layer,
// emitted as a BlockAdditionMapping. `None` for non-DV tracks.
pub dv_config: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}
/// Build a DOVIDecoderConfigurationRecord (dvcC) — 24 bytes — for the Matroska
/// BlockAdditionMapping. For disc Profile 7 dual-layer the base, enhancement,
/// and RPU are all present (lossless FEL/MEL preserved as a second track).
pub fn dolby_vision_config(profile: u8, level: u8, bl_compat_id: u8) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut v = vec![0u8; 24];
v[0] = 1; // dv_version_major
v[1] = 0; // dv_version_minor
// profile(7) | level(6) | rpu_present(1) | el_present(1) | bl_present(1)
v[2] = ((profile & 0x7F) << 1) | ((level >> 5) & 0x01);
v[3] = ((level & 0x1F) << 3) | (1 << 2) | (1 << 1) | 1; // rpu = el = bl = 1
v[4] = (bl_compat_id & 0x0F) << 4;
// v[5..24] reserved = 0
v
}
impl MkvTrack {
@@ -83,23 +101,33 @@ impl MkvTrack {
sample_rate: 0.0,
channels: 0,
bit_depth: 0,
// The DV layer (hdr=DolbyVision) carries the dvcC so the track is
// recognised as Dolby Vision (disc Profile 7 dual-layer).
dv_config: if matches!(v.hdr, HdrFormat::DolbyVision) {
Some(dolby_vision_config(7, 6, 0))
} else {
None
},
}
}
pub fn audio(a: &AudioStream) -> Self {
// Codec ID strings must distinguish the DTS family — strict
// players (Plex transcoder, some hardware decoders, some AV
// receivers) reject lossless DTS-HD MA payload when the
// track advertises plain `A_DTS` because it implies the
// bitstream is the 1.5 Mbps "core" only. Fix is just to
// emit the right ID per BD-STN codec field.
// The Matroska codec-ID registry defines `A_DTS` for the entire
// DTS family — the spec text for `A_DTS` explicitly states it
// "Supports DTS, DTS-ES, DTS-96/26, DTS-HD High Resolution Audio
// and DTS-HD Master Audio." Players distinguish core vs HD-HRA vs
// HD-MA by parsing the DTS bitstream extension substreams, not by
// the container codec ID. The previously-emitted `A_DTS/MA` and
// `A_DTS/HR` suffixes are NOT registered codec IDs; strict parsers
// (libmatroska) and some hardware renderers fail to recognise the
// track at all. Emit plain `A_DTS` for every DTS variant — the
// lossless MA / HRA payload bytes are unchanged, only the
// container codec-ID string differs.
let codec_id = match a.codec {
Codec::Ac3 => "A_AC3",
Codec::Ac3Plus => "A_EAC3",
Codec::TrueHd => "A_TRUEHD",
Codec::DtsHdMa => "A_DTS/MA",
Codec::DtsHdHr => "A_DTS/HR",
Codec::Dts => "A_DTS",
Codec::DtsHdMa | Codec::DtsHdHr | Codec::Dts => "A_DTS",
Codec::Lpcm => "A_PCM/INT/BIG",
_ => "A_AC3",
};
@@ -128,6 +156,7 @@ impl MkvTrack {
sample_rate: sr,
channels: ch,
bit_depth: 0,
dv_config: None,
}
}
@@ -156,6 +185,7 @@ impl MkvTrack {
sample_rate: 0.0,
channels: 0,
bit_depth: 0,
dv_config: None,
}
}
}
@@ -193,6 +223,12 @@ pub struct MkvMuxer<W: Write + Seek> {
/// New cluster every 5 seconds.
const CLUSTER_DURATION_MS: i64 = 5000;
/// Maximum block-relative timestamp expressible in the signed 16-bit
/// SimpleBlock/Block field (`i16::MAX` ms). A frame further than this from
/// the open cluster's timestamp forces a new cluster (see `write_frame`) so
/// the `as i16` cast can never wrap.
const MAX_BLOCK_REL_MS: i64 = i16::MAX as i64;
impl<W: Write + Seek> MkvMuxer<W> {
/// Create a new MKV muxer: writes EBML header, Segment start, Info, Tracks, Chapters.
pub fn new(
@@ -333,6 +369,17 @@ impl<W: Write + Seek> MkvMuxer<W> {
ebml::end_master(&mut writer, vid_pos)?;
}
// Dolby Vision signaling — BlockAdditionMapping is a child of the
// TrackEntry (sibling of Video). Carries the dvcC so players /
// mediainfo recognise the track as Dolby Vision.
if let Some(ref dvcc) = track.dv_config {
let map_pos = ebml::start_master(&mut writer, ebml::BLOCK_ADDITION_MAPPING)?;
// BlockAddIDType = "dvcC" fourcc (DOVIDecoderConfigurationRecord).
ebml::write_uint(&mut writer, ebml::BLOCK_ADD_ID_TYPE, 0x6476_6343)?;
ebml::write_binary(&mut writer, ebml::BLOCK_ADD_ID_EXTRA_DATA, dvcc)?;
ebml::end_master(&mut writer, map_pos)?;
}
// Audio-specific
if track.track_type == ebml::TRACK_TYPE_AUDIO && track.sample_rate > 0.0 {
let aud_pos = ebml::start_master(&mut writer, ebml::AUDIO)?;
@@ -406,7 +453,7 @@ impl<W: Write + Seek> MkvMuxer<W> {
let base = *self.base_pts_ms.get_or_insert(raw_ms);
let pts_ms = raw_ms - base;
// Cluster boundaries must coincide with a video keyframe so every
// Cluster boundaries normally coincide with a video keyframe so every
// Cues entry resolves to a seekable IDR at the cluster start.
let is_video_key = keyframe && track_idx == 0;
let needs_new_cluster = !self.cluster_open
@@ -422,6 +469,17 @@ impl<W: Write + Seek> MkvMuxer<W> {
track: track_idx + 1,
cluster_pos: self.cluster_pos - self.segment_start,
});
} else if (pts_ms - self.cluster_ts_ms) > MAX_BLOCK_REL_MS {
// The block-relative timestamp is a signed 16-bit value, so a
// frame more than i16::MAX ms (~32.767 s) past the current
// cluster's timestamp would silently wrap on the `as i16` cast,
// corrupting A/V sync. The keyframe-driven boundary above only
// fires on a video keyframe — a long audio-only stretch, or a
// very long GOP with no intervening keyframe, can drift past the
// i16 range. Force a fresh cluster here even without a keyframe
// to keep the cast in range. This cluster is not keyframe-aligned
// so it gets no Cues entry (Cues stay IDR-only for seekability).
self.start_cluster(pts_ms)?;
}
let relative_ts = (pts_ms - self.cluster_ts_ms) as i16;
@@ -612,6 +670,7 @@ mod tests {
sample_rate: 0.0,
channels: 0,
bit_depth: 0,
dv_config: None,
}
}
@@ -636,9 +695,60 @@ mod tests {
sample_rate: 48000.0,
channels: 6,
bit_depth: 0,
dv_config: None,
}
}
fn audio_stream(codec: Codec) -> AudioStream {
use crate::disc::{AudioChannels, LabelPurpose, SampleRate};
AudioStream {
pid: 0x1100,
codec,
channels: AudioChannels::Surround51,
language: "eng".into(),
sample_rate: SampleRate::S48,
secondary: false,
purpose: LabelPurpose::Normal,
label: String::new(),
}
}
#[test]
fn dts_variants_map_to_registered_a_dts_codec_id() {
// The Matroska codec-ID registry defines `A_DTS` for the whole DTS
// family (core, DTS-HD HRA, DTS-HD MA). The `/MA` and `/HR` suffixes
// are not registered and break strict parsers, so every DTS variant
// must emit plain `A_DTS`.
for codec in [Codec::Dts, Codec::DtsHdMa, Codec::DtsHdHr] {
let track = MkvTrack::audio(&audio_stream(codec));
assert_eq!(
track.codec_id, "A_DTS",
"{codec:?} must map to registered codec ID A_DTS, got {}",
track.codec_id
);
}
// Sanity: the non-DTS variants keep their distinct IDs.
assert_eq!(MkvTrack::audio(&audio_stream(Codec::Ac3)).codec_id, "A_AC3");
assert_eq!(
MkvTrack::audio(&audio_stream(Codec::TrueHd)).codec_id,
"A_TRUEHD"
);
}
#[test]
fn dolby_vision_config_profile7() {
// dvcC for disc Profile 7 dual-layer: version 1.0, profile 7, all of
// bl/el/rpu present. 24 bytes.
let c = dolby_vision_config(7, 6, 0);
assert_eq!(c.len(), 24);
assert_eq!(c[0], 1); // dv_version_major
assert_eq!(c[1], 0); // dv_version_minor
// profile in the top 7 bits of byte 2
assert_eq!(c[2] >> 1, 7, "dv_profile must be 7");
// rpu/el/bl present flags in byte 3 (low 3 bits after level)
assert_eq!(c[3] & 0b0000_0111, 0b0000_0111, "rpu+el+bl all present");
}
#[test]
fn mkv_writes_ebml_header() {
let buf = Cursor::new(Vec::new());
@@ -1323,6 +1433,85 @@ mod tests {
);
}
/// Collect every (cluster_ts_ms, block_relative_ts_i16, absolute_ms) for
/// all SimpleBlocks across all clusters, so a test can assert that the
/// reconstructed absolute timestamp (cluster_ts + relative_ts) is correct
/// and that no relative_ts ever wrapped the i16 range.
fn all_block_timestamps(data: &[u8]) -> Vec<(i64, i16, i64)> {
let mut out = Vec::new();
for (body_start, body_size, cluster_ts) in find_clusters(data) {
let body = &data[body_start..body_start + body_size as usize];
let mut cursor = Cursor::new(body);
// Skip CLUSTER_TIMESTAMP.
let (tid, tsize, _) = ebml::read_element_header(&mut cursor).unwrap();
assert_eq!(tid, ebml::CLUSTER_TIMESTAMP);
cursor.seek(io::SeekFrom::Current(tsize as i64)).unwrap();
while (cursor.position() as usize) < body.len() {
let (id, sz, _) = ebml::read_element_header(&mut cursor).unwrap();
if id == ebml::SIMPLE_BLOCK {
let bstart = cursor.position() as usize;
let b0 = body[bstart];
let vint_len = if b0 & 0x80 != 0 { 1 } else { 2 };
let ts_pos = bstart + vint_len;
let rel = i16::from_be_bytes([body[ts_pos], body[ts_pos + 1]]);
out.push((cluster_ts as i64, rel, cluster_ts as i64 + rel as i64));
}
cursor.seek(io::SeekFrom::Current(sz as i64)).unwrap();
}
}
out
}
#[test]
fn long_audio_gap_forces_cluster_no_i16_overflow() {
// Regression for the `(pts_ms - cluster_ts_ms) as i16` truncation:
// a single video keyframe at t=0 opens one cluster, then a long
// audio-only stretch (no further video keyframe) drifts well past
// i16::MAX ms (~32.767 s). Without the overflow guard the audio
// blocks past 32.767 s would write a wrapped (negative) relative
// timestamp into the SimpleBlock. With the guard a fresh cluster is
// forced so every relative_ts stays in range and reconstructs to the
// true absolute timestamp.
let tracks = [make_video_track(), make_audio_track()];
let mut frames: Vec<(usize, i64, bool, Vec<u8>)> = Vec::new();
// One video keyframe at t=0 (opens the first cluster).
frames.push((0, 0, true, vec![0xAB; 16]));
// Audio frames every 100 ms out to 60 s — past the 32.767 s i16 limit
// and past two i16 spans, with NO further video keyframe.
let mut t_ms = 0i64;
while t_ms <= 60_000 {
frames.push((1, t_ms * 1_000_000, true, vec![0xCD; 16]));
t_ms += 100;
}
let (data, _) = mux_to_bytes(&tracks, &[], &frames);
let blocks = all_block_timestamps(&data);
assert!(!blocks.is_empty());
// Every block's relative timestamp must be within i16 range (it is by
// type), AND must reconstruct to a non-negative, monotonic-ish
// absolute timestamp matching the source — i.e. no silent wrap.
for (cluster_ts, rel, abs) in &blocks {
assert!(
*rel as i64 >= 0 && (*rel as i64) <= MAX_BLOCK_REL_MS,
"block relative_ts {rel} out of [0, i16::MAX] range \
(cluster_ts={cluster_ts}, abs={abs}) — i16 overflow"
);
}
// The latest audio frame is at 60_000 ms; its reconstructed absolute
// timestamp must equal that, proving no truncation occurred.
let max_abs = blocks.iter().map(|(_, _, abs)| *abs).max().unwrap();
assert_eq!(max_abs, 60_000, "last block must reconstruct to 60_000 ms");
// The overflow guard must have opened more than one cluster (the
// single keyframe alone would otherwise yield exactly one).
let clusters = find_clusters(&data);
assert!(
clusters.len() >= 2,
"expected the i16 guard to force extra clusters, got {}",
clusters.len()
);
}
#[test]
fn pre_first_keyframe_frames_dropped() {
let tracks = [make_video_track()];
+203 -16
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,49 @@ fn skip_bytes(r: &mut impl Read, n: u64) -> io::Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
// ── Sanity caps for untrusted EBML element sizes ──────────────
//
// Sizes come straight from the EBML stream (file or network) and are
// otherwise cast to `usize` and used to allocate/read. An adversarial
// or corrupt container can claim a multi-GB element and trigger an OOM
// allocation, or claim an integer element wider than 8 bytes and panic
// the fixed 8-byte reader. Every untrusted size is validated against
// one of these caps before allocation.
/// Largest accepted SIMPLE_BLOCK payload. A block is a small vint track
/// header + 2-byte rel-ts + 1-byte flags + one frame of elementary data.
/// UHD HEVC keyframes run a few MB; 64 MiB is generously above any real
/// single-frame block while still bounding a hostile allocation.
const MAX_BLOCK_SIZE: u64 = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Largest accepted CODEC_PRIVATE payload. hvcC/avcC/setup blobs are a
/// few KB in practice; 16 MiB is far above any legitimate value.
const MAX_CODEC_PRIVATE: u64 = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Largest accepted string element (TITLE/CODEC_ID/LANGUAGE/TRACK_NAME).
const MAX_STRING_LEN: u64 = 64 * 1024;
/// EBML unsigned-int elements are at most 8 bytes wide.
const MAX_UINT_LEN: u64 = 8;
/// Reject an untrusted element size that exceeds `cap` before it is used
/// to allocate or read. Returns the size as `usize` when within bounds.
fn checked_size(size: u64, cap: u64) -> io::Result<usize> {
if size > cap {
return Err(crate::error::Error::MkvInvalid.into());
}
Ok(size as usize)
}
/// Read a bounded unsigned int. Guards against `size > 8` (which would
/// otherwise index out of the fixed 8-byte buffer in `read_uint_val`)
/// before delegating.
fn read_uint_bounded(r: &mut impl Read, size: u64) -> io::Result<u64> {
ebml::read_uint_val(r, checked_size(size, MAX_UINT_LEN)?)
}
/// Read a bounded UTF-8 string element.
fn read_string_bounded(r: &mut impl Read, size: u64) -> io::Result<String> {
ebml::read_string_val(r, checked_size(size, MAX_STRING_LEN)?)
}
use crate::disc::*;
use std::io::{self, Read};
@@ -108,11 +151,12 @@ impl crate::pes::Stream for MkvStream {
match id {
ebml::CLUSTER => continue,
ebml::CLUSTER_TIMESTAMP => {
rs.cluster_ts_ms = ebml::read_uint_val(&mut rs.reader, size as usize)? as i64;
rs.cluster_ts_ms = read_uint_bounded(&mut rs.reader, size)? as i64;
continue;
}
ebml::SIMPLE_BLOCK => {
let block = ebml::read_binary_val(&mut rs.reader, size as usize)?;
let block =
ebml::read_binary_val(&mut rs.reader, checked_size(size, MAX_BLOCK_SIZE)?)?;
if block.len() < 4 {
continue;
}
@@ -198,7 +242,10 @@ impl crate::pes::Stream for MkvStream {
/// Returns (DiscTitle, codec_privates: Vec<(track_number, codec_private_bytes)>)
fn parse_mkv_header(r: &mut impl Read) -> MkvHeaderResult {
let mut title = String::new();
let mut duration_ms = 0.0f64;
// EBML `DURATION` is a float expressed in TimestampScale ticks, not
// milliseconds (Matroska spec). Named accordingly; converted to
// seconds below as ticks * ts_scale_ns / 1e9.
let mut duration_ticks = 0.0f64;
let mut ts_scale: u64 = 1_000_000;
let mut streams: Vec<crate::disc::Stream> = Vec::new();
let mut codec_privates: Vec<(u16, Vec<u8>)> = Vec::new();
@@ -235,9 +282,9 @@ fn parse_mkv_header(r: &mut impl Read) -> MkvHeaderResult {
let (cid, cs, hlen) = ebml::read_element_header(r)?;
remaining = remaining.saturating_sub(hlen as u64 + cs);
match cid {
ebml::TIMESTAMP_SCALE => ts_scale = ebml::read_uint_val(r, cs as usize)?,
ebml::DURATION => duration_ms = ebml::read_float_val(r, cs as usize)?,
ebml::TITLE => title = ebml::read_string_val(r, cs as usize)?,
ebml::TIMESTAMP_SCALE => ts_scale = read_uint_bounded(r, cs)?,
ebml::DURATION => duration_ticks = ebml::read_float_val(r, cs as usize)?,
ebml::TITLE => title = read_string_bounded(r, cs)?,
_ => {
skip_bytes(r, cs)?;
}
@@ -274,7 +321,7 @@ fn parse_mkv_header(r: &mut impl Read) -> MkvHeaderResult {
let disc_title = DiscTitle {
playlist: title,
duration_secs: duration_ms * (ts_scale as f64) / 1_000_000_000.0,
duration_secs: duration_ticks * (ts_scale as f64) / 1_000_000_000.0,
streams,
..DiscTitle::empty()
};
@@ -296,20 +343,25 @@ fn parse_track(
let (cid, cs, hlen) = ebml::read_element_header(r)?;
remaining = remaining.saturating_sub(hlen as u64 + cs);
match cid {
ebml::TRACK_NUMBER => tnum = ebml::read_uint_val(r, cs as usize)? as u16,
ebml::TRACK_TYPE => ttype = ebml::read_uint_val(r, cs as usize)?,
ebml::CODEC_ID => codec_id = ebml::read_string_val(r, cs as usize)?,
ebml::CODEC_PRIVATE => codec_priv = Some(ebml::read_binary_val(r, cs as usize)?),
ebml::LANGUAGE => lang = ebml::read_string_val(r, cs as usize)?,
ebml::TRACK_NAME => name = ebml::read_string_val(r, cs as usize)?,
ebml::FLAG_FORCED => forced = ebml::read_uint_val(r, cs as usize)? != 0,
ebml::TRACK_NUMBER => tnum = read_uint_bounded(r, cs)? as u16,
ebml::TRACK_TYPE => ttype = read_uint_bounded(r, cs)?,
ebml::CODEC_ID => codec_id = read_string_bounded(r, cs)?,
ebml::CODEC_PRIVATE => {
codec_priv = Some(ebml::read_binary_val(
r,
checked_size(cs, MAX_CODEC_PRIVATE)?,
)?)
}
ebml::LANGUAGE => lang = read_string_bounded(r, cs)?,
ebml::TRACK_NAME => name = read_string_bounded(r, cs)?,
ebml::FLAG_FORCED => forced = read_uint_bounded(r, cs)? != 0,
ebml::VIDEO => {
let mut vrem = cs;
while vrem > 0 {
let (vid, vs, vhlen) = ebml::read_element_header(r)?;
vrem = vrem.saturating_sub(vhlen as u64 + vs);
if vid == ebml::PIXEL_HEIGHT {
ph = ebml::read_uint_val(r, vs as usize)? as u32;
ph = read_uint_bounded(r, vs)? as u32;
} else {
skip_bytes(r, vs)?;
}
@@ -322,7 +374,7 @@ fn parse_track(
arem = arem.saturating_sub(ahlen as u64 + as_);
match aid {
ebml::SAMPLING_FREQUENCY => sr = ebml::read_float_val(r, as_ as usize)?,
ebml::CHANNELS => ch = ebml::read_uint_val(r, as_ as usize)? as u8,
ebml::CHANNELS => ch = read_uint_bounded(r, as_)? as u8,
_ => {
skip_bytes(r, as_)?;
}
@@ -428,3 +480,138 @@ fn block_vint(d: &[u8]) -> (u64, usize) {
}
(0, 1) // Unsupported 5+ byte VINT — treat as track 0
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::pes::Stream as _;
use std::io::Cursor;
// `From<Error> for io::Error` encodes the numeric code into the
// Display string as "E{code}: ...". Check the prefix.
fn is_mkv_invalid(e: &io::Error) -> bool {
e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::InvalidData
&& e.to_string()
.starts_with(&format!("E{}", crate::error::E_MKV_INVALID))
}
#[test]
fn checked_size_rejects_over_cap() {
// Within cap → Ok with usize value.
assert_eq!(checked_size(100, 256).unwrap(), 100);
assert_eq!(checked_size(256, 256).unwrap(), 256);
// Over cap → MkvInvalid, never a giant allocation.
let e = checked_size(257, 256).unwrap_err();
assert!(is_mkv_invalid(&e));
// A hostile multi-GB block size is rejected as MkvInvalid.
let e = checked_size(4 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024, MAX_BLOCK_SIZE).unwrap_err();
assert!(is_mkv_invalid(&e));
}
#[test]
fn read_uint_bounded_rejects_oversized_int() {
// size > 8 would index out of the fixed 8-byte buffer in
// read_uint_val (panic / OOB). The guard turns it into a clean
// MkvInvalid error instead.
let mut data = Cursor::new(vec![0u8; 16]);
let e = read_uint_bounded(&mut data, 9).unwrap_err();
assert!(is_mkv_invalid(&e));
}
#[test]
fn read_uint_bounded_accepts_valid_width() {
// 8 bytes is the max legal EBML uint width and must still work.
let mut data = Cursor::new(vec![0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02]);
assert_eq!(read_uint_bounded(&mut data, 8).unwrap(), 0x0102);
}
#[test]
fn read_string_bounded_rejects_huge_string() {
// Claimed string length far above the cap must not allocate.
let mut data = Cursor::new(vec![0u8; 16]);
let e = read_string_bounded(&mut data, MAX_STRING_LEN + 1).unwrap_err();
assert!(is_mkv_invalid(&e));
}
/// Build a minimal MKV (EBML header + Segment + Info + Tracks) so the
/// reader is positioned in the cluster body, then append the given
/// cluster bytes. Returns the full byte stream.
fn minimal_mkv_with_cluster(cluster_body: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = Vec::new();
// EBML header (empty body).
ebml::write_id(&mut out, ebml::EBML).unwrap();
ebml::write_size(&mut out, 0).unwrap();
// Segment (unknown size so the reader streams children).
ebml::write_id(&mut out, ebml::SEGMENT).unwrap();
ebml::write_unknown_size(&mut out).unwrap();
// Empty Info.
ebml::write_id(&mut out, ebml::INFO).unwrap();
ebml::write_size(&mut out, 0).unwrap();
// Empty Tracks.
ebml::write_id(&mut out, ebml::TRACKS).unwrap();
ebml::write_size(&mut out, 0).unwrap();
out.extend_from_slice(cluster_body);
out
}
#[test]
fn simple_block_oversized_size_is_rejected() {
// Cluster containing a SIMPLE_BLOCK that claims a 2 GiB payload.
// The reader must reject it (MkvInvalid) rather than attempt a
// multi-GB allocation. Header parse stops at CLUSTER, so the
// SIMPLE_BLOCK is hit on the first read().
let mut cluster = Vec::new();
ebml::write_id(&mut cluster, ebml::CLUSTER).unwrap();
ebml::write_unknown_size(&mut cluster).unwrap();
ebml::write_id(&mut cluster, ebml::SIMPLE_BLOCK).unwrap();
ebml::write_size(&mut cluster, 2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024).unwrap();
// No payload follows — but we must fail on the size check, before
// any read of the body.
let bytes = minimal_mkv_with_cluster(&cluster);
let mut stream = MkvStream::open(Cursor::new(bytes)).unwrap();
let e = stream.read().unwrap_err();
assert!(is_mkv_invalid(&e));
}
#[test]
fn well_formed_simple_block_round_trips() {
// A small, well-formed SIMPLE_BLOCK must still parse into a frame.
// We need at least one stream so the track index is in range, so
// give Tracks one video TRACK_ENTRY (track number 1).
let mut out = Vec::new();
ebml::write_id(&mut out, ebml::EBML).unwrap();
ebml::write_size(&mut out, 0).unwrap();
ebml::write_id(&mut out, ebml::SEGMENT).unwrap();
ebml::write_unknown_size(&mut out).unwrap();
ebml::write_id(&mut out, ebml::INFO).unwrap();
ebml::write_size(&mut out, 0).unwrap();
// Tracks → one TRACK_ENTRY (track number 1, type 1 = video).
let mut entry = Vec::new();
ebml::write_uint(&mut entry, ebml::TRACK_NUMBER, 1).unwrap();
ebml::write_uint(&mut entry, ebml::TRACK_TYPE, 1).unwrap();
let mut track_entry = Vec::new();
ebml::write_id(&mut track_entry, ebml::TRACK_ENTRY).unwrap();
ebml::write_size(&mut track_entry, entry.len() as u64).unwrap();
track_entry.extend_from_slice(&entry);
ebml::write_id(&mut out, ebml::TRACKS).unwrap();
ebml::write_size(&mut out, track_entry.len() as u64).unwrap();
out.extend_from_slice(&track_entry);
// Cluster with a SIMPLE_BLOCK: track vint=0x81 (track 1),
// rel_ts=0x0000, flags=0x80 (keyframe), then 4 bytes of data.
ebml::write_id(&mut out, ebml::CLUSTER).unwrap();
ebml::write_unknown_size(&mut out).unwrap();
let block = [0x81u8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD];
ebml::write_id(&mut out, ebml::SIMPLE_BLOCK).unwrap();
ebml::write_size(&mut out, block.len() as u64).unwrap();
out.extend_from_slice(&block);
let mut stream = MkvStream::open(Cursor::new(out)).unwrap();
let frame = stream.read().unwrap().expect("expected a frame");
assert_eq!(frame.track, 0);
assert!(frame.keyframe);
assert_eq!(frame.data, vec![0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD]);
}
}
+12
View File
@@ -176,6 +176,18 @@ impl Stream for PipelinedPesStream {
}
false => {
self.eof = true;
// Drain any access unit a parser buffered past the last
// PES (e.g. DTS-HD's final core+extension unit).
let pid_to_track = &self.pid_to_track;
let pending = &mut self.pending_frames;
for (pid, parser) in self.parsers.iter_mut() {
let Some(&(_, track)) = pid_to_track.iter().find(|(p, _)| p == pid) else {
continue;
};
for frame in parser.flush() {
pending.push_back(PesFrame::from_codec_frame(track, frame));
}
}
return Ok(self.pending_frames.pop_front());
}
}
+110 -13
View File
@@ -162,15 +162,32 @@ fn validate_network_addr(addr: &str) -> io::Result<()> {
/// Options for opening an input stream.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct InputOptions {
pub keydb_path: Option<String>,
/// Caller-supplied Unit Key (external Unit Key) — the second, mutually
/// exclusive key source. Takes precedence over `keydb_path`.
pub unit_key: Option<[u8; 16]>,
/// Caller-resolved per-CPS-unit AACS keys to apply to the scanned disc
/// (`(cps_unit, 16-byte key)`). Empty for an unencrypted disc or when the
/// caller has no key. The library does no lookup — a key source resolves
/// these and the caller passes them here.
pub unit_keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 16])>,
pub title_index: Option<usize>,
/// Skip decryption — return raw encrypted bytes.
pub raw: bool,
}
/// Decide whether an ISO mux must abort for lack of a usable AACS key.
///
/// Returns `true` only when ALL hold: decryption is requested (`!raw`), the
/// disc carries AACS state (`has_aacs` — AACS-encrypted, not CSS/unencrypted),
/// and key resolution produced no usable key (`keys` is
/// [`crate::decrypt::DecryptKeys::None`]). In that case muxing would emit
/// undecryptable garbage, so the caller fails fast with [`Error::NoDiscKey`].
///
/// `--raw` (raw=true) always returns `false` — raw intentionally skips
/// decryption and needs no key. A non-AACS disc (`has_aacs=false`) always
/// returns `false`: unencrypted content has `None` keys legitimately, and CSS
/// DVDs resolve to `DecryptKeys::Css{..}` (never `None`).
fn aacs_key_missing(raw: bool, has_aacs: bool, keys: &crate::decrypt::DecryptKeys) -> bool {
!raw && has_aacs && matches!(keys, crate::decrypt::DecryptKeys::None)
}
/// Open a PES input stream (produces PES frames).
pub fn input(url: &str, opts: &InputOptions) -> io::Result<Box<dyn crate::pes::Stream>> {
let parsed = parse_url(url);
@@ -184,11 +201,6 @@ pub fn input(url: &str, opts: &InputOptions) -> io::Result<Box<dyn crate::pes::S
}
StreamUrl::Iso { ref path } => {
validate_file_path(path, "iso")?;
let scan_opts = crate::disc::ScanOptions {
keydb_path: opts.keydb_path.as_ref().map(Into::into),
unit_key: opts.unit_key,
..Default::default()
};
// FileSectorSource is the sole file-backed sector source.
// It carries the platform-tuned SEQUENTIAL fadvise hint
// (so the kernel readahead window widens) and the periodic
@@ -196,8 +208,38 @@ pub fn input(url: &str, opts: &InputOptions) -> io::Result<Box<dyn crate::pes::S
// when the mux output is being written to the same disk.
let mut reader = crate::io::file_sector_source::FileSectorSource::open(path)?;
let capacity = reader.capacity_sectors();
let disc = crate::disc::Disc::scan_image(&mut reader, capacity, &scan_opts)
.map_err(|e| -> io::Error { e.into() })?;
let mut disc = crate::disc::Disc::scan_image(
&mut reader,
capacity,
&crate::disc::ScanOptions::default(),
)
.map_err(|e| -> io::Error { e.into() })?;
// Apply the caller-resolved keys (lookup-free); decrypt_keys() then
// yields them for the stream below. Propagate a failed application
// rather than silently muxing an undecryptable stream.
if !opts.unit_keys.is_empty() {
// These UKs were already resolved AND validated by the caller
// (the CLI's keydb loop), so no re-validation sample is needed.
disc.decrypt_with(crate::disc::Key::Unit(opts.unit_keys.clone()), &[])
.map_err(|e| -> io::Error { e.into() })?;
}
// No-key guard: if decryption is requested (not --raw) and the disc
// is AACS-encrypted but key resolution yielded no usable key, FAIL
// here — muxing an undecryptable stream produces ~100 MB of garbage
// (encrypted m2ts → no TS syncs → demuxer emits nothing). A cheap
// result-check on `decrypt_keys()`; no probe decryption needed.
// CSS (DVD) decrypts from compiled keys (`decrypt_keys()` returns
// `Css{..}`, never `None`), so this gate is AACS-only via `disc.aacs`.
if aacs_key_missing(opts.raw, disc.aacs.is_some(), &disc.decrypt_keys()) {
// Surface the disc hash (40-hex, no `0x` prefix) so the caller
// can name the disc. Empty if scan didn't capture it.
let disc_hash = disc
.aacs
.as_ref()
.map(|a| a.disc_hash.trim_start_matches("0x").to_string())
.unwrap_or_default();
return Err(crate::error::Error::NoDiscKey { disc_hash }.into());
}
if disc.titles.is_empty() {
return Err(crate::error::Error::NoStreams.into());
}
@@ -209,8 +251,15 @@ pub fn input(url: &str, opts: &InputOptions) -> io::Result<Box<dyn crate::pes::S
}
.into());
}
let title = disc.titles[idx].clone();
// Correct TrueHD channel counts (MPLS understates 7.1/Atmos as 5.1)
// by probing the first DECRYPTED access units of the chosen title.
// A fresh reader avoids disturbing the mux reader below.
let keys = disc.decrypt_keys();
if let Ok(probe) = crate::io::file_sector_source::FileSectorSource::open(path) {
let mut dec = crate::sector::DecryptingSectorSource::new(probe, keys.clone());
crate::disc::correct_truehd_channels(&mut dec, &mut disc.titles[idx]);
}
let title = disc.titles[idx].clone();
let format = disc.content_format;
// ISO file: 16 MiB batch — sequential read from fast
// storage, no bad sectors. Measured optimum on the rip1
@@ -335,7 +384,8 @@ fn build_demux_state(title: &DiscTitle, format: ContentFormat) -> DemuxState {
};
pids.push(pid);
pid_to_track.push((pid, idx));
parsers.push((pid, super::codec::parser_for_codec(codec, None)));
let is_dvd_ps = matches!(format, ContentFormat::MpegPs);
parsers.push((pid, super::codec::parser_for_codec(codec, None, is_dvd_ps)));
}
let (ts, ps) = match format {
ContentFormat::MpegPs => (None, Some(super::ps::PsDemuxer::new())),
@@ -443,3 +493,50 @@ fn build_m2ts_pipeline<R: std::io::Read + Send + 'static>(
pid_to_track,
))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::aacs_key_missing;
use crate::decrypt::DecryptKeys;
fn aacs_keys() -> DecryptKeys {
DecryptKeys::Aacs {
unit_keys: vec![(1, [0x11u8; 16])],
read_data_key: None,
}
}
fn css_keys() -> DecryptKeys {
DecryptKeys::Css {
title_key: [0u8; 5],
}
}
#[test]
fn encrypted_no_key_aborts() {
// AACS disc, decryption requested, resolver yielded no key → abort.
assert!(aacs_key_missing(false, true, &DecryptKeys::None));
}
#[test]
fn encrypted_with_key_proceeds() {
// AACS disc with a usable key → proceed.
assert!(!aacs_key_missing(false, true, &aacs_keys()));
}
#[test]
fn not_encrypted_proceeds() {
// No AACS state: unencrypted (None keys) and CSS (Css keys) both OK.
assert!(!aacs_key_missing(false, false, &DecryptKeys::None));
assert!(!aacs_key_missing(false, false, &css_keys()));
}
#[test]
fn raw_never_aborts() {
// --raw skips decryption — must never hit the no-key abort, even on an
// AACS disc with no key resolved.
assert!(!aacs_key_missing(true, true, &DecryptKeys::None));
assert!(!aacs_key_missing(true, true, &aacs_keys()));
assert!(!aacs_key_missing(true, false, &DecryptKeys::None));
}
}
+59 -7
View File
@@ -35,6 +35,15 @@ struct PesAssembler {
pts: Option<i64>,
dts: Option<i64>,
active: bool,
/// PES-header bytes still to be skipped on the next continuation
/// packet(s). A PES header (9 + PES_header_data_length, up to 264
/// bytes) can exceed a single 184-byte TS payload, spilling into the
/// following continuation packet. Those spillover bytes are NOT
/// elementary-stream data and must be skipped, or the PES start code
/// (`00 00 01 …`) and timestamp bytes get injected into the ES — for
/// HEVC/H264 that reads as a spurious start code / corrupt slice
/// payload. Tracks how many header bytes remain across packets.
header_remaining: usize,
}
/// Initial capacity for a fresh PES buffer. Sized to cover the
@@ -54,6 +63,7 @@ impl PesAssembler {
pts: None,
dts: None,
active: false,
header_remaining: 0,
}
}
@@ -235,12 +245,35 @@ impl TsDemuxer {
let payload = &ts[payload_start..];
if pusi {
let (pts, dts, pes_data_start) = parse_pes_header(payload);
// `header_len` is the FULL (uncapped) PES-header length:
// 0 = malformed (payload is not a PES start), else 6/9+N.
let (pts, dts, header_len) = parse_pes_header(payload);
if let Some(prev) = asm.start(pts, dts) {
completed.push(prev);
}
if pes_data_start < payload.len() {
asm.push(&payload[pes_data_start..]);
if header_len == 0 {
// PUSI packet whose payload is not a valid PES start. Do
// NOT push it — those bytes are not elementary-stream data
// and would inject a spurious start code / garbage.
asm.header_remaining = 0;
} else if header_len <= payload.len() {
// Header fits in this packet (the common case).
asm.header_remaining = 0;
if header_len < payload.len() {
asm.push(&payload[header_len..]);
}
} else {
// Header spills past this packet — skip the remainder on
// the following continuation packet(s).
asm.header_remaining = header_len - payload.len();
}
} else if asm.header_remaining > 0 {
// Continuation packet still inside a PES header that spanned
// the boundary — consume header bytes before any ES data.
let skip = asm.header_remaining.min(payload.len());
asm.header_remaining -= skip;
if skip < payload.len() {
asm.push(&payload[skip..]);
}
} else {
asm.push(payload);
@@ -260,7 +293,14 @@ impl TsDemuxer {
}
/// Parse a PES packet header, extracting PTS and DTS.
/// Returns (pts, dts, offset_to_elementary_stream_data).
///
/// Returns `(pts, dts, header_len)` where `header_len` is the FULL,
/// UNCAPPED PES-header length in bytes (`9 + PES_header_data_length`, or
/// 6 for stream IDs without the standard extension). `0` signals the
/// payload is not a valid PES start (malformed / too short). The caller
/// must treat `header_len` as bytes-to-skip and carry any remainder past
/// this packet's payload into the next continuation packet — the header
/// can exceed one TS payload, and the spillover is header, not ES data.
fn parse_pes_header(data: &[u8]) -> (Option<i64>, Option<i64>, usize) {
// PES packet: 00 00 01 [stream_id] [length:2] [flags...]
if data.len() < 9 || data[0] != 0x00 || data[1] != 0x00 || data[2] != 0x01 {
@@ -288,7 +328,10 @@ fn parse_pes_header(data: &[u8]) -> (Option<i64>, Option<i64>, usize) {
let pts_dts_flags = (data[7] >> 6) & 0x03;
let header_data_len = data[8] as usize;
let data_start = (9 + header_data_len).min(data.len());
// Full, uncapped header length. PTS/DTS (if present) live in the
// first ~19 bytes, always within this packet's payload, so they parse
// here; only the *skip* length may extend into the next packet.
let header_len = 9 + header_data_len;
let mut pts = None;
let mut dts = None;
@@ -300,7 +343,7 @@ fn parse_pes_header(data: &[u8]) -> (Option<i64>, Option<i64>, usize) {
dts = parse_timestamp(&data[14..19]);
}
(pts, dts, data_start)
(pts, dts, header_len)
}
/// Parse a 5-byte PTS/DTS timestamp (33 bits in 90kHz).
@@ -404,10 +447,19 @@ pub fn scan_streams(data: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<crate::disc::Stream>> {
let section_len =
(((data[pmt_start + 1] & 0x0F) as usize) << 8) | data[pmt_start + 2] as usize;
// section_length counts the bytes after this field, including the
// trailing 4-byte CRC; `< 4` would underflow `end` below. Guard it
// exactly like the PAT parser above.
if section_len < 4 {
offset += BD_TS_PACKET_SIZE;
continue;
}
let prog_info_len =
(((data[pmt_start + 10] & 0x0F) as usize) << 8) | data[pmt_start + 11] as usize;
let mut pos = pmt_start + 12 + prog_info_len;
let end = pmt_start + 3 + section_len - 4;
// Clamp the section end to the buffer; a malformed section_len or
// prog_info_len must never drive reads past `data`.
let end = (pmt_start + 3 + section_len - 4).min(data.len());
while pos + 5 <= data.len() && pos < end {
let stream_type = data[pos];
+8 -7
View File
@@ -157,14 +157,15 @@ impl PrefetchedSectorSource {
Ok(b) => b,
Err(_) => return, // consumer dropped both channels
};
if buf.len() < bytes {
buf.resize(bytes, 0);
} else {
// Re-expose the full extent; previous truncate
// shrank the visible len without freeing pages.
// SAFETY: capacity is at least `bytes` after
// construction with `vec![0u8; batch_bytes]`.
if bytes <= buf.capacity() {
// Re-expose `bytes` without zero-filling pages that
// `read_sectors` is about to overwrite. The capacity
// guard makes the `set_len` provably sound even if a
// recycled buffer ever comes back smaller than the
// `vec![0u8; batch_bytes]` it was born with.
unsafe { buf.set_len(bytes) };
} else {
buf.resize(bytes, 0);
}
let lba = extent.start_lba + offset;
match reader.read_sectors(lba, sectors, &mut buf[..bytes], false) {
+55 -53
View File
@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ fn aacs_decrypt_unit_roundtrip() {
plain[offset] = 0x47; // TS sync byte
offset += 192;
}
// Set encryption flag (bits 6-7 of byte 0)
plain[0] |= 0xC0;
// No flag set: CBC-encrypting the body below scrambles packets 1..31's TS
// syncs, which is exactly what `is_aacs_scrambled` (raw-sync) detects.
// Save original plaintext for comparison
let expected = plain.clone();
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ fn aacs_decrypt_unit_roundtrip() {
prev.copy_from_slice(&plain[off..off + 16]);
}
// Verify it looks encrypted
assert!(aacs::is_unit_encrypted(&plain));
// Verify it looks encrypted (body TS syncs scrambled)
assert!(aacs::is_aacs_scrambled(&plain));
// Now decrypt
let result = aacs::decrypt_unit(&mut plain, &unit_key);
@@ -136,8 +136,8 @@ fn aacs_decrypt_unit_roundtrip() {
"decrypt_unit should return true on valid encrypted unit"
);
assert!(
!aacs::is_unit_encrypted(&plain),
"encryption flag should be cleared"
!aacs::is_aacs_scrambled(&plain),
"decrypted unit should read as clear (TS syncs restored)"
);
// Verify TS sync bytes at expected positions (flag byte is cleared by decrypt)
@@ -156,17 +156,11 @@ fn aacs_decrypt_unit_roundtrip() {
sync_count, expected_syncs
);
// Compare all bytes except byte 0 (encryption flag cleared)
// Decryption clears no flag, so the unit round-trips byte-for-byte.
assert_eq!(
&plain[1..aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN],
&expected[1..aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN],
"decrypted unit body does not match original"
);
// Byte 0: original had 0xC0 set, decrypted has it cleared
assert_eq!(
plain[0] & !0xC0,
expected[0] & !0xC0,
"byte 0 mismatch ignoring flag"
&plain[..],
&expected[..],
"decrypted unit does not match original plaintext"
);
}
@@ -260,49 +254,65 @@ fn aacs_vuk_derivation_roundtrip() {
assert_eq!(vuk, vuk2, "derive_vuk not deterministic");
}
/// Test: aacs_is_unit_encrypted detects encryption flags correctly.
/// Test: aacs_is_aacs_scrambled detects scrambled units via the raw TS syncs.
#[test]
fn aacs_is_unit_encrypted_detection() {
let mut unit = vec![0u8; aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN];
fn aacs_is_aacs_scrambled_detection() {
// A clear unit: TS sync (0x47) intact at every 192-byte packet → not
// scrambled. (Flag bits play no role.)
let mut clear = vec![0u8; aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN];
let mut off = 4;
while off < aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN {
clear[off] = 0x47;
off += 192;
}
assert!(
!aacs::is_unit_encrypted(&unit),
"zero unit should not be encrypted"
!aacs::is_aacs_scrambled(&clear),
"clear unit (syncs intact) must not be scrambled"
);
unit[0] = 0x40; // bit 6 set
assert!(aacs::is_unit_encrypted(&unit));
// Flag bits do NOT make a synced unit look scrambled.
let mut flagged = clear.clone();
flagged[0] = 0xC0; // copy-control bits
flagged[7] = 0xC0; // TSC bits
assert!(
!aacs::is_aacs_scrambled(&flagged),
"flag bits must not be read as encryption"
);
unit[0] = 0x80; // bit 7 set
assert!(aacs::is_unit_encrypted(&unit));
unit[0] = 0xC0; // both bits set
assert!(aacs::is_unit_encrypted(&unit));
unit[0] = 0x3F; // bits 6-7 clear
assert!(!aacs::is_unit_encrypted(&unit));
// A scrambled body (syncs destroyed) → scrambled.
let scrambled = vec![0x99u8; aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN];
assert!(
aacs::is_aacs_scrambled(&scrambled),
"unit with no intact TS syncs must read as scrambled"
);
// Too short
let short = vec![0xC0u8; 100];
let short = vec![0xFFu8; 100];
assert!(
!aacs::is_unit_encrypted(&short),
!aacs::is_aacs_scrambled(&short),
"short buffer should not be detected"
);
}
/// Test: aacs_decrypt_unit_unencrypted_passthrough
///
/// A unit without encryption flags should pass through decrypt_unit unchanged.
/// A clear unit (TS syncs intact) should pass through decrypt_unit unchanged.
#[test]
fn aacs_decrypt_unit_unencrypted_passthrough() {
let mut unit = vec![0x42u8; aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN];
unit[0] = 0x00; // no encryption flag
// Intact TS syncs every 192 bytes → not scrambled → passthrough.
let mut off = 4;
while off < aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN {
unit[off] = 0x47;
off += 192;
}
let original = unit.clone();
let key = [0xAA; 16];
assert!(!aacs::is_aacs_scrambled(&unit));
let result = aacs::decrypt_unit(&mut unit, &key);
assert!(result, "unencrypted unit should return true");
assert_eq!(unit, original, "unencrypted unit should be unchanged");
assert!(result, "clear unit should return true");
assert_eq!(unit, original, "clear unit should be unchanged");
}
// ── AACS cross-validation with independent AES implementation ──────────────
@@ -369,8 +379,7 @@ fn aacs_cross_validation_encrypt_then_decrypt() {
plaintext[i] = (i % 251) as u8;
}
}
// Set encryption flag
plaintext[0] = 0xC0;
// No flag set: the CBC-encrypted body scrambles the packet syncs.
let expected = plaintext.clone();
@@ -401,14 +410,11 @@ fn aacs_cross_validation_encrypt_then_decrypt() {
ok,
"decrypt_unit returned false (TS sync verification failed)"
);
assert_eq!(plaintext[0] & 0xC0, 0x00, "encryption flag not cleared");
// Compare (byte 0 flag was cleared)
let mut expected_cleared = expected.clone();
expected_cleared[0] &= !0xC0;
// Decryption clears no flag, so the unit round-trips byte-for-byte.
assert_eq!(
&plaintext[1..aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN],
&expected_cleared[1..aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN],
&plaintext[..],
&expected[..],
"decrypted unit does not match original plaintext"
);
}
@@ -428,7 +434,7 @@ fn aacs_cross_validation_alternate_key() {
plaintext[off] = 0x47;
off += 192;
}
plaintext[0] = 0xC0;
// No flag set: the CBC-encrypted body scrambles the packet syncs.
let expected = plaintext.clone();
let mut header = [0u8; 16];
@@ -446,12 +452,8 @@ fn aacs_cross_validation_alternate_key() {
assert!(aacs::decrypt_unit(&mut plaintext, &unit_key));
let mut expected_cleared = expected;
expected_cleared[0] &= !0xC0;
assert_eq!(
&plaintext[1..aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN],
&expected_cleared[1..aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN],
);
// Decryption clears no flag, so the unit round-trips byte-for-byte.
assert_eq!(&plaintext[..], &expected[..]);
}
/// Verify that `decrypt_bus` correctly reverses AES-CBC encryption applied
+15 -32
View File
@@ -126,31 +126,19 @@ fn disc_title_total_sectors() {
// ── ScanOptions tests ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn scan_options_default() {
fn scan_options_default_has_no_credentials() {
// Lookup-free: the only scan input is the optional live-drive credentials.
let opts = ScanOptions::default();
assert!(opts.keydb_path.is_none());
assert!(opts.credentials.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn scan_options_with_keydb() {
fn scan_options_with_credentials() {
let opts = ScanOptions {
keydb_path: Some(("/tmp/KEYDB.cfg").into()),
..Default::default()
credentials: Some(libfreemkv::DriveCredentials::default()),
};
assert_eq!(
opts.keydb_path.as_ref().unwrap().to_str().unwrap(),
"/tmp/KEYDB.cfg"
);
}
#[test]
fn scan_options_with_keydb_pathbuf() {
let path = std::path::PathBuf::from("/home/user/.config/aacs/KEYDB.cfg");
let opts = ScanOptions {
keydb_path: Some(path.clone()),
..Default::default()
};
assert_eq!(opts.keydb_path.unwrap(), path);
assert!(opts.credentials.is_some());
assert!(opts.credentials.unwrap().host_certs.is_empty());
}
// ── detect_format integration tests ───────────────────────────────────────
@@ -511,21 +499,16 @@ fn batch_count_max_batch_sizes() {
}
#[test]
fn resolve_encryption_no_keydb() {
// A UDF image with /AACS directory but no keydb path -> aacs is None
fn scan_encrypted_resolves_no_keys() {
// A UDF image with an /AACS directory: the lookup-free scan detects
// encryption and captures inputs, but resolves NO key on its own — a
// caller applies one later via Disc::decrypt_with.
let mut reader = MockSectorReader::new();
build_udf_with_aacs_dir(&mut reader);
// No keydb configured and no standard keydb on the system
let opts = ScanOptions {
keydb_path: Some(("/nonexistent/path/KEYDB.cfg").into()),
..Default::default()
};
let disc = Disc::scan_image(&mut reader, 1000, &opts).unwrap();
let disc = Disc::scan_image(&mut reader, 1000, &ScanOptions::default()).unwrap();
// The disc detects encryption but can't resolve keys without a keydb
assert!(
disc.aacs.is_none(),
"aacs should be None when keydb is unavailable"
);
// No unit keys without an external key (the mock has no Unit_Key_RO.inf to
// capture, so the keyless state isn't even built) — either way, no keys.
assert!(matches!(disc.decrypt_keys(), libfreemkv::DecryptKeys::None));
}
+15 -13
View File
@@ -82,22 +82,24 @@ fn decrypt_sectors_with_css_keys_works() {
/// Test: AACS unit encryption detection works.
#[test]
fn aacs_encryption_flag_detection() {
// A clear unit: TS syncs (0x47) intact at every 192-byte packet.
let mut unit = vec![0u8; aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN];
let mut off = 4;
while off < aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN {
unit[off] = 0x47;
off += 192;
}
// Encryption is the scrambled body (TS syncs destroyed), NOT a flag bit.
assert!(!aacs::is_aacs_scrambled(&unit));
// No encryption flag
assert!(!aacs::is_unit_encrypted(&unit));
// Set bit 6
unit[0] |= 0x40;
assert!(aacs::is_unit_encrypted(&unit));
// Set bit 7
unit[0] = 0x80;
assert!(aacs::is_unit_encrypted(&unit));
// Both bits set
// Flag bits on a synced unit do not make it look encrypted.
unit[0] = 0xC0;
assert!(aacs::is_unit_encrypted(&unit));
unit[7] = 0xC0;
assert!(!aacs::is_aacs_scrambled(&unit));
// Scrambled body (syncs gone) → encrypted.
let scrambled = vec![0x99u8; aacs::ALIGNED_UNIT_LEN];
assert!(aacs::is_aacs_scrambled(&scrambled));
}
/// Test: DecryptKeys::is_encrypted() correctly identifies encrypted state.